8. Their signification perfectly arbitrary, not the consequence of a natural connexion.
Words, by long and familiar
use, as has been said, come to excite in men certain ideas so constantly and readily, that they are apt to suppose a
natural connexion between them. But that they signify only men's peculiar ideas, and that by a perfect arbitrary
imposition, is evident, in that they often fail to excite in others (even that use the same language) the same ideas
we take them to be signs of: and every man has so inviolable a liberty to make words stand for what ideas he
pleases, that no one hath the power to make others have the same ideas in their minds that he has, when they use
the same words that he does. And therefore the great Augustus himself, in the possession of that power which
ruled the world, acknowledged he could not make a new Latin word: which was as much as to say, that he could
not arbitrarily appoint what idea any sound should be a sign of, in the mouths and common language of his
subjects. It is true, common use, by a tacit consent, appropriates certain sounds to certain ideas in all languages,
which so far limits the signification of that sound, that unless a man applies it to the same idea, he does not speak
properly: and let me add, that unless a man's words excite the same ideas in the hearer which he makes them stand
for in speaking, he does not speak intelligibly. But whatever be the consequence of any man's using of words
differently, either from their general meaning, or the particular sense of the person to whom he addresses them;
this is certain, their signification, in his use of them, is limited to his ideas, and they can be signs of nothing else.
