15. Though one man's idea of blue should be different from another's.
Neither would it carry any imputation of
falsehood to our simple ideas, if by the different structure of our organs it were so ordered, that the same object
should produce in several men's minds different ideas at the same time; v.g. if the idea that a violet produced in
one man's mind by his eyes were the same that a marigold produced in another man's, and vice versâ. For, since
this could never be known, because one man's mind could not pass into another man's body, to perceive what
appearances were produced by those organs; neither the ideas hereby, nor the names, would be at all confounded,
or any falsehood be in either. For all things that had the texture of a violet, producing constantly the idea that he
called blue, and those which had the texture of a marigold, producing constantly the idea which he as constantly
called yellow, whatever those appearances were in his mind; he would be able as regularly to distinguish things
for his use by those appearances, and understand and signify those distinctions marked by the name blue and
yellow, as if the appearances or ideas in his mind received from those two flowers were exactly the same with the
ideas in other men's minds. I am nevertheless very apt to think that the sensible ideas produced by any object in
different men's minds, are most commonly very near and undiscernibly alike. For which opinion, I think, there
might be many reasons offered: but that being besides my present business, I shall not trouble my reader with
them; but only mind him, that the contrary supposition, if it could be proved, is of little use, either for the
improvement of our knowledge, or conveniency of life, and so we need not trouble ourselves to examine it.
