6. Ideas of substances, as referred to real essences, not adequate.
Thirdly, what ideas we have of substances, I
have above shown. Now, those ideas have in the mind a double reference: 1. Sometimes they are referred to a
supposed real essence of each species of things. 2. Sometimes they are only designed to be pictures and
representations in the mind of things that do exist, by ideas of those qualities that are discoverable in them. In both
which ways these copies of those originals and archetypes are imperfect and inadequate.
First, it is usual for men to make the names of substances stand for things as supposed to have certain real
essences, whereby they are of this or that species: and names standing for nothing but the ideas that are in men's
minds, they must constantly refer their ideas to such real essences, as to their archetypes. That men (especially
such as have been bred up in the learning taught in this part of the world) do suppose certain specific essences of
substances, which each individual in its several kinds is made conformable to and partakes of, is so far from
needing proof that it will be thought strange if any one should do otherwise. And thus they ordinarily apply the
specific names they rank particular substances under, to things as distinguished by such specific real essences.
Who is there almost, who would not take it amiss if it should be doubted whether he called himself a man, with
any other meaning than as having the real essence of a man? And yet if you demand what those real essences are,
it is plain men are ignorant, and know them not. From whence it follows, that the ideas they have in their minds,
being referred to real essences, as to archetypes which are unknown, must be so far from being adequate that they
cannot be supposed to be any representation of them at all. The complex ideas we have of substances are, as it has
been shown, certain collections of simple ideas that have been observed or supposed constantly to exist together.
But such a complex idea cannot be the real essence of any substance; for then the properties we discover in that
body would depend on that complex idea, and be deducible from it, and their necessary connexion with it be
known; as all properties of a triangle depend on, and, as far as they are discoverable, are deducible from the
complex idea of three lines including a space. But it is plain that in our complex ideas of substances are not
contained such ideas, on which all the other qualities that are to be found in them do depend. The common idea
men have of iron is, a body of a certain colour, weight, and hardness; and a property that they look on as
belonging to it, is malleableness. But yet this property has no necessary connexion with that complex idea, or any
part of it: and there is no more reason to think that malleableness depends on that colour, weight, and hardness,
than that colour or that weight depends on its malleableness. And yet, though we know nothing of these real
essences, there is nothing more ordinary than that men should attribute the sorts of things to such essences. The
particular parcel of matter which makes the ring I have on my finger is forwardly by most men supposed to have a
real essence, whereby it is gold; and from whence those qualities flow which I find in it, viz., its peculiar colour,
weight, hardness, fusibility, fixedness, and change of colour upon a slight touch of mercury, etc. This essence,
from which all these properties flow, when I inquire into it and search after it, I plainly perceive I cannot discover:
the furthest I can go is, only to presume that, it being nothing but body, its real essence or internal constitution, on
which these qualities depend, can be nothing but the figure, size, and connexion of its solid parts; of neither of
which having any distinct perception at all can I have any idea of its essence: which is the cause that it has that
particular shining yellowness; a greater weight than anything I know of the same bulk; and a fitness to have its
colour changed by the touch of quicksilver. If any one will say, that the real essence and internal constitution, on
which these properties depend, is not the figure, size, and arrangement or connexion of its solid parts, but
something else, called its particular form, I am further from having any idea of its real essence than I was before.
For I have an idea of figure, size, and situation of solid parts in general, though I have none of the particular
figure, size, or putting together of parts, whereby the qualities above mentioned are produced; which qualities I
find in that particular parcel of matter that is on my finger, and not in another parcel of matter, with which I cut
the pen I write with. But, when I am told that something besides the figure, size, and posture of the solid parts of
that body in its essence, something called substantial form, of that I confess I have no idea at all, but only of the
sound form; which is far enough from an idea of its real essence or constitution. The like ignorance as I have of
the real essence of this particular substance, I have also of the real essence of all other natural ones: of which
essences I confess I have no distinct ideas at all; and, I am apt to suppose, others, when they examine their own
knowledge, will find in themselves, in this one point, the same sort of ignorance.
