1. Relation, what.
Besides the ideas, whether simple or complex, that the mind has of things as they are in
themselves, there are others it gets from their comparison one with another. The understanding, in the
consideration of anything, is not confined to that precise object: it can carry an idea as it were beyond itself, or at
least look beyond it, to see how it stands in conformity to any other. When the mind so considers one thing, that it
does as it were bring it to, and set it by another, and carries its view from one to the other--this is, as the words
import, relation and respect; and the denominations given to positive things, intimating that respect, and serving
as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated to something distinct from it, are what we call
relatives; and the things so brought together, related. Thus, when the mind considers Caius as such a positive
being, it takes nothing into that idea but what really exists in Caius; v.g. when I consider him as a man, I have
nothing in my mind but the complex idea of the species, man. So likewise, when I say Caius is a white man, I
have nothing but the bare consideration of a man who hath that white colour. But when I give Caius the name
husband, I intimate some other person; and when I give him the name whiter, I intimate some other thing: in both
cases my thought is led to something beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into consideration. And
since any idea, whether simple or complex, may be the occasion why the mind thus brings two things together,
and as it were takes a view of them at once, though still considered as distinct: therefore any of our ideas may be
the foundation of relation. As in the above-mentioned instance, the contract and ceremony of marriage with
Sempronia is the occasion of the denomination and relation of husband; and the colour white the occasion why he
is said to be whiter than free-stone.
