4. "What is, is," and "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," not universally assented to.
But, which is worse, this argument of universal consent, which is made use of to prove innate principles, seems to me a
demonstration that there are none such: because there are none to which all mankind give an universal assent. I
shall begin with the speculative, and instance in those magnified principles of demonstration, "Whatsoever is, is,"
and "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be"; which, of all others, I think have the most allowed
title to innate. These have so settled a reputation of maxims universally received, that it will no doubt be thought
strange if any one should seem to question it. But yet I take liberty to say, that these propositions are so far from
having an universal assent, that there are a great part of mankind to whom they are not so much as known.