10. The soul thinks not always; for this wants proofs.
But whether the soul be supposed to exist antecedent to, or
coeval with, or some time after the first rudiments of organization, or the beginnings of life in the body, I leave to
be disputed by those who have better thought of that matter. I confess myself to have one of those dull souls, that
doth not perceive itself always to contemplate ideas; nor can conceive it any more necessary for the soul always to
think, than for the body always to move: the perception of ideas being (as I conceive) to the soul, what motion is
to the body; not its essence, but one of its operations. And therefore, though thinking be supposed never so much
the proper action of the soul, yet it is not necessary to suppose that it should be always thinking, always in action.
That, perhaps, is the privilege of the infinite Author and Preserver of all things, who "never slumbers nor sleeps;"
but is not competent to any finite being, at least not to the soul of man. We know certainly, by experience, that we
sometimes think; and thence draw this infallible consequence,--that there is something in us that has a power to
think. But whether that substance perpetually thinks or no, we can be no further assured than experience informs
us. For, to say that actual thinking is essential to the soul, and inseparable from it, is to beg what is in question,
and not to prove it by reason;--which is necessary to be done, if it be not a self-evident proposition. But whether
this, "That the soul always thinks," be a self-evident proposition, that everybody assents to at first hearing, I
appeal to mankind. It is doubted whether I thought at all last night or no. The question being about a matter of
fact, it is begging it to bring, as a proof for it, an hypothesis, which is the very thing in dispute: by which way one
may prove anything, and it is but supposing that all watches, whilst the balance beats, think, and it is sufficiently
proved, and past doubt, that my watch thought all last night. But he that would not deceive himself, ought to build
his hypothesis on matter of fact, and make it out by sensible experience, and not presume on matter of fact,
because of his hypothesis, that is, because he supposes it to be so; which way of proving amounts to this, that I
must necessarily think all last night, because another supposes I always think, though I myself cannot perceive
that I always do so.
But men in love with their opinions may not only suppose what is in question, but allege wrong matter of fact.
How else could any one make it an inference of mine, that a thing is not, because we are not sensible of it in our
sleep? I do not say there is no soul in a man, because he is not sensible of it in his sleep; but I do say, he cannot
think at any time, waking or sleeping: without being sensible of it. Our being sensible of it is not necessary to
anything but to our thoughts; and to them it is; and to them it always will be necessary, till we can think without
being conscious of it.
