6. The concurrent experience of all other men with ours, produces assurance approaching to knowledge.
Concerning the first of these, viz., Particular matter of fact.
I. Where any particular thing, consonant to the constant observation of ourselves and others in the like case,
comes attested by the concurrent reports of all that mention it, we receive it as easily, and build as firmly upon it,
as if it were certain knowledge; and we reason and act thereupon with as little doubt as if it were perfect
demonstration. Thus, if all Englishmen, who have occasion to mention it, should affirm that it froze in England
the last winter, or that there were swallows seen there in the summer, I think a man could almost as little doubt of
it as that seven and four are eleven. The first, therefore, and highest degree of probability, is, when the general
consent of all men, in all ages, as far as it can be known, concurs with a man's constant and never-failing
experience in like cases, to confirm the truth of any particular matter of fact attested by fair witnesses: such are all
the stated constitutions and properties of bodies, and the regular proceedings of causes and effects in the ordinary
course of nature. This we call an argument from the nature of things themselves. For what our own and other
men's constant observation has found always to be after the same manner, that we with reason conclude to be the
effect of steady and regular causes; though they come not within the reach of our knowledge. Thus, That fire
warmed a man, made lead fluid, and changes the colour or consistency in wood or charcoal; that iron sunk in
water, and swam in quicksilver: these and the like propositions about particular facts, being agreeable to our
constant experience, as often as we have to do with these matters; and being generally spoke of (when mentioned
by others) as things found constantly to be so, and therefore not so much as controverted by anybody--we are put
past doubt that a relation affirming any such thing to have been, or any prediction that it will happen again in the
same manner, is very true. These probabilities rise so near to certainty, that they govern our thoughts as
absolutely, and influence all our actions as fully, as the most evident demonstration; and in what concerns us we
make little or no difference between them and certain knowledge. Our belief, thus grounded, rises to assurance.
