4. The right use of it, mutual charity and forbearance, in a necessary diversity of opinions.
Since, therefore, it is
unavoidable to the greatest part of men, if not all, to have several opinions, without certain and indubitable proofs
of their truth; and it carries too great an imputation of ignorance, lightness, or folly for men to quit and renounce
their former tenets presently upon the offer of an argument which they cannot immediately answer, and show the
insufficiency of: it would, methinks, become all men to maintain peace, and the common offices of humanity, and
friendship, in the diversity of opinions; since we cannot reasonably expect that any one should readily and
obsequiously quit his own opinion, and embrace ours, with a blind resignation to an authority which the
understanding of man acknowledges not. For however it may often mistake, it can own no other guide but reason,
nor blindly submit to the will and dictates of another. If he you would bring over to your sentiments be one that
examines before he assents, you must give him leave at his leisure to go over the account again, and, recalling
what is out of his mind, examine all the particulars, to see on which side the advantage lies: and if he will not
think our arguments of weight enough to engage him anew in so much pains, it is but what we often do ourselves
in the like case; and we should take it amiss if others should prescribe to us what points we should study. And if
he be one who takes his opinions upon trust, how can we imagine that he should renounce those tenets which time
and custom have so settled in his mind, that he thinks them self-evident, and of an unquestionable certainty; or
which he takes to be impressions he has received from God himself, or from men sent by him? How can we
expect, I say, that opinions thus settled should be given up to the arguments or authority of a stranger or
adversary, especially if there be any suspicion of interest or design, as there never fails to be, where men find
themselves ill treated? We should do well to commiserate our mutual ignorance, and endeavour to remove it in all
the gentle and fair ways of information; and not instantly treat others ill, as obstinate and perverse, because they
will not renounce their own, and receive our opinions, or at least those we would force upon them, when it is more
than probable that we are no less obstinate in not embracing some of theirs. For where is the man that has
incontestable evidence of the truth of all that he holds, or of the falsehood of all he condemns; or can say that he
has examined to the bottom all his own, or other men's opinions? The necessity of believing without knowledge,
nay often upon very slight grounds, in this fleeting state of action and blindness we are in, should make us more
busy and careful to inform ourselves than constrain others. At least, those who have not thoroughly examined to
the bottom all their own tenets, must confess they are unfit to prescribe to others; and are unreasonable in
imposing that as truth on other men's belief, which they themselves have not searched into, nor weighed the
arguments of probability, on which they should receive or reject it. Those who have fairly and truly examined,
and are thereby got past doubt in all the doctrines they profess and govern themselves by, would have a juster
pretence to require others to follow them: but these are so few in number, and find so little reason to be
magisterial in their opinions, that nothing insolent and imperious is to be expected from them: and there is reason
to think, that, if men were better instructed themselves, they would be less imposing on others.
