6. Probable arguments capable of great variety.
Upon these grounds depends the probability of any proposition:
and as the conformity of our knowledge, as the certainty of observations, as the frequency and constancy of
experience and the number and credibility of testimonies do more or less agree or disagree with it, so is any
proposition in itself more or less probable. There is another, I confess, which, though by itself it be no true ground
of probability, yet is often made use of for one, by which men most commonly regulate their assent, and upon
which they pin their faith more than anything else, and that is, the opinion of others; though there cannot be a
more dangerous thing to rely on, nor more likely to mislead one; since there is much more falsehood and error
among men than truth and knowledge. And if the opinions and persuasions of others, whom we know and think
well of, be a ground of assent, men have reason to be Heathens in Japan, Mahometans in Turkey, Papists in Spain,
Protestants in England, and Lutherans in Sweden. But of this wrong ground of assent I shall have occasion to
speak more at large in another place.
