University of Virginia Library

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.[97]

Dear Sir,—My last was of the 11th of February,
and went by the packet. This will go to England in

the care of a French gentleman, who will consign it
to the care of Mr. Adams.

The appointments for the Convention go on
auspiciously. Since my last, Georgia, South Carolina,
New York, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire,
have come into the measure. The first and the last
of these States have commissioned their delegates to
Congress as their representatives in Convention.
The deputation of Massachusetts consists of Messrs.
Gorham, Dana, King, Gerry, and Strong. That of
New York, Messrs. Hamilton, Yates, and Lansing.
That of South Carolina, Messrs. J. Rutledge, Laurens,
Pinckney, (General,) Butler, and Charles Pinckney,
lately member of Congress. The States which
have not yet appointed are Rhode Island, Connecticut,
and Maryland. The last has taken measures
which prove her intention to appoint, and the two
former it is not doubted will follow the example of
their neighbours. I just learn from the Governor of
Virginia that Mr. Henry has resigned his place in the
deputation from that State, and that General Nelson
is put into it by the Executive, who were authorised
to fill vacancies. The Governor, Mr. Wythe, and
Mr. Blair, will attend, and some hopes are entertained
of Col. Mason's attendance. General Washington
has prudently authorised no expectations of his attendance,
but has not either precluded himself absolutely
from stepping into the field if the crisis should
demand it.

What may be the result of this political experiment
cannot be foreseen. The difficulties which present
themselves are, on one side, almost sufficient to
dismay the most sanguine, whilst on the other side
the most timid are compelled to encounter them by
the mortal diseases of the existing Constitution.
These diseases need not be pointed out to you, who
so well understand them. Suffice it to say, that they
are at present marked by symptoms which are truly
alarming, which have tainted the faith of the most
orthodox republicans, and which challenge from the
votaries of liberty every concession in favor of stable
Government not infringing fundamental principles,
as the only security against an opposite extreme of
our present situation.

I think myself that it will be expedient, in the first
place, to lay the foundation of the new system in
such a ratification by the people themselves of the
several States as will render it clearly paramount to
their Legislative authorities. 2dly. Over and above
the positive power of regulating trade and sundry
other matters in which uniformity is proper, to arm the
federal head with a negative in all cases whatsoever
on the local Legislatures. Without this defensive
power, experience and reflection have satisfied me
that, however ample the federal powers may be made,
or however clearly their boundaries may be delineated
on paper, they will be easily and continually
baffled by the Legislative sovereignties of the States.
The effects of this provision would be not only to
guard the national rights and interests against invasion,

but also to restrain the States from thwarting
and molesting each other; and even from oppressing
the minority within themselves by paper money and
other unrighteous measures which favor the interest
of the majority. In order to render the exercise of
such a negative prerogative convenient, an emanation
of it must be vested in some set of men within the
several States, so far as to enable them to give a
temporary sanction to laws of immediate necessity.
3dly. To change the principle of Representation in
the federal system. Whilst the execution of the acts
of Congress depends on the several Legislatures, the
equality of votes does not destroy the inequality of
importance and influence in the States. But in case
of such an augmentation of the federal power as will
render it efficient without the intervention of the
Legislatures, a vote in the general Councils from
Delaware would be of equal value with one from
Massachusetts or Virginia. This change, therefore,
is just. I think, also, it will be practicable. A majority
of the States conceive that they will be gainers
by it. It is recommended to the Eastern States by
the actual superiority of their populousness, and to
the Southern by their expected superiority; and if a
majority of the larger States concur, the fewer and
smaller States must finally bend to them. This point
being gained, many of the objections now urged in
the leading States against renunciations of power
will vanish. 4thly. To organize the federal powers in
such a manner as not to blend together those which
ought to be exercised by separate departments.
The limited powers now vested in Congress are frequently
mismanaged from the want of such a distribution
of them. What would be the case under an
enlargement not only of the powers, but the number
of the federal Representatives? These are some of
the leading ideas which have occurred to me, but
which may appear to others as improper as they
appear to me necessary.