3. This notice by our senses, though not so certain as demonstration, yet may be called knowledge, and proves the
existence of things without us.
The notice we have by our senses of the existing of things without us, though it be
not altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge, or the deductions of our reason employed about the clear
abstract ideas of our own minds; yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of knowledge. If we persuade
ourselves that our faculties act and inform us right concerning the existence of those objects that affect them, it
cannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence: for I think nobody can, in earnest, be so sceptical as to be uncertain of
the existence of those things which he sees and feels. At least, he that can doubt so far, (whatever he may have
with his own thoughts,) will never have any controversy with me; since he can never be sure I say anything
contrary to his own opinion. As to myself, I think God has given me assurance enough of the existence of things
without me: since, by their different application, I can produce in myself both pleasure and pain, which is one
great concernment of my present state. This is certain: the confidence that our faculties do not herein deceive us,
is the greatest assurance we are capable of concerning the existence of material beings. For we cannot act
anything but by our faculties; nor talk of knowledge itself, but by the help of those faculties which are fitted to
apprehend even what knowledge is.
But besides the assurance we have from our senses themselves, that they do not err in the information they give us
of the existence of things without us, when they are affected by them, we are further confirmed in this assurance
by other concurrent reasons:--