10. Incogitative being cannot produce a cogitative being.
If, then, there must be something eternal, let us see what
sort of being it must be. And to that it is very obvious to reason, that it must necessarily be a cogitative being. For
it is as impossible to conceive that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking intelligent being, as
that nothing should of itself produce matter. Let us suppose any parcel of matter eternal, great or small, we shall
find it, in itself, able to produce nothing. For example: let us suppose the matter of the next pebble we meet with
eternal, closely united, and the parts firmly at rest together; if there were no other being in the world, must it not
eternally remain so, a dead inactive lump? Is it possible to conceive it can add motion to itself, being purely
matter, or produce anything? Matter, then, by its own strength, cannot produce in itself so much as motion: the
motion it has must also be from eternity, or else be produced, and added to matter by some other being more
powerful than matter; matter, as is evident, having not power to produce motion in itself. But let us suppose
motion eternal too: yet matter, incogitative matter and motion, whatever changes it might produce of figure and
bulk, could never produce thought: knowledge will still be as far beyond the power of motion and matter to
produce, as matter is beyond the power of nothing or nonentity to produce. And I appeal to every one's own
thoughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive matter produced by nothing, as thought to be produced by pure
matter, when, before, there was no such thing as thought or an intelligent being existing? Divide matter into as
many parts as you will, (which we are apt to imagine a sort of spiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of it,)
vary the figure and motion of it as much as you please--a globe, cube, cone, prism, cylinder, etc., whose
diameters are but 100,000th part of a gry, will operate no otherwise upon other bodies of proportionable bulk,
than those of an inch or foot diameter; and you may as rationally expect to produce sense, thought, and
knowledge, by putting together, in a certain figure and motion, gross particles of matter, as by those that are the
very minutest that do anywhere exist. They knock, impel, and resist one another, just as the greater do; and that is
all they can do. So that, if we will suppose nothing first or eternal, matter can never begin to be: if we suppose
bare matter without motion, eternal, motion can never begin to be: if we suppose only matter and motion first, or
eternal, thought can never begin to be. For it is impossible to conceive that matter, either with or without motion,
could have, originally, in and from itself, sense, perception, and knowledge; as is evident from hence, that then
sense, perception, and knowledge, must be a property eternally inseparable from matter and every particle of it.
Not to add, that, though our general or specific conception of matter makes us speak of it as one thing, yet really
all matter is not one individual thing, neither is there any such thing existing as one material being, or one single
body that we know or can conceive. And therefore, if matter were the eternal first cogitative being, there would
not be one eternal, infinite, cogitative being, but an infinite number of eternal, finite, cogitative beings,
independent one of another, of limited force, and distinct thoughts, which could never produce that order,
harmony, and beauty which are to be found in nature. Since, therefore, whatsoever is the first eternal being must
necessarily be cogitative; and whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily contain in it, and actually have, at
least, all the perfections that can ever after exist; nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it hath not
either actually in itself, or, at least, in a higher degree; it necessarily follows, that the first eternal being cannot be
matter.
