Livy's History of Rome: Book 21
From Saguntum to the Trebia
21.1
I consider myself at
liberty to commence what is only a section of my history with a prefatory
remark such as most writers have placed at the very beginning of their
works, namely, that the war I am about to describe is the most memorable of
any that have ever been waged, I mean the war which the Carthaginians,
under Hannibal's leadership, waged with Rome. No states, no nations ever
met in arms greater in strength or richer in resources; these Powers
themselves had never before been in so high a state of efficiency or better
prepared to stand the strain of a long war; they were no strangers to each
other's tactics after their experience in the first Punic War; and so variable
were the fortunes and so doubtful the issue of the war that those who were
ultimately victorious were in the earlier stages brought nearest to ruin. And
yet, great as was their strength, the hatred they felt towards each other was
almost greater. The Romans were furious with indignation because the
vanquished had dared to take the offensive against their conquerors; the
Carthaginians bitterly resented what they regarded as the tyrannical and
rapacious conduct of Rome. The prime author of the war was Hamilcar.
There was a story widely current that when, after bringing the African War
to a close, he was offering sacrifices before transporting his army to Spain,
the boy Hannibal, nine years old, was coaxing his father to take him with
him, and his father led him up to the altar and made him swear with his hand
laid on the victim that as soon as he possibly could he would show himself
the enemy of Rome. The loss of Sicily and Sardinia vexed the proud spirit of
the man, for he felt that the cession of Sicily had been made hastily in a spirit
of despair, and that Sardinia had been filched by the Romans during the
troubles in Africa, who, not content with seizing it, had imposed an
indemnity as well.
21.2
Smarting
under these wrongs, he made it quite clear from his conduct of the African
War which followed immediately upon the conclusion of peace with Rome,
and from the way in which he strengthened and extended the rule of
Carthage during the nine years' war with Spain, that he was meditating a far
greater war than any he was actually engaged in, and that had he lived longer
it would have been under his command that the Carthaginians effected the
invasion of Italy, which they actually carried out under Hannibal. The death
of Hamilcar, occurring as it did most opportunely, and the tender years of
Hannibal delayed the war. Hasdrubal, coming between father and son, held
the supreme power for eight years. He is said to have become a favourite of
Hamilcar's owing to his personal beauty as a boy; afterwards he displayed
talents of a very different order, and became his son-in-law. Through this
connection he was placed in power by the influence of the Barcine party,
which was unduly preponderant with the soldiers and the common people,
but his elevation was utterly against the wishes of the nobles. Trusting to
policy rather than to arms, he did more to extend the empire of Carthage by
forming connections with the petty chieftains and winning over new tribes by
making friends of their leading men than by force of arms or by war. But
peace brought him no security. A barbarian whose master he had put to
death murdered him in broad daylight, and when seized by the bystanders he
looked as happy as though he had escaped. Even when put to the torture, his
delight at the success of his attempt mastered his pain and his face wore a
smiling expression. Owing to the marvellous tact he had shown in winning
over the tribes and incorporating them into his dominions, the Romans had
renewed the treaty with Hasdrubal. Under its terms, the River Ebro was to
form the boundary between the two empires, and Saguntum, occupying an
intermediate position between them, was to be a free city.
21.3
There
was no hesitation shown in filling his place. The soldiers led the way by
bringing the young Hannibal forthwith to the palace and proclaiming him
their commander-in-chief amidst universal applause. Their action was
followed by the plebs. Whilst little more than a boy, Hasdrubal had written
to invite Hannibal to come to him in Spain, and the matter had actually been
discussed in the senate. The Barcines wanted Hannibal to become familiar
with military service; Hanno, the leader of the opposite party, resisted this.
"Hasdrubal's request," he said, "appears a reasonable one, and yet I do not
think we ought to grant it" This paradoxical utterance aroused the attention
of the whole senate. He continued: "The youthful beauty which Hasdrubal
surrendered to Hannibal's father he considers he has a fair claim to ask for in
return from the son. It ill becomes us, however, to habituate our youths to
the lust of our commanders, by way of military training. Are we afraid that it
will be too long before Hamilcar's son surveys the extravagant power and the
pageant of royalty which his father assumed, and that there will be undue
delay in our becoming the slaves of the despot to whose son-in-law our
armies have been bequeathed as though they were his patrimony? I, for my
part, consider that this youth ought to be kept at home and taught to live in
obedience to the laws and the magistrates on an equality with his
fellow-citizens; if not, this small fire will some day or other kindle a vast
conflagration."
21.4
Hanno's
proposal received but slight support, though almost all the best men in the
council were with him, but as usual, numbers carried the day against reason.
No sooner had Hannibal landed in Spain than he became a favourite with the
whole army. The veterans thought they saw Hamilcar restored to them as he
was in his youth; they saw the same determined expression the same piercing
eyes, the same cast of features. He soon showed, however, that it was not
his father's memory that helped him most to win the affections of the army.
Never was there a character more capable of the two tasks so opposed to
each other of commanding and obeying; you could not easily make out
whether the army or its general were more attached to him. Whenever
courage and resolution were needed Hasdrubal never cared to entrust the
command to any one else; and there was no leader in whom the soldiers
placed more confidence or under whom they showed more daring. He was
fearless in exposing himself to danger and perfectly self-possessed in the
presence of danger. No amount of exertion could cause him either bodily or
mental fatigue; he was equally indifferent to heat and cold; his eating and
drinking were measured by the needs of nature, not by appetite; his hours of
sleep were not determined by day or night, whatever time was not taken up
with active duties was given to sleep and rest, but that rest was not wooed
on a soft couch or in silence, men often saw him lying on the ground
amongst the sentinels and outposts, wrapped in his military cloak. His dress
was in no way superior to that of his comrades; what did make him
conspicuous were his arms and horses. He was by far the foremost both of
the cavalry and the infantry, the first to enter the fight and the last to leave
the field. But these great merits were matched by great vices -inhuman
cruelty, a perfidy worse than Punic, an utter absence of truthfulness,
reverence, fear of the gods, respect for oaths, sense of religion. Such was his
character, a compound of virtues and vices. For three years he served under
Hasdrubal, and during the whole time he never lost an opportunity of gaining
by practice or observation the experience necessary for one who was to be a
great leader of men.
21.5
From the
day when he was proclaimed commander-in-chief, he seemed to regard Italy
as his assigned field of action, and war with Rome as a duty imposed upon
him. Feeling that he ought not to delay operations, lest some accident should
overtake him as in the case of his father and afterwards of Hasdrubal, he
decided to attack the Saguntines. As an attack on them would inevitably set
the arms of Rome in motion, he began by invading the Olcades, a tribe who
were within the boundaries but not under the dominion of Carthage. He
wished to make it appear that Saguntum was not his immediate object, but
that he was drawn into a war with her by the force of circumstances, by the
conquest, that is, of all her neighbours and the annexation of their territory.
Cartala, a wealthy city and the capital of the tribe, was taken by storm and
sacked; the smaller cities, fearing a similar fate, capitulated and agreed to pay
an indemnity. His victorious army enriched with plunder was marched into
winter quarters in New Carthage. Here, by a lavish distribution of the spoils
and the punctual discharge of all arrears of pay, he secured the allegiance of
his own people and of the allied contingents.
At the beginning of spring he extended his operations to the
Vaccaei, and two of their cities, Arbocala and Hermandica, were taken by
assault. Arbocala held out for a considerable time, owing to the courage and
numbers of its defenders; the fugitives from Hermandica joined hands with
those of the Olcades who had abandoned their country -this tribe had been
subjugated the previous year -and together they stirred up the Carpetani to
war. Not far from the Tagus an attack was made upon Hannibal as he was
returning from his expedition against the Vaccaei, and his army, laden as it
was with plunder, was thrown into some confusion. Hannibal declined battle
and fixed his camp by the side of the river; as soon as there was quiet and
silence amongst the enemy, he forded the stream. His entrenchments had
been carried just far enough to allow room for the enemy to cross over, and
he decided to attack them during their passage of the river. He instructed his
cavalry to wait until they had actually entered the water and then to attack
them; his forty elephants he stationed on the bank. The Carpetani together
with the contingents of the Olcades and Vaccaei numbered altogether
100,000 men, an irresistible force had they been fighting on level ground.
Their innate fearlessness, the confidence inspired by their numbers, their
belief that the enemy's retreat was due to fear, all made them look on victory
as certain, and the river as the only obstacle to it. Without any word of
command having been given, they raised a universal shout and plunged, each
man straight in front of him, into the river. A huge force of cavalry
descended from the opposite bank, and the two bodies met in mid-stream.
The struggle was anything but an equal one. The infantry, feeling their
footing insecure, even where the river was fordable, could have been ridden
down even by unarmed horsemen, whereas the cavalry, with their bodies and
weapons free and their horses steady even in the midst of the current, could
fight at close quarters or not, as they chose. A large proportion were swept
down the river, some were carried by cross currents to the other side where
the enemy were, and were trampled to death by the elephants. Those in the
rear thought it safest to return to their own side, and began to collect
together as well as their fears allowed them, but before they had time to
recover themselves Hannibal entered the river with his infantry in battle
order and drove them in flight from the bank. He followed up his victory by
laying waste their fields, and in a few days was able to receive the submission
of the Carpetani There was no part of the country beyond the Ebro which
did not now belong to the Carthaginians, with the exception of Saguntum.
21.6
War had
not been formally declared against this city, but there were already grounds
for war. The seeds of quarrel were being sown amongst her neighbours,
especially amongst the Turdetani. When the man who had sown the seed
showed himself ready to aid and abet the quarrel, and his object plainly was
not to refer the question to arbitration, but to appeal to force, the Saguntines
sent a deputation to Rome to beg for help in a war which was inevitably
approaching. The consuls for the time being were P. Cornelius Scipio and
Tiberius Sempronius Longus. After introducing the envoys they invited the
senate to declare its opinion as to what policy should be adopted. It was
decided that commissioners should be sent to Spain to investigate the
circumstances, and if they considered it necessary they were to warn
Hannibal not to interfere with the Saguntines, who were allies of Rome; then
they were to cross over to Africa and lay before the Carthaginian council the
complaints which they had made. But before the commission was despatched
news came that the siege of Saguntum had, to every one's surprise, actually
commenced. The whole position of affairs required to be reconsidered by the
senate; some were for assigning Spain and Africa as separate fields of action
for the two consuls, and thought that the war ought to be prosecuted by land
and sea; others were for confining the war solely to Hannibal in Spain; others
again were of opinion that such an immense task ought not to be entered
upon hastily, and that they ought to await the return of the commission from
Spain. This latter view seemed the safest and was adopted, and the
commissioners, P. Valerius Flaccus and Q. Baebius Tamphilus, were
despatched without further delay to Hannibal. If he refused to abandon
hostilities they were to proceed to Carthage to demand the surrender of the
general to answer for his breach of treaty.
21.7
During
these proceedings in Rome the siege of Saguntum was being pressed with
the utmost vigour. That city was by far the most wealthy of all beyond the
Ebro; it was situated about a mile from the sea. It is said to have been
founded by settlers from the island of Zacynthus, with an admixture of
Rutulians from Ardea. In a short time, however, it had attained to great
prosperity, partly through its land and sea-borne commerce, partly through
the rapid increase of its population, and also through the maintenance of a
high standard of political integrity which led it to act with a loyalty towards
its allies that brought about its ruin. After carrying his ravages everywhere
throughout the territory, Hannibal attacked the city from three separate
points. There was an angle of the fortifications which looked down on a
more open and level descent than the rest of the ground surrounding the city,
and here he decided to bring up his vineae to allow the battering rams to be
placed against the walls. But although the ground to a considerable distance
from the walls was sufficiently level to admit of the vineae being brought up,
they found when they had succeeded in doing this that they made no
progress. A huge tower overlooked the place, and the wall, being here more
open to attack, had been carried to a greater height than the rest of the
fortifications. As the position was one of especial danger, so the resistance
offered by a picked body of defenders was of the most resolute character. At
first they confined themselves to keeping the enemy back by the discharge of
missiles and making it impossible for them to continue their operations in
safety. As time went on, however, their weapons no longer flashed on the
walls or from the tower, they ventured on a sortie and attacked the outposts
and siege works of the enemy. In these irregular encounters the
Carthaginians lost nearly as many men as the Saguntines. Hannibal himself,
approaching the wall somewhat incautiously, fell with a severe wound in his
thigh from a javelin, and such was the confusion and dismay that ensued that
the vineae and siege works were all but abandoned.
21.8
For a few
days, until the general's wound was healed, there was a blockade rather than
an active siege, and during this interval, though there was a respite from
fighting, the construction of siege works and approaches went on
uninterruptedly. When the fighting was resumed it was fiercer than ever. In
spite of the difficulties of the ground the vineae were advanced and the
battering rams placed against the walls. The Carthaginians had the
superiority in numbers -there were said to have been 150,000 fighting men -whilst the defenders, obliged to keep watch and ward everywhere, were
dissipating their strength and finding their numbers unequal to the task. The
walls were now being pounded by the rams, and in many places had been
shaken down. One part where a continuous fall had taken place laid the city
open; three towers in succession, and the whole of the wall between them
fell with a tremendous crash. The Carthaginians looked upon the town as
already captured after that fall, and both sides rushed through the breach as
though the wall had only served to protect them from each other. There was
nothing of the desultory fighting which goes on when cities are stormed, as
each side gets an opportunity of attacking the other. The two bodies of
combatants confronted one another in the space between the ruined wall and
the houses of the city in as regular formation as though they had been in an
open field. On the one side there was the courage of hope, on the other the
courage of despair. The Carthaginians believed that with a little effort on
their part the city would be theirs; the Saguntines opposed their bodies as a
shield for their fatherland now stripped of its walls; not a man relaxed his
foothold for fear of letting an enemy in through the spot which he had left
open. So the hotter and closer the fighting became the greater grew the
number of wounded, for no missile fell ineffectively amongst the crowded
ranks. The missile used by the Saguntines was the phalarica, a javelin with a
shaft smooth and round up to the head, which, as in the pilum, was an iron
point of square section. The shaft was wrapped in tow and then smeared
with pitch; the iron head was three feet long and capable of penetrating
armour and body alike. Even if it only stuck in the shield and did not reach
the body it was a most formidable weapon, for when it was discharged with
the tow set on fire the flame was fanned to a fiercer heat by its passage
through the air, and it forced the soldier to throw away his shield and left
him defenceless against the sword thrusts which followed.
21.9
The
conflict had now gone on for a considerable time without any advantage to
either side; the courage of the Saguntines was rising as they found
themselves keeping up an unhoped-for resistance, whilst the Carthaginians,
unable to conquer, were beginning to look upon themselves as defeated.
Suddenly the defenders, raising their battle-shout, forced the enemy back to
the debris of the ruined wall; there, stumbling and in disorder, they were
forced still further back and finally driven in rout and flight to their camp.
Meantime it was announced that envoys had arrived from Rome. Hannibal
sent messengers down to the harbour to meet them and inform them that it
would be unsafe for them to advance any further through so many wild tribes
now in arms, and also that Hannibal in the present critical position of affairs
had no time to receive embassies. It was quite certain that if they were not
admitted they would go to Carthage. He therefore forestalled them by
sending messengers with a letter addressed to the heads of the Barcine party,
to warn his supporters and prevent the other side from making any
concessions to Rome.
21.10
The
result was that, beyond being received and heard by the Carthaginian senate,
the embassy found its mission a failure. Hanno alone, against the whole
senate, spoke in favour of observing the treaty, and his speech was listened
to in silence out of respect to his personal authority, not because his hearers
approved of his sentiments. He appealed to them in the name of the gods,
who are the witnesses and arbiters of treaties, not to provoke a war with
Rome in addition to the one with Saguntum. "I urged you," he said, "and
warned you not to send Hamilcar's son to the army. That man's spirit, that
man's offspring cannot rest; as long as any single representative of the blood
and name of Barca survives our treaty with Rome will never remain
unimperilled. You have sent to the army, as though supplying fuel to the fire,
a young man who is consumed with a passion for sovereign power, and who
recognises that the only way to it lies in passing his life surrounded by armed
legions and perpetually stirring up fresh wars. It is you, therefore, who have
fed this fire which is now scorching you. Your armies are investing
Saguntum, which by the terms of the treaty they are forbidden to approach;
before long the legions of Rome will invest Carthage, led by the same
generals under the same divine guidance under which they avenged our
breach of treaty obligations in the late war. Are you strangers to the enemy,
to yourselves, to the fortunes of each nation? That worthy commander of
yours refused to allow ambassadors who came from allies, on behalf of allies,
to enter his camp, and set at naught the law of nations. Those men, repulsed
from a place to which even an enemy's envoys are not refused access, have
come to us; they ask for the satisfaction which the treaty prescribes; they
demand the surrender of the guilty party in order that the State may clear
itself from all taint of guilt. The slower they are to take action, the longer
they are in commencing war, so much the more persistence and
determination, I fear, will they show when war has begun. Remember the
Aegates and Eryx, and all you had to go through for four-and-twenty years.
This boy was not commanding then, but his father, Hamilcar -a second Mars
as his friends would have us believe. But we broke the treaty then as we are
breaking it now; we did not keep our hands off Tarentum or, which is the
same thing, off Italy then any more than we are keeping our hands off
Saguntum now, and so gods and men combined to defeat us, and the
question in dispute, namely, which nation had broken the treaty, was settled
by the issue of the war, which, like an impartial judge, left the victory on the
side which was in the right. It is against Carthage that Hannibal is now
bringing up his vineae and towers, it is Carthage whose walls he is shaking
with his battering rams. The ruins of Saguntum -would that I might prove a
false prophet -will fall on our heads, and the war which was begun with
Saguntum will have to be carried on with Rome.
"'Shall we then surrender Hannibal?' some one will say. I am quite
aware that as regards him my advice will have little weight, owing to my
differences with his father, but whilst I was glad to hear of Hamilcar's death,
for if he were alive we should already be involved in war with Rome, I feel
nothing but loathing and detestation for this youth, the mad firebrand who is
kindling this war. Not only do I hold that he ought to be surrendered as an
atonement for the broken treaty, but even if no demand for his surrender
were made I consider that he ought to be deported to the farthest corner of
the earth, exiled to some spot from which no tidings of him, no mention of
his name, could reach us, and where it would be impossible for him to
disturb the welfare and tranquillity of our State. This then is what I propose:
'That a commission be at once despatched to Rome to inform the senate of
our compliance with their demands, and a second to Hannibal ordering him
to withdraw his army from Saguntum and then surrendering him to the
Romans in accordance with the terms of the treaty, and I also propose that a
third body of commissioners be sent to make reparation to the Saguntines.'"
21.11
When
Hanno sat down no one deemed it necessary to make any reply, so
completely was the senate, as a body, on the side of Hannibal. They accused
Hanno of speaking in a tone of more uncompromising hostility than Flaccus
Valerius, the Roman envoy, had assumed. The reply which it was decided to
make to the Roman demands was that the war was started by the Saguntines
not by Hannibal, and that the Roman people would commit an act of
injustice if they took the part of the Saguntines against their ancient allies,
the Carthaginians. Whilst the Romans were wasting time in despatching
commissioners, things were quiet round Saguntum. Hannibal's men were
worn out with the fighting and the labours of the siege, and after placing
detachments on guard over the vineae and other military engines, he gave his
army a few days' rest. He employed this interval in stimulating the courage of
his men by exasperating them against the enemy, and firing them by the
prospect of rewards. After he had given out in the presence of his assembled
troops that the plunder of the city would go to them, they were all in such a
state of excitement that had the signal been given then and there it seemed
impossible for anything to withstand them. As for the Saguntines, though
they had a respite from fighting for some days, neither meeting attacks nor
making any, they worked at their defences so continuously by day and night
that they completed a fresh wall at the place where the fall of the former wall
had laid the town open.
The assault was recommenced with greater vigour than ever. In
every direction confused shouts and clamour resounded, so that it was
difficult to ascertain where to render assistance most promptly or where it
was most needed. Hannibal was present in person to encourage his men,
who were bringing up a tower on rollers which overtopped all the
fortifications of the city. Catapults and ballistae had been put in position on
each of the stories, and after it had been brought up to the walls it swept
them clear of the defenders. Seizing his opportunity, Hannibal told off about
500 African troops to undermine the wall with pick-axes, an easy task, as the
stones were not fixed with cement but with layers of mud between the
courses in the ancient fashion of construction. More of it consequently fell
than had been dug away, and through the gaping ruin the columns of armed
warriors marched into the city. They seized some high ground, and after
massing their catapults and ballistae there they enclosed it with a wall so as
to have a fortified position actually within the city which could dominate it
like a citadel. The Saguntines on their side carried an inside wall round the
portion of the city not yet captured. Both sides kept up their fortifying and
fighting with the utmost energy, but by having to defend the interior portion
of the city the Saguntines were continually reducing its dimensions. In
addition to this there was a growing scarcity of everything as the siege was
prolonged, and the anticipations of outside help were becoming fainter; the
Romans, their one hope, were so far away, whilst all immediately round
them was in the hands of the enemy. For a few days their drooping spirits
were revived by the sudden departure of Hannibal on an expedition against
the Oretani and the Carpetani. The rigorous way in which troops were being
levied in these two tribes had created great excitement, and they had kept the
officers who were superintending the levy practically prisoners. A general
revolt was feared, but the unexpected swiftness of Hannibal's movements
took them by surprise and they abandoned their hostile attitude.
21.12
The
attack on Saguntum was not slackened; Maharbal, the son of Himilco, whom
Hannibal had left in command, carried on operations with such energy that
the general's absence was not felt by either friends or foes. He fought several
successful actions, and with the aid of three battering rams brought down a
considerable portion of the wall, and on Hannibal's return showed him the
place all strewn with the newly-fallen wall. The army was at once led to an
assault on the citadel; a desperate fight began, with heavy losses on both
sides, and a part of the citadel was captured. Attempts were now made in the
direction of peace, though with but faint hopes of success. Two men
undertook the task, Alco, a Saguntine, and Alorcus, a Spaniard. Alco,
thinking that his prayers might have some effect, crossed over without the
knowledge of the Saguntines to Hannibal at night. When he found that he
gained nothing by his tears, and that the conditions offered were such as a
victor exasperated by resistance would insist upon, harsh and severe, he laid
aside the character of a pleader and remained with the enemy as a deserter,
alleging that any one who advocated peace on such terms would be put to
death. The conditions were that restitution should be made to the Turdetani,
all the gold and silver should be delivered up, and the inhabitants should
depart with one garment each and take up their abode wherever the
Carthaginians should order them. As Alco insisted that the Saguntines would
not accept peace on these terms, Alorcus, convinced, as he said, that when
everything else has gone courage also goes, undertook to mediate a peace on
those conditions. At that time he was one of Hannibal's soldiers, but he was
recognised as a guest friend by the city of Saguntum. He started on his
mission, gave up his weapon openly to the guard, crossed the lines, and was
at his request conducted to the praetor of Saguntum. A crowd, drawn from
all classes of society, soon gathered, and after a way had been cleared
through the press, Alorcus was admitted to an audience of the senate. He
addressed them in the following terms:
21.13
"If
your fellow-townsman, Alco, had shown the same courage in bringing back
to you the terms on which Hannibal will grant peace that he showed in going
to Hannibal to beg for peace, this journey of mine would have been
unnecessary. I have not come to you either as an advocate for Hannibal or as
a deserter. But as he has remained with the enemy either through your fault
or his own -his own if his fears were only feigned, yours if those who report
what is true have to answer for their lives -I have come to you out of regard
to the old ties of hospitality which have so long subsisted between us, that
you may not be left in ignorance of the fact that there do exist terms on
which you can secure peace and the safety of your lives. Now, that it is for
your sake alone and not on behalf of any one else that I say what I am saying
before you is proved by the fact that as long as you had the strength to
maintain a successful resistance, and as long as you had any hopes of help
from Rome, I never breathed a word about making peace. But now that you
have no longer anything to hope for from Rome, now that neither your arms
nor your walls suffice to protect you, I bring you a peace forced upon you by
necessity rather than recommended by the fairness of its conditions. But the
hopes, faint as they are, of peace rest upon your accepting as conquered men
the terms which Hannibal as conqueror imposes and not looking upon what
is taken from you as a positive loss, since everything is at the victor's mercy,
but regarding what is left to you as a free gift from him. The city, most of
which he has laid in ruins, the whole of which he has all but captured, he
takes from you; your fields and lands he leaves you; and he will assign you a
site where you can build a new town. He orders all the gold and silver, both
that belonging to the State and that owned by private individuals, to be
brought to him; your persons and those of your wives and children he
preserves inviolate on condition that you consent to leave Saguntum with
only two garments apiece and without arms. These are the demands of your
victorious enemy, and heavy and bitter as they are, your miserable plight
urges you to accept them. I am not without hope that when everything has
passed into his power he will relax some of these conditions, but I consider
that even as they are you ought to submit to them rather than permit
yourselves to be butchered and your wives and children seized and carried
off before your eyes."
21.14
A
large crowd had gradually collected to listen to the speaker, and the popular
Assembly had become mingled with the senate, when without a moment's
warning the leading citizens withdrew before any reply was given. They
collected all the gold and silver from public and private sources and brought
it into the forum, where a fire had already been kindled, and flung it into the
flames, and most of them thereupon leaped into the fire themselves. The
terror and confusion which this occasioned throughout the city was
heightened by the noise of a tumult in the direction of the citadel. A tower
after much battering had fallen, and through the breach created by its fall a
Carthaginian cohort advanced to the attack and signalled to their commander
that the customary outposts and guards had disappeared and the city was
unprotected. Hannibal thought that he ought to seize the opportunity and act
promptly. Attacking it with his full strength, he took the place in a moment.
Orders had been given that all the adult males were to be put to death; a
cruel order, but under the circumstances inevitable, for whom would it have
been possible to spare when they either shut themselves up with their wives
and children and burnt their houses over their heads, or if they fought, would
not cease fighting till they were killed?
21.15
An
enormous amount of booty was found in the captured city. Although most of
it had been deliberately destroyed by the owners, and the enraged soldiers
had observed hardly any distinctions of age in the universal slaughter, whilst
all the prisoners that were taken were assigned to them, still, it is certain that
a considerable sum was realised by the sale of the goods that were seized,
and much valuable furniture and apparel was sent to Carthage. Some writers
assert that Saguntum was taken in the eighth month of the siege, and that
Hannibal led his force from there to New Carthage for the winter, his arrival
in Italy occurring five months later. In this case it is impossible for P.
Cornelius and Ti. Sempronius to have been the consuls to whom the
Saguntine envoys were sent at the beginning of the siege and who
afterwards, whilst still in office, fought with Hannibal, one of them at the
Ticinus, both shortly afterwards at the Trebia. Either all the incidents
occurred within a much shorter period or else it was the capture of
Saguntum, not the beginning of the siege, which occurred when those two
entered upon office. For the battle of the Trebia cannot have fallen so late as
the year when Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius were in office, because C.
Flaminius entered upon his consulship at Ariminum, his election taking place
under the consul Tiberius Sempronius, who came to Rome after the battle of
the Trebia to hold the consular elections, and, after they were over, returned
to his army in winter quarters.
21.16
The
commissioners who had been sent to Carthage, on their return to Rome,
reported that everything breathed a hostile spirit. Almost on the very day
they returned the news arrived of the fall of Saguntum, and such was the
distress of the senate at the cruel fate of their allies, such was their feeling of
shame at not having sent help to them, such their exasperation against the
Carthaginians and their alarm for the safety of the State -for it seemed as
though the enemy were already at their gates -that they were in no mood for
deliberating, shaken as they were by so many conflicting emotions. There
were sufficient grounds for alarm. Never had they met a more active or a
more warlike enemy, and never had the Roman republic been so lacking in
energy or so unprepared for war. The operations against the Sardinians,
Corsicans, and Histrians, as well as those against the Illyrians, had been more
of an annoyance than a training for the soldiers of Rome; whilst with the
Gauls there had been desultory fighting rather than regular warfare. But the
Carthaginians, a veteran enemy which for three-and-twenty years had seen
hard and rough service amongst the Spanish tribes, and had always been
victorious, trained under a general of exceptional ability, were now crossing
the Ebro fresh from the sack of a most wealthy city, and were bringing with
them all those Spanish tribes, eager for the fray. They would rouse the
various Gaulish tribes, who were always ready to take up arms; there would
be the whole world to fight against; the battleground would be Italy; the
struggle would take place before the walls of Rome.
21.17
The
seat of the campaigns had already been decided; the consuls were now
ordered to draw lots. Spain fell to Cornelius, Africa to Sempronius. It was
resolved that six legions should be raised for that year, the allies were to
furnish such contingents as the consuls should deem necessary, and as large
a fleet as possible was to be fitted out; 24,000 Roman infantry were called
up and 1800 cavalry; the allies contributed 40,000 infantry and 4400 cavalry,
and a fleet of 220 ships of war and 20 light galleys was launched. The
question was then formally submitted to the Assembly, Was it their will and
pleasure that war should be declared against the people of Carthage? When
this was decided, a special service of intercession was conducted; the
procession marched through the streets of the city offering prayers at the
various temples that the gods would grant a happy and prosperous issue to
the war which the people of Rome had now ordered. The forces were
divided between the consuls in the following way: To Sempronius two
legions were assigned, each consisting of 4000 infantry and 300 cavalry, and
16,000 infantry and 1800 cavalry from the allied contingents. He was also
provided with 160 warships and 12 light galleys. With this combined land
and sea force he was sent to Sicily, with instructions to cross over to Africa
if the other consul succeeded in preventing the Carthaginian from invading
Italy. Cornelius, on the other hand, was provided with a smaller force, as L.
Manlius, the praetor, was himself being despatched to Gaul with a fairly
strong detachment. Cornelius was weakest in his ships; he had only 60
warships, for it was never supposed that the enemy would come by sea or
use his navy for offensive purposes. His land force was made up of two
Roman legions, with their complement of cavalry, and 14,000 infantry from
the allies with 1600 cavalry. The province of Gaul1 was held by two Roman
legions and 10,000 allied infantry with 600 Roman and 1000 allied cavalry.
This force was ultimately employed in the Punic War.
21.18
When
these preparations were completed, the formalities necessary before entering
upon war required that a commission should be despatched to Carthage.
Those selected were men of age and experience -Q. Fabius, M. Livius, L.
Aemilius, C. Licinius, and Q. Baebius. They were instructed to inquire
whether it was with the sanction of the government that Hannibal had
attacked Saguntum, and if, as seemed most probable, the Carthaginians
should admit that it was so and proceed to defend their action, then the
Roman envoys were to formally declare war upon Carthage. As soon as they
had arrived in Carthage they appeared before the senate. Q. Fabius had, in
accordance with his instructions, simply put the question as to the
responsibility of the government, when one of the members present said:
"The language of your previous deputation was peremptory enough when
you demanded the surrender of Hannibal on the assumption that he was
attacking Saguntum on his own authority, but your language now, so far at
least, is less provocative, though in effect more overbearing. For on that
occasion it was Hannibal whose action you denounced and whose surrender
you demanded, now you are seeking to extort from us a confession of guilt
and insist upon obtaining instant satisfaction, as from men who admit they
are in the wrong. I do not, however, consider that the question is whether
the attack on Saguntum was an act of public policy or only that of a private
citizen, but whether it was justified by circumstances or not. It is for us to
inquire and take proceedings against a citizen when he has done anything on
his own authority; the only point for you to discuss is whether his action was
compatible with the terms of the treaty. Now, as you wish us to draw a
distinction between what our generals do with the sanction of the State and
what they do on their own initiative, you must remember that the treaty with
us was made by your consul, C. Lutatius, and whilst it contained provisions
guarding the interests of the allies of both nations, there was no such
provision for the Saguntines, for they were not your allies at the time. But,
you will say, by the treaty concluded with Hasdrubal, the Saguntines are
exempted from attack. I shall meet that with your own arguments. You told
us that you refused to be bound by the treaty which your consul, C. Lutatius,
concluded with us, because it did not receive the authorisation of either the
senate or the Assembly. A fresh treaty was accordingly made by your
government. Now, if no treaties have any binding force for you unless they
have been made with the authority of your senate or by order of your
Assembly, we, on our side, cannot possibly be bound by Hasdrubal's treaty,
which he made without our knowledge. Drop all allusions to Saguntum and
the Ebro, and speak out plainly what has long been secretly hatching in your
minds." Then the Roman, gathering up his toga, said, "Here we bring you
war and peace, take which you please." He was met by a defiant shout
bidding him give whichever he preferred, and when, letting the folds of his
toga fall, he said that he gave them war, they replied that they accepted war
and would carry it on in the same spirit in which they accepted it.
21.19
This
straightforward question and threat of war seemed to be more consonant
with the dignity of Rome than a wordy argument about treaties; it seemed so
previous to the destruction of Saguntum, and still more so afterwards. For
had it been a matter for argument, what ground was there for comparing
Hasdrubal's treaty with the earlier one of Lutatius? In the latter it was
expressly stated that it would only be of force if the people approved it,
whereas in Hasdrubal's treaty there was no such saving clause. Besides, his
treaty had been silently observed for many years during his lifetime, and was
so generally approved that, even after its author's death, none of its articles
were altered. But even if they took their stand upon the earlier treaty -that
of Lutatius -the Saguntines were sufficiently safeguarded by the allies of
both parties being exempted from hostile treatment, for nothing was said
about "the allies for the time being" or anything to exclude "any who should
be hereafter taken into alliance." And since it was open to both parties to
form fresh alliances, who would think it a fair arrangement that none should
be received into alliance whatever their merits, or that when they had been
received they should not be loyally protected, on the understanding that the
allies of the Carthaginians should not be induced to revolt, or if they deserted
their allies on their own accord were not to be received into alliance by the
others?
The Roman envoys in accordance with their instructions went on to
Spain for the purpose of visiting the different tribes and drawing them into
alliance with Rome, or at least detaching them from the Carthaginians. The
first they came to were the Borgusii, who were tired of Punic domination
and gave them a favourable reception, and their success here excited a desire
for change amongst many of the tribes beyond the Ebro. They came next to
the Volciani, and the response they met with became widely known
throughout Spain and determined the rest of the tribes against an alliance
with Rome. This answer was given by the senior member of their national
council in the following terms: "Are you not ashamed, Romans, to ask us to
form friendship with you in preference to the Carthaginians, seeing how
those who have done so have suffered more through you, their allies, cruelly
deserting them than through any injury inflicted on them by the
Carthaginians? I advise you to look for allies where the fall of Saguntum has
never been heard of; the nations of Spain see in the ruins of Saguntum a sad
and emphatic warning against putting any trust in alliances with Rome."
They were then peremptorily ordered to quit the territory of the Volciani,
and from that time none of the councils throughout Spain gave them a more
favourable reply. After this fruitless mission in Spain they crossed over into
Gaul.
21.20
Here a
strange and appalling sight met their eyes; the men attended the council fully
armed, such was the custom of the country. When the Romans, after
extolling the renown and courage of the Roman people and the greatness of
their dominion, asked the Gauls not to allow the Carthaginian invaders a
passage through their fields and cities, such interruption and laughter broke
out that the younger men were with difficulty kept quiet by the magistrates
and senior members of the council. They thought it a most stupid and
impudent demand to make, that the Gauls, in order to prevent the war from
spreading into Italy, should turn it against themselves and expose their own
lands to be ravaged instead of other people's. After quiet was restored the
envoys were informed that the Romans had rendered them no service, nor
had the Carthaginians done them any injury to make them take up arms
either on behalf of the Romans or against the Carthaginians. On the other
hand, they heard that men of their race were being expelled from Italy, and
made to pay tribute to Rome, and subjected to every other indignity. Their
experience was the same in all the other councils of Gaul, nowhere did they
hear a kindly or even a tolerably peaceable word till they reached Massilia.
There all the facts which their allies had carefully and honestly collected
were laid before them; they were informed that the interest of the Gauls had
already been secured by Hannibal, but even he would not find them very
tractable, with their wild and untamable nature, unless the chiefs were also
won over with gold, a thing which as a nation they were most eager to
procure. After thus traversing Spain and the tribes of Gaul the envoys
returned to Rome not long after the consuls had left for their respective
commands. They found the whole City in a state of excitement; definite news
had been received that the Carthaginians had crossed the Ebro, and every
one was looking forward to war.
21.21
After
the capture of Saguntum, Hannibal withdrew into winter quarters at New
Carthage. Information reached him there of the proceedings at Rome and
Carthage, and he learnt that he was not only the general who was to conduct
the war, but also the sole person who was responsible for its outbreak. As
further delay would be most inexpedient, he sold and distributed the rest of
the plunder, and calling together those of his soldiers who were of Spanish
blood, he addressed them as follows: "I think, soldiers, that you yourselves
recognise that now that we have reduced all the tribes in Spain we shall
either have to bring our campaigns to an end and disband our armies or else
we must transfer our wars to other lands. If we seek to win plunder and
glory from other nations, then these tribes will enjoy not only the blessings of
peace, but also the fruits of victory. Since, therefore, there await us
campaigns far from home, and it is uncertain when you will again see your
homes and all that is dear to you, I grant a furlough to every one who wishes
to visit his friends. You must reassemble at the commencement of spring, so
that we may, with the kindly help of the gods, enter upon a war which will
bring us immense plunder and cover us with glory." They all welcomed the
opportunity, so spontaneously offered, of visiting their homes after so long
an absence, and in view of a still longer absence in the future. The winter's
rest, coming after their past exertions, and soon to be followed by greater
ones, restored their faculties of mind and body and strengthened them for
fresh trials of endurance.
In the early days of spring they reassembled according to orders.
After reviewing the whole of the native contingents, Hannibal left for Gades,
where he discharged his vows to Hercules, and bound himself by fresh
obligations to that deity in case his enterprise should succeed. As Africa
would be open to attack from the side of Sicily during his land march
through Spain and the two Gauls into Italy, he decided to secure that
country with a strong garrison. To supply their place he requisitioned troops
from Africa, a light-armed force consisting mainly of slingers. By thus
transferring Africans to Spain and Spaniards to Africa, the soldiers of each
nationality would be expected to render more efficient service, as being
practically under reciprocal obligations. The force he despatched to Africa
consisted of 13,850 Spanish infantry furnished with ox-hide bucklers, and
870 Balearic slingers, with a composite body of 1200 cavalry drawn from
numerous tribes. This force was destined partly for the defence of Carthage,
partly to hold the African territory. At the same time recruiting officers were
sent to various communities; some 4000 men of good family were called up
who were under orders to be conveyed to Carthage to strengthen its
defence, and also to serve as hostages for the loyalty of their people.
21.22
Spain
also had to be provided for, all the more so as Hannibal was fully aware that
Roman commissioners had been going all about the country to win over the
leading men of the various tribes. He placed it in charge of his energetic and
able brother, Hasdrubal, and assigned him an army mainly composed of
African troops -11,850 native infantry, 300 Ligurians, and 500 Balearics. In
addition to this body of infantry there were 450 Libyphoenician cavalry -these are a mixed race of Punic and aboriginal African descent -some 1800
Numidians and Moors, dwellers on the shore of the Mediterranean, and a
small mounted contingent of 300 Ilergetes raised in Spain. Finally, that his
land force might be complete in all its parts, there were twenty-one
elephants. The protection of the coast required a fleet, and as it was natural
to suppose that the Romans would again make use of that arm in which they
had been victorious before, Hasdrubal had assigned to him a fleet of 57
warships, including 50 quinqueremes, 2 quadriremes, and 5 triremes, but
only 32 quinqueremes and the 5 triremes were ready for sea. From Gades he
returned to the winter quarters of his army at New Carthage, and from New
Carthage he commenced his march on Italy. Passing by the city of Onusa, he
marched along the coast to the Ebro. The story runs that whilst halting there
he saw in a dream a youth of god-like appearance who said that he had been
sent by Jupiter to act as guide to Hannibal on his march to Italy. He was
accordingly to follow him and not to lose sight of him or let his eyes wander.
At first, filled with awe, he followed him without glancing round him or
looking back, but as instinctive curiosity impelled him to wonder what it was
that he was forbidden to gaze at behind him, he could no longer command
his eyes. He saw behind him a serpent of vast and marvellous bulk, and as it
moved along trees and bushes crashed down everywhere before it, whilst in
its wake there rolled a thunder-storm. He asked what the monstrous portent
meant, and was told that it was the devastation of Italy; he was to go
forward without further question and allow his destiny to remain hidden.
21.23
Gladdened by this vision he proceeded to
cross the Ebro, with his army in three divisions, after sending men on in
advance to secure by bribes the good-will of the Gauls dwelling about his
crossing-place, and also to reconnoitre the passes of the Alps. He brought
90,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry over the Ebro. His next step was to
reduce to submission the Ilergetes, the Bargusii, and the Ausetani, and also
the district of Lacetania, which lies at the foot of the Pyrenees. He placed
Hanno in charge of the whole coast-line to secure the passes which connect
Spain with Gaul, and furnished him with an army of 10,000 infantry to hold
the district, and 1000 cavalry. When his army commenced the passage of the
Pyrenees and the barbarians found that there was truth in the rumour that
they were being led against Rome, 3000 of the Carpetani deserted. It was
understood that they were induced to desert not so much by the prospect of
the war as by the length of the march and the impossibility of crossing the
Alps. As it would have been hazardous to recall them, or to attempt to
detain them by force, in case the quick passions of the rest of the army
should be roused, Hannibal sent back to their homes more than 7000 men
who, he had personally discovered, were getting tired of the campaign, and
at the same time he gave out that the Carpetani had also been sent back by
him.
21.24
Then,
to prevent his men from being demoralised by further delay and inactivity, he
crossed the Pyrenees with the remainder of his force and fixed his camp at
the town of Iliberri. The Gauls were told that it was against Italy that war
was being made, but as they had heard that the Spaniards beyond the
Pyrenees had been subjugated by force of arms, and strong garrisons placed
in their towns, several tribes, fearing for their liberty, were roused to arms
and mustered at Ruscino. On receiving the announcement of this movement,
Hannibal, fearing delay more than hostilities, sent spokesmen to their chiefs
to say that he was anxious for a conference with them, and either they might
come nearer to Iliberri, or he would approach Ruscino to facilitate their
meeting, for he would gladly receive them in his camp or would himself go
to them without loss of time. He had come into Gaul as a friend not a foe,
and unless the Gauls compelled him he would not draw his sword till he
reached Italy. This was the proposal made through the envoys, but when the
Gauls had, without any hesitation, moved their camp up to Iliberri, they were
effectually secured by bribes and allowed the army a free and unmolested
passage through their territory under the very walls of Ruscino.
21.25
No
intelligence, meanwhile, had reached Rome beyond the fact reported by the
Massilian envoys, namely that Hannibal had crossed the Ebro. No sooner
was this known than the Boii, who had been tampering with the Insubres,
rose in revolt, just as though he had already crossed the Alps, not so much in
consequence of their old standing enmity against Rome as of her recent
aggressions. Bodies of colonists were being settled on Gaulish territory in
the valley of the Po, at Placentia and Cremona, and intense irritation was
produced. Seizing their arms they made an attack on the land, which was
being actually surveyed at the time, and created such terror and confusion
that not only the agricultural population, but even the three Roman
commissioners who were engaged in marking out the holdings, fled to
Mutina, not feeling themselves safe behind the walls of Placentia. The
commissioners were C. Lutatius, C. Servilius, and M. Annius. There is no
doubt as to the name Lutatius, but instead of Annius and Servilius some
annalists have Manlius Acilius and C. Herennius, whilst others give P.
Cornelius Asina and C. Papirius Maso. There is also doubt as to whether it
was the envoys who had been sent to the Boii to remonstrate with them that
were maltreated, or the commissioners upon whom an attack was made
whilst surveying the ground. The Gauls invested Mutina, but as they were
strangers to the art of conducting sieges, and far too indolent to set about
the construction of military works, they contented themselves with
blockading the town without inflicting any injury on the walls. At last they
pretended that they were ready to discuss terms of peace, and the envoys
were invited by the Gaulish chieftains to a conference. Here they were
arrested, in direct violation not only of international law but of the
safe-conduct which had been granted for the occasion. Having made them
prisoners the Gauls declared that they would not release them until their
hostages were restored to them.
When news came that the envoys were prisoners and Mutina and its
garrison in jeopardy, L. Manlius, the praetor, burning with anger, led his
army in separate divisions to Mutina. Most of the country was uncultivated
at that time and the road went through a forest. He advanced without
throwing out scouting parties and fell into an ambush, out of which, after
sustaining considerable loss, he made his way with difficulty on to more open
ground. Here he entrenched himself, and as the Gauls felt it would be
hopeless to attack him there, the courage of his men revived, though it was
tolerably certain that as many as 500 had fallen. They recommenced their
march, and as long as they were going through open country there was no
enemy in view; when they re-entered the forest their rear was attacked and
great confusion and panic created. They lost 700 men and six standards.
When they at last got out of the trackless and entangled forest there was an
end to the terrifying tactics of the Gauls and the wild alarm of the Romans.
There was no difficulty in repelling attacks when they reached the open
country and made their way to Tannetum, a place near the Po. Here they
hastily entrenched themselves, and, helped by the windings of the river and
assisted by the Brixian Gauls, they held their ground against an enemy whose
numbers were daily increasing.
21.26
When
the intelligence of this sudden outbreak reached Rome and the senate
became aware that they had a Gaulish war to face in addition to the war with
Carthage, they ordered C. Atilius, the praetor, to go to the relief of Manlius
with a Roman legion and 5000 men who had been recently enlisted by the
consul from among the allies. As the enemy, afraid to meet these
reinforcements, had retired, Atilius reached Tannetum without any fighting.
After raising a fresh legion in place of the one which had been sent away
with the praetor, P. Cornelius Scipio set sail with sixty warships and coasted
along by the shores of Etruria and Liguria, and from there past the
mountains of the Salyes until he reached Marseilles. Here he disembarked his
troops at the first mouth of the Rhone to which he came -the river flows
into the sea through several mouths -and formed his entrenched camp,
hardly able yet to believe that Hannibal had surmounted the obstacle of the
Pyrenees. When, however, he understood that he was already contemplating
crossing the Rhone, feeling uncertain as to where he would meet him and
anxious to give his men time to recover from the effects of the voyage, he
sent forward a picked force of 300 cavalry accompanied by Massilian guides
and friendly Gauls to explore the country in all directions and if possible to
discover the enemy.
Hannibal had overcome the opposition of the native tribes by either
fear or bribes and had now reached the territory of the Volcae. They were a
powerful tribe, inhabiting the country on both sides of the Rhone, but
distrusting their ability to stop Hannibal on the side of the river nearest to
him, they determined to make the river a barrier and transported nearly all
the population to the other side, on which they prepared to offer armed
resistance. The rest of the river population and those of the Volcae even,
who still remained in their homes, were induced by presents to collect boats
from all sides and to help in constructing others, and their efforts were
stimulated by the desire to get rid as soon as possible of the burdensome
presence of such a vast host of men. So an enormous number of boats and
vessels of every kind, such as they used in their journeys up and down the
river, was got together; new ones were made by the Gauls by hollowing out
the trunks of trees, then the soldiers themselves, seeing the abundance of
timber and how easily they were made, took to fashioning uncouth canoes,
quite content if only they would float and carry burdens and serve to
transport themselves and their belongings.
21.27
Everything was now ready for the
crossing, but the whole of the opposite bank was held by mounted and
unmounted men prepared to dispute the passage. In order to dislodge them
Hannibal sent Hanno, the son of Bomilcar, with a division, consisting mainly
of Spaniards, a day's march up the river. He was to seize the first chance of
crossing without being observed, and then lead his men by a circuitous route
behind the enemy and at the right moment attack them in the rear. The Gauls
who were taken as guides informed Hanno that about 25 miles up-stream a
small island divided the river in two, and the channel was of less depth in
consequence. When they reached the spot they hastily cut down the timber
and constructed rafts on which men and horses and other burdens could be
ferried across. The Spaniards had no trouble; they threw their clothes on to
skins and placing their leather shields on the top they rested on these and so
swam across. The rest of the army was ferried over on rafts, and after
making a camp near the river they took a day's rest after their labours of
boat-making and the nocturnal passage, their general in the meantime
waiting anxiously for an opportunity of putting his plan into execution. The
next day they set out on their march, and lighting a fire on some rising
ground they signalled by the column of smoke that they had crossed the river
and were not very far away. As soon as Hannibal received the signal he
seized the occasion and at once gave the order to cross the river. The
infantry had prepared rafts and boats, the cavalry mostly barges on account
of the horses. A line of large boats was moored across the river a short
distance up-stream to break the force of the current, and consequently the
men in the smaller boats crossed over in smooth water. Most of the horses
were towed astern and swam over, others were carried in barges, ready
saddled and bridled so as to be available for the cavalry the moment they
landed.
21.28
The
Gauls flocked together on the bank with their customary whoops and war
songs, waving their shields over their heads and brandishing their javelins.
They were somewhat dismayed when they saw what was going on in front of
them; the enormous number of large and small boats, the roar of the river,
the confused shouts of the soldiers and boatmen, some of whom were trying
to force their way against the current, whilst others on the bank were
cheering their comrades who were crossing. Whilst they were watching all
this movement with sinking hearts, still more alarming shouts were heard
behind them; Hanno had captured their camp. Soon he appeared on the
scene, and they were now confronted by danger from opposite quarters -the
host of armed men landing from the boats and the sudden attack which was
being made on their rear. For a time the Gauls endeavoured to maintain the
conflict in both directions, but finding themselves losing ground they forced
their way through where there seemed to be least resistance and dispersed to
their various villages. Hannibal brought over the rest of his force
undisturbed, and, without troubling himself any further about the Gauls,
formed his camp.
In the transport of the elephants I believe different plans were
adopted; at all events, the accounts of what took place vary considerably.
Some say that after they had all been collected on the bank the
worst-tempered beast amongst them was teased by his driver, and when he
ran away from it into the water the elephant followed him and drew the
whole herd after it, and as they got out of their depth they were carried by
the current to the opposite bank. The more general account, however, is that
they were transported on rafts; as this method would have appeared the
safest beforehand so it is most probable that it was the one adopted. They
pushed out into the river a raft 200 feet long and 50 feet broad, and to
prevent it from being carried down-stream, one end was secured by several
stout hawsers to the bank. It was covered with earth like a bridge in order
that the animals, taking it for solid ground, would not be afraid to venture on
it. A second raft, of the same breadth but only 100 feet long and capable of
crossing the river, was made fast to the former. The elephants led by the
females were driven along the fixed raft, as if along a road, until they came
on to the smaller one. As soon as they were safely on this it was cast off and
towed by light boats to the other side of the river. When the first lot were
landed others were brought over in the same way. They showed no fear
whilst they were being driven along the fixed raft; their fright began when
they were being carried into mid-channel on the other raft which had been
cast loose. They crowded together, those on the outside backing away from
the water, and showed considerable alarm until their very fears at the sight of
the water made them quiet. Some in their excitement fell overboard and
threw their drivers, but their mere weight kept them steady, and as they felt
their way into shallow water they succeeded in getting safely to land.
21.29
While
the elephants were being ferried across, Hannibal sent 500 Numidian horse
towards the Romans to ascertain their numbers and their intentions. This
troop of horse encountered the 300 Roman cavalry who, as I have already
stated, had been sent forward from the mouth of the Rhone. It was a much
more severe fight than might have been expected from the number of
combatants. Not only were there many wounded but each side lost about the
same number of killed, and the Romans, who were at last completely
exhausted, owed their victory to a panic among the Numidians and their
consequent flight. Of the victors as many as 160 fell, not all Romans, some
were Gauls; whilst the vanquished lost more than 200. This action with
which the war commenced was an omen of its final result, but though it
portended the final victory of Rome it showed that the victory would not be
attained without much bloodshed and repeated defeats. The forces drew off
from the field and returned to their respective commanders. Scipio found
himself unable to form any definite plans beyond what were suggested to him
by the movements of the enemy. Hannibal was undecided whether to resume
his march to Italy or to engage the Romans, the first army to oppose him. He
was dissuaded from the latter course by the arrival of envoys from the Boii
and their chief, Magalus. They came to assure Hannibal of their readiness to
act as guides and take their share in the dangers of the expedition, and they
gave it as their opinion that he ought to reserve all his strength for the
invasion of Italy and not fritter any of it away beforehand. The bulk of his
army had not forgotten the previous war and looked forward with dismay to
meeting their old enemy, but what appalled them much more was the
prospect of an endless journey over the Alps, which rumour said was, to
those at all events who had never tried it, a thing to be dreaded.
21.30
When
Hannibal had made up his mind to go forward and lose no time in reaching
Italy, his goal, he ordered a muster of his troops and addressed them in tones
of mingled rebuke and encouragement. "I am astonished," he said, "to see
how hearts that have been always dauntless have now suddenly become a
prey to fear. Think of the many victorious campaigns you have gone
through, and remember that you did not leave Spain before you had added to
the Carthaginian empire all the tribes in the country washed by two widely
remote seas. The Roman people made a demand for all who had taken part
in the siege of Saguntum to be given up to them, and you, to avenge the
insult, have crossed the Ebro to wipe out the name of Rome and bring
freedom to the world. When you commenced your march, from the setting
to the rising sun, none of you thought it too much for you, but now when
you see that by far the greater part of the way has been accomplished; the
passes of the Pyrenees, which were held by most warlike tribes, surmounted;
the Rhone, that mighty stream, crossed in the face of so many thousand
Gauls, and the rush of its waters checked -now that you are within sight of
the Alps, on the other side of which lies Italy, you have become weary and
are arresting your march in the very gates of the enemy. What do you
imagine the Alps to be other than lofty mountains? Suppose them to be
higher than the peaks of the Pyrenees, surely no region in the world can
touch the sky or be impassable to man. Even the Alps are inhabited and
cultivated, animals are bred and reared there, their gorges and ravines can be
traversed by armies. Why, even the envoys whom you see here did not cross
the Alps by flying through the air, nor were their ancestors native to the soil.
They came into Italy as emigrants looking for a land to settle in, and they
crossed the Alps often in immense bodies with their wives and children and
all their belongings. What can be inaccessible or insuperable to the soldier
who carries nothing with him but his weapons of war? What toils and perils
you went through for eight months to effect the capture of Saguntum! And
now that Rome, the capital of the world, is your goal, can you deem
anything so difficult or so arduous that it should prevent you from reaching
it? Many years ago the Gauls captured the place which Carthaginians despair
of approaching; either you must confess yourselves inferior in courage and
enterprise to a people whom you have conquered again and again, or else
you must look forward to finishing your march on the ground between the
Tiber and the walls of Rome."
21.31
After
this rousing appeal he dismissed them with orders to prepare themselves by
food and rest for the march. The next day they advanced up the left bank of
the Rhone towards the central districts of Gaul, not because this was the
most direct route to the Alps, but because he thought that there would be
less likelihood of the Romans meeting him, for he had no desire to engage
them before he arrived in Italy. Four days' marching brought him to the
"Island." Here the Isere and the Rhone, flowing down from different points
in the Alps, enclose a considerable extent of land and then unite their
channels; the district thus enclosed is called the "Island." The adjacent
country was inhabited by the Allobroges, a tribe who even in those days
were second to none in Gaul in power and reputation. At the time of
Hannibal's visit a quarrel had broken out between two brothers who were
each aspiring to the sovereignty. The elder brother, whose name was
Brancus, had hitherto been the chief, but was now expelled by a party of the
younger men, headed by his brother, who found an appeal to violence more
successful than an appeal to right. Hannibal's timely appearance on the scene
led to the question being referred to him; he was to decide who was the
legitimate claimant to the kingship. He pronounced in favour of the elder
brother, who had the support of the senate and the leading men. In return for
this service he received assistance in provisions and supplies of all kinds,
especially of clothing, a pressing necessity in view of the notorious cold of
the Alps. After settling the feud amongst the Allobroges, Hannibal resumed
his march. He did not take the direct course to the Alps, but turned to the
left towards the Tricastini; then, skirting the territory of the Vocontii, he
marched in the direction of the Tricorii. Nowhere did he meet with any
difficulty until he arrived at the Durance. This river, which also takes its rise
in the Alps, is of all the rivers of Gaul the most difficult to cross. Though
carrying down a great volume of water, it does not lend itself to navigation,
for it is not kept in by banks, but flows in many separate channels. As it is
constantly shifting its bottom and the direction of its currents, the task of
fording it is a most hazardous one, whilst the shingle and boulders carried
down make the foothold insecure and treacherous. It happened to be swollen
by rain at the time, and the men were thrown into much disorder whilst
crossing it, whilst their fears and confused shouting added considerably to
their difficulties.
21.32
Three
days after Hannibal had left the banks of the Rhone, P. Cornelius Scipio
arrived at the deserted camp with his army in battle order, ready to engage at
once. When, however, he saw the abandoned lines and realised that it would
be no easy matter to overtake his opponent after he had got such a long
start, he returned to his ships. He considered that the easier and safer course
would be to meet Hannibal as he came down from the Alps. Spain was the
province allotted to him, and to prevent its being entirely denuded of Roman
troops he sent his brother Cneius Scipio with the greater part of his army to
act against Hasdrubal, not only to keep the old allies and win new ones, but
to drive Hasdrubal out of Spain. He himself sailed for Genoa with a very
small force, intending to defend Italy with the army lying in the valley of the
Po. From the Durance Hannibal's route lay mostly through open level
country, and he reached the Alps without meeting with any opposition from
the Gauls who inhabited the district. But the sight of the Alps revived the
terrors in the minds of his men. Although rumour, which generally magnifies
untried dangers, had filled them with gloomy forebodings, the nearer view
proved much more fearful. The height of the mountains now so close, the
snow which was almost lost in the sky, the wretched huts perched on the
rocks, the flocks and herds shrivelled and stunted with the cold, the men wild
and unkempt, everything animate and inanimate stiff with frost, together
with other sights dreadful beyond description -all helped to increase their
alarm.
As the head of the column began to climb the nearest slopes, the
natives appeared on the heights above; had they concealed themselves in the
ravines and then rushed down they would have caused frightful panic and
bloodshed. Hannibal called a halt and sent on some Gauls to examine the
ground, and when he learnt that advance was impossible in that direction he
formed his camp in the widest part of the valley that he could find;
everywhere around the ground was broken and precipitous. The Gauls who
had been sent to reconnoitre got into conversation with the natives, as there
was little difference between their speech or their manners, and they brought
back word to Hannibal that the pass was only occupied in the daytime, at
nightfall the natives all dispersed to their homes. Accordingly, at early dawn
he began the ascent as though determined to force the pass in broad daylight,
and spent the day in movements designed to conceal his real intentions and
in fortifying the camp on the spot where they had halted. As soon as he
observed that the natives had left the heights and were no longer watching
his movements, he gave orders, with the view of deceiving the enemy, for a
large number of fires to be lighted, larger in fact than would be required by
those remaining in camp. Then, leaving the baggage with the cavalry and the
greater part of the infantry in camp, he himself with a specially selected body
of troops in light marching order rapidly moved out of the defile and
occupied the heights which the enemy had held.
21.33
The
following day the rest of the army broke camp in the grey dawn and
commenced its march. The natives were beginning to assemble at their
customary post of observation when they suddenly became aware that some
of the enemy were in possession of their stronghold right over their heads,
whilst others were advancing on the path beneath. The double impression
made on their eyes and imagination kept them for a few moments
motionless, but when they saw the column falling into disorder mainly
through the horses becoming frightened, they thought that if they increased
the confusion and panic it would be sufficient to destroy it. So they charged
down from rock to rock, careless as to whether there were paths or not, for
they were familiar with the ground. The Carthaginians had to meet this
attack at the same time that they were struggling with the difficulties of the
way, and as each man was doing his best for himself to get out of the reach
of danger, they were fighting more amongst themselves than against the
natives. The horses did the most mischief; they were terrified at the wild
shouts, which the echoing woods and valleys made all the louder, and when
they happened to be struck or wounded they created terrible havoc amongst
the men and the different baggage animals. The road was flanked by sheer
precipices on each side, and in the crowding together many were pushed
over the edge and fell an immense depth. Amongst these were some of the
soldiers; the heavily-laden baggage animals rolled over like falling houses.
Horrible as the sight was, Hannibal remained quiet and kept his men back for
some time, for fear of increasing the alarm and confusion, but when he saw
that the column was broken and that the army was in danger of losing all its
baggage, in which case he would have brought them safely through to no
purpose, he ran down from his higher ground and at once scattered the
enemy. At the same time, however, he threw his own men into still greater
disorder for the moment, but it was very quickly allayed now that the
passage was cleared by the flight of the natives. In a short time the whole
army had traversed the pass, not only without any further disturbance, but
almost in silence. He then seized a fortified village, the head place of the
district, together with some adjacent hamlets, and from the food and cattle
thus secured he provided his army with rations for three days. As the natives,
after their first defeat, no longer impeded their march, whilst the road
presented little difficulty, they made considerable progress during those three
days.
21.34
They
now came to another canton which, considering that it was a mountain
district, had a considerable population. Here he narrowly escaped
destruction, not in fair and open fighting, but by the practices which he
himself employed -falsehood and treachery. The head men from the fortified
villages, men of advanced age, came as a deputation to the Carthaginian and
told him that they had been taught by the salutary example of other people's
misfortunes to seek the friendship of the Carthaginians rather than to feel
their strength. They were accordingly prepared to carry out his orders; he
would receive provisions and guides, and hostages as a guarantee of good
faith. Hannibal felt that he ought not to trust them blindly nor to meet their
offer with a flat refusal, in case they should become hostile. So he replied in
friendly terms, accepted the hostages whom they placed in his hands, made
use of the provisions with which they supplied him on the march, but
followed their guides with his army prepared for action, not at all as though
he were going through a peaceable or friendly country. The elephants and
cavalry were in front, he himself followed with the main body of the infantry,
keeping a sharp and anxious look-out in all directions. Just as they reached a
part of the pass where it narrowed and was overhung on one side by a wall
of rock, the barbarians sprang up from ambush on all sides and assailed the
column in front and rear, at close quarters, and at a distance by rolling huge
stones down on it. The heaviest attack was made in the rear, and as the
infantry faced round to meet it, it became quite obvious that if the rear of the
column had not been made exceptionally strong, a terrible disaster must have
occurred in that pass. As it was, they were in the greatest danger, and within
an ace of total destruction. For whilst Hannibal was hesitating whether to
send his infantry on into the narrow part of the pass -for whilst protecting
the rear of the cavalry they had no reserves to protect their own rear -the
mountaineers, making a flank charge, burst through the middle of the column
and held the pass so that Hannibal had to spend that one night without his
cavalry or his baggage.
21.35
The
next day, as the savages attacked with less vigour, the column closed up, and
the pass was surmounted, not without loss, more, however, of baggage
animals than of men. From that time the natives made their appearance in
smaller numbers and behaved more like banditti than regular soldiers; they
attacked either front or rear just as the ground gave them opportunity, or as
the advance or halt of the column presented a chance of surprise. The
elephants caused considerable delay, owing to the difficulty of getting them
through narrow or precipitous places; on the other hand, they rendered that
part of the column safe from attack where they were, for the natives were
unaccustomed to the sight of them and had a great dread of going too near
them. Nine days from their commencing the ascent they arrived at the
highest point of the Alps, after traversing a region mostly without roads and
frequently losing their way either through the treachery of their guides or
through their own mistakes in trying to find the way for themselves. For two
days they remained in camp on the summit, whilst the troops enjoyed a
respite from fatigue and fighting. Some of the baggage animals which had
fallen amongst the rocks and had afterwards followed the track of the
column came into camp. To add to the misfortunes of the worn-out troops,
there was a heavy fall of snow -the Pleiads were near their setting -and this
new experience created considerable alarm. In the early morning of the third
day the army recommenced its heavy march over ground everywhere deep in
snow. Hannibal saw in all faces an expression of listlessness and
despondency. He rode on in front to a height from which there was a wide
and extensive view, and halting his men, he pointed out to them the land of
Italy and the rich valley of the Po lying at the foot of the Alps. "You are
now," he said, "crossing the barriers not only of Italy, but of Rome itself.
Henceforth all will be smooth and easy for you; in one or, at the most, two
battles, you will be masters of the capital and stronghold of Italy." Then the
army resumed its advance with no annoyance from the enemy beyond
occasional attempts at plunder. The remainder of the march, however, was
attended with much greater difficulty than they had experienced in the
ascent, for the distance to the plains on the Italian side is shorter, and
therefore the descent is necessarily steeper. Almost the whole of the way
was precipitous, narrow, and slippery, so that they were unable to keep their
footing, and if they slipped they could not recover themselves; they kept
falling over each other, and the baggage animals rolled over on their drivers.
21.36
At
length they came to a much narrower pass which descended over such sheer
cliffs that a light-armed soldier could hardly get down it even by hanging on
to projecting roots and branches. The place had always been precipitous, and
a landslip had recently carried away the road for 1000 feet. The cavalry came
to a halt here as though they had arrived at their journey's end, and whilst
Hannibal was wondering what could be causing the delay he was informed
that there was no passage. Then he went forward to examine the place and
saw that there was nothing for it but to lead the army by a long circuitous
route over pathless and untrodden snow. But this, too, soon proved to be
impracticable. The old snow had been covered to a moderate depth by a
fresh fall, and the first comers planted their feet firmly on the new snow, but
when it had become melted under the tread of so many men and beasts there
was nothing to walk on but ice covered with slush. Their progress now
became one incessant and miserable struggle. The smooth ice allowed no
foothold, and as they were going down a steep incline they were still less
able to keep on their legs, whilst, once down, they tried in vain to rise, as
their hands and knees were continually slipping. There were no stumps or
roots about for them to get hold of and support themselves by, so they rolled
about helplessly on the glassy ice and slushy snow. The baggage animals as
they toiled along cut through occasionally into the lowest layer of snow, and
when they stumbled they struck out their hoofs in their struggles to recover
themselves and broke through into the hard and congealed ice below, where
most of them stuck as though caught in a gin.
21.37
At
last, when men and beasts alike were worn out by their fruitless exertions, a
camp was formed on the summit, after the place had been cleared with
immense difficulty owing to the quantity of snow that had to be removed.
The next thing was to level the rock through which alone a road was
practicable. The soldiers were told off to cut through it. They built up
against it an enormous pile of tall trees which they had felled and lopped, and
when the wind was strong enough to blow up the fire they set light to the
pile. When the rock was red hot they poured vinegar upon it to disintegrate
it. After thus treating it by fire they opened a way through it with their tools,
and eased the steep slope by winding tracks of moderate gradient, so that
not only the baggage animals but even the elephants could be led down. Four
days were spent over the rock, and the animals were almost starved to death,
for the heights are mostly bare of vegetation and what herbage there is is
buried beneath the snow. In the lower levels there were sunny valleys and
streams flowing through woods, and spots more deserving of human
inhabitants. Here the beasts were turned loose to graze, and the troops, worn
out with their engineering, were allowed to rest. In three days more they
reached the open plains and found a pleasanter country and pleasanter
people living in it
21.38
Such,
in the main, was the way in which they reached Italy, five months, according
to some authorities, after leaving New Carthage, fifteen days of which were
spent in overcoming the difficulties of the Alps. The authorities are
hopelessly at variance as to the number of the troops with which Hannibal
entered Italy. The highest estimate assigns him 100,000 infantry and 20,000
cavalry; the lowest puts his strength at 20,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry. L.
Cincius Alimentus tells us that he was taken prisoner by Hannibal, and I
should be most inclined to accept his authority if he had not confused the
numbers by adding in the Gauls and Ligurians; if these are included there
were 80,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. It is, however, more probable that
these joined Hannibal in Italy, and some authorities actually assert this.
Cincius also states that he had heard Hannibal say that subsequently to his
passage of the Rhone he lost 36,000 men, besides an immense number of
horses and other animals. The first people he came to were the Taurini, a
semi-Garlic tribe. As tradition is unanimous on this point I am the more
surprised that a question should be raised as to what route Hannibal took
over the Alps, and that it should be generally supposed that he crossed over
the Poenine range, which is said to have derived its name from that
circumstance. Coelius asserts that he crossed by the Cremonian range. These
two passes, however, would not have brought him to the Taurini but
through the Salassi, a mountain tribe, to the Libuan Gauls. It is highly
improbable that those routes to Gaul were available at that time, and in any
case the Poenine route would have been closed by the semi-German tribes
who inhabited the district. And it is perfectly certain, if we accept their
authority, that the Seduni and Veragri, who inhabit that range, say that the
name of Poenine was not given to it from any passage of the Carthaginians
over it but from the deity Poeninus, whose shrine stands on the highest point
of the range.
21.39
It was
a very fortunate circumstance for Hannibal at the outset of his campaign that
the Taurini, the first people he came to, were at war with the Insubres. But
he was unable to bring his army into the field to assist either side, for it was
whilst they were recovering from the ills and misfortunes which had gathered
upon them that they felt them most. Rest and idleness instead of toil, plenty
following upon starvation, cleanliness and comfort after squalor and
emaciation, affected their filthy and well-nigh bestialised bodies in various
ways. It was this state of things which induced P. Cornelius Scipio, the
consul, after he had arrived with his ships at Pisa and taken over from
Manlius and Atilius an army of raw levies disheartened by their recent
humiliating defeats, to push on with all speed to the Po that he might engage
the enemy before he had recovered his strength. But when he reached
Placentia Hannibal had already left his encampment and taken by storm one
of the cities of the Taurini, their capital, in fact, because they would not
voluntarily maintain friendly relations with him. He would have secured the
adhesion of the Gauls in the valley of the Po, not by fear but by their own
choice, if the sudden arrival of the consul had not taken them by surprise
whilst they were waiting for a favourable moment to revolt. Just at the time
of Scipio's arrival, Hannibal moved out of the country of the Taurini, for,
seeing how undecided the Gauls were as to whose side they should take, he
thought that if he were on the spot they would follow him. The two armies
were now almost within sight of one another, and the commanders who were
confronting each other, though not sufficiently acquainted with each other's
military skill, were even then imbued with mutual respect and admiration.
Even before the fall of Saguntum the name of Hannibal was on all men's lips
in Rome, and in Scipio Hannibal recognised a great leader, seeing that he
had been chosen beyond all others to oppose him. This mutual esteem was
enhanced by their recent achievements; Scipio, after Hannibal had left him in
Gaul, was in time to meet him on his descent from the Alps; Hannibal had
not only dared to attempt but had actually accomplished the passage of the
Alps. Scipio, however, made the first move by crossing the Po and shifting
his camp to the Ticinus. Before leading his men into battle he addressed
them in a speech full of encouragement, in the following terms:
21.40
"If,
soldiers, I were leading into battle the army which I had with me in Gaul,
there would have been no need for me to address you. For what
encouragement would those cavalry need who had won such a brilliant
victory over the enemy's cavalry at the Rhone or those legions of infantry
with whom I pursued this same enemy, who by his running away and
shirking an engagement acknowledged that I was his conqueror? That army,
raised for service in Spain, is campaigning under my brother, Cn. Scipio,
who is acting as my deputy in the country which the senate and people of
Rome have assigned to it. In order, therefore, that you might have a consul
to lead you against Hannibal and the Carthaginians, I have volunteered to
command in this battle, and as I am new to you and you to me I must say a
few words to you. "Now as to the character of the enemy and the kind of
warfare which awaits you. You have to fight, soldiers, with the men whom
you defeated in the former war by land and sea, from whom you have
exacted a war indemnity for the last twenty years, and from whom you
wrested Sicily and Sardinia as the prizes of war. You, therefore, will go into
this battle with the exultation of victors, they with the despondency of the
vanquished. They are not going to fight now because they are impelled by
courage but through sheer necessity; unless indeed you suppose that, after
shirking a contest when their army was at its full strength, they have gained
more confidence now that they have lost two-thirds of their infantry and
cavalry in their passage over the Alps, now that those who survive are fewer
than those who have perished. "'Yes,' it may be said, 'they are few in number,
but they are strong in courage and physique, and possess a power of
endurance and vigour in attack which very few can withstand.' No, they are
only semblances or rather ghosts of men, worn out with starvation, cold,
filth, and squalor, bruised and enfeebled amongst the rocks and precipices,
and, what is more, their limbs are frostbitten, their thews and sinews
cramped with cold, their frames shrunk and shrivelled with frost, their
weapons battered and shivered, their horses lame and out of condition. This
is the cavalry, this the infantry with whom you are going to fight; you will
not have an enemy but only the last vestiges of an enemy to meet. My only
fear is that when you have fought it will appear to be the Alps that have
conquered Hannibal. But perhaps it was right that it should be so, and that
the gods, without any human aid, should begin and all but finish this war
with a people and their general who have broken treaties, and that to us,
who next to the gods have been sinned against, it should be left to complete
what they began.
21.41
"I am
not afraid of any one thinking that I am saying this in a spirit of bravado for
the sake of putting you in good heart, whilst my real feelings and convictions
are far otherwise. I was at perfect liberty to go with my army to Spain, for
which country I had actually started, and which was my assigned province.
There I should have had my brother to share my plans and dangers; I should
have had Hasdrubal rather than Hannibal as my foe, and undoubtedly a less
serious war on my hands. But as I was sailing along the coast of Gaul I
heard tidings of this enemy, and at once landed, and after sending on cavalry
in advance moved up to the Rhone. A cavalry action was fought -that was
the only arm I had the opportunity of employing -and I defeated the enemy.
His infantry were hurrying away like an army in flight, and as I could not
come up with them overland, I returned to my ships with all possible speed,
and after making a wide circuit by sea and land have met this dreaded foe
almost at the foot of the Alps. Does it seem to you that I have unexpectedly
fallen in with him whilst I was anxious to decline a contest and not rather
that I am meeting him actually on his track and challenging and dragging him
into action? I shall be glad to learn whether the earth has suddenly within the
last twenty years produced a different breed of Carthaginans, or whether
they are the same as those who fought at the Aegates, and whom you
allowed to depart from Eryx on payment of eighteen denarii a head, and
whether this Hannibal is, as he gives out, the rival of Hercules in his
journeys, or whether he has been left by his father to pay tax and tribute and
to be the slave of the Roman people. If his crime at Saguntum were not
driving him on, he would surely have some regard, if not for his conquered
country, at all events for his house and his father, and the treaties signed by
that Hamilcar who at the order of our consul withdrew his garrison from
Eryx, who with sighs and groans accepted the hard conditions imposed on
the conquered Carthaginians, and who agreed to evacuate Sicily and pay a
war indemnity to Rome. And so I would have you, soldiers, fight not merely
in the spirit which you are wont to show against other foes, but with feelings
of indignant anger as though you saw your own slaves bearing arms against
you. When they were shut up in Eryx we might have inflicted the most
terrible of human punishments and starved them to death; we might have
taken our victorious fleet across to Africa, and in a few days destroyed
Carthage without a battle. We granted pardon to their prayers, we allowed
them to escape from the blockade, we agreed to terms of peace with those
whom we had conquered, and afterwards when they were in dire straits
through the African war we took them under our protection, To requite us
for these acts of kindness they are following the lead of a young madman and
coming to attack our fatherland. I only wish this struggle were for honour
alone and not for safety. It is not about the possession of Sicily and Sardinia,
the old subjects of dispute, but for Italy that you have to fight. There is no
second army at our back to oppose the enemy if we fall to win, there are no
more Alps to delay his advance while a fresh army can be raised for defence.
Here it is, soldiers, that we have to resist, just as though we were fighting
before the walls of Rome. Every one of you must remember that he is using
his arms to protect not himself only but also his wife and little children; nor
must his anxiety be confined to his home, he must realise, too, that the
senate and people of Rome are watching our exploits today. What our
strength and courage are now here, such will be the fortune of our City
yonder and of the empire of Rome."
21.42
Such
was the language which the consul used towards the Romans. Hannibal
thought that the courage of his men ought to be roused by deeds first rather
than by words. After forming his army into a circle to view the spectacle, he
placed in the centre some Alpine prisoners in chains, and when some Gaulish
arms had been thrown down at their feet he ordered an interpreter to ask if
any one of them was willing to fight if he were freed from his chains and
received arms and a horse as the reward of victory. All to a man demanded
arms and battle, and when the lot was cast to decide who should fight, each
wished that he might be the one whom Fortune should select for the combat.
As each man's lot fell, he hastily seized his arms full of eagerness and
exultant delight, amidst the congratulations of his comrades and danced after
the custom of his country. But when they began to fight, such was the state
of feeling not only amongst the men who had accepted this condition, but
amongst the spectators generally that the good fortune of those who died
bravely was lauded quite as much as that of those who were victorious.
21.43
After
his men had been impressed by watching several pairs of combatants
Hannibal dismissed them, and afterwards summoned them round him, when
he is reported to have made the following speech: "Soldiers, you have seen
in the fate of others an example how to conquer or to die. If the feelings with
which you watched them lead you to form a similar estimate of your own
fortunes we are victors. That was no idle spectacle but a picture, as it were,
of your own condition. Fortune, I am inclined to think has bound you in
heavier chains and imposed upon you a sterner necessity than on your
captives. You are shut in on the right hand and on the left by two seas, and
you have not a single ship in which to make your escape; around you flows
the Po, a greater river than the Rhone and a more rapid one; the barrier of
the Alps frowns upon you behind, those Alps which you could hardly cross
when your strength and vigour were unimpaired. Here, soldiers, on this spot
where you have for the first time encountered the enemy you must either
conquer or die. The same Fortune which has imposed upon you the necessity
of fighting also holds out rewards of victory, rewards as great as any which
men are wont to solicit from the immortal gods. Even if we were only going
to recover Sicily and Sardinia, possessions which were wrested from our
fathers, they would be prizes ample enough to satisfy us. Everything that the
Romans now possess, which they have won through so many triumphs, all
that they have amassed, will become yours, together with those who own it.
Come then, seize your arms and with the help of heaven win this splendid
reward. You have spent time enough in hunting cattle on the barren
mountains of Lusitania and Celtiberia, and finding no recompense for all
your toils and dangers; now the hour has come for you to enter upon rich
and lucrative campaigns and to earn rewards which are worth the earning,
after your long march over all those mountains and rivers, and through all
those nations in arms. Here Fortune has vouchsafed an end to your toils,
here she will vouchsafe a reward worthy of all your past services.
"Do not think because the war, being against Rome, bears a great
name, that therefore victory will be correspondingly difficult. Many a
despised enemy has fought a long and costly fight; nations and kings of high
renown have been beaten with a very slight effort. For, setting aside the
glory which surrounds the name of Rome, what point is there in which they
can be compared to you? To say nothing of your twenty years' campaigning
earned on with all your courage, all your good fortune, from the pillars of
Hercules, from the shores of the ocean, from the furthest corners of the
earth, through the midst of all the most warlike peoples of Spain and Gaul,
you have arrived here as victors. The army with which you will fight is made
up of raw levies who were beaten, conquered, and hemmed in by the Gauls
this very summer, who are strangers to their general, and he a stranger to
them. I, reared as I was, almost born, in the headquarters tent of my father, a
most distinguished general, I, who have subjugated Spain and Gaul, who
have conquered not only the Alpine tribes, but, what is a much greater task,
the Alps themselves -am I to compare myself with this six months' general
who has deserted his own army, who, if any one were to point out to him the
Romans and the Carthaginians after their standards were removed, would, I
am quite certain, not know which army he was in command of as consul? I
do not count it a small matter, soldiers, that there is not a man amongst you
before whose eyes I have not done many a soldierly deed, or to whom I,
who have witnessed and attested his courage, could not recount his own
gallant exploits and the time and place where they were performed. I was
your pupil before I was your commander, and I shall go into battle
surrounded by men whom I have commended and rewarded thousands of
times against those who know nothing of each other, who are mutual
strangers.
21.44
"Wherever I turn my eyes I see nothing
but courage and strength, a veteran infantry, a cavalry, regular and irregular
alike, drawn from the noblest tribes, you, our most faithful and brave allies,
you, Carthaginians, who are going to fight for your country, inspired by a
most righteous indignation. We are taking the aggressive, we are descending
in hostile array into Italy, prepared to fight more bravely and more fearlessly
than our foe because he who attacks is animated by stronger hopes and
greater courage than he who meets the attack. Besides, we are smarting
from a sense of injustice and humiliation. First they demanded me, your
general, as their victim, then they insisted that all of you who had taken part
in the siege of Saguntum should be surrendered; had you been given up they
would have inflicted upon you the most exquisite tortures. That
outrageously cruel and tyrannical nation claims everything for itself, makes
everything dependent on its will and pleasure; they think it right to dictate
with whom we are to make war or peace. They confine and enclose us
within mountains and rivers as boundaries, but they do not observe the limits
which they themselves have fixed. 'Do not cross the Ebro, see that you have
nothing to do with the Saguntines.' 'But Saguntum is not on the Ebro.' 'You
must not move a step anywhere.' 'Is it a small matter, your taking from me
my oldest provinces, Sicily and Sardinia? Will you cross over into Spain as
well, and if I withdraw from there, will you cross over into Africa? Do I say,
will cross over? You have crossed over.' They have sent the two consuls for
this year, one to Africa, the other to Spain. There is nothing left to us
anywhere except what we claim by force of arms. Those may be allowed to
be cowards and dastards who have something to fall back upon, whom their
own land, their own territory will receive as they flee through its safe and
peaceful roads; you must of necessity be brave men, every alternative
between victory and death has been broken off by the resolve of despair, and
you are compelled either to conquer, or if Fortune wavers, to meet death in
battle rather than in flight. If you have all made up your minds to this, I say
again you are victors, no keener weapon has been put into men's hands by
the immortal gods than a contempt for death."
21.45
After
the fighting spirit of both armies had been roused by these harangues, the
Romans threw a bridge over the Ticinus and constructed a blockhouse for its
defence. Whilst they were thus occupied, the Carthaginian sent Maharbal
with a troop of 500 Numidian horse to ravage the lands of the allies of
Rome, but with orders to spare those of the Gauls as far as possible, and to
win over their chiefs to his side. When the bridge was completed the Roman
army crossed over in the territory of the Insubres and took up a position five
miles from Ictumuli, where Hannibal had his camp. As soon as he saw that a
battle was imminent, he hastily recalled Maharbal and his troopers. Feeling
that he could never say enough by way of admonition and encouragement to
his soldiers, he ordered an assembly, and before the whole army offered
definite rewards in the hope of which they were to fight. He said that he
would give them land wherever they wished, in Italy, Africa, or Spain, which
would be free from all taxation for the recipient and for his children; if any
preferred money to land, he would satisfy his desires; if any of the allies
wished to become Carthaginian citizens he would give them the opportunity;
if any preferred to return to their homes he would take care that their
circumstances should be such that they would never wish to exchange them
with any of their countrymen. He even promised freedom to the slaves who
followed their masters, and to the masters, for every slave freed, two more
as compensation. To convince them of his determination to carry out these
promises, he held a lamb with his left hand and a flint knife in his right and
prayed to Jupiter and the other gods, that, if he broke his word and forswore
himself they would slay him as he had slain the lamb. He then crushed the
animal's head with the flint. They all felt then that the gods themselves would
guarantee the fulfilment of their hopes, and looked upon the delay in
bringing on an action as delay in gaining their desires; with one mind and one
voice they clamoured to be led into battle.
21.46
The
Romans were far from showing this alacrity. Amongst other causes of alarm
they had been unnerved by some portents which had happened lately. A wolf
had entered the camp and after worrying all it met had got away unhurt. A
swarm of bees, too, had settled on a tree which overhung the headquarters
tent. After the necessary propitiation had been made Scipio moved out with
a force of cavalry and light-armed javelin men towards the enemy's camp to
get a nearer view and to ascertain the number and nature of his force. He fell
in with Hannibal who was also advancing with his cavalry to explore the
neighbourhood. Neither body at first saw the other; the first indication of a
hostile approach was given by the unusually dense cloud of dust which was
raised by the tramp of so many men and horses. Each party halted and made
ready for battle. Scipio placed the javelin men and the Gaulish cavalry in the
front, the Roman horse and the heavy cavalry of the allies as reserves.
Hannibal formed his centre with his regular cavalry, and posted the
Numidians on the flanks. Scarcely had the battle shout been raised before the
javelin men retired to the second line amongst the reserves. For some time
the cavalry kept up an equal fight, but as the foot-soldiers became mixed up
with the mounted men they made their horses unmanageable, many were
thrown or else dismounted where they saw their comrades in difficulty, until
the battle was mainly fought on foot. Then the Numidians on the flanks
wheeled round and appeared on the rear of the Romans, creating dismay and
panic amongst them. To make matters worse the consul was wounded and in
danger; he was rescued by the intervention of his son who was just
approaching manhood. This was the youth who afterwards won the glory of
bringing this war to a close, and gained the soubriquet of Africanus for his
splendid victory over Hannibal and the Carthaginians. The javelin men were
the first to be attacked by the Numidians and they fled in disorder, the rest of
the force, the cavalry, closed round the consul, shielding him as much by
their persons as by their arms, and returned to camp in orderly retirement.
Caelius assigns the honour of saving the consul to a Ligurian slave, but I
would rather believe that it was his son; the majority of authors assert this
and the tradition is generally accepted.
21.47
This
was the first battle with Hannibal, and the result made it quite clear that the
Carthaginian was superior in his cavalry, and consequently that the open
plains which stretch from the Po to the Alps were not a suitable battlefield
for the Romans. The next night accordingly, the soldiers were ordered to
collect their baggage in silence, the army moved away from the Ticinus and
marched rapidly to the Po, which they crossed by the pontoon bridge which
was still intact, in perfect order and without any molestation by the enemy.
They reached Placentia before Hannibal knew for certain that they had left
the Ticinus; however, he succeeded in capturing some 600, who were
loitering on his side of the Po, and were slowly unfastening the end of the
bridge. He was unable to use the bridge for crossing, as the ends had been
unfastened and the whole was floating down-stream. According to Caelius,
Mago with the cavalry and Spanish infantry at once swam across, whilst
Hannibal himself took his army across higher up the river where it was
fordable, the elephants being stationed in a row from bank to bank to break
the force of the current. Those who know the river will hardly believe this
for it is highly improbable that the cavalry could have stood against so
violent a river without damage to their horses and arms, even supposing that
the Spaniards had been carried across by their inflated skins, and it would
have required a march of many days to find a ford in the Po where an army
loaded with baggage could be taken across. I attach greater weight to those
authorities who state that it took them at least two days to find a spot where
they could throw a bridge over the river, and that it was there that Mago's
cavalry and the Spanish light infantry crossed. Whilst Hannibal was waiting
near the river to give audience to deputations from the Gauls, he sent his
heavy infantry across, and during this interval Mago and his cavalry
advanced a day's march from the river in the direction of the enemy at
Placentia. A few days later Hannibal entrenched himself in a position six
miles from Placentia, and the next day he drew out his army in battle order in
full view of the enemy and gave him the opportunity of fighting.
21.48
The
following night a murderous outbreak took place amongst the Gaulish
auxiliaries in the Roman camp; there was, however, more excitement and
confusion than actual loss of life. About 2000 infantry and 200 horsemen
massacred the sentinels and deserted to Hannibal. The Carthaginian gave
them a kind reception and sent them to their homes with the promise of great
rewards if they would enlist the sympathies of their countrymen on his
behalf. Scipio saw in this outrage a signal of revolt for all the Gauls, who,
infected by the madness of this crime, would at once fly to arms, and though
still suffering severely from his wound, he left his position in the fourth
watch of the following night, his army marching in perfect silence, and
shifted his camp close to the Trebia on to higher ground where the hills were
impracticable for cavalry. He was less successful in escaping the notice of
the enemy than he had been at the Ticinus, Hannibal sent first the Numidians,
then afterwards the whole of his cavalry in pursuit and would have inflicted
disaster upon the rear of the column at all events, had not the Numidians
been tempted by their desire for plunder to turn aside to the deserted Roman
camp. Whilst they were wasting their time in prying into every corner of the
camp, without finding anything worth waiting for, the enemy slipped out of
their hands, and when they caught sight of the Romans they had already
crossed the Trebia and were measuring out the site for their camp. A few
stragglers whom they caught on their side the river were killed. Unable any
longer to endure the irritation of his wound, which had been aggravated
during the march, and also thinking that he ought to wait for his colleague -he had already heard that he had been recalled from Sicily -Scipio selected
what seemed the safest position near the river, and formed a standing camp
which was strongly entrenched. Hannibal had encamped not far from there,
and in spite of his elation at his successful cavalry action he felt considerable
anxiety at the shortness of supplies which, owing to his marching through
hostile territory where no stores were provided, became more serious day by
day. He sent a detachment to the town of Clastidium where the Romans had
accumulated large quantities of corn. Whilst they were preparing to attack
the place they were led to hope that it would be betrayed to them. Dasius, a
Brundisian, was commandant of the garrison, and he was induced by a
moderate bribe of 400 gold pieces to betray Clastidium to Hannibal. The
place was the granary of the Carthaginians while they were at the Trebia. No
cruelty was practiced on the garrison, as Hannibal was anxious to win a
reputation for clemency at the outset.
21.49
.The
war on the Trebia had for the time being come to a standstill, but military
and naval actions were taking place around Sicily and the islands fringing
Italy, both under the conduct of Sempronius and also before his arrival.
Twenty quinqueremes with a thousand soldiers on board had been
despatched by the Carthaginians to Italy, nine of them to Liparae, eight to
the island of Vulcanus, and three had been carried by the currents into the
Straits of Messana. These were sighted from Messana, and Hiero, the King
of Syracuse, who happened to be there at the time waiting for the consul,
despatched twelve ships against them, and they were taken without any
opposition and brought into the harbour of Messana. It was ascertained from
the prisoners, that besides the fleet of twenty ships to which they belonged
which had sailed for Italy thirty-five quinqueremes were also on the way to
Sicily with the object of stirring up the old allies of Carthage. Their main
anxiety was to secure Lilybaeum, and the prisoners were of opinion that the
storm which had separated them from the rest had also driven that fleet up to
the Aegates. The king communicated this information just as he had received
it to M. Aemilius, the praetor, whose province Sicily was, and advised him
to throw a strong garrison into Lilybaeum. The praetor at once sent envoys
and military tribunes to the neighbouring states to urge them to take
measures for self-defence. Lilybaeum especially was engrossed in
preparations for war; orders were issued for the seamen to carry ten days'
rations on board that there might be no delay in setting sail when the signal
was given; and men were despatched along the coast to look out for the
approach of the hostile fleet. So it came to pass that although the
Carthaginians had purposely lessened the speed of their vessels, so that they
might approach Lilybaeum before daylight, they were descried in the offing
owing to there being a moon all night, and also because they were coming
with their sails set. Instantly the signal was given by the look-out men; in the
town there was the cry, "To arms," and the ships were manned. Some of the
soldiers were on the walls and guarding the gates, others were on board the
ships. As the Carthaginians saw that they would have to deal with people
who were anything but unprepared, they stood out from the harbour till
daylight, and spent the time in lowering their masts and preparing for action.
When it grew light they put out to sea that they might have sufficient room
for fighting, and that the enemy's ships might be free to issue from the
harbour. The Romans did not decline battle, encouraged as they were by the
recollection of their former conflicts in this very place, and full of confidence
in the numbers and courage of their men.
21.50
When
they had sailed out to sea the Romans were eager to come to close quarters
and make a hand-to-hand fight of it; the Carthaginians, on the other hand,
sought to avoid this and to succeed by maneuvering and not by direct attack;
they preferred to make it a battle of ships rather than of soldiers. For their
fleet was amply provided with seamen, but only scantily manned by soldiers,
and whenever a ship was laid alongside one of the enemy's they were very
unequally matched in fighting men. When this became generally known, the
spirits of the Romans rose as they realised how many of their military were
on board, whilst the Carthaginians lost heart when they remembered how
few they had. Seven of their ships were captured in a very short time, the
rest took to flight. In the seven ships there were 1700 soldiers and sailors,
amongst them three members of the Carthaginian nobility. The Roman fleet
returned undamaged into port, with the exception of one which had been
rammed, but even that was brought in. Immediately after this battle Tiberius
Sempronius, the consul, arrived at Messana before those in the town had
heard of it. King Hiero went to meet him at the entrance of the Straits with
his fleet fully equipped and manned, and went on board the consul's vessel to
congratulate him on having safely arrived with his fleet and his army, and to
wish him a prosperous and successful passage to Sicily. He then described
the condition of the island and the movements of the Carthaginians, and
promised to assist the Romans now in his old age with the same readiness
which he had shown as a young man in the former war; he should supply the
seamen and soldiers with corn and clothing gratis. He also told the consul
that Lilybaeum and the cities on the coast were in great danger, some were
anxious to effect a revolution. The consul saw that there must be no delay in
his sailing for Lilybaeum; he started at once and the king accompanied him
with his fleet.
21.51
At
Lilybaeum Hiero and his fleet bade him farewell, and the consul, after leaving
the praetor to see to the defence of the coast of Sicily, crossed over to Malta
which was held by the Carthaginians. Hamilcar, the son of Gisgo, who was
in command of the garrison, surrendered the island and his men, a little under
2000 in number. A few days later he returned to Lilybaeum, and the
prisoners, with the exception of the three nobles, were sold by auction. After
satisfying himself as to the security of that part of Sicily, the consul sailed to
the Insulae Vulcani, as he heard that the Carthaginian fleet was anchored
there. No enemy, however, was found in the neighbourhood, for they had
left for Italy to ravage the coastal districts, and after laying waste the
territory of Vibo they were threatening the city. Whilst he was returning to
Sicily the news of these depredations reached the consul, and at the same
time a despatch was handed to him from the senate informing him of
Hannibal's presence in Italy and ordering him to come to his colleague's
assistance as soon as possible. With all these causes for anxiety weighing
upon him, the consul at once embarked his army and despatched it up the
Adriatic to Ariminum. He furnished Sex. Pomponius, his legate, with
twenty-five ships of war, and entrusted to him the protection of the Italian
coast and the territory of Vibo, and made up the fleet of M. Aemilius, the
praetor, to fifty vessels. After making these arrangements for Sicily, he
started for Italy with ten ships, and cruising along the coast reached
Ariminum. From there he marched to the Trebia and effected a junction with
his colleague.
21.52
The
fact that both consuls and all the available strength that Rome possessed
were now brought up to oppose Hannibal, was a pretty clear proof that
either that force was adequate for the defence of Rome or that all hope of its
defence must be abandoned. Nevertheless, one consul, depressed after his
cavalry defeat, and also by his wound, would rather that battle should be
deferred. The other, whose courage had suffered no check and was therefore
all the more eager to fight, was impatient of any delay. The country between
the Trebia and the Po was inhabited by Gauls who in this struggle between
two mighty peoples showed impartial goodwill to either side, with the view,
undoubtedly, of winning the victor's gratitude. The Romans were quite
satisfied with this neutrality if only it was maintained and the Gauls kept
quiet, but Hannibal was extremely indignant, as he was constantly giving out
that he had been invited by the Gauls to win their freedom. Feelings of
resentment and, at the same time, a desire to enrich his soldiers with plunder
prompted him to send 2000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, made up of Gauls and
Numidians, mostly the latter, with orders to ravage the whole country,
district after district, right up to the banks of the Po. Though the Gauls had
hitherto maintained an impartial attitude, they were compelled in their need
of help to turn from those who had inflicted these outrages to those who
they hoped would avenge them. They sent envoys to the consuls to beg the
Romans to come to the rescue of a land which was suffering because its
people had been too loyal to Rome. Cornelius Scipio did not consider that
either the grounds alleged or the circumstances justified his taking action. He
regarded that nation with suspicion on account of their many acts of
treachery, and even if their past faithlessness could have been forgotten
through lapse of time, he could not forget the recent treachery of the Boii.
Sempronius, on the other hand, was of opinion that the most effective means
of preserving the fidelity of their allies was to defend those who first asked
for their help. As his colleague still hesitated, he sent his own cavalry
supported by about a thousand javelin men to protect the territory of the
Gauls on the other side of the Trebia. They attacked the enemy suddenly
whilst they were scattered and in disorder, most of them loaded with
plunder, and after creating a great panic amongst them, and inflicting severe
losses upon them, they drove them in flight to their camp. The fugitives were
driven back by their comrades who poured in great numbers out of the
camp, and thus reinforced they renewed the fighting. The battle wavered as
each side retired or pursued, and up to the last the action was undecided.
The enemy lost more men; the Romans claimed the victory.
21.53
To no
one in the whole army did the victory appear more important or more
decisive than to the consul himself. What gave him especial pleasure was that
he had proved superior in that arm in which his colleague had been worsted.
He saw that the spirits of his men were restored, and that there was no one
but his colleague who wished to delay battle; he believed that Scipio was
more sick in mind than in body, and that the thought of his wound made him
shrink from the dangers of the battlefield. "But we must not be infected by a
sick man's lethargy. What will be gained by further delay, or rather, by
wasting time? Whom are we expecting as our third consul; what fresh army
are we looking for? The camp of the Carthaginians is in Italy, almost in sight
of the City. They are not aiming at Sicily and Sardinia, which they lost after
their defeats, nor the Spain which lies on this side the Ebro; their sole object
is to drive the Romans away from their ancestral soil, from the land on which
they were born. What groans our fathers would utter, accustomed as they
were to warring round the walls of Carthage, if they could see us, their
descendants, with two consuls and two consular armies, cowering in our
camp in the very heart of Italy, whilst the Carthaginian is annexing to his
empire all between the Alps and the Apennines." This was the way he spoke
when sitting by his incapacitated colleague, this the language he used before
his soldiers as though he were haranguing the Assembly. He was urged on,
too, by the near approach of the time for the elections, and the fear that the
war, if delayed, might pass into the hands of the new consuls, as well as by
the chance he had of monopolising all the glory of it while his colleague was
on the sick list. In spite, therefore, of the opposition of Cornelius he ordered
the soldiers to get ready for the coming battle.
Hannibal saw clearly what was the best course for the enemy to
adopt, and had very little hope that the consuls would do anything rash or
ill-advised. When, however, he found that what he had previously learnt by
hearsay was actually the case, namely, that one of the consuls was a man of
impetuous and headstrong character, and that he had become still more so
since the recent cavalry action, he had very little doubt in his own mind that
he would have a favourable opportunity of giving battle. He was anxious not
to lose a moment, in order that he might fight whilst the hostile army was
still raw and the better of the two generals was incapacitated by his wound,
and also whilst the Gauls were still in a warlike mood, for he knew that most
of them would follow him with less alacrity the further they were dragged
from their homes. These and similar considerations led him to hope that a
battle was imminent, and made him desirous of forcing an engagement if
there was any holding back on the other side. He sent out some Gauls to
reconnoitre -as Gauls were serving in both armies they could be most safely
trusted to find out what he wanted -and when they reported that the
Romans had prepared for battle, the Carthaginian began to look out for
ground which would admit of an ambuscade.
21.54
Between the two armies there was a
stream with very high banks which were overgrown with marshy grass and
the brambles and brushwood which are generally found on waste ground.
After riding round the place and satisfying himself from personal observation
that it was capable of concealing even cavalry, Hannibal, turning to his
brother Mago, said, "This will be the place for you to occupy. Pick out of
our whole force of cavalry and infantry a hundred men from each arm, and
bring them to me at the first watch, now it is time for food and rest." He then
dismissed his staff. Presently Mago appeared with his 200 picked men. "I see
here," said Hannibal, "the very flower of my army, but you must be strong in
numbers as well as in courage. Each of you therefore go and choose nine
others like himself, from the squadrons and the maniples. Mago will show
you the place where you are to lie in ambuscade, you have an enemy who are
blindly ignorant of these practices in war." After sending Mago with his 1000
infantry and 1000 cavalry to take up his position, Hannibal gave orders for
the Numidian cavalry to cross the Trebia in the early dawn and ride up to the
gates of the Roman camp; then they were to discharge their missiles on the
outposts and so goad the enemy on to battle. When the fighting had once
started they were gradually to give ground and draw their pursuers to their
own side of the river. These were the instructions to the Numidians; the
other commanders, both infantry and cavalry, were ordered to see that all
their men had breakfast, after which they were to wait for the signal, the men
fully armed, the horses saddled and ready. Eager for battle, and having
already made up his mind to fight, Sempronius led out the whole of his
cavalry to meet the Numidian attack, for it was in his cavalry that he placed
most confidence; these were followed by 6000 infantry and at last the whole
of his force marched on to the field. It happened to be the season of winter, a
snowstorm was raging, and the district, situated between the Alps and the
Apennines, was rendered especially cold by the vicinity of rivers and
marshes. To make matters worse, men and horses alike had been hurriedly
sent forward, without any food, without any protection against the cold, so
they had no heat in them and the chilling blasts from the river made the cold
still more severe as they approached it in their pursuit of the Numidians. But
when they entered the water which had been swollen by the night's rain and
was then breast high, their limbs became stiff with cold, and when they
emerged on the other side they had hardly strength to hold their weapons;
they began to grow faint from fatigue and as the day wore on, from hunger.
21.55
Hannibal's men, meanwhile, had made
fires in front of their tents, oil had been distributed amongst the maniples for
them to make their joints and limbs supple and they had time for an ample
repast. When it was announced that the enemy had crossed the river they
took their arms, feeling alert and active in mind and body, and marched to
battle. The Balearic and light-armed infantry were posted in front of the
standards; they numbered about 8000; behind them the heavy-armed
infantry, the mainstay and backbone of the army; on the flanks Hannibal
distributed the cavalry, and outside them, again, the elephants. When the
consul saw his cavalry, who had lost their order in the pursuit, suddenly
meeting with an unsuspected resistance from the Numidians, he recalled
them by signal and received them within his infantry. There were 18,000
Romans, 20,000 Latin allies, and an auxiliary force of Cenomani, the only
Gallic tribe which had remained faithful. These were the forces engaged. The
Balearics and light infantry opened the battle, but on being met by the
heavier legions they were rapidly withdrawn to the wings, an evolution
which at once threw the Roman horse into difficulties, for the 4000 wearied
troopers had been unable to offer an effective resistance to 10,000 who were
fresh and vigorous, and now in addition they were overwhelmed by what
seemed a cloud of missiles from the light infantry. Moreover, the elephants,
towering aloft at the ends of the line, terrified the horses not only by their
appearance but by their unaccustomed smell, and created widespread panic.
The infantry battle, as far as the Romans were concerned, was maintained
more by courage than by physical strength, for the Carthaginians, who had
shortly before been getting themselves into trim, brought their powers fresh
and unimpaired into action, whilst the Romans were fatigued and hungry and
stiff with cold. Still, their courage would have kept them up had it been only
infantry that they were fighting against. But the light infantry, after repulsing
the cavalry, were hurling their missiles on the flanks of the legions; the
elephants had now come up against the centre of the Roman line, and Mago
and his Numidians, as soon as it had passed their ambuscade, rose up in the
rear and created a terrible disorder and panic. Yet in spite of all the dangers
which surrounded them, the ranks stood firm and immovable for some time,
even, contrary to all expectation, against the elephants. Some skirmishers
who had been placed where they could attack these animals flung darts at
them and drove them off, and rushed after them, stabbing them under their
tails, where the skin is soft and easily penetrated.
21.56
Maddened with pain and terror, they
were beginning to rush wildly on their own men, when Hannibal ordered
them to be driven away to the left wing against the auxiliary Gauls on the
Roman right. There they instantly produced unmistakable panic and flight,
and the Romans had fresh cause for .alarm when they saw their auxiliaries
routed. They now stood fighting in a square, and about 10,000 of them,
unable to escape in any other direction, forced their way through the centre
of the African troops and the auxiliary Gauls who supported them and
inflicted an immense loss on the enemy. They were prevented by the river
from returning to their camp, and the rain made it impossible for them to
judge where they could best go to the assistance of their comrades, so they
marched away straight to Placentia. Then desperate attempts to escape were
made on all sides; some who made for the river were swept away by the
current or caught by the enemy while hesitating to cross; others, scattered
over the fields in flight, followed the track of the main retreat and sought
Placentia; others, fearing the enemy more than the river, crossed it and
reached their camp. The driving sleet and the intolerable cold caused the
death of many men and baggage animals, and nearly all the elephants
perished. The Carthaginians stopped their pursuit at the banks of the Trebia
and returned to their camp so benumbed with cold that they hardly felt any
joy in their victory. In the night the men who had guarded the camp, and the
rest of the soldiers, mostly wounded, crossed the Trebia on rafts without any
interference from the Carthaginians, either because the roaring of the storm
prevented them from hearing or because they were unable to move through
weariness and wounds and pretended that they heard nothing. Whilst the
Carthaginians were keeping quiet, Scipio led his army to Placentia and
thence across the Po to Cremona, in order that one colony might not be
burdened with providing winter quarters for the two armies.
21.57
This
defeat so unnerved people in Rome that they believed the enemy was already
advancing to attack the City, and that there was no help to be looked for, no
hope of repelling him from their walls and gates. After one consul had been
beaten at the Ticinus the other was recalled from Sicily, and now both
consuls and both consular armies had been worsted. What fresh generals,
men asked, what fresh legions could be brought to the rescue? Amidst this
universal panic Sempronius arrived. He had slipped through the enemy's
cavalry at immense risk while they were dispersed in quest of plunder, and
owed his escape rather to sheer audacity than to cleverness, for he had little
hope of eluding them or of successful resistance if he failed to do so. After
conducting the elections, which was the pressing need for the moment, he
returned to winter quarters. The consuls elected were Cneius Servilius and
C. Flaminius. Even in their winter quarters the Romans were not allowed
much quiet; the Numidian horse were roaming in all directions, or where the
ground was too rough for them, the Celtiberians and Lusitanians. They were,
therefore, cut off from supplies on every side, except what were brought in
ships on the Po. Near Placentia there was a place called Emporium, which
had been carefully fortified and occupied by a strong garrison. In the hope of
capturing the place, Hannibal approached with cavalry and light-armed
troops, and as he trusted mainly to secrecy for success, he marched thither
by night. But he did not escape the observation of the sentinels, and such a
shouting suddenly arose that it was actually heard at Placentia. By daybreak
the consul was on the spot with his cavalry, having given orders for the
legions of infantry to follow in battle formation. A cavalry action followed in
which Hannibal was wounded, and his retirement from the field discomfited
the enemy; the position was admirably defended.
After taking only a few days' rest, before his wound was thoroughly
healed Hannibal proceeded to attack Victumviae. During the Gaulish war
this place had served as an emporium for the Romans; subsequently, as it
was a fortified place, a mixed population from the surrounding country had
settled there in considerable numbers, and now the terror created by the
constant depredations had driven most of the people from the fields into the
town. This motley population, excited by the news of the energetic defence
of Placentia, flew to arms and went out to meet Hannibal. More like a crowd
than an army they met him on his march, and as on the one side there was
nothing but an undisciplined mob, and on the other a general and soldiers
who had perfect confidence in each other, a small body routed as many as
35,000 men. The next day they surrendered and admitted a Carthaginian
garrison within their walls. They had just completed the surrender of their
arms in obedience to orders, when instructions were suddenly given to the
victors to treat the city as though it had been carried by storm, and no deed
of blood, which on such occasions historians are wont to mention, was left
undone, so awful was the example set of every form of licentiousness and
cruelty and brutal tyranny towards the wretched inhabitants. Such were the
winter operations of Hannibal.
21.58
The
soldiers rested whilst the intolerable cold lasted; it did not, however, last
long, and at the first doubtful indications of spring Hannibal left his winter
quarters for Etruria with the intention of inducing that nation to join forces
with him, either voluntarily or under compulsion. During his passage of the
Apennines he was overtaken by a storm of such severity as almost to surpass
the horrors of the Alps. The rain was driven by the wind straight into the
men's faces, and either they had to drop their weapons or if they tried to
struggle against the hurricane it caught them and dashed them to the ground,
so they came to a halt. Then they found that it was stopping their respiration
so that they could not breathe, and they sat down for a short time with their
backs to the wind. The heavens began to reverberate with terrific roar, and
amidst the awful din lightning flashed and quivered. Sight and sound alike
paralysed them with terror. At last, as the force of the gale increased owing
to the rain having ceased, they saw that there was nothing for it but to pitch
their camp on the ground where they had been caught by the storm. Now all
their labour had to begin over again, for they could neither unroll anything
nor fix anything, whatever was fixed did not stand, the wind tore everything
into shreds and carried it off. Soon the moisture in the upper air above the
cold mountain peaks froze and discharged such a shower of snow and hail
that the men, giving up all further attempts, lay down as best they could,
buried beneath their coverings rather than protected by them. This was
followed by such intense cold that when any one attempted to rise out of
that pitiable crowd of prostrate men and beasts it was a long time before he
could get up, for his muscles being cramped and stiff with cold, he could
hardly bend his limbs. At length, by exercising their arms and legs, they were
able to move about, and began to recover their spirits; here and there fires
were lighted, and those who were most helpless turned to their colleagues
for help. They remained on that spot for two days like a force blockaded;
many men and animals perished; of the elephants which survived the battle of
the Trebia they lost seven.
21.59
After
descending from the Apennines Hannibal advanced towards Placentia, and
after a ten miles' march formed camp. The following day he marched against
the enemy with 12,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry. Sempronius had by this
time returned from Rome, and he did not decline battle. That day the two
camps were three miles distant from each other; the following day they
fought, and both sides exhibited the most determined courage, but the action
was indecisive. At the first encounter the Romans were so far superior that
they not only conquered in the field, but followed the routed enemy to his
camp and soon made an attack upon it. Hannibal stationed a few men to
defend the rampart and the gates, the rest he massed in the middle of the
camp, and ordered them to be on the alert and wait for the signal to make a
sortie. It was now about three o'clock; the Romans were worn out with their
fruitless efforts as there was no hope of carrying the camp, and the consul
gave the signal to retire. As soon as Hannibal heard it and saw that the
fighting had slackened and that the enemy were retiring from the camp, he
immediately launched his cavalry against them right and left, and sallied in
person with the main strength of his infantry from the middle of the camp.
Seldom has there been a more equal fight, and few would have been
rendered more memorable by the mutual destruction of both armies had the
daylight allowed it to be sufficiently prolonged; as it was, night put an end to
a conflict which had been maintained with such determined courage. There
was greater fury than bloodshed, and as the fighting had been almost equal
on both sides, they separated with equal loss. Not more than 600 infantry
and half that number of cavalry fell on either side, but the Roman loss was
out of proportion to their numbers; several members of the equestrian order
and five military tribunes as well as three prefects of the allies were killed.
Immediately after the battle Hannibal withdrew into Liguria, and Sempronius
to Luca. Whilst Hannibal was entering Liguria, two Roman quaestors who
had been ambushed and captured, C. Fulvius and L. Lucretius, together with
three military tribunes and five members of the equestrian order, most of
them sons of senators, were given up to him by the Gauls in order that he
might feel more confidence in their maintenance of peaceful relations, and
their determination to give him active support.
21.60
While
these events were in progress in Italy, Cn. Cornelius Scipio, who had been
sent with a fleet and an army to Spain, commenced operations in that
country. Starting from the mouth of the Rhone, he sailed round the eastward
end of the Pyrenees and brought up at Emporiae. Here he disembarked his
army, and beginning with the Laeetani, he brought the whole of the maritime
populations as far as the Ebro within the sphere of Roman influence by
renewing old alliances and forming new ones. He gained in this way a
reputation for clemency which extended not only to the maritime populations
but to the more warlike tribes in the interior and the mountain districts. He
established peaceable relations with these, and more than that, he secured
their support in arms and several strong cohorts were enrolled from amongst
them. The country on this side the Ebro was Hanno's province, Hannibal had
left him to hold it for Carthage. Considering that he ought to oppose Scipio's
further progress before the whole province was under Roman sway, he fixed
his camp in full view of the enemy and offered battle. The Roman general,
too, thought that battle ought not to be delayed; he knew he would have to
fight both Hanno and Hasdrubal, and preferred dealing with each singly
rather than meeting them both at once.. The battle was not a hard-fought
one. The enemy lost 6000; 2000, including those who were guarding the
camp, were made prisoners; the camp itself was carried and the general with
some of his chiefs was taken; Cissis, a town near the camp, was successfully
attacked. The plunder, however, as it was a small place, was of little value,
consisting mainly of the barbarians' household goods and some worthless
slaves. The camp, however, enriched the soldiers with the property
belonging not only to the army they had defeated but also to the one serving
with Hannibal in Italy. They had left almost all their valuable possessions on
the other side of the Pyrenees, that they might not have heavy loads to carry.
21.61
Before
he had received definite tidings of this defeat, Hasdrubal had crossed the
Ebro with 8000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, hoping to encounter the Romans
as soon as they landed, but after hearing of the disaster at Cissis and the
capture of the camp, he turned his route to the sea. Not far from Tarracona
he found our marines and seamen wandering at will through the fields,
success as usual producing carelessness. Sending his cavalry in all directions
amongst them, he made a great slaughter and drove them pell-mell to their
ships. Afraid to remain any longer in the neighbourhood lest he should be
surprised by Scipio, he retreated across the Ebro. On hearing of this fresh
enemy Scipio came down by forced marches, and after dealing summary
punishment to some of the naval captains, returned by sea to Emporiae,
leaving a small garrison in Tarracona. He had scarcely left when Hasdrubal
appeared on the scene, and instigated the Ilergetes, who had given hostages
to Scipio, to revolt, and in conjunction with the warriors of that tribe
ravaged the territories of those tribes who remained loyal to Rome. This
roused Scipio from his winter quarters, on which Hasdrubal again
disappeared beyond the Ebro, and Scipio invaded in force the territory of the
Ilergetes, after the author of the revolt had left them to their fate. He drove
them all into Antanagrum, their capital, which he proceeded to invest, and a
few days later he received them into the protection and jurisdiction of Rome,
after demanding an increase in the number of hostages and inflicting a heavy
fine upon them. From there he advanced against the Ausetani, who lived
near the Ebro and were also in alliance with the Carthaginians, and invested
their city. The Laeetani whilst bringing assistance to their neighbours by
night were ambushed not far from the city which they intended to enter. As
many as 12,000 were killed, almost all the survivors threw away their arms
and fled to their homes in scattered groups all over the country. The only
thing which saved the invested city from assault and storm was the severity
of the weather. For the thirty days during which the siege lasted the snow
was seldom less than four feet deep, and it covered up the mantlets and
vineae so completely that it even served as a sufficient protection against the
firebrands which the enemy discharged from time to time. At last, after their
chief, Amusicus, had escaped to Hasdrubal's quarters, they surrendered and
agreed to pay an indemnity of twenty talents. The army returned to its winter
quarters at Tarracona.
21.62
During
this winter many portents occurred in Rome and the neighbourhood, or at all
events, many were reported and easily gained credence, for when once men's
minds have been excited by superstitious fears they easily believe these
things. A six-months-old child, of freeborn parents, is said to have shouted
"Io Triumphe" in the vegetable market, whilst in the Forum Boarium an ox is
reported to have climbed up of its own accord to the third story of a house,
and then, frightened by the noisy crowd which gathered, it threw itself down.
A phantom navy was seen shining in the sky; the temple of Hope in the
vegetable market was struck by lightning; at Lanuvium Juno's spear had
moved of itself, and a crow had flown down to her temple and settled upon
her couch; in the territory of Amiternum beings in human shape and clothed
in white were seen at a distance, but no one came close to them; in the
neighbourhood of Picenum there was a shower of stones; at Caere the
oracular tablets had shrunk in size; in Gaul a wolf had snatched a sentinel's
sword from its scabbard and run off with it. With regard to the other
portents, the decemvirs were ordered to consult the Sacred Books, but in the
case of the shower of stones at Picenum a nine days' sacred feast was
proclaimed, at the close of which almost the whole community busied itself
with the expiation of the others. First of all the City was purified, and
full-grown victims were sacrificed to the deities named in the Sacred Books;
an offering of forty pounds' weight of gold was conveyed to Juno at
Lanuvium, and the matrons dedicated a bronze statue of that goddess on the
Aventine. At Caere, where the tablets had shrunk, a lectisternium was
enjoined, and a service of intercession was to be rendered to Fortuna on
Algidus. In Rome also a lectisternium was ordered for Juventas and a special
service of intercession at the temple of Hercules, and afterwards one in
which the whole population were to take part at all the shrines. Five
full-grown victims were sacrificed to the Genius of Rome, and C. Atilius
Serranus, the praetor, received instructions to undertake certain vows which
were to be discharged should the commonwealth remain in the same
condition for ten years. These ceremonial observances and vows, ordered in
obedience to the Sacred Books, did much to allay the religious fears of the
people.
21.63
One of
the consuls elect was C. Flaminius, and to him was assigned by lot the
command of the legions at Placentia. He wrote to the consul giving orders
for the army to be in camp at Ariminum by the 15th of March. The reason
was that he might enter upon his office there, for he had not forgotten his old
quarrels with the senate, first as tribune of the people, then afterwards about
his consulship, the election to which had been declared illegal, and finally
about his triumph. He further embittered the senate against him by his
support of C. Claudius; he alone of all the members was in favour of the
measure which that tribune introduced. Under its provisions no senator, no
one whose father had been a senator, was allowed to possess a vessel of
more than 300 amphorae burden. This was considered quite large enough for
the conveyance of produce from their estates, all profit made by trading was
regarded as dishonourable for the patricians. The question excited the
keenest opposition and brought Flaminius into the worst possible odium with
the nobility through his support of it, but on the other hand made him a
popular favourite and procured for him his second consulship. Suspecting,
therefore, that they would endeavour to detain him in the City by various
devices, such as falsifying the auspices or the delay necessitated by the Latin
Festival, or other hindrances to which as consul he was liable, he gave out
that he had to take a journey, and then left the City secretly as a private
individual and so reached his province. When this got abroad there was a
fresh outburst of indignation on the part of the incensed senate; they
declared that he was carrying on war not only with the senate but even with
the immortal gods. "On the former occasion," they said, "when he was
elected consul against the auspices and we recalled him from the very field of
battle, he was disobedient to gods and men. Now he is conscious that he has
despised them and has fled from the Capitol and the customary recital of
solemn vows. He refuses to approach the temple of Jupiter Optimus
Maximus on the day of his entrance upon office, to see and consult the
senate, to whom he is so odious and whom he alone of all men detests, to
proclaim the Latin Festival and offer sacrifice to Jupiter Latiaris on the Alban
Mount, to proceed to the Capitol and after duly taking the auspices recite
the prescribed vows, and from thence, vested in the paludamentum and
escorted by lictors, go in state to his province. He has stolen away furtively
without his insignia of office, without his lictors, just as though he were
some menial employed in the camp and had quitted his native soil to go into
exile. He thinks it, forsooth, more consonant with the greatness of his office
to enter upon it at Ariminum rather than in Rome, and to put on his official
dress in some wayside inn rather than at his own hearth and in the presence
of his own household gods." It was unanimously decided that he should be
recalled, brought back if need be by force, and compelled to discharge, on
the spot, all the duties he owed to God and man before he went to the army
and to his province. Q. Terentius and M. Antistius were delegated for this
task, but they had no more influence with him than the despatch of the
senate in his former consulship. A few days afterwards he entered upon
office, and whilst offering his sacrifice, the calf, after it was struck, bounded
away out of the hands of the sacrificing priests and bespattered many of the
bystanders with its blood. Amongst those at a distance from the altar who
did not know what the commotion was about there was great excitement;
most people regarded it as a most alarming omen. Flaminius took over the
two legions from Sempronius, the late consul, and the two from C. Atilius,
the praetor, and commenced his march to Etruria through the passes of the
Apennines.
End of Book 21