University of Virginia Library

CHAPTER XLIII.

Sheridan'S cavalry, flushed with success, were believed to be
directing their course via Gordonsville to Lynchburg; a number
of field-guns, for which there were no horses, had been previously
sent thither, and now a force had to be detached from
Lee's army to man these guns and protect the town. On the
morning of March 7 General Pendleton was directed by the
commanding general to send men enough to Lynchburg to man
six or eight guns, to report to Colonel Carter, who had been

sent up to take command of this artillery.[1] A sudden rise in
James River and the destruction of the bridges, however, compelled
the great raider to change his route, and it was not unlikely
that he might make an attempt against Richmond on the
north and west. Artillery here, too, had to be the main reliance,
as no infantry could be spared from the trenches. General
Pendleton wrote, March 17,—

"The raiders have probably passed round to Grant. They
did a good deal of mischief. I was in Richmond to aid in
guarding against them on the northwest. Returned here yesterday.
Have been very busy ever since. We look for active opera
tions before long. It will be a very severe campaign. I am
D. V. to preach for Cabell's battalion day after to-morrow."[2]

Early in February Congress had conferred on General Lee the
title of commander-in-chief of the Confederate forces, a position
which, if given him before, might have led to a state of things
very different from that now pressing upon him. At this time
also a bill for further promotions in the artillery branch of the
service was, after long delay, brought to a favorable conclusion.
We have before seen that in January, 1862, a bill had authorized
the appointment of one brigadier-general for every eighty guns,
a colonel for forty, etc. General Pendleton's own promotion to
the rank of brigadier was, however, the only one made until

September, 1863, when Colonels A. L. Long and E. P. Alexander
were given similar rank, and Colonel R. L. Walker after
the passage of the last bill. This tardiness in acknowledging
the gallant services of so important and efficient a branch of the
service General Pendleton felt as a great injustice to the brave
officers serving under him, and from the seven days' battles
round Richmond he had not ceased to urge that the full allowance
of promotions should be given to men who so well deserved
it. The slowness of the legislative authorities in acknowledging
the efficiency of the artillery General Pendleton accounted for in
a confidential communication some years later:

"On the ground, probably, that this arm of the service, all-essential
as it is, can never be independent, but always only cooperative
with others, Confederate law allowed in it no grade
above that of brigadier. Only such, therefore, was I to the last,
though having under me three other artillery brigadiers, and,
consequently, serving in fact as a major-general. But as no
exaltation of name was, so far as I know myself, a ruling motive
with me, the incongruity never disturbed me. It was about to
be corrected on General Lee's recommendation when irremediable
reverse befell our army and cause."

This irremediable reverse was now close upon them. Lee's
army seemed melting away. Grant was preparing for vigorous
work so soon as the spring should open. Sherman was almost
within striking distance in North Carolina, and Sheridan drawing
near to lengthen and strengthen the already immense body of
the besieging army. The Richmond authorities had opposed
and prevented General Lee's plan of withdrawing from Petersburg,
and he must remain there against his better judgment and
face the tremendous odds before him. But to sit quietly awaiting
the contraction of the deadly coil which must soon surround
him was contrary to the genius and practice of the great soldier.
Frequent and earnest were the consultations as to the best utilizing
of the force which still held the long line of defences.[3] On
the morning of March 25 the chief of artillery was notified to meet

the commanding general at five o'clock A.M. at the head-quarters
of Major-General Gordon. General Lee had decided to make a
daring and desperate attempt to break General Grant's line near
the centre by an attack upon Fort Steadman, which, it was believed,
could be carried by surprise. The attack was made gallantly
in the early morning and at first seemed successful, but
"for some reason which has never been made very clear" the
supporting column did not advance promptly to the assistance of
the force which had seized the fort. "One of those unfortunate
failures in combination which have caused the loss of so many
battles here occurred, and the well-devised plan of the Confederate
commander came to naught . . . whatever may have been
the cause of the fatal delay."[4] Two days later Sheridan joined
Grant, and preparations were at once made to surround Lee on
his right and seize all his southern communications.

Divining his enemy's purpose, General Lee moved quickly to
the right, with all the men he could spare from the fortifications,
about seventeen thousand, and, as was his wont, attacked himself
the Federal advance. Their foremost divisions gave way,
but the heavy, masses behind these could not be successfully encountered
by Lee's greatly inferior force, and he returned to his
intrenchments. Sheridan's advance upon Five Forks the same
day, March 31, was met and driven back by Fitz Lee's cavalry
and Pickett's infantry. Reinforced, however, by two infantry
corps, he carried the position at Five Forks on April 1, and on
the morning of the 2d the whole Federal force was thrown upon
the thin and exhausted Confederate lines, and overpowering them
by their immensely superior numbers, succeeded in taking possession
of the outer line of fortifications, the Southern troops
falling back behind the inner line of works.

Forts Alexander and Gregg were strong redoubts defending
this inner line, and against them a powerful Federal assault was
directed. Fort Alexander was taken, and, after a desperate resistance,
Fort Gregg also. Of the two hundred and fifty gallant
soldiers who held it only thirty were taken alive,—every other
man died in its defence. This was about seven o'clock in the
morning. When General Pendleton joined General Lee at daybreak,

he had sent Lieutenant Peterkin with some directions to
Colonel Hilary Jones. Riding rapidly to deliver this order, and
returning, Mr. Peterkin met General Lee, accompanied by General
Pendleton and others, drawing slowly back from the vicinity
of Fort Gregg, which had just fallen. There was no Confederate
force close at hand, and an immediate advance might have captured
General Lee and those with him. With the enemy thus
within his stronghold, the utmost that General Lee could do was
to maintain a bold front during the day, and withdraw his army
as soon as night came. Tidings of the disaster which had befallen
the army, and of his intention to evacuate the lines at
Petersburg, were immediately sent to the government at Richmond,
and arrangements made for withdrawing the army as soon
as the darkness should conceal their movements.

The part taken by General Pendleton and the artillery during
these last days in the trenches is best told by himself:

"Owing to the demonstrations of the enemy on the right of our
lines near Petersburg on the morning of April 1, I ordered seven
guns of Poague's battalion, which had been held in reserve near
Hewlett's, to march to Petersburg, and on the night of the 1st,
by direction of the commanding general, I ordered down the remainder
of the battalion, and at the same time ordered the
guns, which had arrived during the day, to proceed on the road
towards the right, so as to be out of sight of the town by dawn.
Those guns were used with good effect near Mr. Turnbull's
house (General Lee's head-quarters) on the morning of the 2d,
where the enemy had unexpectedly massed a heavy force against
that portion of our line, and succeeded in breaking it, and then,
sweeping down towards the city, captured a number of men and
guns along the line. While these guns were well contesting the
ground and holding the enemy in check, Lieutenant-Colonel
Poague arrived with the remainder of his guns, and rendered admirable
service in retarding the heavy advance of the enemy
until such troops as remained could be withdrawn into the interior
line. Three pieces with Major Brander were placed on
the north side of the Appomattox, so as to annoy the left flank
of the enemy and prevent his crossing. On the line and to the
right of the Cox road were placed four pieces of the 'Horse

Artillery,' under Lieutenant-Colonel Chew and Major Breathed.
The enemy had by this time (twelve o'clock) fully established his
line from Fort Gregg to the Appomattox River. In the fighting
attendant upon these operations various batteries of the Third
Corps were captured. The conduct of officers and men was
worthy of all praise, and that of the drivers and supernumeraries
of the artillery,—Third Corps,—who had been by General
Walker, chief of artillery of that corps, armed with muskets, deserves
special mention. Those in Fort Gregg fought until
literally crushed by numbers, and scarcely a man survived.

"In the mean time the firing on Colonel Jones's front, east of
the city, had been severe. During the night of the 1st the fire
from mortars and guns was incessant, and the men were very
much exposed throughout the 2d. I saw Colonel Jones on
the line about three P.M., and found his pieces so disposed as
effectually to prevent any attempt of the enemy to improve the
advantage already gained at the river salient.

"I was at Battery 45 during the day, and directed its guns
against columns of the enemy moving down the valley towards
the Weldon Railroad. The officers in charge of that part of
the line deeming an attack imminent, I ordered two pieces of
artillery to strengthen the position.

"In obedience to orders from the commanding general, I ordered
the withdrawal of all the guns at eight P.M. This was
accomplished with entire success. And although the difficulties
on Colonel Jones's line were very great, he succeeded in withdrawing
all the guns but about ten, which for the most part
were not provided with horses and not intended to be removed.
Several mortars were also brought off. Every piece that was
abandoned was first disabled. After making all necessary arrangements
with regard to this movement, and seeing all the
guns safely across the river, about two A.M. of the 3d of April 1
moved on by the Hickory road and marched all night."[5]

The crossing to the north side of the river was a necessity,
since the enemy occupied all the country on the south side, and
the army was pushed on to Amelia Court-House. The relief of

getting away from the trenches and being once more in the open
country for a little while buoyed up the spirits of men and officers,
and the march of the first night and day was a rapid one.
But the roads were heavy with incessant rains, the scanty rations
were soon consumed, the long wagon-train encumbered and hindered
the progress of infantry and artillery, and the weary,
hungry men plodded along and urged on their tired teams,
cheered by the hope of finding a good store of provisions for
man and beast at Amelia Court-House. But, alas! disobedience
or neglect, incompetence or wilful disregard of duty, had failed
to carry out General Lee's direction that an abundant supply of
food should meet him there. "Delay and embarrassment unavoidably
ensued,—men and horses were starving." For nearly
two days and nights they had been without rest or food, and it
was impossible for them to proceed until something of both
could be procured. Foraging parties were, therefore, sent out
to secure whatever food was to be had, and the retreating force
in this way partially depleted and demoralized. Of the progress
to Amelia Court-House General Pendleton says,—

"The march on the 3d was very slow and fatiguing on account
of the immense number of carriages with the army. At night I
bivouacked on the road-side about nine miles from Goode's bridge.[6]
Amelia Court-House I reached on the morning of the 4th."

The lack of food made it necessary to divide the column, so
that a wider extent of country might afford a better supply of
forage especially. General Pendleton, therefore, "immediately
proceeded to arrange for reducing the artillery with the troops to
a proportionate quantity and properly to dispose of the surplus.
These arrangements were at length effected, and on the 5th General
Walker moved to the right and west of the line of march of
the army, having in charge all the artillery not needed with the
troops. Ninety-five caissons, mostly loaded, which had early in
the winter been sent from Petersburg to the rear, were here
destroyed."[7]

All hope of pressing on beyond the enemy's pursuit was rendered
impossible by the enforced delay at Amelia, and when the
retreat was resumed on the evening of the 5th, hunger, weariness,
and despondency had lessened the spirit and endurance of
the twenty thousand men remaining of the Army of Northern
Virginia. In the mean time the Federal cavalry had pressed rapidly
to the front, and Grant's whole force advancing by an almost
parallel line, took advantage of the opportunity to seize on the
most important points, and to intercept the retreating troops at the
most unexpected places. And now began a series of continued
skirmishes and fightings accompanied by disaster after disaster.

In the words of one of General Pendleton's staff, "It was a
period in which no note was taken of day nor night; one long,
confused, dreadful day. There seemed to be no front nor rear,
for firing and fighting might be heard ahead and behind and on
both sides at once. There were no 'head-quarters' except where
the ambulance happened to be." And this confusion was intensified
by almost absolute starvation. One day a tiny bit of raw
bacon, another a handful of uncooked corn,—part of the scanty
horse-feed,—was all that the general had to sustain life, and men
and horses dropped by the road-side exhausted by want and
weariness.

"By ten A.M. on the 6th of April we reached Rice's Station,
South Side Railroad," continues General Pendleton. "Our troops
here went into line, and I chose positions for guns, commanding
the Burkeville road and sweeping the ground to its left. On this
line there was severe skirmishing during the evening, but no
attack by the enemy. The enemy's cavalry, meanwhile, having
attacked our wagon-train about two miles back on the road, I,
happening to be with the commanding general when he received
information of this, was requested by him to see what could be
done to prevent any further loss in that quarter. On the way I
met a few wearied men of Harris's brigade, and taking of them
some twenty volunteers, proceeded with them to the road where
the train had been attacked. While attempting to rescue some
of the property most valuable I discovered a line of the enemy
in a thick pine wood, and supposing it to be but a small body I
prepared for attack thereon,—one of General Cooke's regiments

having just reported to me in consequence of a message sent by
me to the commanding general. This regiment, however, proved
unable to hold its ground, and fell back some half a mile until
reinforced by two regiments of cavalry. They then again moved
forward, but after regaining the original position the infantry was
recalled by General Cooke, and the cavalry, by my direction, fell
back with a few prisoners they had secured. The enemy had,
meantime, fired our train to prevent anything being saved. They
then seemed disposed to quit, and as nothing apparently remained
to be accomplished by the small force with me, I directed
it slowly to withdraw towards our main body and myself returned
in that direction."[8]

Having ascertained from a confidential despatch captured in
Richmond the numbers and plans of the Confederate commander,
General Grant had pushed forward heavy masses of his troops
to points which the retreat must pass, and at nearly the same
time with the fight at Rice's Station the rear half of Lee's army,
under command of General Ewell, was attacked both in front
and rear by a force immensely outnumbering them. Exhausted
by hunger and fatigue, their brave resistance was soon overpowered,
and with the exception of two hundred and fifty men the
whole command was either killed, wounded, or captured. General
Lee had gone in person to try and turn the tide of disaster,
but finding such attempt useless he returned to the other troops,
and told General Pendleton on coming up with him, "General,
that half of our army is destroyed."

When night set in the guns along the line were withdrawn,
and the retreat continued towards Farmville, which was reached
on the early morning of the 7th. Here some rations were found
and distributed to the troops, the first they had had since leaving
Petersburg. Short time was there, however, to prepare this food,
for it was necessary again to cross the Appomattox to the north
side, and the enemy being close behind, the bridges were fired to
check, if not prevent, pursuit.

During this time a consultation among the superior officers
was held, and they decided that, in view of the immense force

which was pressing them and the exhausted condition of their
small numbers, further resistance was unadvisable, as it could
only result in destruction to the remnant of the army without
accomplishing any good.

General Pendleton was deputed to communicate this opinion
of his brother officers to General Lee. His own account says,—

"Fighting was going on, but not very severely, so that conversation
was practicable. General Gordon had with me an interview,
told me of discouraging intelligence from the South, and of
a conference which had been held between other responsible officers
and himself, and announced their joint wish that, if my views
agreed with theirs, I should convey to General Longstreet, as
second in command, and then, if he agreed, to General Lee, our
united judgment that the cause had become so hopeless we
thought it wrong longer to be having men killed on either side,
and not right, moreover, that our beloved commander should be
left to bear the entire trial of initiating the idea of terms with the
enemy. My judgment not conflicting with those expressed, it
seemed to me duty to convey them to General Lee. At first General
Longstreet dissented, but on second thought preferred that
himself should be represented with the rest. General Lee was
lying alone, resting, at the base of a large pine-tree. I approached
and sat by him. To a statement of the case he quietly listened,
and then, courteously expressing thanks for the consideration of
his subordinates in desiring to relieve him in part of existing burdens,
spoke in about these words: 'I trust it has not come to that.
We certainly have too many brave men to think of laying down
our arms. They still fight with great spirit, whereas the enemy
does not. And, besides, if I were to intimate to General Grant
that I would listen to terms, he would at once regard it as such
an evidence of weakness that he would demand unconditional
surrender, and sooner than that I am resolved to die. Indeed,
we must all determine to die at our posts.' My reply could only
be that every man would no doubt cheerfully meet death with him
in discharge of duty, and that we were perfectly willing that he
should decide the question."[9]

Less than twenty-four hours after this General Grant himself
sent General Lee a note asking for the surrender of his army.
To this General Lee replied with an inquiry as to what terms
of surrender General Grant proposed to offer, and in the mean
time pushed his army on a long march towards Appomattox
Court-House. Says General Pendleton,—

"As we were leaving Farmville by the bridges which there
cross the Appomattox River the enemy pressed up close after our
rear-guard, and guns were placed in position and used to good
purpose on the heights north of the river. . . . This position was
held all day, and it was not until midnight that the column moved
on. In spite of the terrible roads quite a long march was effected,
and the evening of the 8th saw the head of our column near Appomattox
Court-House. I pushed on in person to communicate
with General Walker, and found him with his command parked
about two miles beyond the court-house. While I was with him
an attack, wholly unexpected, was made by the enemy on his defenceless
camp. To avoid immediate disaster under this attack
demanded the exercise of all our energies. It was, however, at
once effectually repelled by the aid, especially, of the two gallant
artillery companies of Captains Walker and Dickenson, under
command of the former, which, being at the time unequipped as
artillerists, were armed with muskets. They met the enemy's
sharp-shooters in a brushwood near, and enabled a number of
General Walker's pieces to play with effect while the remainder
of his train was withdrawn.

"After a sharp skirmish this attack seemed entirely remedied,
and I started back, having received by courier a note requesting
my presence with the commanding general. When I had reached
a point a few hundred yards from the court-house, some of the
enemy's cavalry, which had under cover of dusk gained the road,
came rushing along, firing upon everything, and I only escaped by
leaping my horse over the fence into a clump of sassafras-bushes,
and skirting along the left of that road towards our column then
advancing, and until I reached a point where the enemy's charge
was checked."[10]

When General Pendleton did come up with General Lee—at
about one A.M. of the 9th—he found the general "dressed in his
neatest style, new uniform, snowy linen, etc." To General Pendleton's
expression of surprise General Lee explained, "I have probably
to be General Grant's prisoner, and thought I must make
my best appearance." Since their interview of some thirty hours
before, repeated communications had passed between the Federal
and Confederate commanders, and General Lee had resolved, if
an attempt to cut through the enemy's cordon and push on next
morning should prove unsuccessful, he must then make the best
terms possible and surrender his worn-out little army.

"Having briefly expressed to me his views," writes General
Pendleton, "he desired me, worn and weary, to get some rest,
and closed by directing me,—'In the morning be governed by
circumstances.'"

In the morning "circumstances" were more hopeless than ever.
The brave little army found itself surrounded and intercepted on
all sides by an immense force, and though a gallant resistance in
front by cavalry, artillery, and infantry succeeded not only in
checking the enemy's advance, but actually drove it back and
captured two guns and a number of prisoners, it was evident to
all that prolonged fighting could only result in the absolute destruction
of the eight thousand men who had been reported
for duty that morning. General Lee therefore requested an
interview with General Grant, and towards one o'clock the two
commanders met and agreed upon terms of surrender.

By the time General Lee returned to his own lines the news of
their surrender had spread through his army, and the conviction
that they had failed to achieve the independence they had so
valiantly struggled for—that the cause for which they had fought
and bled and for which so many noble Southerners had died was
lost—filled all hearts with an agony of grief too deep for expression.
There was some relief to know that the unequal struggle
was no longer to be maintained,—that the weary might rest and
the starving hope for food; but far stronger than this was the
sense of humiliation, the regret for hopes crushed, and the
anguish of defeat to men so long accustomed to victory against
almost any odds.

As General Lee rode back to his head-quarters the men

crowded round him, and with tears streaming down their bronzed
faces sought to press his hand, and silently showed their devotion
to the beloved commander whose appearance they had been wont
to greet with shouts of applause.

General Grant appointed as his commissioners to carry out the
details of surrender Major-Generals Gibbon, Griffin, and Merritt.
Those on the Confederate side were Lieutenant-General Longstreet,
Major-General Gordon, and Brigadier-General Pendleton.
These officers, as soon as practicable, adjusted articles of the
surrender in detail, and the different bodies of troops were
paroled and disbanded. Notwithstanding the "oppression and
depression" which filled all hearts, there was considerable excitement
among General Pendleton's staff when they learned of
his appointment as one of the commissioners of surrender, and
a general desire to enable him to make the best appearance
possible. To brush up his well-worn gray uniform, tarnished
and defaced by the long winter on the lines and the hardships
of the march, was all that could be done for his clothing. Even
if they had possessed better, the stout soldier of fifty-five could
not wear the apparel of his younger, slenderer attendants; but
they, too, were in such woful case that only one among them
could be made neat enough to accompany him. The most they
could accomplish to better his outfit was to mount him upon Dr.
Graham's handsome black horse instead of his own "old Brown,"
and to put upon his hands a pair of new gloves belonging to
another staff-officer. And so, accompanied by Mr. Peterkin, he
rode to General Gibbon's head-quarters, where the details of the
surrender were agreed upon and signed by the six commissioners.

Then came the leave-taking between himself and his beloved
commander, when both were affected to tears, and other officers
who had come on a similar errand wept in sympathy. Then the
sad parting among the military family at artillery head-quarters,
endeared to each other by the common dangers and hardships
of their arduous campaigns; and finally the starting homeward
in the ambulance, accompanied only by Dr. Graham, who was
also a resident of Lexington. Before this departure the whole
army, including stragglers, had been paroled and disbanded. In
concluding his final report on the 10th of April, General Pendleton

stated that "of two hundred and fifty field-pieces belonging
to the army on the lines near Richmond and Petersburg only
sixty-one remained and thirteen caissons" to be surrendered.
The rest had been captured or abandoned on the retreat.

After the morning of the 9th the starving Southerners had
been fed by rations issued on General Grant's orders, who in this
as in other arrangements connected with the surrender showed
himself a magnanimous conqueror. Respect and admiration for
his foe must have largely filled his mind. Not only had General
Lee held him at bay for many months with an ill-fed and half-clothed
army not one-third as large as his own well-equipped
and nourished troops, but, after disaster which might well have
appalled the boldest, had withdrawn the remnant of that army
successfully from his front, and after struggling for a whole week,
not only against overwhelming numbers, but against starvation
and deathly fatigue, both officers and men had been ready on the
very morning of the surrender to fight to the death to defend
their rights and homes. Knowing the small number—"not
more than twenty-five thousand men"—who began the retreat
from Petersburg, and the enormous hosts which Grant summoned
to surround them, we can but marvel at the steady and
determined spirit which animated them under circumstances well
calculated to fill them with despair.

When, on April 10, the troops were paroled there were only
eight thousand with arms, and counting stragglers, civilians, and
all who claimed to form part of the army, there were only
twenty-eight thousand three hundred and fifty-six of all arms.

The Army of the Potomac was, when the pursuit began, one
hundred and twenty-one thousand strong, and must have numbered
one hundred thousand at least at this date.

All the circumstances and experiences connected with the
surrender of Lee's army were so painful that General Pendleton
rarely spoke of them. Once or twice he began a narration of
them to his daughter, Mrs. Lee, who was in Canada at the time,
but emotion choked his utterance, and he put it off until "some
other time," which time never came. Writing to her some six
weeks after the sad conclusion of hostilities, he said,—

"You were, no doubt, greatly astonished and shocked at the

suddenness with which our army and cause failed after the breakup
at Petersburg and Richmond. It was to some extent a matter
of surprise to us who were on the spot. But the truth is the
enormous disparity of force was experienced then as never before,
and the conviction of it, added to all their long privations, so discouraged
the majority of our soldiers in the ranks as to take all
the fight out of them. And, therefore, when the disaster of a
broken line at Petersburg occurred, and we had to evacuate at
night, and then continue retreating a week or more, mainly at
night, while offering battle in the day, with a vastly outnumbering
force of cavalry, as well as of other arms, literally surrounding
us, our men scattered in the woods, etc., until the army melted
away to a mere handful, so that at last we had only some seven
thousand muskets to oppose Grant's multitude. Still, battle was
delivered on the very morning of the surrender, with habitual
spirit and triumphant success by the brave remnant of the heroic
Army of Northern Virginia up to the very moment of recall to
our troops by General Lee. The South was really exhausted
and could do no more, hence with the failure of this army the
rapid collapse of the entire cause."