University of Virginia Library

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant was placed in command
of all the forces of the United States early in March. The only
general who had achieved marked success on their side, he possessed
the full confidence of Mr. Lincoln and the whole North,
and accepted the responsible post with quiet confidence in his
own judgment and the determination to use all the resources of
the Federal government in his effort to defeat and destroy the
Southern Confederacy. Estimating correctly the immense preponderance
of such resources, he began at once massing great
armies in front of General Lee in Virginia and General Johnston
in Georgia, determined to prevent the reinforcing of one Southern
army by the other. General B. F. Butler, with over thirty thousand
men, was also ordered to threaten and perhaps capture Richmond
and Petersburg on the south side of James River. A large

force under Sigel was to move up the valley of Virginia and cut
off the supplies for Lee's army from that quarter.

These different armies were directed to move by May 4.[1]

The Army of the Potomac, between one hundred and twenty-five
thousand[2] and one hundred and forty thousand[3] men,—General
Meade commanding, but General Grant directing its movements,
—was put in motion on the 3d of May, and crossed the
Rapidan at the fords below Lee's position, turning his line of
defence on the right. General Lee was so well posted as to the
designs of the enemy that on May 2 he predicted to his officers
the crossing of the river at Ely's and Germanna Fords.[4] The
Federal generals seemed absolutely ignorant of the Confederate
movements, and plunged into the unknown and difficult Wilderness
country expecting to steal unobserved through its thickets
and plant themselves between Lee's army and Richmond. This
General Lee did not intend. At the time that the Federal army
crossed the Rapidan, Ewell's corps and two divisions of A. P. Hill's
corps were put in motion to intercept its advance. Longstreet's
corps from Gordonsville and Anderson's division of the Third
Corps were also ordered forward. Lee's entire force did not
exceed sixty-four thousand, little more than half of the lowest
number attributed to General Grant.

Moving eastward on two nearly parallel roads, Ewell and Hill
were directed to keep abreast of each other and if possible to avoid
a general engagement until the rest of the troops could come up.
The advance of Ewell's and Warren's corps bivouacked within
three miles of each other on the night of the 4th, unaware of
their close proximity. Ewell's approach on his right flank was,
however, perceived next morning by General Warren, who, supposing
it only a small force sent to cover Lee's retreat, attacked
about mid-day with some spirit and gained a temporary advantage,
but was soon vigorously attacked in turn and driven back
with heavy loss. Thus opened the battle which raged fiercely
throughout the day. Ewell's corps of fifteen thousand men, on
the turnpike, fought the Fifth and part of the Sixth Corps, while
later in the day Hill's two divisions, on the plank road farther

south, successfully repulsed all the "repeated and desperate
assaults" of Getty's division and Hancock's Second Corps.

This was like no previous encounter of the two armies. The
dense and tangled growth, the rough ground, the narrow and difficult
roads, prevented anything like manœuvring. Concert of
action was almost impossible. An officer could scarcely see his
men a dozen yards away. Artillery could be used to little
purpose; cavalry was as difficult to handle. It was a desperate
infantry struggle. Brigade against brigade, regiment against
regiment, often company against company. Only at a few points
could the Confederate artillery be made available. A part of
Nelson's battalion aided Ewell in repelling attack on the extreme
left, and a portion of Poague's on the right was, by General Pendleton's
orders, put in position in a clearing on Hill's right, and
"was effectively used in the bloody repulse given by Heth and
Wilcox to a very heavy assault of the enemy."[5]

Night fell upon the bloody scene without decisive result, though
the Federal army had been checked in its advance and had lost
greatly. Slight breastworks had been thrown up during the day.
These were strengthened in the night, and General Lee sent to
hasten forward Longstreet's fresh troops. Anderson's division
was also on its way from Orange Court-House.

A general attack on the whole front was ordered by General
Meade, to take place at five o'clock on the morning of the 6th.
The attack by Hancock on the right against the weary troops in
his front was for a little while successful. Writing of it as an
eye-witness General Pendleton says,—

". . . All night Hill, Heth, and Wilcox remained at their posts
in the thicket, with their men really under arms, and not only
ready for a night encounter, but occasionally exchanging shots
with the enemy.

"By those guns I bivouacked that night, and General Lee very
near. Early next morning (6th) the fight was renewed by Hill,
with his brave division commanders and their sternly-enduring
soldiers. Before long, however, they sent word to General Lee—
by whose side I was on horseback—that they were much worn,

and even harder pressed than on the previous day, and must inevitably
fall back if not reinforced. General Lee sent exhorting
them to hold on and promising support; he also sent to hasten
Longstreet to the rescue. Then, riding to the right gun of the
batteries, just in rear of those brave, suffering, and fighting divisions
of Hill's corps, I dismounted, talked with the immediate
commander of what must be done, and not only directed him to
have every gun loaded with grape, so as to begin sweeping the
enemy so soon as our brave boys should get sufficiently clear
and the blue forms appear, but I went myself to every gun and
repeated the instruction. Not long after, our exhausted fellows
came back in numbers, and occasion arrived for the grape from
those guns to stem and shatter the hastening blue-coats. It
was at this critical moment that General Lee, deeply anxious for
the appearance of Longstreet's column, greeted a score or two
of gray boys who rushed double-quick into the little opening
occupied by our guns and ourselves. The general called out,
'Who are you, my boys?' They immediately cried out, 'Texas
boys.' The general instantly lifted his hat and waved it round,
exclaiming, 'Hurrah for Texas! Hurrah for Texas!' By this
nearly a regiment had gathered, and at word from the general to
form they at once did so. The general placed himself at their
left with the shout 'Charge!' Many voices cried, 'General Lee
to the rear!' But he kept his place at the left, square up with
the line, repeating, with his thrilling tone,' Charge, boys!' Then
a tall, gray-bearded man very near him stepped from the ranks and
grasped the bridle of General Lee's horse near the bit, and said to
him, respectfully yet resolutely, 'General Lee, if you do not go
back we will not go forward.' The general yielded. But the
gallant Texans sprang forward with a shout and the enemy's
advance was driven back.

"Just then General Longstreet arrived, and, after a few words
with General Lee, ordered his corps, as the troops were up or
should arrive, to deploy in the thicket on each side of the plank
road, but more strongly to the right, and to push forward as fast
as possible. He himself rode forward on the road. General
Lee said to me, 'I wish two guns to go down that road with
Longstreet's troops.' I immediately selected two and led them
on. It was touching to hear the detachments belonging to those

two guns say to their companions left behind, 'Good-by, boys!'
Within two hundred yards, perhaps, we came up with General
Longstreet in the road, bleeding profusely and insensible. Getting
ahead of his troops he had turned back, and being imperfectly
seen by his men on the left of the road, there depressed, and supposed
to be one of the enemy, he was, like Jackson, shot by one
of his own men,—the ball ploughing through the front of the
throat and embedding itself in his left shoulder. With difficulty
we got him into an ambulance and sent him—dying we supposed
—to the rear."

Previous to this unfortunate occurrence Longstreet's troops
had attacked Hancock on the left flank and were driving him
successfully from one position after another. General Longstreet's
fall occasioned some confusion and consequent delay, so that when
the attack was renewed in the evening the enemy was found too
strongly fortified on his original position on the Brock road to be
dislodged. But Hancock's attack had failed, Burnside's in the
centre had failed, and Warren on the Federal right had been struck
on the right flank and driven in, with a heavy loss in killed and captured.
So far the success and prestige were on the Confederate side.
On the 7th the Federal army refrained from attack, and Lee's
men lay behind their breastworks and watched it. General Lee,
divining the next move,—

"The general chief of artillery" (General Pendleton), "under
instructions from the commanding general, reconnoitred positions
on the right, and caused a road to be opened by portions
of the artillery to facilitate a rapid movement in that direction."[6]

General Grant, meanwhile, determined to push on and put his
whole force between the Confederate army and Richmond, and
on the night of the 7th the Federal army marched for Spottsylvania
Court-House, fifteen miles to the southeast, on the main
road to Richmond. General Stuart having informed General
Lee that the enemy's trains were in motion towards his right,
preparations were made again to head General Grant, and what

has been termed "the race for Spottsylvania" began. Mr. Swinton
says that "by an accident" the Confederate infantry reached
there before General Warren's troops. General Pendleton tells
a different story: "About dusk of the 7th," he says, he "was
directed by the commanding general to send to General Anderson,
who had succeeded to the command of the First Corps, a
staff-officer who could guide that general along the new road cut
out that day;" that he "went himself to General Anderson, described
the route, and left an officer as a guide. Here a circumstance
occurred which should be specially noticed. General
Anderson stated that his orders were to march by three next
morning. He was preparing to start at eleven that night. Those
four hours anticipated proved of incalculable value next day,"[7]
when Anderson got up in time to assist Stuart's cavalry in
driving back the head of Warren's advance. By diligence, not
" accident," the important junction of roads and choice of position
was gained on the morning of May 8 at Spottsylvania; and an
effort made that same evening by the two corps of Sedgwick and
Warren to turn Anderson's right and dislodge him was repelled
with heavy loss. Ewell's corps, "after a distressing march
through intense heat and thick dust and smoke from burning
woods, reached the Court-House just in time"[8] to assist Anderson's
corps in this, their second heavy encounter with the enemy
that day.

The 9th of May was passed in skirmishing, intrenching, and
posting the artillery, here destined to prove more effective than
it could be in the Wilderness.

On the 10th the Federal army made a series of attacks all
along the lines in front, while Hancock's corps, passing round
their left, endeavored to gain the Confederate rear. These efforts
were everywhere repulsed with great loss. Only on one point,
near Ewell's left, a heavy column of the Sixth Corps broke
through the first line held by Dole's brigade, capturing several
hundred men and some guns. But the advantage was only temporary.
The troops at hand pressed eagerly up, and the assailants
were driven out of the intrenchments, leaving many dead on
the ground. Here, as before in the Wilderness, General Lee

rode to the head of Gordon's troops prepared to lead the charge.
This time the gallant Gordon seized General Lee's bridle in
remonstrance, while the men cried out, "General Lee to the
rear!" General Lee again yielded, and Gordon led the fierce
charge which swept the Yankee intruders out of the works and
re-established the Confederate line.

On the 11th General Lee was informed that the Federal army
was preparing for a move still farther to his right. He therefore
directed the artillery on the front line to be withdrawn where the
roads were difficult to follow in the darkness of night, so that the
army could move at any hour. The guns defending a salient on
Ewell's front were therefore sent back, their route being a very
narrow and intricate one. Against this very point, thus weakened,
Hancock's corps was to be thrown at daylight on the 12th.
Brigadier-General Edward Johnson, commanding in the salient,
during the night perceived the massing of troops in his front, and
the artillery was ordered to return to the lines. The assault,
however, was made at daylight, under cover of a dense fog, before
the guns could get into position. An immense column swept
across the open space in front of the salient,—there was no artillery
to mow them down,—rushed upon the works, and by
force of numbers overpowered and captured Generals Johnson
and Stuart, with upwards of two thousand men and twenty guns.
It was the work of only a few moments. Through the breach
thus made the Federal troops "poured in immense numbers,"
but the Confederates had quickly rallied to the threatened point.
So fierce, so desperate, was the fighting, so resolute the endeavor
to drive back the fresh bodies of assailants, so many men fell
dead in their efforts, that the space within the salient was piled
with dead bodies, and has been known as the "Bloody Angle."
From dawn till far into the night this murderous struggle was
maintained. The assailing force was unable to derive the hoped-for
advantage and penetrate the second line at the base of the
angle. The Confederates could not drive the enemy from the
apex of the salient, though they penned him up and mowed him
down within its walls. On both sides artillery was used with
great effect, and the musketry fire was so severe as to cut down
an oak-tree twenty-two inches through, in rear of a Confederate
brigade.

To the right and left of this furiously-contested point the
assaults of the enemy were everywhere repulsed "with very
heavy loss of life." (Swinton.) To this result the steady and
vigorous fire of the artillery greatly contributed. After twenty
hours of this continuous and exhausting "hand-to-hand" battle,
both sides were weary of the strife. The Confederates occupied
a fortified line across the base of the salient, which had been
constructed during the day, and the Northern army was in no
condition for further attack. In one of the hottest moments of
this desperate fight General Lee had again taken the head of a
column prepared to rush into the thickest of the battle, and had
been again prevented by the eager cries of the men from leading
them into the deadly danger.

After the carrying of the salient and capture of General Johnson's
men and guns on the morning of this bloody day, the
Yankee army had nothing to boast of. Their losses there and
elsewhere along the line were so great that for five days after the
battle General Grant manœuvred and waited for reinforcements
from Washington. These days of rest were of great service to
Lee's men, who could then recruit their weary bodies and profit
by the welcome rations taken from the knapsacks of the enemy
dead along their front. A strong force was thrown against the
line in rear of the "bloody angle" on the morning of the 18th,
but was repulsed with heavy loss, mainly from the fire of thirty
pieces of artillery on Ewell's line. This last attempt satisfied
General Grant that it was hopeless to attempt to dislodge General
Lee from his strong position, and on the night of the 20th of
May—having received forty thousand fresh troops from Washington
—he once more moved towards the right,—"sidling"
towards Richmond.

While the two great armies had thus grappled each other for
two weeks, events of great moment were taking place in other
parts of Virginia. On the 6th of May General Butler landed
his force, thirty thousand strong, at City Point and Bermuda
Hundred, threatening both Petersburg and Richmond.

About the same time General Sigel advanced up the valley of
the Shenandoah with ten thousand or twelve thousand men.

On the 8th of May General Sheridan was ordered to attack
the Confederate cavalry, cut the communications with Richmond,

proceed to James River and communicate with General Butler,
replenish his supplies there, and return to the army. From the
time that Lee's army plunged into the Wilderness it was lost
to the knowledge of the outer world. General Lee's brief despatches
of the fighting there did not reach the government in
Richmond until the day after they were sent. The cutting of the
railroads and telegraphs by Sheridan at Beaver Dam Depot and
Hanover Junction isolated Lee and prevented intercourse with
Richmond for several days. What the anxiety felt there by the
government and people was cannot be told.

General J. E. B. Stuart and his gallant command had thrown
themselves in Sheridan's way and stoutly contested his advance.
Their opposition at the Yellow Tavern, six miles from Richmond,
was effectual in delaying them until the local force in the
city and some brigades from Ransom's command in front of
Butler could be brought up, and the defences on that side the
city be properly garrisoned. But this fortunate rescue of the
capital from Sheridan's unexpected dash was bought by the
death of the gallant Stuart himself, who was mortally wounded
in the fight at Yellow Tavern and died in Richmond the
next day. Stuart's death was a severe loss to the Confederate
army,—the greatest it had experienced save in that of General
Jackson.

Sheridan's daring attempt on Richmond was the greatest
danger to which that city was exposed. Butler was easily
"bottled up" by the greatly inferior force opposed to him, and
Sigel defeated at New Market by General Breckenridge with
about one-fourth of his numbers. In this action the Cadet
Battalion from the Virginia Military Institute—all of them mere
boys—took an important part, leaving eight of their number
dead on the field.

After the Wilderness battles General Pendleton wrote in pencil
to his wife,—

Again, on the I7th, he wrote,—

"Although I do not know how a letter can be sent to you, I
will get one ready with the little time I can take this day. On
Saturday morning I sent George Peterkin to Richmond to have
for me a confidential conversation with the President instead of
giving him my views by letter, as that might have fallen into the
hands of raiders. George took down a letter to Sue, which she
was to send you as soon as possible. No fighting of importance
for some days. Grant seems to have enough of it at this point,
and appears to be trying to slide on a little eastward. If he does,
we shall of course head him again.

"We have great cause for thankfulness in that the enemy has
so far been repulsed and our lives have been spared. We have
all been many times in the extremest dangers of hot battle, yet
almost as by miracle not one has thus far received a scratch.
Such protection from the hand of God ought to render us personally
and more thoroughly devoted to His holy service. Besides
so many perils, we have a good deal of real hardship.
Short rations, little sleep, constant labor, and more or less anxiety
all the time. Still, the spirits of officers and men are wonderful.
Everything is braved and borne not only with resolute determination,
but with the most cheerful good humor.

"The constant rains add much to our difficulties, exposing the
men all the time to wet and mud, and rendering the roads almost
impassable. In common with some other officers in responsible
position, I had last night a long ride through as bad roads as I
ever travelled, exploring a new position to head Grant off if he
move that way. The night before I was out all night, putting
some guns in position to meet an attack reported as likely to be
made on part of our lines. I manage, however, to get along
pretty well, and feel this morning quite fresh. Grant is in the
mud too, and will find it next to impossible to move till we have
some dry weather. . . . Stuart's death is very sad. He is indeed
a great loss to us,—next to Jackson. I thank God he died as a

Christian. . . . I frequently see Sandie; he is well, but generally
worn down and sleepy."

In the letter to his daughter referred to he had written,—
"Sandie had two horses killed under him."

On Lieutenant Peterkin's return Mrs. Lee had written to her
father of affairs in Richmond,—

"You, of course, know of the cavalry raid upon the railroads
and attempt against the city. With them on this side and Butler
below we were really a beleaguered city for some time, and the
booming of cannon and rattle of musketry could be heard in
various parts of the city. . . . I will gladly send your letter to
mamma as soon as possible. But no mails have left the city in
any direction since the Yankees landed on the south side, as the
post-office clerks were ordered out with the other city forces.
Mr. Lee is acting on General Ransom's staff, and has done a
great deal of hard riding. He has been out all night several
times, and this evening has gone to Drewry's Bluff. General
Beauregard is in command across the river and has his headquarters
at the bluff."

From Spottsylvania General Grant moved on the 21st to the
North Anna River, and from that point onward still to the east
until, after crossing the Pamunkey, on June 1, he occupied the
memorable battle-field of Cold Harbor, northeast of Richmond.
Everywhere he had found Lee's forces in his front. At the North
Anna, and again on Totopotomoy Creek, the two armies had confronted
each other for several days. But, though severe skirmishing
occurred at both places and a sharp cavalry fight took
place on the 28th near Hawe's Shop, the Confederate positions
were so well chosen and so strongly defended by infantry and artillery
that General Grant had nowhere ventured to attack them.
The old battle-ground at Cold Harbor reached, with Lee's army
between him and Richmond, with the Chickahominy behind it, the
"sidling" process was no longer practicable. To destroy the Confederate
army and to take possession of the Confederate capital
were the two avowed objects of his campaign. Hitherto all his
efforts to effect either had proved futile, and unless he proposed

withdrawing to James River and his gunboats, as McClellan had
done, he must now once again try the issue of direct battle. To
this end he massed his troops against the Confederate lines in
heavy columns for the attack. The positions of the two armies
were the reverse of those occupied by McClellan and Lee in 1862,
and the disparity in their numbers much greater than it was then.
Some slight advantage was claimed by the Federal commanders
in preliminary actions on the 1st and 2d of June, and the whole
army was ordered to a desperate attack on the very early morning
of the 3d. The assault was made fiercely and resolutely
along the whole front, and was met by such a deadly fire of musketry
and cannon that the assailing force literally melted away.
Thirteen thousand of them lay dead and wounded in front of the
breastworks, behind which the Confederate loss was not more than
as many hundreds.[9] At one point, in front of Hoke's brigade,
not one of that command was killed, while the ground in their
front "was literally covered with the dead and wounded."[10] This
decided defeat, accomplished in a brief time, virtually terminated
the campaign north of the James. The Federal troops declined
to move when ordered to renew the attack later in the day.
General Grant asked a truce to bury his dead, and for a short
period the fighting was over.

The campaign had lasted thirty days. Desperate battles, weary
marches, constant exposure and hardship, had been the experience
of both armies; but the excitement of success, the energizing
consciousness of victory, had everywhere encouraged the hungry,
ragged, weary, and foot-sore Southern troops. But the diminution
of their numbers in the loss of many of their bravest and best
men and officers was beginning to tell heavily on their numerical
strength, and to confirm General Grant in his purpose to overcome
them at last "by mere attrition." We have seen that General
Lee had about one-half as many men at the Rapidan as General
Grant brought to attack him. The various reliable authorities
on both sides, with all the data at their disposal at this late day,
put down the Federal loss during the campaign at sixty thousand
men,[11] that of General Lee at twenty thousand. Grant had been

reinforced during this time by fifty thousand men and Lee by
only fourteen thousand four hundred. But Grant had still a
reserved force larger than Lee's whole army to draw upon,[12]
while boys and old men were the only "reserves" left in the
South, and General Lee was obliged to send detachments in a
short time to protect other parts of the State.

Although comparatively useless in the thickets of the Wilderness,
the artillery of Lee's army had done gallant and effective
service on every battle-field thereafter, checking the enemy's advance
when moving from place to place, and contributing nobly to
the victories at Spottsylvania and Cold Harbor. General Pendleton's
report[13] of all those operations gives a full account of the
marching and fighting of the battalions and companies in detail.

Extracts from letters make the events of these days very
vivid:

On the 13th Sandie Pendleton wrote in pencil on a torn piece
of a note-book,—

Across this fragment is scratched in haste,—

"I have this morning declined to be made a brigadier, as I
think I can do more good where I am."