University of Virginia Library

Friday June 29th. in Convention.

Docr. Johnson. The controversy must be endless
whilst Gentlemen differ in the grounds of their arguments;
Those on one side considering the States as
districts of people composing one political Society;
those on the other considering them as so many political
societies. The fact is that the States do exist as
political Societies, and a Govt. is to be formed for
them in their political capacity, as well as for the
individuals composing them. Does it not seem to
follow, that if the States as such are to exist they
must be armed with some power of self-defence.
This is the idea of (Col. Mason) who appears to have
looked to the bottom of this matter. Besides the

aristocratic and other interests, which ought to have
the means of defending themselves, the States have
their interests as such, and are equally entitled to
like means. On the whole he thought that as in
some respects the States are to be considered in their
political capacity, and in others as districts of individual
citizens the two ideas embraced on different
sides, instead of being opposed to each other, ought
to be combined; that in one branch the people, ought
to be represented, in the other the States.

Mr. Ghoram. The States as now confederated have
no doubt a right to refuse to be consolidated, or to
be formed into any new system. But he wished the
small States which seemed most ready to object, to
consider which are to give up most, they or the
larger ones. He conceived that a rupture of the
Union wd. be an event unhappy for all, but surely
the large States would be least unable to take care of
themselves, and to make connections with one another.
The weak therefore were most interested in
establishing some general system for maintaining
order. If among individuals, composed partly of
weak, and partly of strong, the former most need the
protection of law & Government, the case is exactly
the same with weak & powerful States. What would
be the situation of Delaware (for these things he
found must be spoken out, & it might as well be
done at first as last) what wd. be the situation of Delaware
in case of a separation of the States? Would
she not be at the mercy of Pennsylvania? would not
her true interest lie in being consolidated with her,

and ought she not now to wish for such a union with
Pa. under one Govt. as will put it out of the power
of Pena. to oppress her? Nothing can be more ideal
than the danger apprehended by the States from
their being formed into one nation. Massts. was originally
three colonies, viz old Massts. Plymouth—&
the province of Mayne. These apprehensions existed
then. An incorporation took place; all parties
were safe & satisfied; and every distinction is now
forgotten. The case was similar with Connecticut
& New haven. The dread of Union was reciprocal;
the consequence of it equally salutary and satisfactory.
In like manner N. Jersey has been made one
society out of two parts. Should a separation of the
States take place, the fate of N. Jersey wd. be worst
of all. She has no foreign commerce & can have but
little. Pa. & N. York will continue to levy taxes on
her consumption. If she consults her interest she
wd. beg of all things to be annihilated. The apprehensions
of the small States ought to be appeased
by another reflection. Massts. will be divided. The
province of Maine is already considered as approaching
the term of its annexation to it; and Pa. will
probably not increase, considering the present state
of her population, & other events that may happen.
On the whole he considered a Union of the States as
necessary to their happiness, & a firm Genl. Govt. as
necessary to their Union. He shd. consider it as his
duty if his colleagues viewed the matter in the same
light he did to stay here as long as any other State
would remain with them, in order to agree on some
plan that could with propriety be recommended to
the people.

Mr. Elseworth, did not despair. He still trusted
that some good plan of Govt. wd. be devised & adopted.

Mr. Read. He shd. have no objection to the system
if it were truly national, but it has too much of a
federal mixture in it. The little States he thought
had not much to fear. He suspected that the large
States felt their want of energy, & wished for a Genl.
Govt. to supply the defect. Massts. was evidently
labouring under her weakness and he believed Delaware
wd. not be in much danger if in her neighbourhood.
Delaware had enjoyed tranquillity & he
flattered himself wd. continue to do so. He was not
however so selfish as not to wish for a good Genl.
Govt. In order to obtain one the whole States must
be incorporated. If the States remain, the representatives
of the large ones will stick together, and
carry everything before them. The Executive also
will be chosen under the influence of this partiality,
and will betray it in his administration. These jealousies
are inseparable from the scheme of leaving
the States in existence. They must be done away.
The ungranted lands also which have been assumed
by particular States must also be given up. He
repeated his approbation of the plan of Mr. Hamilton,
& wished it to be substituted in the place of that on
the table.

Mr. Madison agreed with Docr. Johnson, that the
mixed nature of the Govt. ought to be kept in view:
but thought too much stress was laid on the rank of

the States as political societies. There was a gradation,
he observed from the smallest corporation, with
the most limited powers, to the largest empire with
the most perfect sovereignty. He pointed out the
limitations on the sovereignty of the States, as now
confederated their laws in relation to the paramount
law of the Confederacy were analagous to
that of bye laws to the supreme law within a State;
Under the proposed Govt. the powers of the States
will be much farther reduced. According to the
views of every member, the Genl. Govt. will have
powers far beyond those exercised by the British
Parliament, when the States were part of the British
Empire. It will in particular have the power, without
the consent of the State Legislatures, to levy
money directly on the people themselves; and
therefore not to divest such unequal portions of the
people as composed the several States, of an equal
voice, would subject the system to the reproaches
& evils which have resulted from the vicious representation
in G. B.

He entreated the gentlemen representing the small
States to renounce a principle wch. was confessedly
unjust, which cd. never be admitted, & if admitted
must infuse mortality into a Constitution which we
wished to last forever. He prayed them to ponder
well the consequences of suffering the Confederacy
to go to pieces. It had been sd. that the want of
energy in the large states wd. be a security to the
small. It was forgotten that this want of energy
proceeded from the supposed security of the States

agst. all external danger. Let each state depend on
itself for its security, & let apprehensions arise of
danger, from distant powers or from neighbouring
States, & the languishing condition of all the
States, large as well as small, wd. soon be transformed
into vigorous & high toned Govts. His great fear was
that their Govts. wd. then have too much energy, that
these might not only be formidable in the large to the
small States, but fatal to the internal liberty of all.
The same causes which have rendered the old world
the Theatre of incessant wars, & have banished
liberty from the face of it, wd. soon produce the same
effects here. The weakness & jealousy of the small
States wd. quickly introduce some regular military
force agst. sudden danger from their powerful neighbours.
The example wd. be followed by others, and
wd. soon become universal. In time of actual war,
great discretionary powers are constantly given to
the Executive Magistrate. Constant apprehension
of war, has the same tendency to render the head
too large for the body. A standing military force,
with an overgrown Executive will not long be safe
companions to liberty. The means of defence agst.
foreign danger, have been always the instruments of
tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a
standing maxim to excite a war, whenever a revolt
was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the
armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have
enslaved the people. It is perhaps questionable,
whether the best concerted system of absolute power
in Europe cd. maintain itself, in a situation, where no
alarms of external danger cd. tame the people to the
domestic yoke. The insular situation of G. Britain
was the principal cause of her being an exception to
the general fate of Europe. It has rendered less
defence necessary, and admitted a kind of defence
wch. cd. not be used for the purpose of oppression.—
These consequences he conceived ought to be apprehended
whether the States should run into a total
separation from each other, or shd. enter into partial
confederacies. Either event wd. be truly deplorable; &
those who might be accessary to either, could never
be forgiven by their Country, nor by themselves.

[113] Mr. Hamilton observed that individuals forming
political Societies modify their rights differently with
regard to suffrage. Examples of it are found in all
the States. In all of them some individuals are deprived
of the right altogether, not having the requisite
qualification of property. In some of the States
the right of suffrage is allowed in some cases and
refused in others. To vote for a member in one
branch, a certain quantum of property, to vote for
a member in another branch of the Legislature, a
higher quantum of property is required. In like
manner States may modify their right of suffrage
differently, the larger exercising a larger, the smaller
a smaller share of it. But as States are a collection
of individual men which ought we to respect
most, the rights of the people composing them, or of
the artificial beings resulting from the composition.
Nothing could be more preposterous or absurd than

to sacrifice the former to the latter. It has been
sd. that if the smaller States renounce their equality,
they renounce at the same time their liberty. The
truth is it is a contest for power, not for liberty.
Will the men composing the small States be less free
than those composing the larger. The State of
Delaware having 40,000 souls will lose power, if she
has 1/10 only of the votes allowed to Pa. having 400,000:
but will the people of Del: be less free, if each
citizen has an equal vote with each citizen of Pa.
He admitted that common residence within the same
State would produce a certain degree of attachment;
and that this principle might have a certain influence
in public affairs. He thought however that this
might by some precautions be in a great measure
excluded: and that no material inconvenience could
result from it, as there could not be any ground for
combination among the States whose influence was
most dreaded. The only considerable distinction of
interests, lay between the carrying & non-carrying
States, which divides instead of uniting the largest
States. No considerable inconvenience had been
found from the division of the State of N. York into
different districts of different sizes.

Some of the consequences of a dissolution of the
Union, and the establishment of partial confederacies,
had been pointed out. He would add another
of a most serious nature. Alliances will immediately
be formed with different rival & hostile nations of
Europes, who will foment disturbances among ourselves,
and make us parties to all their own quarrels.

Foreign Nations having American dominion are &
must be jealous of us. Their representatives betray
the utmost anxiety for our fate, & for the result of
this meeting, which must have an essential influence
on it.—It had been said that respectability in the
eyes of foreign Nations was not the object at which
we aimed; that the proper object of republican
Government was domestic tranquillity & happiness.
This was an ideal distinction. No Government
could give us tranquillity & happiness at home,
which did not possess sufficient stability and strength
to make us respectable abroad. This was the critical
moment for forming such a Government. We should
run every risk in trusting to future amendments.
As yet we retain the habits of union. We are weak
& sensible of our weakness. Henceforward the
motives will become feebler, and the difficulties
greater. It is a miracle that we were now here
exercising our tranquil & free deliberations on the
subject. It would be madness to trust to future
miracles. A thousand causes must obstruct a reproduction
of them.

Mr. Pierce considered the equality of votes under
the Confederation as the great source of the public
difficulties. The members of Congs. were advocates
for local advantages. State distinctions must be
sacrificed as far as the general good required, but
without destroying the States. Tho' from a small
State he felt himself a Citizen of the U. S.

Mr. Gerry, urged that we never were independent
States, were not such now, & never could be even

on the principles of the Confederation. The States
& the advocates for them were intoxicated with the
idea of their sovereignty. He was a member of Congress
at the time the federal articles were formed.
The injustice of allowing each State an equal vote
was long insisted on. He voted for it, but it was
agst. his Judgment, and under the pressure of public
danger, and the obstinacy of the lesser States. The
present Confederation he considered as dissolving.
The fate of the Union will be decided by the Convention.
If they do not agree on something, few
delegates will probably be appointed to Congs. If
they do Congs. will probably be kept up till the new
System should be adopted. He lamented that instead
of coming here like a band of brothers, belonging
to the same family, we seemed to have
brought with us the spirit of political negotiators.

Mr. L. Martin remarked that the language of the
States being sovereign & independent, was once
familiar & understood; though it seemed now so
strange & obscure. He read those passages in the
articles of Confederation, which describe them in
that language.

On the question as moved by Mr. Lansing. Shall
the word "not" be struck out.

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no.
Del.ay. Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On the motion to agree to the clause as reported,
"that the rule of suffrage in the 1st. branch ought
not to be according to that established by the Articles
of the Confederation

Mass. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa.
ay. Del. no. Md. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C.
ay. Geo. ay.

Docr. Johnson & Mr. Elseworth moved to postpone
the residue of the clause, & take up ye. 8 Resol:

On question

Mas. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa.
ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Mr. Elseworth moved that the rule of suffrage in
the 2d. branch be the same with that established by
the articles of Confederation. "He was not sorry
on the whole he said that the vote just passed, had
determined against this rule in the first branch. He
hoped it would become a ground of compromise
with regard to the 2d. branch. We were partly
national; partly federal. The proportional representation
in the first branch was conformable to the
national principle & would secure the large States
agst. the small. An equality of voices was conformable
to the federal principle and was necessary to
secure the Small States agst. the large. He trusted
that on this middle ground a compromise would take
place. He did not see that it could on any other.
And if no compromise should take place, our meeting
would not only be in vain but worse than in vain.
To the Eastward he was sure Massts. was the only
State that would listen to a proposition for excluding
the States as equal political Societies, from an equal
voice in both branches. The others would risk every
consequence rather than part with so dear a right.

An attempt to deprive them of it, was at once cutting
the body of America in two, and as he supposed
would be the case, somewhere about this part of it.
The large States he conceived would notwithstanding
the equality of votes, have an influence that
would maintain their superiority. Holland, as had
been admitted (by Mr. Madison) had, notwithstanding
a like equality in the Dutch Confederacy, a prevailing
influence in the public measures. The power
of self defence was essential to the small States.
Nature had given it to the smallest insect of the
creation. He could never admit that there was no
danger of combinations among the large States.
They will like individuals find out and avail themselves
of the advantage to be gained by it. It was
true the danger would be greater if they were
contiguous and had a more immediate common
interest. A defensive combination of the small
States was rendered more difficult by their great
number. He would mention another consideration
of great weight. The existing confederation was
founded on the equality of the States in the article
of suffrage: was it meant to pay no regard to this
antecedent plighted faith. Let a strong Executive, a
Judiciary & Legislative power be created, but Let
not too much be attempted; by which all may be
lost. He was not in general a half-way man, yet he
preferred doing half the good we could, rather than
do nothing at all. The other half may be added,
when the necessity shall be more fully experienced.[114]

Mr. Baldwin[115] could have wished that the powers
of the General Legislature had been defined, before
the mode of constituting it had been agitated. He
should vote against the motion of Mr. Elseworth,
tho. he did not like the Resolution as it stood in the
Report of the Comittee of the whole. He thought
the second branch ought to be the representation of
property, and that in forming it therefore some reference
ought to be had to the relative wealth of their
Constituents, and to the principles on which the
Senate of Massts. was constituted. He concurred
with those who thought it wd. be impossible for the
Genl. Legislature to extend its cares to the local
matters of the States.[116] Adjd.