University of Virginia Library

Friday June 1st. 1787

William Houston from Georgia took his seat.
The Committee of the whole proceeded to Resolution

7. "that a national Executive be instituted, to
be chosen by the national Legislature for the term
Of—years &c to be ineligible thereafter, to
possess the Executive powers of Congress &c."

Mr. Pinkney was for a vigorous Executive but was
afraid the Executive powers of the existing Congress
might extend to peace & war &c which would render
the Executive a monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit
an elective one.

Mr. Wilson moved that the Executive consist of a
single person. Mr C. Pinkney seconded the motion,
so as to read "that a National Ex. to consist of a
single person, be instituted.

A considerable pause ensuing and the Chairman[44]
asking if he should put the question, Docr. Franklin

observed that it was a point of great importance and
wished that the gentlemen would deliver their sentiments
on it before the question was put.

Mr. Rutlidge animadverted on the shyness of gentlemen
on this and other subjects. He said it
looked as if they supposed themselves precluded by
having frankly disclosed their opinions from afterwards
changing them, which he did not take to be at
all the case. He said he was for vesting the Executive
power in a single person, tho' he was not for
giving him the power of war and peace. A single
man would feel the greatest responsibility and administer
the public affairs best.

Mr. Sherman said he considered the Executive
magistracy as nothing more than an institution for
carrying the will of the Legislature into effect, that
the person or persons ought to be appointed by and
accountable to the Legislature only, which was the
depository of the supreme will of the Society. As
they were the best judges of the business which
ought to be done by the Executive department, and
consequently of the number necessary from time to
time for doing it, he wished the number might
not be fixed, but that the legislature should be at
liberty to appoint one or more as experience might
dictate.

Mr.Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giving

most energy dispatch and responsibility to the office.
He did not consider the Prerogatives of the British
Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive
powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a Legislative
nature. Among others that of war & peace
&c. The only powers he considered strictly Executive
were those of executing the laws, and appointing
officers, not appertaining to and appointed by the
Legislature.[45]

Mr. Gerry favored the policy of annexing a Council
to the Executive in order to give weight & inspire
confidence.[46]

Mr. Randolph strenuously opposed a unity in the
Executive magistracy. He regarded it as the fœtus
of monarchy. We had he said no motive to be governed
by the British Govenmt. as our prototype.
He did not mean however to throw censure on that
Excellent fabric. If we were in a situation to copy
it he did not know that he should be opposed to it;

but the fixt genius of the people of America required
a different form of Government. He could not see
why the great requisites for the Executive department,
vigor, dispatch & responsibility could not be
found in three men, as well as in one man. The
Executive ought to be independent. It ought
therefore in order to support its independence to
consist of more than one.

Mr. Wilson said that unity in the Executive instead
of being the fetus of monarchy would be the
best safeguard against tyranny. He repeated that
he was not governed by the British Model which
was inapplicable to the situation of this Country;
the extent of which was so great, and the manners so

republican, that nothing but a great confederated
Republic would do for it.

Mr. Wilson's motion for a single magistrate was
postponed by common consent, the Committee
seeming unprepared for any decision on it; and the
first part of the clause agreed to, viz—"that a National
Executive be instituted."[47]

Mr. Madison thought it would be proper, before a
choice shd. be made between a unity and a plurality
in the Executive, to fix the extent of the Executive
authority; that as certain powers were in their
nature Executive, and must be given to that departmt.
whether administered by one or more persons,
a definition of their extent would assist the
judgment in determining how far they might be
safely entrusted to a single officer. He accordingly
moved that so much of the clause before the Committee
as related to the powers of the Executive shd.
be struck out & that after the words "that a national
Executive ought to be instituted" there be inserted
the words following viz. "with power to carry
into effect the national laws, to appoint to offices
in cases not otherwise provided for, and to execute
such other powers "not Legislative nor Judiciary
in their nature," as may from time to time be
delegated by the national Legislature." The words
"not legislative nor judiciary in their nature" were
added to the proposed amendment, in consequence

of a suggestion by Genl. Pinkney that improper
powers might otherwise be delegated.

Mr. Wilson seconded this motion.

Mr. Pinkney moved to amend the amendment by
striking out the last member of it; viz: "and to execute
such other powers not Legislative nor Judiciary
in their nature as may from time to time be delegated."
He said they were unnecessary, the object
of them being included in the "power to carry into
effect the national laws."

Mr. Randolph seconded the motion.

Mr. Madison did not know that the words were
absolutely necessary, or even the preceding words,
"to appoint to offices &c. the whole being perhaps
included in the first member of the proposition. He
did not however see any inconveniency in retaining
them, and cases might happen in which they might
serve to prevent doubts and misconstructions.

In consequence of the motion of Mr. Pinkney, the
question on Mr. Madison's motion was divided; and
the words objected to by Mr. Pinkney struck out;
by the votes of Connecticut, N. Y., N. J., Pena., Del.,
N. C., & Geo. agst. Mass., Virga. & S. Carolina the
preceding part of the motion being first agreed to;
Connecticut divided all the other States in the
affirmative.

The next clause in Resolution 7, relating to the
mode of appointing, & the duration of, the Executive
being under consideration,

Mr. Wilson said he was almost unwilling to declare
the mode which he wished to take place, being

apprehensive that it might appear chimerical. He
would say however at least that in theory he was for
an election by the people. Experience, particularly
in N. York & Massts, shewed that an election of the
first magistrate by the people at large, was both
a convenient & successful mode. The objects of
choice in such cases must be persons whose merits
have general notoriety.

Mr. Sherman was for the appointment by the
Legislature, and for making him absolutely dependent
on that body, as it was the will of that which was
to be executed. An independence of the Executive
on the supreme Legislature, was in his opinion the
very essence of tyranny if there was any such thing.

Mr. Wilson moves that the blank for the term of
duration should be filled with three years, observing
at the same time that he preferred this short period,
on the supposition that a re-eligibility would be provided
for.

Mr. Pinkney moves for seven years.

Mr. Sherman was for three years, and agst. the
doctrine of rotation as throwing out of office the men
best qualified to execute its duties.

Mr. Mason was for seven years at least, and for
prohibiting a re-eligibility as the best expedient both
for preventing the effect of a false complaisance on
the side of the Legislature towards unfit characters;
and a temptation on the side of the Executive to intrigue
with the Legislature for a re-appointment.

Mr. Bedford[48] was strongly opposed to so long a

term as seven years. He begged the Committee to
consider what the situation of the Country would be,
in case the first magistrate should be saddled on it
for such a period and it should be found on trial that
he did not possess the qualifications ascribed to him,
or should lose them after his appointment. An impeachment
he said would be no cure for this evil,
as an impeachment would reach misfeasance only,
not incapacity. He was for a triennial election, and
for an ineligibility after a period of nine years.

On the question for seven years,

Massts. dividd. Cont. no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay.
Pena. ay. Del. ay. Virga. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geor. no.

There being 5 ays, 4 noes, & 1 divd., a question was
asked whether a majority had voted in the Affirmative?
The President decided that it was an affirmative
vote.

The mode of appointing the Executive was the next
question.

Mr. Wilson renewed his declarations in favor of an
appointment by the people. He wished to derive
not only both branches of the Legislature from the
people, without the intervention of the State Legislatures
but the Executive also; in order to make them
as independent as possible of each other, as well as
of the States;

Col. Mason favors the idea, but thinks it impracticable.

He wishes however that Mr. Wilson might
have time to digest it into his own form.—the clause,
"to be chosen by the National Legislature "—was
accordingly postponed.—

Mr. Rutlidge suggests an election of the Executive
by the second branch only of the national Legislature.

The Committee then rose and the House

Adjourned.