University of Virginia Library

Saturday, July 7. in Convention.

"Shall the clause allowing each State one vote in
the 2d. branch, stand as part of the Report,"? being
taken up—

Mr. Gerry. This is the critical question. He had
rather agree to it than have no accommodation. A
Governt. short of a proper national plan, if generally
acceptable, would be preferable to a proper one
which if it could be carried at all, would operate on
discontented States. He thought it would be best
to suspend the question till the Comme. yesterday appointed,
should make report.

Mr. Sherman Supposed that it was the wish of
every one that some Genl. Govt. should be established.
An equal vote in the 2d. branch would, he thought,
be most likely to give it the necessary vigor. The
small States have more vigor in their Govts. than the
large ones, the more influence therefore the large
ones have, the weaker will be the Govt. In the

large States it will be most difficult to collect the real
& fair sense of the people. Fallacy & undue influence
will be practised with most success; and improper
men will most easily get into office. If they
vote by States in the 2d. branch, and each State has
an equal vote, there must be always a majority of
States as well as a majority of the people on the
side of public measures, & the Govt. will have decision
and efficacy. If this be not the case in
the 2d. branch there may be a majority of States agst.
public measures, and the difficulty of compelling
them to abide by the public determination, will
render the Government feebler than it has ever yet
been.

Mr. Wilson was not deficient in a conciliating
temper, but firmness was sometimes a duty of higher
obligation. Conciliation was also misapplied in this
instance. It was pursued here rather among the
Representatives, than among the Constituents; and
it wd. be of little consequence if not established
among the latter; and there could be little hope of
its being established among them if the foundation
should not be laid in justice and right.

On Question shall the words stand as part of the
Report?

Massts. divd. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa.
no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no.
Geo. divd.

(Note. several votes were given here in the affirmative
or were divd. because another final question
was to be taken on the whole report.)

Mr. Gerry[121] thought it would be proper to proceed
to enumerate & define the powers to be vested in
the Genl. Govt. before a question on the report should
be taken as to the rule of representation in the 2d.
branch.

Mr. Madison, observed that it wd. be impossible
to say what powers could be safely & properly vested

in the Govt. before it was known, in what manner
the States were to be represented in it. He was
apprehensive that if a just representation were not
the basis of the Govt. is would happen, as it did when
the Articles of Confederation were depending, that
every effectual prerogative would be withdrawn or
withheld, and the New Govt. wd. be rendered as impotent
and as shortlived as the old.

Mr. Patterson would not decide whether the privilege
concerning money bills were a valuable consideration
or not: But he considered the mode &
rule of representation in the 1st. branch as fully so;
and that after the establishment of that point, the
small States would never be able to defend themselves
without an equality of votes in the 2d. branch.
There was no other ground of accommodation. His
resolution was fixt. He would meet the large States
on that ground and no other. For himself he should
vote agst. the Report, because it yielded too much.

Mr. Govr. Morris. He had no resolution unalterably
fixed except to do what should finally appear to him
right. He was agst. the Report because it maintained
the improper constitution of the 2d. branch. It
made it another Congress, a mere whisp of straw. It
had been sd. (by Mr. Gerry) that the new Governt.
would be partly national, partly federal; that it
ought in the first quality to protect individuals; in
the second, the States. But in what quality was it
to protect the aggregate interest of the whole.
Among the many provisions which had been urged,
he had seen none for supporting the dignity and

splendor of the American Empire. It had been one
of our greatest misfortunes that the great objects of
the nation had been sacrificed constantly to local
views; in like manner as the general interests of
States had been sacrificed to those of the Counties.
What is to be the check in the Senate? none; unless
it be to keep the majority of the people from injuring
particular States. But particular States
ought to be injured for the sake of a majority of the
people, in case their conduct should deserve it.
Suppose they should insist on claims evidently unjust,
and pursue them in a manner detrimental to
the whole body. Suppose they should give themselves
up to foreign influence. Ought they to be
protected in such cases. They were originally nothing
more than colonial corporations. On the declaration
of Independence, a Governmt. was to be formed.
The small States aware of the necessity of preventing
anarchy, and taking advantage of the moment,
extorted from the large ones an equality of votes.
Standing now on that ground, they demand under
the new system greater rights as men, than their
fellow Citizens of the large States. The proper
answer to them is that the same necessity of which
they formerly took advantage, does not now exist,
and that the large States are at liberty now to consider
what is right, rather than what may be expedient.
We must have an efficient Govt. and if
there be an efficiency in the local Govts. the former is
impossible. Germany alone proves it. Notwithstanding
their common diet, notwithstanding the
great prerogatives of the Emperor as head of the
Empire, and his vast resources, as sovereign of his
particular dominions, no union is maintained; foreign
influence disturbs every internal operation, & there
is no energy whatever in the General Governmt.
Whence does this proceed? From the energy of the
local authorities; from its being considered of more
consequence to support the Prince of Hesse, than
the Happiness of the people of Germany. Do
Gentlemen wish this to be ye. case here. Good God,
Sir, is it possible they can so delude themselves.
What if all the Charters & Constitutions of the
States were thrown into the fire, and all their demagogues
into the Ocean. What would it be to the
happiness of America. And will not this be the
case here if we pursue the train in wch. the business
lies. We shall establish an Aulic Council without an
Emperor to execute its decrees. The same circumstances
which unite the people here, unite them in
Germany. They have there a common language, a
common law, common usages and manners, and a
common interest in being united; Yet their local
jurisdictions destroy every tie. The case was the
same in the Grecian States. The United Netherlands
are at this time torn in factions. With these
examples before our eyes shall we form establishments
which must necessarily produce the same
effects. It is of no consequence from what districts the
2d. branch shall be drawn, if it be so constituted as to
yield an asylum agst. these evils. As it is now constituted
he must be agst. its being drawn from the States
in equal portions. But still he was ready to join in
devising such an amendment of the plan, as will be
most likely to secure our liberty & happiness.

Mr. Sherman & Mr. Elseworth moved to postpone
the Question on the Report from the Committee of
a member from each State, in order to wait for the
Report from the Come. of 5 last appointed,

Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Maryland ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Adjd.