The writings of James Madison, comprising his public papers and his private correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed. |
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Thursday June 28th. in Convention |
 | The writings of James Madison, |  |
Thursday June 28th. in Convention
Mr. L. Martin resumed his discourse,[110]
contending
that the Genl. Govt. ought to be formed for the States,
not for individuals: that if the States were to have
would be the same thing whether their representatives
were chosen by the Legislatures or the people;
the smaller States would be equally enslaved; that
if the large States have the same interest with the
smaller as was urged, there could be no danger in
giving them an equal vote; they would not injure
themselves, and they could not injure the large ones
on that supposition without injuring themselves and
if the interests, were not the same, the inequality of
suffrage wd. be dangerous to the smaller States: that
rulers of the States, whose influence over the people
will certainly prevent their adopting it: that the
large States were weak at present in proportion to
their extent; & could only be made formidable to
the small ones, by the weight of their votes: that in
case a dissolution of the Union should take place,
the small States would have nothing to fear from
their power; that if in such a case the three great
States should league themselves together, the other
ten could do so too; & that he had rather see partial
This was the substance of the residue of his discourse
which was delivered with much diffuseness
& considerable vehemence.
Mr. Lansing & Mr. Dayton moved to strike out
"not," so that the 7 art. might read that the rights
of suffrage in the 1st. branch ought to be according to
the rule established by the Confederation."
Mr. Dayton expressed great anxiety that the question
might not be put till tomorrow; Governr. Livingston
being kept away by indisposition, and the
representation of N. Jersey thereby suspended.
Mr. Williamson, thought that if any political truth
could be grounded on mathematical demonstration,
it was that if the States were equally sovereign
now, and parted with equal proportions of sovereignty,
that they would remain equally sovereign. He
could not comprehend how the smaller States would
be injured in the case, and wished some Gentleman
would vouchsafe a solution of it. He observed that
the small States, if they had a plurality of votes
would have an interest in throwing the burdens off
their own shoulders on those of the large ones. He
begged that the expected addition of new States
from the Westward might be kept in view. They
would be small States, they would be poor States,
they would be unable to pay in proportion to their
numbers; their distance from market rendering the
produce of their labour less valuable; they would
consequently be tempted to combine for the purpose
of laying burdens on com̃erce & consumption
States.
Mr. Madison, sd. he was much disposed to concur in
any expedient not inconsistent with fundamental
principles, that could remove the difficulty concerning
the rule of representation. But he could neither
be convinced that the rule contended for was just,
nor necessary for the safety of the small States agst.
the large States. That it was not just, had been
conceded by Mr. Breerly & Mr. Paterson themselves.
The expedient proposed by them was a new
partition of the territory of the U. States. The
fallacy of the reasoning drawn from the equality of
Sovereign States in the formation of compacts, lay
in confounding together mere Treaties, in which
were specified certain duties to which the parties
were to be bound, and certain rules by which their
subjects were to be reciprocally governed in their
intercourse, with a compact by which an authority
was created paramount to the parties, & making
laws for the government of them. If France, England
& Spain were to enter into a Treaty for the
regulation of commerce &c with the Prince of Monacho
& 4 or 5 other of the smallest sovereigns of
Europe, they would not hesitate to treat as equals,
and to make the regulations perfectly reciprocal.
Wd. the case be the same, if a Council were to be
formed of deputies from each with authority and discretion,
to raise money, levy troops, determine the
value of coin &c?. Would 30 or 40, million of people
submit their fortunes into the hands of a few thousands?
expected more from the terror of their superior force,
than they feared from the selfishness of their feeble
associates. Why are Counties of the Same States
represented in proportion to their numbers? Is it
because the representatives are chosen by the people
themselves? So will be the representatives in the
Nationl. Legislature. Is it because, the larger have
more at stake than the smaller? The Case will be
the same with the larger & smaller States. Is it
because the laws are to operate immediately on their
persons & properties? The same is the case in some
degree as the articles of confederation stand; the
same will be the case in a far greater degree, under
the plan proposed to be substituted. In the cases of
captures, of piracies, and of offences in a federal army,
the property & persons of individuals depend on the
laws of Congs. By the plan proposed a compleat
power of taxation, the highest prerogative of supremacy
is proposed to be vested in the National Govt.
Many other powers are added which assimilate it to
the Govt. of individual States. The negative proposed
on the State laws, will make it an essential
branch of the State Legislatures & of course will
require that it should be exercised by a body established
on like principles with the other branches of
those Legislatures.—That it is not necessãy to
secure the small States agst. the large ones he conceived
to be equally obvious: Was a combination
of the large ones dreaded? This must arise either
from some interest common to Va. Massts. & Pa. &
the mere circumstance of similarity of size. Did any
such common interest exist? In point of situation
they could not have been more effectually separated
from each other by the most jealous citizen of the
most jealous State. In point of manners, Religion,
and the other circumstances which sometimes beget
affection between different communities, they were
not more assimilated than the other States—In point
of the staple productions they were as dissimilar as
any three other States in the Union. The Staple of
Massts. was fish, of Pa. flower, of Va. Tobo. Was a Combination
to be apprehended from the mere circumstance
of equality of size? Experience suggested no
such danger. The journals of Congs. did not present
any peculiar association of these States in the votes
recorded. It had never been seen that different
Counties in the same State, conformable in extent,
but disagreeing in other circumstances, betrayed a
propensity to such combinations. Experience rather
taught a contrary lesson. Among individuals of
superior eminence & weight in Society, rivalships
were much more frequent than coalitions. Among
independent Nations, pre-eminent over their neighbours,
the same remark was verified. Carthage &
Rome tore one another to pieces instead of uniting
their forces to devour the weaker nations of the
Earth. The Houses of Austria & France were hostile
as long as they remained the greatest powers of
Europe. England & France have succeeded to the
pre-eminence & to the enmity. To this principle we
powers would have been fatal to us. Among the
principal members of antient & Modern confederacies,
we find the same effect from the same cause.
The contentions, not the Coalitions of Sparta, Athens
& Thebes, proved fatal to the smaller members of
the Amphyctionic Confederacy. The contentions,
not the combinations of Prussia & Austria, have distracted
& oppressed the German empire. Were the
large States formidable singly to their smaller neighbours?
On this supposition the latter ought to wish
for such a General Govt. as will operate with equal
energy on the former as on themselves. The more
lax the band, the more liberty the larger will have to
avail themselves of their superior force. Here again
Experience was an instructive monitor. What is ye.
situation of the weak compared with the strong in
those stages of civilization in which the violence of
individuals is least controuled by an efficient Government?
The Heroic period of Antient Greece the
feudal licentiousness of the middle ages of Europe,
the existing condition of the American Savages, answer
this question. What is the situation of the
minor sovereigns in the great society of independent
nations, in which the more powerful are under no
controul but the nominal authority of the law of
Nations? Is not the danger to the former exactly in
proportion to their weakness. But there are cases
still more in point. What was the condition of the
weaker members of the Amphyctionic Confederacy.
Plutarch (life of Themistocles) will inform us that it
& awed the weaker, and that Judgment went
in favor of the more powerful party. What is the
condition of the lesser states in the German Confederacy?
We all know that they are exceedingly
trampled upon; and that they owe their safety as
far as they enjoy it, partly to their enlisting themselves,
under the rival banners of the pre-eminent
members, partly to alliances with neighbouring
Princes which the Constitution of the Empire does
not prohibit. What is the state of things in the lax
system of the Dutch Confederacy? Holland contains
about 1/2 the People, supplies about 1/2 of the
money, and by her influence, silently & indirectly
governs the whole republic. In a word; the two
extremes before us are a perfect separation & a perfect
incorporation, of the 13 States. In the first case
they would be independent nations subject to no law,
but the law of nations. In the last, they would be
mere counties of one entire republic, subject to one
common law. In the first case the smaller States
would have every thing to fear from the larger. In
the last they would have nothing to fear. The true
policy of the small States therefore lies in promoting
those principles & that form of Govt. which will
most approximate the States to the condition of
counties. Another consideration may be added. If
the Genl. Govt. be feeble, the large States distrusting
its continuance, and foreseeing that their importance
& security may depend on their own size & strength,
will never submit to a partition. Give to the Genl.
the objection. Gradual partitions of the large, &
junctions of the small States will be facilitated, and
time may effect that equalization, which is wished
for by the small States now, but can never be accomplished
at once.
Mr. Wilson. The leading argument of those who
contend for equality of votes among the States is
that the States as such being equal, and being represented
not as districts of individuals, but in their
political & corporate capacities, are entitled to an
equality of suffrage. According to this mode of
reasoning the representation of the boroughs in Engld̃
which has been allowed on all hands to be the rotten
part of the Constitution, is perfectly right & proper.
They are like the States represented in their corporate
capacity like the States therefore they are
entitled to equal voices, old Sarum to as many as
London. And instead of the injury supposed hitherto
to be done to London, the true ground of Complaint
lies with old Sarum: for London instead of two which
is her proper share, sends four representatives to
Parliament.[111]
Mr. Sherman. The question is not what rights
naturally belong to man; but how they may be most
some give up more than others in order to obtain
this end, there can be no room for complaint. To
do otherwise, to require an equal concession from all,
if it would create danger to the rights of some, would
be sacrificing the end to the means. The rich man
who enters into Society along with the poor man,
gives up more than the poor man, yet with an equal
vote he is equally safe. Were he to have more votes
than the poor man in proportion to his superior stake
the rights of the poor man would immediately cease
to be secure. This consideration prevailed when
the articles of Confederation were formed.[112]
The determination of the question from striking
out the word "not" was put off till tomorrow at the
request of the Deputies of N. York.
Docr Franklin. Mr. President
The small progress we have made after 4 or five
weeks close attendance & continual reasonings with
each other—our different sentiments on almost every
question, several of the last producing as many noes
as ays, is methinks a melancholy proof of the imperfection
of the Human Understanding. We indeed
seem to feel our own want of political wisdom, since
we have been running about in search of it. We
and examined the different forms of those
Republics which having been formed with the seeds
of their own dissolution now no longer exist. And
we have viewed Modern States all round Europe, but
find none of their Constitutions suitable to our
circumstances.
In this situation of this Assembly, groping as it
were in the dark to find political truth, and scarce
able to distinguish it when presented to us, how has
it happened; Sir, that we have not hitherto once
thought of humbly applying to the Father of lights
to illuminate our understandings? In the beginning
of the Contest with G. Britain, when we were sensible
of danger we had daily prayer in this room for
the divine protection.—Our prayers, Sir, were heard,
& they were graciously answered. All of us who
were engaged in the struggle must have observed
frequent instances of a superintending providence in
our favor. To that kind providence we owe this
happy opportunity of consulting in peace on the
means of establishing our future national felicity.
And have we now forgotten that powerful friend?
or do we imagine that we no longer need his assistance?
I have lived, Sir, a long time, and the longer
I live, the more convincing proofs I see of this truth
—that God Governs in the affairs of men. And if a
sparrow cannot fall to the ground without his notice,
is it probable that an empire can rise without his aid?
We have been assured, Sir, in the sacred writings
that "except the Lord build the House they labour
also believe that without his concurring aid we shall
succeed in this political building no better than the
Builders of Babel: We shall be divided by our little
partial local interests; our projects will be confounded,
and we ourselves shall become a reproach
and bye word down to future ages. And what is
worse, mankind may hereafter from this unfortunate
instance, despair of establishing Governments by
Human wisdom and leave it to chance, war and
conquest.
I therefore beg leave to move—that henceforth
prayers imploring the assistance of Heaven, and its
blessings on our deliberations, be held in this Assembly
every morning before we proceed to business, and
that one or more of the Clergy of this City be requested
to officiate in that Service—
Mr. Sharman seconded the motion.
Mr. Hamilton & several others expressed their apprehensions
that however proper such a resolution
might have been at the beginning of the convention,
it might at this late day, 1. bring on it some disagreeable
animadversions, & 2. lead the public to
believe that the embarrassments and dissensions
within the Convention, had suggested this measure.
It was answered by Docr. F. Mr. Sherman & others,
that the past omission of a duty could not justify a
further omission—that the rejection of such a proposition
would expose the Convention to more unpleasant
animadversions than the adoption of it: and
that the alarm out of doors that might be excited for
to do good as ill.
Mr. Williamson, observed that the true cause of the
omission could not be mistaken. The Convention
had no funds.
Mr. Randolph proposed in order to give a favorable
aspect to ye. measure, that a sermon be preached at
the request of the convention on 4th of July, the
anniversary of Independence; & thenceforward
prayers be used in ye. Convention every morning.
Dr. Frankn. 2ded. this motion. After several unsuccessful
attempts for silently postponing this matter
by adjourng. the adjournment was at length carried,
without any vote on the motion.
Yates gives Martin's speech, more fully:
"On federal grounds, it is said, that a minority will govern a majority
—but on the Virginia plan a minority would tax a majority. In a
federal government, a majority of states must and ought to tax. In
the local government of states, counties may be unequal—still numbers,
not property, govern. What is the government now forming,
over states or persons? As to the latter, their rights cannot be the
object of a general government. These are already secured by their
guardians, the state governments. The general government is therefore
intended only to protect and guard the rights of the states as
states.
"This general government, I believe, is the first upon earth which
gives checks against democracies or aristocracies. The only necessary
check in a general government ought to be a restraint to prevent its
absorbing the powers of the state governments. Representation on
federal principles can only flow from state societies. Representation
and taxation are ever inseparable—not according to the quantum of
property, but the quantum of freedom.
"Will the representatives of a state forget state interests? The
mode of election cannot change it. These prejudices cannot be eradicated
—Your general government cannot be just or equal upon the
Virginia plan, unless you abolish state interests. If this cannot be
done, you must go back to principles purely federal.
"On this latter ground, the state legislatures and their constituents
will have no interests to pursue different from the general government,
and both will be interested to support each other. Under these ideas
can it be expected that the people can approve the Virginia plan?
But it is said, the people, not the state legislatures, will be called upon
for approbation—with an evident design to separate the interests of
the governors from the governed. What must be the consequence?
Anarchy and confusion. We lose the ideas of the powers with which
we are intrusted. The legislatures must approve. By them it must,
on your own plan, be laid before the people. How will such a government,
over so many great states, operate. Wherever new settlements
have been formed in large states, they immediately want to shake off
their independency. Why? Because the government is too remote
for their good. The people want it nearer home.
"The basis of all ancient and modern confederacies is the freedom
and the independency of the states composing it. The states forming
the amphictionic council were equal, though Lacedemon, one of the
greatest states, attempted the exclusion of three of the lesser states
from this right. The plan reported, it is true, only intends to diminish
those rights, not to annihilate them—It was the ambition and
power of the great Grecian states which at last ruined this respectable
council. The states as societies are ever respectful. Has Holland or
Switzerland ever complained of the equality of the states which compose
their respective confederacies? Bern and Zurich are larger than
the remaining eleven cantons—so of many of the states of Germany;
and yet their governments are not complained of. Bern alone might
usurp the whole power of the Helvetic confederacy, but she is contented
still with being equal.
"The admission of the larger states into the confederation, on the
principle of equality, is dangerous—But on the Virginia system it is
ruinous and destructive. Still it is the true interest of all the states
to confederate—It is their joint efforts which must protect and secure
us from foreign danger, and give us peace and harmony at home.
"(Here Mr. Martin entered into a detail of the comparative powers
of each state, and stated their probable weakness and strength.)
"At the beginning of our troubles with Great Britain, the smaller
states were attempted to be cajoled to submit to the views of that
nation, lest the larger states should usurp their rights. We then
answered them—your present plan is slavery, which on the remote
prospect of a distant evil, we will not submit to.
"I would rather confederate with any single state, than submit to
the Virginia plan. But we are already confederated, and no power
on earth can dissolve it but by the consent of all the contracting powers
—and four states, on this floor, have already declared their opposition
to annihilate it. Is the old confederation dissolved, because some of
the states wish a new confederation?"—Yates, Secret Proceedings,
etc., 177.
According to King's Notes, Charles Pinckney spoke after Madison:
"Charles Pinckney. The Honors & offices may become the objects
of strong desire and of combination to acquire them. If Representatives
be apportioned among the States in the Ratio of numbers, the
Citizens will be free and equal but the States will be unequal, and
their sovereignty will be degraded."—King's Life and Correspondence
of Rufus King, i., 610.
According to Yates, Madison followed Sherman: "Mr. Madison.
There is danger in the idea of the gentleman from Connecticut. Unjust
representation will ever produce it. In the United Netherlands,
Holland governs the whole, although she has only one vote. The
counties in Virginia are exceedingly disproportionate, and yet the
smaller has an equal vote with the greater, and no inconvenience
arises."—Yates, Secret Proceedings, etc., 182.
| The writings of James Madison, | |