University of Virginia Library

Thursday June 7th. 1787—In Committee of the
whole

Mr. Pinkney according to notice moved to reconsider
the clause respecting the negative on State

laws, which was agreed to, and tomorrow for fixed
the purpose.

The Clause providing for ye. appointment of the
2d. branch of the national Legislature, having lain
blank since the last vote on the mode of electing it,
to wit, by the 1st. branch, Mr. Dickinson now moved
"that the members of the 2d. branch ought to be
chosen by the individual Legislatures."

Mr. Sherman seconded the motion; observing that
the particular States would thus become interested
in supporting the National Govenmt. and that a due
harmony between the two Governments would be
maintained. He admitted that the two ought to
have separate and distinct jurisdictions, but that
they ought to have a mutual interest in supporting
each other.

Mr. Pinkney. If the small States should be allowed
one Senator only, the number will be too
great, there will be 80 at least.

Mr. Dickinson had two reasons for his motion.
1, because the sense of the States would be better
collected through their Governments; than immediately
from the people at large; 2. because he
wished the Senate to consist of the most distinguished
characters, distinguished for their rank in
life and their weight of property, and bearing as
strong a likeness to the British House of Lords as
possible; and he thought such characters more
likely to be selected by the State Legislatures, than
in any other mode. The greatness of the number
was no objection with him. He hoped there would

be 80 and twice 80. of them. If their number should
be small, the popular branch could not be balanced
by them. The legislature of a numerous people
ought to be a numerous body.

Mr. Williamson, preferred a small number of Senators,
but wished that each State should have at
least one. He suggested 25 as a convenient number.
The different modes of representation in the
different branches, will serve as a mutual check.

Mr. Butler was anxious to know the ratio of representation
before he gave any opinion.

Mr. Wilson. If we are to establish a national
Government, that Government ought to flow from
the people at large. If one branch of it should be
chosen by the Legislatures, and the other by the
people, the two branches will rest on different foundations,
and dissensions will naturally arise between
them. He wished the Senate to be elected by the
people as well as the other branch, the people might
be divided into proper districts for the purpose &
moved to postpone the motion of Mr. Dickinson,
in order to take up one of that import.

Mr. Morris 2ded. him.

Mr. Read proposed "that the Senate should be
appointed by the Executive Magistrate out of a
proper number of persons to be nominated by the
individual legislatures." He said he thought it his
duty, to speak his mind frankly. Gentlemen he
hoped would not be alarmed at the idea. Nothing
short of this approach towards a proper model of
Government would answer the purpose, and he

thought it best to come directly to the point at once.
—His proposition was not seconded nor supported.

Mr. Madison, if the motion (of Mr. Dickinson)
should be agreed to, we must either depart from the
doctrine of proportional representation; or admit
into the Senate a very large number of members.
The first is inadmissible, being evidently unjust.
The second is inexpedient. The use of the Senate
is to consist in its proceeding with more coolness,
with more system, & with more wisdom, than the
popular branch. Enlarge their number and you
communicate to them the vices which they are meant
to correct. He differed from Mr. D. who thought
that the additional number would give additional
weight to the body. On the contrary it appeared
to him that their weight would be in an inverse
ratio to their number. The example of the Roman
Tribunes was applicable. They lost their influence
and power, in proportion as their number was
augmented. The reason seemed to be obvious:
They were appointed to take care of the popular
interests & pretensions at Rome, because the people
by reason of their numbers could not act in concert;
were liable to fall into factions among themselves,
and to become a prey to their aristocratic
adversaries. The more the representatives of the
people therefore were multiplied, the more they
partook of the infirmities of their constituents, the
more liable they became to be divided among themselves
either from their own indiscretions or the artifices
of the opposite faction, and of course the less

capable of fulfilling their trust. When the weight
of a set of men depends merely on their personal
characters; the greater the number the greater the
weight. When it depends on the degree of political
authority lodged in them the smaller the number
the greater the weight. These considerations might
perhaps be combined in the intended Senate; but
the latter was the material one.

Mr. Gerry. 4 modes of appointing the Senate
have been mentioned. 1. by the 1st branch of the
National Legislature. This would create a dependance
contrary to the end proposed. 2. by the
National Executive. This is a stride towards monarchy
that few will think of. 3. by the people. The
people have two great interests, the landed interest,
and the commercial including the stockholders.
To draw both branches from the people will leave
no security to the latter interest; the people being
Chiefly composed of the landed interest, and erroneously
supposing, that the other interests are adverse
to it. 4 by the Individual Legislatures. The elections
being carried thro' this refinement, will be
most likely to provide some check in favor of the
Commercial interest agst. the landed; without which
oppression will take place, and no free Govt can last
long where that is the case. He was therefore in
favor of this last.

Mr. Dickenson.[63] The preservation of the States

in a certain degree of agency is indispensable. It
will produce that collision between the different
authorities which should be wished for in order to
check each other. To attempt to abolish the States
altogether, would degrade the Councils of our
Country, would be impracticable, would be ruinous.
He compared the proposed National System to the
Solar System, in which the States were the planets,
and ought to be left to move freely in their proper
orbits. The Gentleman from Pa. (Mr. Wilson)
wished he said to extinguish these planets. If the
State Governments were excluded from all agency
in the national one, and all power drawn from the
people at large, the consequence would be that the
national Govt. would move in the same direction as
the State Govts. now do, and would run into all the
same mischiefs. The reform would only unite the 13
small streams into one great current pursuing the
same course without any opposition whatever. He
adhered to the opinion that the Senate ought to be
composed of a large number, and that their influence
from family weight & other causes would be
increased thereby. He did not admit that the
Tribunes lost their weight in proportion as their no.
was augmented and gave a historical sketch of this
institution. If the reasoning of (Mr. Madison) was
good it would prove that the number of the Senate
ought to be reduced below ten, the highest no. of the
Tribunitial corps.

Mr. Wilson. The subject it must be owned is
surrounded with doubts and difficulties. But we
must surmount them. The British Governmt. cannot
be our model. We have no materials for a
similar one. Our manners, our laws, the abolition
of entails and of primogeniture, the whole genius of
the people, are opposed to it. He did not see the
danger of the States being devoured by the Nationl.
Govt. On the contrary, he wished to keep them
from devouring the national Govt. He was not however
for extinguishing these planets as was supposed
by Mr. D.—neither did he on the other hand,
believe that they would warm or enlighten the Sun.
Within their proper orbits they must still be suffered
to act for subordinate purposes, for which their
existence is made essential by the great extent of
our Country. He could not comprehend in what
manner the landed interest wd. be rendered less predominant
in the Senate, by an election through the
medium of the Legislatures than by the people
themselves. If the Legislatures, as was now complained,
sacrificed the commercial to the landed interest,
what reason was there to expect such a
choice from them as would defeat their own views.
He was for an election by the people in large districts
which wd. be most likely to obtain men of intelligence
& uprightness; subdividing the districts
only for the accommodation of voters.

Mr. Madison could as little comprehend in what
manner family weight, as desired by Mr. D. would
be more certainly conveyed into the Senate through

elections by the State Legislatures, than in some
other modes. The true question was in what mode
the best choice wd. be made? If an election by the
people, or thro' any other channel than the State
Legislatures promised as uncorrupt & impartial a
preference of merit, there could surely be no necessity
for an appointment by those Legislatures.
Nor was it apparent that a more useful check would
be derived thro' that channel than from the people
thro' some other. The great evils complained of
were that the State Legislatures run into schemes
of paper money &c. whenever solicited by the people,
& sometimes without even the sanction of the people.
Their influence then, instead of checking a like propensity
in the National Legislature, may be expected
to promote it. Nothing can be more contradictory
than to say that the Natl. Legislature witht. a proper
check, will follow the example of the State Legislatures,
& in the same breath, that the State
Legislatures are the only proper check.

Mr. Sharman opposed elections by the people in
districts, as not likely to produce such fit men as
elections by the State Legislatures.

Mr. Gerry insisted that the commercial & monied
interest wd. be more secure in the hands of the State
Legislatures, than of the people at large. The former
have more sense of character, and will be restrained
by that from injustice. The people are for
paper money when the Legislatures are agst. it. In
Massts. the County Conventions had declared a wish
for a depreciating paper that wd. sink itself. Besides,

in some States there are two Branches in the Legislature,
one of which is somewhat aristocratic. There
wd. therefore be so far a better chance of refinement in
the choice. There seemed, he thought to be three
powerful objections agst. elections by districts, 1. it
is impracticable; the people cannot be brought to
one place for the purpose; and whether brought to
the same place or not, numberless frauds wd. be unavoidable.
2. small States forming part of the same
district with a large one, or large part of a large one,
wd. have no chance of gaining an appointment for its
citizens of merit. 3 a new source of discord wd. be
opened between different parts of the same district.

Mr. Pinkney thought the 2d. branch ought to be
permanent & independent; & that the members of
it wd. be rendered more so by receiving their appointment
from the State Legislatures. This mode wd.
avoid the rivalships & discontents incident to the
election by districts. He was for dividing the States
into three classes according to their respective sizes,
& for allowing to the 1st. class three members, to the
2d. two, & to the 3d. one.

On the question for postponing Mr. Dickinson's
motion referring the appointment of the Senate to
the State Legislatures, in order to consider Mr. Wilson's
for referring it to the people

Mass. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
no.

Col. Mason. Whatever power may be necessary
for the Natl. Govt. a certain portion must necessarily

be left in the States. It is impossible for one
power to pervade the extreme parts of the U. S. so
as to carry equal justice to them. The State Legislatures
also ought to have some means of defending
themselves agst. encroachments of the Natl. Govt. In
every other department we have studiously endeavoured
to provide for its self-defence. Shall we leave
the States alone unprovided with the means for this
purpose? And what better means can we provide
than the giving them some share in, or rather to
make them a constituent part of, the Natl. Establishment.
There is danger on both sides no doubt; but
we have only seen the evils arising on the side
of the State Govts. Those on the other side remain
to be displayed. The example of Congs. does not
apply. Congs. had no power to carry their acts into
execution, as the Natl. Govt. will have.

On Mr. Dickinson's motion for an appointment of
the Senate by the State Legislatures,

Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. Y. ay. Pa. ay Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. ay N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. Gerry gave notice that he wd. tomorrow move
for a reconsideration of the mode of appointing the
Natl. Executive in order to substitute an appointmt.
by the State Executives

The Committee rose & The House adjd.