University of Virginia Library

Saturday June 30. 1787. in Convention

Mr. Brearly moved that the Presidt. write to the
Executive of N. Hampshire, informing it that the
business depending before the Convention was of
such a nature as to require the immediate attendance
of the deputies of that State. In support of his
motion he observed that the difficulties of the subject
and the diversity of opinions called for all the
assistance we could possibly obtain. (it was well
understood that the object was to add N. Hampshire
to the no. of States opposed to the doctrine of proportional
representation, which it was presumed
from her relative size she must be adverse to).

Mr. Patterson seconded the motion.

Mr. Rutlidge could see neither the necessity nor
propriety of such a measure. They are not unapprized
of the meeting, and can attend if they choose.
Rho. Island might as well be urged to appoint & send
deputies. Are we to suspend the business until the
deputies arrive? if we proceed he hoped all the
great points would be adjusted before the letter
could produce its effect.

Mr. King, said he had written more than once as
a private correspondent, & the answers gave him
every reason to expect that State would be represented
very shortly, if it shd. be so at all. Circumstances
of a personal nature had hitherto prevented
it. A letter cd. have no effect.

Mr. Wilson wished to know whether it would be
consistent with the rule or reason of secrecy, to
communicate to N. Hampshire that the business was
of such a nature as the motion described. It wd.
spread a great alarm. Besides he doubted the propriety
of soliciting any State on the subject; the
meeting being merely voluntary—on motion of Mr.
Brearly Masts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay.
Pa. not on ye. floor. Del. not on floor. Md. divd.
Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. not on floor.

The motion of Mr. Elseworth resumed for allowing
each State an equal vote in ye 2d. branch.

Mr. Wilson did not expect such a motion after the
establishment of ye. contrary principle in the 1st.
branch; and considering the reasons which would
oppose it, even if an equal vote had been allowed
in the 1st branch. The Gentleman from Connecticut

(Mr. Elseworth) had pronounced that if the motion
should not be acceded to, of all the States North of
Pena. one only would agree to any Genl. Government.
He entertained more favorable hopes of Connt. and
of the other Northern States. He hoped the alarms
exceeded their cause, and that they would not abandon
a Country to which they were bound by so many
strong and endearing ties. But should the deplored
event happen, it would neither stagger his sentiments
nor his duty. If the minority of the people
of America refuse to coalesce with the majority on
just and proper principles, if a separation must take
place, it could never happen on better grounds. The
votes of yesterday agst. the just principle of representation,
were as 22 to 90 of the people of America.
Taking the opinions to be the same on this point,
and he was sure if there was any room for change,
it could not be on the side of the majority, the question
will be shall less than 1/4 of the U. States withdraw
themselves from the Union; or shall more than
3/4 renounce the inherent, indisputable and unalienable
rights of men, in favor of the artificial systems of
States. If issue must be joined, it was on this
point he would chuse to join it. The Gentleman
from Connecticut in supposing that the prepondenancy
secured to the majority in the 1st branch had removed
the objections to an equality of votes in the
2d. branch for the security of the minority, narrowed
the case extremely. Such an equality will enable
the minority to controul in all cases whatsoever, the
sentiments and interests of the majority. Seven
States will controul six: Seven States, according to
the estimates that had been used, composed 24/90 of
the whole people. It would be in the power then of
less than 1/3 to overrule 2/3 whenever a question should
happen to divide the States in that manner. Can
we forget for whom we are forming a Government?
Is it for men, or for the imaginary beings called
States? Will our honest Constituents be satisfied
with metaphysical distinctions? Will they, ought
they to be satisfied with being told, that the one-third
compose the greater number of States? The
rule of suffrage ought on every principle to be the
same in the 2d. as in the 1st. branch. If the Government
be not laid on this foundation, it can be neither
solid nor lasting. Any other principle will be local,
confined & temporary. This will expand with the
expansion, and grow with the growth of the U.
States.—Much has been said of an imaginary combination
of three States. Sometimes a danger of
monarchy, sometimes of aristocrary has been charged
on it. No explanation however of the danger has
been vouchsafed. It would be easy to prove both
from reason & history that rivalships would be more
probable than coalitions; and that there are no
coinciding interests that could produce the latter.
No answer has yet been given to the observations of
(Mr. Madison) on this subject. Should the Executive
Magistrate be taken from one of the large States
would not the other two be thereby thrown into the
scale with the other States? Whence then the danger
of monarchy? Are the people of the three large
States more aristocratic than those of the small ones?
Whence then the danger of aristocracy from their
influence? It is all a mere illusion of names. We
talk of States, till we forget what they are composed
of. Is a real & fair majority, the natural hot-bed
of aristocracy? It is a part of the definition of this
species of Govt. or rather of tyranny, that the smaller
number governs the greater. It is true that a majority
of States in the 2d. branch cannot carry a law
agst. a majority of the people in the 1st. But this
removes half only of the objection. Bad Governts.
are of two sorts. 1. that which does too little. 2.
that which does too much: that which fails thro'
weakness; and that which destroys thro' oppression.
Under which of these evils do the U. States at present
groan? Under the weakness and inefficiency of
its Governt. To remedy this weakness we have been
sent to this Convention. If the motion should be
agreed to, we shall leave the U. S. fettered precisely
as heretofore; with the additional mortification of
seeing the good purposes of ye. fair representation of
the people in the 1st. branch, defeated in the 2d.
Twenty four will still controul sixty six. He lamented
that such a disagreement should prevail on the point
of representation, as he did not foresee that it would
happen on the other point most contested, the
boundary between the Genl. & the local authorities.
He thought the States necessary & valuable parts
of a good system.

Mr. Elseworth. The capital objection of Mr. Wilson,
"that the minority will rule the majority" is not

true. The power is given to the few to save them
from being destroyed by the many. If an equality
of votes had been given to them in both branches,
the objection might have had weight. Is it a novel
thing that the few should have a check on the many?
Is it not the case in the British Constitution the
wisdom of which so many gentlemen have united in
applauding? Have not the House of Lords, who
form so small a proportion of the nation a negative
on the laws, as a necessary defence of their peculiar
rights agst. the encroachmts. of the Commons. No
instance of a Confederacy has existed in which an
equality of voices has not been exercised by the
members of it. We are running from one extreme
to another. We are razing the foundations of the
building, when we need only repair the roof. No
salutary measure has been lost for want of a majority
of the States, to favor it. If security be all that the
great States wish for the 1st. branch secures them.
The danger of combinations among them is not
imaginary. Altho' no particular abuses could be
foreseen by him, the possibility of them would be
sufficient to alarm him. But he could easily conceive
cases in which they might result from such
combinations. Suppose that in pursuance of some
commercial treaty or arrangement, three or four
free ports & no more were to be established would
not combinations be formed in favor of Boston—
Philada. & some port of the Chesapeak? A like concert
might be formed in the appointment of the
Great officers. He appealed again to the obligations
of the federal pact which was still in force, and
which had been entered into with so much solemnity;
persuading himself that some regard would still
be paid to the plighted faith under which each State
small as well as great, held an equal right of suffrage
in the general Councils. His remarks were not the
result of partial or local views. The State he represented
(Connecticut) held a middle rank.

Mr. Madison did justice to the able and close reasoning
of Mr. E. but must observe that it did not always
accord with itself. On another occasion, the large
States were described by him as the Aristocratic
States, ready to oppress the small. Now the Small
are the House of Lords requiring a negative to defend
them agst. the more numerous Commons. Mr. E. had
also erred in saying that no instance had existed
in which confederated States had not retained to
themselves a perfect equality of suffrage. Passing
over the German system in which the K. of Prussia
has nine voices, he reminded Mr. E. of the Lycian
Confederacy, in which the component members had
votes proportioned to their importance, and which
Montesquieu recommends as the fittest model for
that form of Government. Had the fact been as
stated by Mr. E. it would have been of little avail to
him, or rather would have strengthened the arguments
agst. him; the History & fate of the several
confederacies modern as well as Antient, demonstrating
some radical vice in their structure. In
reply to the appeal of Mr. E. to the faith plighted in
the existing federal compact, he remarked that the

party claiming from others an adherence to a common
engagement ought at least to be guiltless itself
of a violation. Of all the States however Connecticut
was perhaps least able to urge this plea. Besides
the various omissions to perform the stipulated acts
from which no State was free, the Legislature of
that State had by a pretty recent vote, positively
refused to pass a law for complying with the Requisitions
of Congs., and had transmitted a copy of the
vote to Congs. It was urged, he said, continually
that an equality of votes in the 2d. branch was not
only necessary to secure the small, but would be
perfectly safe to the large ones whose majority in
the 1st. branch was an effectual bulwark. But notwithstanding
this apparent defence, the majority
of States might still injure the majority of people.
1. they could obstruct the wishes and interests of the
majority. 2. they could extort measures repugnant
to the wishes & interest of the Majority. 3. they
could impose measures adverse thereto; as the 2d.
branch will probl̃y exercise some great powers, in
which the 1st. will not participate. He admitted
that every peculiar interest whether in any class of
Citizens, or any description of States, ought to be
secured as far as possible. Wherever there is danger
of attack there ought to be given a Constitutional
power of defence. But he contended that the
States were divided into different interests not by
their difference of size, but by other circumstances;
the most material of which resulted partly from climate,
but principally from the effects of their having
or not having slaves. These two causes concurred
in forming the great division of interests in the U.
States. It did not lie between the large & small
States: It lay between the Northern & Southern.
And if any defensive power were necessary, it ought
to be mutually given to these two interests. He was
so strongly impressed with this important truth that
he had been casting about in his mind for some
expedient that would answer the purpose. The one
which had occurred was that instead of proportioning
the votes of the States in both branches, to their
respective numbers of inhabitants computing the
slaves in the ratio of 5 to 3, they should be represented
in one branch according to the number of free inhabitants
only; and in the other according to the
whole no. counting the slaves as free. By this arrangement
the Southern Scale would have the advantage
in one House, and the Northern in the other.
He had been restrained from proposing this expedient
by two considerations: one was his unwillingness to
urge any diversity of interests on an occasion where
it is but too apt to arise of itself—the other was, the
inequality of powers that must be vested in the two
branches, and which wd. destroy the equilibrium of
interests.

Mr. Elseworth assured the House that whatever
might be thought of the Representatives of Connecticut
the State was entirely federal in her disposition.
He appealed to her great exertions during
the war, in supplying both men & money. The
muster rolls would show she had more troops in the

field than Virga. If she had been Delinquent, it had
been from inability, and not more so than other
States.

Mr. Sherman. Mr. Madison had animadverted on
the delinquency of the States, when his object required
him to prove that the Constitution of Congs.
was faulty. Congs. is not to blame for the faults of
the States. Their measures have been right, and the
only thing wanting has been, a further power in
Congs. to render them effectual.

Mr. Davy was much embarrassed and wished for
explanations. The Report of the Committee allowing
the Legislatures to choose the Senate, and
establishing a proportional representation in it,
seemed to be impracticable. There will according
to this rule be ninety members in the outset, and
the number will increase as new States are added.
It was impossible that so numerous a body could
possess the activity and other qualities required in
it. Were he to vote on the comparative merits of the
report as it stood, and the amendment, he should
be constrained to prefer the latter. The appointment
of the Senate by electors chosen by the people
for that purpose was he conceived liable to an insuperable
difficulty. The larger Counties or districts
thrown into a general district, would certainly prevail
over the smaller Counties or Districts, and merit
in the latter would be excluded altogether. The
report therefore seemed to be right in referring the
appointment to the Legislatures, whose agency in
the general System did not appear to him objectionable

as it did to some others. The fact was that the
local prejudices & interests which could not be
denied to exist, would find their way into the
national Councils whether the Representatives
should be chosen by the Legislatures or by the people
themselves. On the other hand if a proportional
representation was attended with insuperable difficulties,
the making the Senate the Representative
of the States, looked like bringing us back to Congs.
again, and shutting out all the advantages expected
from it. Under this view of the subject he could
not vote for any plan for the Senate yet proposed.
He thought that in general there were extremes on
both sides. We were partly federal, partly national
in our Union, and he did not see why the Govt.
might not in some respects operate on the States,
in others on the people.

Mr. Wilson admitted the question concerning the
number of Senators, to be embarrassing. If the
smallest States be allowed one, and the others in
proportion, the Senate will certainly be too numerous.
He looked forward to the time when the
smallest States will contain 100,000 souls at least.
Let there be then one Senator in each for every
100,000 souls and let the States not having that
no. of inhabitants be allowed one. He was willing
himself to submit to this temporary concession to
the small States; and threw out the idea as a ground
of compromise.

Docr. Franklin. The diversity of opinions turns on
two points. If a proportional representation takes

place, the small States contend that their liberties
will be in danger. If an equality of votes is to be
put in its place, the large States say their money will
be in danger. When a broad table is to be made, and
the edges of planks do not fit, the artist takes a little
from both, and makes a good joint. In like manner
here both sides must part with some of their demands,
in order that they may join in some accommodating
proposition. He had prepared one which he would
read, that it might lie on the table for consideration.
The proposition was in the words following

"That the Legislatures of the several States shall
choose & send an equal number of Delegates,
namely—who are to compose the 2d.
branch of the General Legislature—

That in all cases or questions wherein the Sovereignty
of individual States may be affected, or
whereby their authority over their own Citizens
may be diminished, or the authority of the General
Government within the several States augmented,
each State shall have equal suffrage.

That in the appointment of all Civil officers of ye.
Genl. Govt. in the election of whom the 2d. branch
may by the Constitution have part, each State shall
have equal suffrage.
That in fixing the Salaries of such Officers, and
in all allowances for public services, and generally
in all appropriations & dispositions of money to be
drawn out of the general Treasury; and in all laws
for supplying that Treasury, the Delegates of the
several States shall have suffrage in proportion to

the Sums which their respective States do actually
contribute to the Treasury." Where a ship had
many owners this was the rule of deciding on her
expedition. He had been one of the Ministers from
this Country to France during the joint war and wd.
have been very glad if allowed a vote in distributing
the money to carry it on.

Mr. King observed that the simple question was
whether each State should have an equal vote in
the 2d. branch; that it must be apparent to those
Gentlemen who liked neither the motion for this
equality, nor the report as it stood, that the report
was as susceptible of melioration as the motion;
that a reform would be nugatory & nominal only
if we should make another Congress of the proposed
Senate: that if the adherence to an equality of votes
was fixed & unalterable, there could not be less
obstinacy on the other side, & that we were in fact
cut asunder already, and it was in vain to shut our
eyes against it: that he was however filled with
astonishment that if we were convinced that every
man in America was secured in all his rights, we
should be ready to sacrifice this substantial good
to the Phantom of State sovereignty: that his feelings
were more harrowed & his fears more agitated
for his Country than he could express, that he conceived
this to be the last opportunity of providing
for its liberty & happiness: that he could not therefore
but repeat his amazement that when a just
governt. founded on a fair representation of the
people of America was within our reach, we should

renounce the blessing, from an attachment to the
ideal freedom & importance of States: that should
this wonderful illusion continue to prevail, his mind
was prepared for every event, rather than to sit down
under a Govt. founded in a vicious principle of
representation, and which must be as short lived as
it would be unjust. He might prevail on himself
to accede to some such expedient as had been hinted
by Mr. Wilson; but he never could listen to an equality
of votes as proposed in the motion.

Mr. Dayton, When assertion is given for proof,
and terror substituted for argument, he presumed
they would have no effect however eloquently spoken.
It should have been shewn that the evils we
have experienced have proceeded from the equality
now objected to; and that the seeds of dissolution
for the State Governments are not sown in the Genl.
Government. He considered the system on the table
as a novelty, an amphibious monster; and was persuaded
that it never would be recd. by the people.
Mr. Martin wd. never confederate if it could not be
done on just principles.

Mr. Madison would acquiesce in the concession
hinted by Mr. Wilson, on condition that a due independence
should be given to the Senate. The plan
in its present shape makes the Senate absolutely dependent
on the States. The Senate therefore is only
another edition of Congs. He knew the faults of
that Body & had used a bold language agst. it. Still
he would preserve the State rights, as carefully as
the trials by jury.

Mr. Bedford, contended that there was no middle
way between a perfect consolidation and a mere
confederacy of the States. The first is out of the
question, and in the latter they must continue if
not perfectly, yet equally sovereign. If political
Societies possess ambition avarice, and all the other
passions which render them formidable to each
other, ought we not to view them in this light here?
Will not the same motives operate in America as
elsewhere? If any gentleman doubts it let him look
at the votes. Have they not been dictated by
interest, by ambition? Are not the large States
evidently seeking to aggrandize themselves at the
expense of the small? They think no doubt that
they have right on their side, but interest had blinded
their eyes. Look at Georgia. Though a small State
at present, she is actuated by the prospect of soon
being a great one. S. Carolina is actuated both by
present interest & future prospects. She hopes too
to see the other States cut down to her own dimensions.
N. Carolina has the same motives of present &
future interest. Virga. follows. Maryd. is not on that
side of the Question. Pena. has a direct and future
interest. Massts. has a decided and palpable interest in
the part she takes. Can it be expected that the small
States will act from pure disinterestedness. Look
at G. Britain. Is the Representation there less unequal?
But we shall be told again that that is the
rotten part of the Constitution. Have not the boroughs
however held fast their constitutional rights?
And are we to act with greater purity than the rest

of mankind. An exact proportion in the Representation
is not preserved in any one of the States. Will
it be said that an inequality of power will not result
from an inequality of votes. Give the opportunity,
and ambition will not fail to abuse it. The whole
History of mankind proves it. The three large
States have a common interest to bind them together
in commerce. But whether a combination
as we suppose, or a competition as others suppose,
shall take place among them, in either case, the small
States must be ruined. We must like Solon make
such a Governt. as the people will approve. Will
the smaller States ever agree to the proposed degradation
of them. It is not true that the people will
not agree to enlarge the powers of the present Congs.
The language of the people has been that Congs.
ought to have the power of collecting an impost,
and of coercing the States where it may be necessary.
On The first point they have been explicit &, in
a manner, unanimous in their declarations. And
must they not agree to this & similar measures if
they ever mean to discharge their engagements.
The little States are willing to observe their engagements,
but will meet the large ones on no ground but
that of the Confederation. We have been told with
a dictatorial air that this is the last moment for a
fair trial in favor of a Good Governmt. It will be
the last indeed if the propositions reported from the
Gommittee go forth to the people. He was under
no apprehensions. The Large States dare not dissolve
the Confederation. If they do the small ones
will find some foreign ally of more honor and good
faith, who will take them by the hand and do them
justice. He did not mean by this to intimidate or
alarm. It was a natural consequence, which ought
to be avoided by enlarging the federal powers not
annihilating the federal system. This is what the
people expect. All agree in the necessity of a more
efficient Govt. and why not make such an one as they
desire.

Mr. Elseworth. Under a National Govt. he should
participate in the National Security, as remarked
by (Mr. King) but that was all. What he wanted was
domestic happiness. The Natl. Govt. could not descend
to the local objects on which this depended.
It could only embrace objects of a general nature.
He turned his eyes therefore for the preservation of
his rights to the State Govts. From these alone he
could derive the greatest happiness he expects in
this life. His happiness depends on their existence,
as much as a new born infant on its mother for
nourishment. If this reasoning was not satisfactory,
he had nothing to add that could be so.

Mr. King was for preserving the States in a subordinate
degree, and as far as they could be necessary
for the purposes stated by Mr. Elsew̃h. He did
not think a full answer had been given to those who
apprehended a dangerous encroachment on their
jurisdictions. Expedients might be devised as he
conceived that would give them all the security the
nature of things would admit of. In the establishmt.
of Societies the Contstitution was to the Legislature

what the laws were to individuals. As the fundamental
rights of individuals are secured by express
provisions in the State Constitutions; why may not
a like security be provided for the Rights of States
in the National Constitution. The articles of Union
between Engld. & Scotland furnish an example of
such a provision in favor of sundry rights of Scotland.
When that Union was in agitation, the same
language of apprehension which has been heard from
the smaller States, was in the mouths of the Scotch
patriots. The articles however have not been violated
and the Scotch have found an increase of prosperity
& happiness. He was aware that this will be
called a mere paper security. He thought it a sufficient
answer to say that if fundamental articles of
compact, are no sufficient defence against physical
power, neither will there be any safety agst. it if there
be no compact. He could not sit down, without
taking some notice of the language of the honorable
gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Bedford). It was not
he that had uttered a dictatorial language. This
intemperance had marked the honorabl Gentleman
himself. It was not he who with a vehemence unprecedented
in that House, had declared himself
ready to turn his hopes from our common Country, and
court the protection of some foreign hand. This too
was the language of the Honbl member himself. He
was grieved that such a thought had entered into his
heart. He was more grieved that such an expression
had dropped from his lips. The gentleman cd. only
excuse it to himself on the score of passion. For
himself whatever might be his distress, he wd. never
court relief from a foreign power.

Adjourned