University of Virginia Library

Thursday June 21. In Convention.

Mr. Jonathan Dayton from N. Jersey took his seat.[88]

Docr. Johnson.[89] On a comparison of the two plans
which had been proposed from Virginia & N. Jersey,
it appeared that the peculiarity which characterized
the latter was its being calculated to preserve
the individuality of the States. The plan from Va.
did not profess to destroy this individuality altogether,
but was charged with such a tendency. One
Gentleman alone (Col. Hamilton) in his animadversions
on the plan of N. Jersey, boldly and decisively
contended for an abolition of the State Govts. Mr.
Wilson & the gentleman from Virga. who also were
adversaries of the plan of N. Jersey held a different
language. They wished to leave the States in possession
of a considerable, tho' a subordinate jurisdiction.
They had not yet however shewn how this cd.
consist with, or be secured agst. the general sovereignty
& jurisdiction, which they proposed to give
to the National Government. If this could be shewn
in such a manner as to satisfy the patrons of the N.

Jersey propositions, that the individuality of the
States would not be endangered, many of their objections
would no doubt be removed. If this could
not be shewn their objections would have their full
force. He wished it therefore to be well considered
whether in case the States, as was proposed, shd. retain
some portion of sovereignty at least, this portion
could be preserved, without allowing them to
participate effectually in the Genl. Govt., without giving
them each a distinct and equal vote for the purpose
of defending themselves in the general Councils.

Mr. Wilson's respect for Docr. Johnson, added to
the importance of the subject led him to attempt,
unprepared as he was, to solve the difficulty which
had been started. It was asked how the Genl.
Govt. and individuality of the particular States could
be reconciled to each other; and how the latter could
be secured agst the former? Might it not, on the
other side be asked how the former was to be secured
agst. the latter? It was generally admitted that a
jealousy & rivalship would be felt between the Genl.
& particular Govts. As the plan now stood, tho' indeed
contrary to his opinion, one branch of the
Genl. Govt. (the Senate or second branch) was to be
appointed by the State Legislatures. The State
Legislatures, therefore, by this participation in the
Genl. Govt. would have an opportunity of defending
their rights. Ought not a reciprocal opportunity to
be given to the Genl. Govt. of defending itself by having
an appointment of some one constituent branch
of the State Govts. If a security be necessary on one

side, it wd. seem reasonable to demand it on the other.
But taking the matter in a more general view, he
saw no danger to the States from the Genl. Govt. In
case a combination should be made by the large ones
it wd. produce a general alarm among the rest; and
the project wd. be frustrated. But there was no
temptation to such a project. The States having in
general a similar interest, in case of any propositions
in the National Legislature to encroach on the State
Legislatures, he conceived a general alarm wd. take
place in the National Legislature itself, that it would
communicate itself to the State Legislatures, and wd.
finally spread among the people at large. The Genl.
Govt. will be as ready to preserve the rights of the
States as the latter are to preserve the rights of individuals;
all the members of the former, having a
common interest, as representatives of all the people
of the latter, to leave the State Govts. in possession
of what the people wish them to retain. He could
not discover, therefore any danger whatever on the
side from which it was apprehended. On the contrary,
he conceived that in spite of every precaution
the General Govt. would be in perpetual danger of
encroachments from the State Govts.

Mr. Madison was of opinion that there was 1. less
danger of encroachment from the Genl. Govt. than
from the State Govts. 2. that the mischief from encroachments
would be less fatal if made by the
former, than if made by the latter. 1. All the
examples of other confederacies prove the greater
tendency in such systems to anarchy than to

tyranny; to a disobedience of the members than
usurpations of the federal head. Our own experience
had fully illustrated this tendency.—But it will
be said that the proposed change in the principles
& form of the Union will vary the tendency; that
the Genl. Govt. will have real & greater powers, and
will be derived in one branch at least from the people,
not from the Govts. of the States. To give full force
to this objection, let it be supposed for a moment
that indefinite power should be given to the Genl.
Legislature, and the States reduced to Corporations
dependent on the Genl. Legislature; Why shd. it follow
that the Genl. Govt. wd. take from the States any
branch of their power as far as its operation was
beneficial, and its continuance desireable to the
people? In some of the States, particularly in Connecticut,
all the Townships are incorporated, and
have a certain limited jurisdiction. Have the Representatives
of the people of the Townships in the
Legislature of the State ever endeavoured to despoil
the Townships of any part of their local authority?
As far as this local authority is convenient to the
people they are attached to it; and their representatives
chosen by & amenable to them, naturally respect
their attachment to this, as much as their
attachment to any other right or interest. The relation
of a General Govt. to State Govts. is parallel.
2. Guards were more necessary agst. encroachments
of the State Govts. on the Genl. Govt. than of the latter
on the former. The great objection made agst.
an abolition of the State Govts. was that the Genl.
Govt. could not extend its care to all the minute
objects which fall under the cognizance of the local
jurisdictions. The objection as stated lay not agst.
the probable abuse of the general power, but agst. the
imperfect use that could be made of it throughout
so great an extent of country, and over so great a
variety of objects. As far as its operation would be
practicable it could not in this view be improper;
as far as it would be impracticable, the conveniency
of the Genl. Govt. itself would concur with that of the
people in the maintenance of subordinate Governments.
Were it practicable for the Genl. Govt. to
extend its care to every requisite object without the
cooperation of the State Govts. the people would not
be less free as members of one great Republic than
as members of thirteen small ones. A Citizen of
Delaware was not more free than a Citizen of Virginia:
nor would either be more free than a Citizen
of America. Supposing therefore a tendency in the
Genl. Government to absorb the State Govts. no fatal
consequence could result. Taking the reverse as
the supposition, that a tendency should be left in
the State Govts. towards an independence on the
General Govt. and the gloomy consequences need not
be pointed out. The imagination of them, must
have suggested to the States the experiment we are
now making to prevent the calamity, and must have
formed the chief motive with those present to undertake
the arduous task.

On the question for resolving "that the Legislature
ought to consist of two Branches "

Mass. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. Jersey, no.
Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C.
ay. Geo. ay.

The third resolution of the Report taken into
consideration.

Genl. Pinkney moved "that the 1st. branch, instead
of being elected by the people, shd. be elected in such
manner as the Legislature of each State should direct."
He urged 1. that this liberty would give
more satisfaction, as the Legislatures could then
accommodate the mode to the conveniency & opinions
of the people. 2. that it would avoid the undue
influence of large Counties which would prevail if
the elections were to be made in districts as must be
the mode intended by the Report of the Committee.
3. that otherwise disputed elections must be referred
to the General Legislature which would be attended
with intolerable expence and trouble to the distant
parts of the Republic.

Mr. L. Martin seconded the Motion.[90]

Col. Hamilton considered the Motion as intended
manifestly to transfer the election from the people
to the State Legislatures, which would essentially
vitiate the plan. It would increase that State influence
which could not be too watchfully guarded
agst. All too must admit the possibility, in case the
Genl. Govt. shd. maintain itself, that the State Govts.

might gradually dwindle into nothing. The system
therefore shd. not be engrafted on what might possibly
fail.

Mr. Mason urged the necessity of retaining the
election by the people. Whatever inconveniency
may attend the democratic principle, it must actuate
one part of the Govt. It is the only security for
the rights of the people.

Mr. Sherman, would like an election by the Legislatures
best, but is content with the plan as it stands.

Mr Rutlidge could not admit the solidity of the
distinction between a mediate & immediate election
by the people. It was the same thing to act by
oneself, and to act by another. An election by
the Legislature would be more refined than an election
immediately by the people: and would be more
likely to correspond with the sense of the whole community.
If this Convention had been chosen by the
people in districts it is not to be supposed that such
proper characters would have been preferred. The
Delegates to Congs. he thought had also been fitter
men than would have been appointed by the people
at large.

Mr. Wilson considered the election of the 1st. branch
by the people not only as the Corner Stone, but as
the foundation of the fabric: and that the difference
between a mediate & immediate election was immense.
The difference was particularly worthy of
notice in this respect: that the Legislatures are
actuated not merely by the sentiment of the people;
but have an official sentiment opposed to that of the

Genl. Govt. and perhaps to that of the people themselves.

Mr. King enlarged on the same distinction. He
supposed the Legislatures wd. constantly choose men
subservient to their own views as contrasted to the
general interest; and that they might even devise
modes of election that wd. be subversive of the end in
view. He remarked several instances in which the
views of a State might be at variance with those of
the Genl. Govt.: and mentioned particularly a competition
between the National & State debts, for the
most certain & productive funds.

Genl. Pinkney was for making the State Govts. a
part of the General System. If they were to be
abolished, or lose their agency, S. Carolina & other
States would have but a small share of the benefits
of Govt.

On the question for Genl. Pinkney motion to substitute
election of the 1st branch in such mode as the
Legislatures should appoint, in stead of its being
elected by the people"

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa.
no. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C.
ay. Geo. no.

General Pinkney then moved that the 1st. branch
be elected by the people in such mode as the Legislatures
should direct; but waived it on its being hinted
that such a provision might be more properly tried
in the detail of the plan.

On the question for ye. election of the 1st. branch by
the people"

Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa.
ay. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C.
ay. Geo. ay.

Election of the 1st. branch "for the term of three
years," considered

Mr. Randolph moved to strike out, "three years"
and insert "two years"—he was sensible that annual
elections were a source of great mischiefs in the
States, yet it was the want of such checks agst. the
popular intemperence as were now proposed, that
rendered them so mischievous. He would have preferred
annual to biennial, but for the extent of the
U. S. and the inconveniency which would result
from them to the representatives of the extreme
parts of the Empire. The people were attached to
frequency of elections. All the Constitutions of the
States except that of S. Carolina, had established
annual elections.

Mr. Dickinson. The idea of annual elections was
borrowed from the antient Usage of England, a
country much less extensive than ours. He supposed
biennial would be inconvenient. He preferred triennial,
and in order to prevent the inconveniency
of an entire change of the whole number at the same
moment, suggested a rotation, by an annual election
of one third.

Mr. Elseworth was opposed to three years, supposing
that even one year was preferable to two
years. The people were fond of frequent elections
and might be safely indulged in one branch of the
Legislature. He moved for 1 year.

Mr. Strong[91] seconded & supported the motion.

Mr. Wilson being for making the 1st. branch an
effectual representation of the people at large, preferred
an annual election of it. This frequency was
most familiar & pleasing to the people. It would
not be more inconvenient to them, than triennial
elections, as the people in all the States have annual
meetings with which the election of the National
representatives might be made to co-incide. He
did not conceive that it would be necessary for the
Natl. Leigsl: to sit constantly; perhaps not half—
perhaps not one fourth of the year.

Mr. Madison was persuaded that annual elections
would be extremely inconvenient and apprehensive
that biennial would be too much so: he did not
mean inconvenient to the electors; but to the representatives.
They would have to travel seven or
eight hundred miles from the distant parts of the
Union; and would probably not be allowed even a
reimbursement of their expences. Besides, none of
those who wished to be re-elected would remain at
the seat of Governmt.; confiding that their absence
would not affect them. The members of Congs. had
done this with few instances of disappointment.
But as the choice was here to be made by the people
themselves who would be much less complaisant to
individuals, and much more susceptible of impressions

from the presence of a Rival candidate, it must
be supposed that the members from the most distant
States would travel backwards & forwards at least
as often as the elections should be repeated. Much
was to be said also on the time requisite for new
Members who would always form a large proportion,
to acquire that knowledge of the affairs of the States
in general without which their trust could not be
usefully discharged.

Mr. Sherman preferred annual elections, but would
be content with biennial. He thought the Representatives
ought to return home and mix with the
people. By remaining at the seat of Govt. they
would acquire the habits of the place which might
differ from those of their Constituents.

Col. Mason observed that the States being differently
situated such a rule ought to be formed as
would put them as nearly as possible on a level. If
elections were annual the middle States would have
a great advantage over the extreme ones. He
wished them to be biennial; and the rather as in
that case they would coincide with the periodical
elections of S. Carolina as well of the other States.

Col. Hamilton urged the necessity of 3 years. there
ought to be neither too much nor too little dependence,
on the popular sentiments. The checks in the
other branches of the Governt. would be but feeble,
and would need every auxiliary principle that could
be interwoven. The British House of Commons
were elected septennially, yet the democratic spirit
of ye. Constitution had not ceased. Frequency of

elections tended to make the people listless to them;
and to facilitate the success of little cabals. This
evil was complained of in all the States. In Virga. it
had been lately found necessary to force the attendance
& voting of the people by severe regulations.

On the question for striking out "three years"

Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. divd. Pa.
ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

The motion for "two years" was then inserted
nem. con.

Adjd.