University of Virginia Library

Monday, June 11th. Mr. Abraham Baldwin from
Georgia took his seat. In Committee of the Whole.

The clause concerning the rule of suffrage in the
Natl. Legislature postponed on Saturday was resumed.

Mr. Sharman proposed that the proportion of
suffrage in the 1st. branch should be according to the
respective numbers of free inhabitants; and that in
the second branch or Senate, each State should have
one vote and no more. He said as the States would
remain possessed of certain individual rights, each
State ought to be able to protect itself: otherwise a
few large States will rule the rest. The House of
Lords in England he observed had certain particular
rights under the Constitution, and hence they
have an equal vote with the House of Commons that
they may be able to defend their rights.

Mr. Rutlidge proposed that the proportion of suffrage
in the 1st. branch should be according to the
quotas of contribution. The justice of this rule he
said could not be contested. Mr. Butler urged the
same idea: adding that money was power; and that
the States ought to have weight in the Govt. in proportion
to their wealth.

Mr. King & Mr. Wilson,[67] in order to bring the question
to a point moved "that the right of suffrage in
the first branch of the national Legislature ought not
to be according [to] the rule established in the articles
of Confederation, but according to some equitable
ratio of representation." The clause so far as it
related to suffrage in the first branch was postponed
in order to consider this motion.

Mr. Dickenson contended for the actual contributions
of the States as the rule of their representation
& suffrage in the first branch. By thus connecting
the interests of the States with their duty, the latter
would be sure to be performed.

Mr. King remarked that it was uncertain what
mode might be used in levying a National revenue;
but that it was probable, imposts would be one
source of it. If the actual contributions were to be
the rule the non-importing States, as Cont. & N.
Jersey, wd. be in a bad situation indeed. It might so
happen that they wd. have no representation. This
situation of particular States had been always one
powerful argument in favor of the 5 Per Ct. impost.

The question being abt. to be put Docr. Franklin
sd. he had thrown his ideas of the matter on a paper
wch. Mr. Wilson read to the Committee in the words
following—Mr. Chairman

It has given me great pleasure to observe that till
this point, the proportion of representation, came
before us, our debates were carried on with great
coolness & temper. If any thing of a contrary kind,
has on this occasion appeared. I hope it will not be
repeated; for we are sent here to consult, not to contend,
with each other; and declarations of a fixed
opinion, and of determined resolution, never to
change it, neither enlighten nor convince us. Positiveness
and warmth on one side, naturally beget
their like on the other; and tend to create and augment
discord & division in a great concern, wherein
harmony & Union are extremely necessary to give
weight to our Councils, and render them effectual in
promoting & securing the common good.

I must own that I was originally of opinion it
would be better if every member of Congress, or our
national Council, were to consider himself rather as
a representative of the whole, than as an Agent for
the interests of a particular State; in which case the
proportion of members for each State would be of
less consequence, & it would not be very material
whether they voted by States or individually. But
as I find this is not to be expected, I now think the
number of Representatives should bear some proportion
to the number of the Represented; and that
the decisions shd. be by the majority of members, not

by the majority of the States. This is objected to
from an apprehension that the greater States would
then swallow up the smaller. I do not at present
clearly see what advantage the greater States could
propose to themselves by swallowing up the smaller,
and therefore do not apprehend they would attempt
it. I recollect that in the beginning of this Century,
When the Union was proposed of the two Kingdoms,
England & Scotland, the Scotch Patriots were full of
fears, that unless they had an equal number of Representatives
in Parliament, they should be ruined by
the superiority of the English. They finally agreed
however that the different proportions of importance
in the Union, of the two Nations should be
attended to, whereby they were to have only forty
members in the House of Commons, and only sixteen
in the House of Lords; A very great inferiority of
numbers! And yet to this day I do not recollect
that any thing has been done in the Parliament of
Great Britain to the prejudice of Scotland; and whoever
looks over the lists of Public officers, Civil &
Military of that nation will find I believe that the
North Britons enjoy at least their full proportion of
emolument.

But, sir, in the present mode of voting by States,
it is equally in the power of the lesser States to
swallow up the greater; and this is mathematically
demonstrable. Suppose for example, that 7 smaller
States had each 3 members in the House, and the 6
larger to have one with another 6 members; and that
upon a question, two members of each smaller State

should be in the affirmative and one in the Negative,
they would make

     

Affirmatives	14	Negatives	7
And that all the larger States should be unanimously in the Negative, they would make		Negatives	36
In all			43

It is then apparent that the 14 carry the question
against the 43. and the minority overpowers the majority,
contrary to the common practice of Assemblies
in all Countries and Ages.

The greater States Sir are naturally as unwilling to
have their property left in the disposition of the
smaller, as the smaller are to have theirs in the disposition
of the greater. An honorable gentleman
has, to avoid this difficulty, hinted a proposition of
equalizing the States. It appears to me an equitable
one, and I should, for my own part, not be
against such a measure, if it might be found practicable.
Formerly, indeed, when almost every province
had a different Constitution, some with greater
others with fewer privileges, it was of importance to
the borderers when their boundaries were contested,
whether by running the division lines, they were
placed on one side or the other. At present when
such differences are done away, it is less material.
The Interest of a State is made up of the interests
of its individual members. If they are not injured,
the State is not injured. Small States are

more easily well & happily governed than large
ones. If therefore in such an equal division, it should
be found necessary to diminish Pennsylvania, I
should not be averse to the giving a part of it to N.
Jersey, and another to Delaware. But as there
would probably be considerable difficulties in adjusting
such a division; and however equally made
at first, it would be continually varying by the augmentation
of inhabitants in some States, and their
fixed proportion in others; and thence frequent
occasion for new divisions, I beg leave to propose
for the consideration of the Committee another mode,
which appears to me to be as equitable, more easily
carried into practice, and more permanent in its
nature.

Let the weakest State say what proportion of
money or force it is able and willing to furnish for
the general purposes of the Union.

Let all the others oblige themselves to furnish
each an equal proportion.

The whole of these joint supplies to be absolutely
in the disposition of Congress.

The Congress in this case to be composed of an
equal number of Delegates from each State.

And their decisions to be by the Majority of individual
members voting.

If these joint and equal supplies should on particular
occasions not be sufficient, Let Congress make
requisitions on the richer and more powerful States
for further aids, to be voluntarily afforded, leaving
to each State the right of considering the necessity

and utility of the aid desired, and of giving more or
less as it should be found proper.

This mode is not new. it was formerly practised
with success by the British Government with respect
to Ireland and the Colonies. We sometimes
gave even more than they expected, or thought just
to accept; and in the last war carried on while we
were united, they gave us back in 5 years a million
Sterling. We should probably have continued such
voluntary contributions, whenever the occasions
appeared to require them for the common good of
the Empire. It was not till they chose to force us,
and to deprive us of the merit and pleasure of voluntary
contributions that we refused & resisted.
Those contributions however were to be disposed
of at the pleasure of a Government in which we had
no representative. I am therefore persuaded, that
they will not be refused to one in which the Representation
shall be equal.

My learned colleague (Mr. Wilson) has already
mentioned that the present method of voting by
States, was submitted to originally by Congress,
under a conviction of its impropriety, inequality,
and injustice. This appears in the words of their
Resolution. It is of Sepr. 6. 1774. The words
are

"Resolved that in determining questions in this
Congs. each Colony or province shall have one vote:
The Congs. not being possessed of or at present able
to procure materials for ascertaining the importance
of each Colony."

On the question for agreeing to Mr. King's and
Mr. Wilsons motion it passed in the affirmative

Massts. ay. Ct. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

It was then moved by Mr. Rutlidge, 2ded. by Mr.
Butler to add to the words "equitable ratio of representation
"at the end of the motion just agreed to,
the words "according to the quotas of contribution."
On motion of Mr. Wilson seconded by Mr. Pinkney,
this was postponed; in order to add, after the words
"equitable ratio of representation" the words following:"
in proportion to the whole number of white
& other free Citizens & inhabitants of every age sex
& condition including those bound to servitude for
a term of years and three fifths of all other persons
not comprehended in the foregoing description, except
Indians not paying taxes, in each State," this
being the rule in the Act of Congress agreed to by
eleven States, for apportioning quotas of revenue
on the States, and requiring a Census only every 5,
7, or 10 years.

Mr. Gerry thought property not the rule of representation.
Why then shd. the blacks, who were
property in the South, be in the rule of representation
more than the Cattle & horses of the North.[68]

On the question,—Mass: Con: N. Y. Pen: Maryd.

Virga. N. C. S. C. & Geo: were in the affirmative:
N. J. & Del: in the negative.

Mr. Sharman moved that a question be taken
whether each State shall have one vote in the 2d.
branch. Every thing he said depended on this.
The smaller States would never agree to the plan
on any other principle than an equality of suffrage
in this branch. Mr. Elsworth[69] seconded the motion.
On the question for allowing each State one vote in
the 2d. branch,

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa.
no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Mr. Wilson & Mr. Hamilton moved that the right
of suffrage in the 2d. branch ought to be according to
the same rule as in the 1st branch. On this question
for making the ratio of representation the same in
the 2d. as in the 1st. branch it passed in the affirmative;

Massts. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa.
ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.

Resol: 11, for guarantying Republican Govt.
& territory to each State, being considered—the
words "or partition," were, on motion of Mr. Madison

added, after the words "voluntary junction;"

Mas. N. Y. P. Va. N. C. S. C. G. ay. Con: N. J.
Del: Md. no.

Mr. Read disliked the idea of guarantying territory.
It abetted the idea of distinct States wch.
would be a perpetual source of discord. There can
be no cure for this evil but in doing away States
altogether and uniting them all into one great Society.

Alterations having been made in the Resolution,
making it read, "that a Republican Constitution &
its existing laws ought to be guaranteed to each
State by the U. States,"the whole was agreed to
nem. con.[70]

Resolution 13. for amending the national Constitution
hereafter without consent of the Natl. Legislature
being considered, Several members did not
see the necessity of the Resolution at all, nor the
propriety of making the consent of the Natl. Legisl.
unnecessary.

Col. Mason urged the necessity of such a provision.
The plan now to be formed will certainly be defective,
as the Confederation has been found on trial to
be. Amendments therefore will be necessary, and
it will be better to provide for them, in an easy, regular
and Constitutional way than to trust to chance
and violence. It would be improper to require the
consent of the Natl. Legislature, because they may

abuse their power, and refuse their consent on that
very account. The opportunity for such an abuse,
may be the fault of the Constitution calling for
amendmt.

Mr. Randolph enforced these arguments.

The words, "without requiring the consent of the
Natl. Legislature" were postponed. The other provision
in the clause passed nem. con.

Resolution 14. requiring oaths from the members
of the State Govts. to observe the Natl. Constitution
& laws, being considered,[71]

Mr. Sharman opposed it as unnecessarily intruding
into the State jurisdictions.

Mr. Randolph considered it necessary to prevent
that competition between the National Constitution
& laws & those of the particular States, which had
already been felt. The officers of the States are
already under oath to the States. To preserve a
due impartiality they ought to be equally bound to
the Natl. Govt. The Natl. authority needs every support
we can give it. The Executive & Judiciary of
the States, notwithstanding their nominal independence
on the State Legislatures are in fact, so dependent
on them, that unless they be brought under
some tie to the Natl. System, they will always lean
too much to the State systems, whenever a contest
arises between the two.

Mr. Gerry did not like the clause. He thought

there was as much reason for requiring an oath of
fidelity to the States from Natl officers, as vice versa.

Mr. Luther Martin moved to strike out the words
requiring such an oath from the State officers, viz
"within the several States," observing that if the
new oath should be contrary to that already taken
by them it would be improper; if coincident the
oaths already taken will be sufficient.

On the question for striking out as proposed by
Mr. L. Martin

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa.
no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.

Question on whole Resolution as proposed by
Mr. Randolph;

Massts. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay.

Come. rose & House Adjd.