1. The feeble resistance of Governments in time of
Revolution.
MANY modern nations—France, Spain, Italy, Austria, Poland,
Japan, Turkey, Portugal, &c.—have known revolutions within the
last century. These were usually characterised by their
instantaneous quality and the facility with which the governments
attacked were overthrown.
The instantaneous nature of these revolutions is explained
by the rapidity of mental contagion due to modern methods of
publicity. The slight resistance of the governments attacked is
more surprising. It implies a total inability to comprehend and
foresee created by a blind confidence in their own strength.
The facility with which governments fall is not however a
new phenomenon. It has been proved more than once, not only in
autocratic systems, which are always overturned by palace
conspiracies, but also in governments perfectly instructed in the
state of public opinion by the press and their own agents.
Among these instantaneous downfalls one of the most
striking was that which followed the Ordinances of Charles X.
This monarch was, as we know, over
thrown in four days. His minister Polignac had taken no measures
of defence, and the king was so confident of the tranquillity of
Paris that he had gone hunting. The army was not in the least
hostile, as in the reign of Louis XVI., but the troops, badly
officered, disbanded before the attacks of a few insurgents.
The overthrow of Louis-Philippe was still more typical,
since it did not result from any arbitrary action on the part of
the sovereign. This monarch was not surrounded by the hatred
which finally surrounded Charles X., and his fall was the result
of an insignificant riot which could easily have been repressed.
Historians, who can hardly comprehend how a solidly
constituted government, supported by an imposing army, can be
overthrown by a few rioters, naturally attributed the fall of
Louis-Philippe to deep-seated causes. In reality the incapacity
of the generals entrusted with his defence was the real cause of
his fall.
This case is one of the most instructive that could be
cited, and is worthy of a moment's consideration. It has been
perfectly investigated by General Bonnal, in the light of the
notes of an eye-witness, General Elchingen. Thirty-six thousand
troops were then in Paris, but the weakness and incapacity of
their officers made it impossible to use them. Contradictory
orders were given, and finally the troops were forbidden to fire
on the people, who, moreover—and nothing could have been more
dangerous—were permitted to mingle with the troops. The riot
succeeded without fighting and forced the king to abdicate.
Applying to the preceding case our knowledge of
the psychology of crowds, General Bonnal shows how easily the
riot which overthrew Louis-Philippe could have been controlled.
He proves, notably, that if the commanding officers had not
completely lost their heads quite a small body of troops could
have prevented the insurgents from invading the Chamber of
Deputies. This last, composed of monarchists, would certainly
have proclaimed the Count of Paris under the regency of his
mother.
Similar phenomena were observable in the revolutions of
Spain and Portugal.
These facts show the rôle of petty accessory
circumstances in great events, and prove that one must not speak
too readily of the general laws of history. Without the riot
which overthrew Louis-Philippe, we should probably have seen
neither the Republic of 1848, nor the Second Empire, nor Sedan,
nor the invasion, nor the loss of Alsace.
In the revolutions of which I have just been speaking the
army was of no assistance to the government, but did not turn
against it. It sometimes happens otherwise. It is often the
army which effects the revolution, as in Turkey and Portugal.
The innumerable revolutions of the Latin republics of America are
effected by the army.
When a revolution is effected by an army the new rulers
naturally fall under its domination. I have already recalled the
fact that this was the case at the end of the Roman Empire, when
the emperors were made and unmade by the soldiery.
The same thing has sometimes been witnessed in modern
times. The following extract from a news
paper, with reference to the Greek revolution, shows what becomes
of a government dominated by its army:—
“One day it was announced that eighty officers of the
navy would send in their resignations if the government did not
dismiss the leaders of whom they complained. Another time it was
the agricultural labourers on a farm (metairie) belonging
to the Crown Prince who demanded the partition of the soil among
them. The navy protested against the promotion promised to
Colonel Zorbas. Colonel Zorbas, after a week of discussion with
Lieutenant Typaldos, treated with the President of the Council as
one power with another. During this time the Federation of the
corporations abused the officers of the navy. A deputy demanded
that these officers and their families should be treated as
brigands. When Commander Miaoulis fired on the rebels, the
sailors, who first of all had obeyed Typaldos, returned to duty.
This is no longer the harmonious Greece of Pericles and
Themistocles. It is a hideous camp of Agramant.”
A revolution cannot be effected without the assistance or
at least the neutrality of the army, but it often happens that
the movement commences without it. This was the case with the
revolutions of 1830 and 1848, and that of 1870, which overthrew
the Empire after the humiliation of France by the surrender of
Sedan.
The majority of revolutions take place in the capitals,
and by means of contagion spread through the country; but this is
not a constant rule. We know that during the French Revolution
La Vendée,
Brittany, and the Midi revolted spontaneously against Paris.
