3. Psychological Elements which determined the Success
of the Work of the Consulate
All the external forces which act upon men—economic,
historical, geographical, &c.—may be finally translated into
psychological forces. These psychological forces a ruler must
understand in order
to govern. The Revolutionary Assemblies were completely ignorant
of them; Bonaparte knew how to employ them.
The various Assemblies, the Convention notably, were
composed of conflicting parties. Napoleon understood that to
dominate them he must not belong to any one of these parties.
Very well aware that the value of a country is disseminated among
the superior intelligences of the various parties, he tried to
utilise them all. His agents of government—ministers, priests,
magistrates, &c.—were taken indifferently from among the
Liberals, Royalists, Jacobites, &c., having regard only to their
capacities.
While accepting the assistance of men of the ancien
régime, Bonaparte took care to make it understood that
he intended to maintain the fundamental principles of the
Revolution. Nevertheless many Royalists rallied round the new
Government.
One of the most remarkable feats of the Consulate, from
the psychological point of view, was the restoration of religious
peace. France was far more divided by religious disagreement
than by political differences. The systematic destruction of a
portion of the Vendée had almost completely terminated the
struggle by force of arms, but without pacifying men's minds. As
only one man, and he the head of Christianity, could assist in
this pacification, Bonaparte did not hesitate to treat with him.
His concordat was the work of a real psychologist, who knew that
moral forces do not use violence, and the great danger of
persecuting such. While conciliating the clergy he contrived to
place them under his own domination. The bishops
were to be appointed and remunerated by the State, so that he
would still be master.
The religious policy of Napoleon had a bearing which
escapes our modern Jacobins. Blinded by their narrow fanaticism,
they do not understand that to detach the Church from the
Government is to create a state within the State, so that they
are liable to find themselves opposed by a formidable caste,
directed by a master outside France, and necessarily hostile to
France. To give one's enemies a liberty they did not possess is
extremely dangerous. Never would Napoleon, nor any of the
sovereigns who preceded him, have consented to make the clergy
independent of the State, as they have become to-day.
The difficulties of Bonaparte the First Consul were far
greater than those he had to surmount after his coronation. Only
a profound knowledge of men enabled him to triumph over them.
The future master was far from being the master as yet. Many
departments were still in insurrection. Brigandage persisted,
and the Midi was ravaged by the struggles of partisans.
Bonaparte, as Consul, had to conciliate and handle Talleyrand,
Fouché, and a number of generals who thought themselves
his equal. Even his brothers conspired against his power.
Napoleon, as Emperor, had no hostile party to face, but as Consul
he had to combat all the parties and to hold the balance equal
among them. This must indeed have been a difficult task, since
during the last century very few Governments have succeeded in
accomplishing it.
The success of such an undertaking demanded an extremely
subtle mixture of finesse, firmness, and
diplomacy. Not feeling himself powerful enough as yet, Bonaparte
the Consul made a rule, according to his own expression, “of
governing men as the greater number wish to be governed.” As
Emperor he often managed to govern them according to his own
ideal.
We have travelled a long way since the time when
historians, in their singular blindness, and great poets, who
possessed more talent than psychology, would hold forth in
indignant accents against the coup d'État of
Brumaire. What profound illusions underlay the assertion that
“France lay fair in Messidor's great sun”! And other
illusions no less profound underlay such verdicts as that of
Victor Hugo concerning this period. We have seen that the
“Crime of Brumaire” had as an enthusiastic accomplice,
not only the Government itself but the whole of France, which it
delivered from anarchy.
One may wonder how intelligent men could so misjudge a
period of history which is nevertheless so clear. It was
doubtless because they saw events through their own convictions,
and we know what transformations the truth may suffer for the man
who is imprisoned in the valleys of belief. The most luminous
facts are obscured, and the history of events is the history of
his dreams.
The psychologist who desires to understand the period
which we have so briefly sketched can only do so if, being
attached to no party, he stands clear of the passions which are
the soul of parties. He will never dream of recriminating a past
which was dictated by such imperious necessities. Certainly
Napoleon has cost France dear: his epic was terminated by two
invasions, and there was yet to
be a third, whose consequences are felt even to-day, when the
prestige which he exerted even from the tomb set upon the throne
the inheritor of his name.
All these events are narrowly connected in their origin.
They represent the price of that capital phenomenon in the
evolution of a people, a change of ideal. Man can never make the
attempt to break suddenly with his ancestors without profoundly
affecting the course of his own history.
