2. CHAPTER II
THE RESTORATION OF ORDER. THE CONSULAR REPUBLIC
1. How the Work of the Revolution was Confirmed by the
Consulate.
THE history of the Consulate is as rich as the preceding
period in psychological material. In the first place it shows us
that the work of a powerful individual is superior to that of a
collectivity. Bonaparte immediately replaced the bloody anarchy
in which the Republic had for ten years been writhing by a period
of order. That which none of the four Assemblies of the
Revolution had been able to realise, despite the most violent
oppression, a single man accomplished in a very short space of
time.
His authority immediately put an end to all the Parisian
insurrections and the attempts at monarchical resistance, and re-
established the moral unity of France, so profoundly divided by
intense hatreds. Bonaparte replaced an unorganised collective
despotism by a perfectly organised individual despotism.
Everyone gained thereby, for his tyranny was infinitely less
heavy than that which had been endured for ten long years. We
must suppose, moreover, that it was unwelcome to very few, as it
was very soon accepted with immense enthusiasm.
We know better to-day than to repeat with the old
historians that Bonaparte overthrew the Republic. On the
contrary, he retained of it all that could be retained, and never
would have been retained without him, by establishing all the
practicable work of the Revolution—the abolition of privileges,
equality before the law, &c.—in institutions and codes of law.
The Consular Government continued, moreover, to call itself the
Republic.
It is infinitely probable that without the Consulate a
monarchical restoration would have terminated the Directory, and
would have wiped out the greater part of the work of the
Revolution. Let us suppose Bonaparte erased from history. No
one, I think, will imagine that the Directory could have survived
the universal weariness of its rule. It would certainly have
been overturned by the royalist conspiracies which were breaking
out daily, and Louis XVIII. would probably have ascended the
throne. Certainly he was to mount it sixteen years later, but
during this interval Bonaparte gave such force to the principles
of the Revolution, by establishing them in laws and customs, that
the restored sovereign dared not touch them, nor restore the
property of the returned emigrés.
Matters would have been very different had Louis XVIII.
immediately followed the Directory. He would have brought with
him all the absolutism of the ancien régime, and
fresh revolutions would have been necessary to abolish it. We
know that a mere attempt to return to the past overthrew Charles
X.
It would be a little ingenuous to complain of the
tyranny of Bonaparte. Under the
ancien régime
Frenchmen had supported every species of tyranny, and the
Republic had created a despotism even heavier than that of the
monarchy. Despotism was then a normal condition, which aroused
no protest save when it was accompanied by disorder.
A constant law of the psychology of crowds shows them as
creating anarchy, and then seeking the master who will enable
them to emerge therefrom. Bonaparte was this master.
2. The Reorganisation of France by the
Consulate.
Upon assuming power Bonaparte undertook a colossal task. All
was in ruins; all was to be rebuilt. On the morrow of the
coup of Brumaire he drafted, almost single-handed, the
Constitution destined to give him the absolute power which was to
enable him to reorganise the country and to prevail over the
factions. In a month it was completed.
This Constitution, known as that of the year VIII.,
survived, with slight modifications, until the end of his reign.
The executive power was the attribute of three Consuls, two of
whom possessed a consultative voice only. The first Consul,
Bonaparte, was therefore sole master of France. He appointed
ministers, councillors of state, ambassadors, magistrates, and
other officials, and decided upon peace or war. The legislative
power was his also, since only he could initiate the laws, which
were subsequently submitted to three Assemblies—the Council of
State, the Tribunate, and the Legislative Corps. A fourth
Assembly,
the Senate, acted effectually as the guardian of the
Constitution.
Despotic as he was and became, Bonaparte always called the
other Consuls about him before proceeding with the most trivial
measure. The Legislative Corps did not exercise much influence
during his reign, but he signed no decrees of any kind without
first discussing them with the Council of State. This Council,
composed of the most enlightened and learned men of France,
prepared laws, which were then presented to the Legislative
Corps, which could criticise them very freely, since voting was
secret. Presided over by Bonaparte, the Council of State was a
kind of sovereign tribunal, judging even the actions of
ministers.9
The new master had great confidence in this Council, as it
was composed more particularly of
eminent jurists, each of whom dealt with his own speciality. He
was too good a psychologist not to entertain the greatest
suspicion of large and incompetent assemblies of popular origin,
whose disastrous results had been obvious to him during the whole
of the Revolution.
Wishing to govern for the people, but never with its
assistance, Bonaparte accorded it no part in the government,
reserving to it only the right of voting, once for all, for or
against the adoption of the new Constitution. He only in rare
instances had recourse to universal suffrage. The members of the
Legislative Corps recruited themselves, and were not elected by
the people.
In creating a Constitution intended solely to fortify his
own power, the First Consul had no illusion that it would serve
to restore the country. Consequently, while he was drafting it
he also undertook the enormous task of the administrative,
judicial, and financial reorganisation of France. The various
powers were centralised in Paris. Each department was directed
by a prefect, assisted by a consul-general; the
arrondissement by a sub-prefect, assisted by a council;
the commune by a mayor, assisted by a municipal council. All
were
appointed by the ministers, and not by election, as under the
Republic.
This system, which created the omnipotent State and a
powerful centralisation, was retained by all subsequent
Governments and is preserved to-day. Centralisation being, in
spite of its drawbacks, the only means of avoiding local
tyrannies in a country profoundly divided within itself, has
always been maintained.
This organisation, based on a profound knowledge of the
soul of the French people, immediately restored that tranquillity
and order which had for so long been unknown.
To complete the mental pacification of the country, the
political exiles were recalled and the churches restored to the
faithful.
Continuing to rebuild the social edifice, Bonaparte busied
himself also with the drafting of a code, the greater part of
which consisted of customs borrowed from the ancien
régime. It was, as has been said, a sort of
transition or compromise between the old law and the new.
Considering the enormous task accomplished by the First
Consul in so short a time, we realise that he had need, before
all, of a Constitution according him absolute power. If all the
measures by which he restored France had been submitted to
assemblies of attorneys, he could never have extricated the
country from the disorder into which it had fallen.
The Constitution of the year VIII. obviously transformed
the Republic into a monarchy at least as absolute as the
“Divine right” monarchy of Louis XIV. Being the only
Constitution adapted to the needs of the moment, it represented a
psychological necessity.
3. Psychological Elements which determined the Success
of the Work of the Consulate
All the external forces which act upon men—economic,
historical, geographical, &c.—may be finally translated into
psychological forces. These psychological forces a ruler must
understand in order
to govern. The Revolutionary Assemblies were completely ignorant
of them; Bonaparte knew how to employ them.
The various Assemblies, the Convention notably, were
composed of conflicting parties. Napoleon understood that to
dominate them he must not belong to any one of these parties.
Very well aware that the value of a country is disseminated among
the superior intelligences of the various parties, he tried to
utilise them all. His agents of government—ministers, priests,
magistrates, &c.—were taken indifferently from among the
Liberals, Royalists, Jacobites, &c., having regard only to their
capacities.
While accepting the assistance of men of the ancien
régime, Bonaparte took care to make it understood that
he intended to maintain the fundamental principles of the
Revolution. Nevertheless many Royalists rallied round the new
Government.
One of the most remarkable feats of the Consulate, from
the psychological point of view, was the restoration of religious
peace. France was far more divided by religious disagreement
than by political differences. The systematic destruction of a
portion of the Vendée had almost completely terminated the
struggle by force of arms, but without pacifying men's minds. As
only one man, and he the head of Christianity, could assist in
this pacification, Bonaparte did not hesitate to treat with him.
His concordat was the work of a real psychologist, who knew that
moral forces do not use violence, and the great danger of
persecuting such. While conciliating the clergy he contrived to
place them under his own domination. The bishops
were to be appointed and remunerated by the State, so that he
would still be master.
The religious policy of Napoleon had a bearing which
escapes our modern Jacobins. Blinded by their narrow fanaticism,
they do not understand that to detach the Church from the
Government is to create a state within the State, so that they
are liable to find themselves opposed by a formidable caste,
directed by a master outside France, and necessarily hostile to
France. To give one's enemies a liberty they did not possess is
extremely dangerous. Never would Napoleon, nor any of the
sovereigns who preceded him, have consented to make the clergy
independent of the State, as they have become to-day.
The difficulties of Bonaparte the First Consul were far
greater than those he had to surmount after his coronation. Only
a profound knowledge of men enabled him to triumph over them.
The future master was far from being the master as yet. Many
departments were still in insurrection. Brigandage persisted,
and the Midi was ravaged by the struggles of partisans.
Bonaparte, as Consul, had to conciliate and handle Talleyrand,
Fouché, and a number of generals who thought themselves
his equal. Even his brothers conspired against his power.
Napoleon, as Emperor, had no hostile party to face, but as Consul
he had to combat all the parties and to hold the balance equal
among them. This must indeed have been a difficult task, since
during the last century very few Governments have succeeded in
accomplishing it.
The success of such an undertaking demanded an extremely
subtle mixture of finesse, firmness, and
diplomacy. Not feeling himself powerful enough as yet, Bonaparte
the Consul made a rule, according to his own expression, “of
governing men as the greater number wish to be governed.” As
Emperor he often managed to govern them according to his own
ideal.
We have travelled a long way since the time when
historians, in their singular blindness, and great poets, who
possessed more talent than psychology, would hold forth in
indignant accents against the coup d'État of
Brumaire. What profound illusions underlay the assertion that
“France lay fair in Messidor's great sun”! And other
illusions no less profound underlay such verdicts as that of
Victor Hugo concerning this period. We have seen that the
“Crime of Brumaire” had as an enthusiastic accomplice,
not only the Government itself but the whole of France, which it
delivered from anarchy.
One may wonder how intelligent men could so misjudge a
period of history which is nevertheless so clear. It was
doubtless because they saw events through their own convictions,
and we know what transformations the truth may suffer for the man
who is imprisoned in the valleys of belief. The most luminous
facts are obscured, and the history of events is the history of
his dreams.
The psychologist who desires to understand the period
which we have so briefly sketched can only do so if, being
attached to no party, he stands clear of the passions which are
the soul of parties. He will never dream of recriminating a past
which was dictated by such imperious necessities. Certainly
Napoleon has cost France dear: his epic was terminated by two
invasions, and there was yet to
be a third, whose consequences are felt even to-day, when the
prestige which he exerted even from the tomb set upon the throne
the inheritor of his name.
All these events are narrowly connected in their origin.
They represent the price of that capital phenomenon in the
evolution of a people, a change of ideal. Man can never make the
attempt to break suddenly with his ancestors without profoundly
affecting the course of his own history.
