 | THE HISTORY OF THE FORMER HAN DYNASTY The history of the former Han dynasty |  |
Li Ling's brilliant military exploit
Perhaps the most brilliant military exploit in Han times after the
death of Hsiang Yü was the famous expedition of Li Ling deep into Hun
territory. It throws so much light upon Emperor Wu and upon military
practises that it is perhaps worth recounting.
Li Ling was a grandson of Li Kuang3, a doughty and intrepid fighter
from the Commandery of Lung-hsi (in the present Kansu). Li Kuang3
had been a famous archer, who was said to have mistaken in the dusk a
stone for a tiger and to have sunk an arrow deep into it. He intrepidly
attacked greatly larger forces of Huns, with the result that he twice lost
all or almost all his soldiers in battle. He shared the hardships of his
men and achieved great fame by his valor and ability. When, in 119
B.C., a strenuous attempt was to be made to capture the Hun Shan-yü,
Li Kuang3, who was then a general, asked several times to go along. He
was more than sixty years of age, and Emperor Wu thought him too old,
but he was finally made General of the Van, with secret orders to the
Commander-in-chief, Wei Ch'ing, to keep him in the rear. Emperor Wu
had consulted the diviners about Li Kuang3, and had been told that his
fate was to be an evil one, so did not wish Li Kuang3 to lead in the
expedition; Wei Ch'ing wanted his personal friend, Kung-sun Ao, to have
the opportunity of capturing the Shan-yü, because Kung-sun Ao had
arrived late with his army at a rendezvous, a capital crime. He
had been allowed to ransom his life, but had lost his noble rank and
Right. The proud Li Kuang3 became angry and arrived late at the
rendezvous. Wei Ch'ing's expedition defeated the Huns, but failed to
capture the Shan-yü, possibly because it lacked Li Kuang3. When the
expedition returned, Li Kuang3 was questioned; he admitted his fault,
recounted his seventy victories over the Huns, and committed suicide.
Thus the intrepid commander was robbed of his opportunity and his life
by imperial superstition, professional jealousy, and his own pride.
In 99 B.C., his grandson, Li Ling, had entered the imperial service and
had been stationed in Kansu with a force of five thousand picked men to
defend the frontiers. He was an excellent horseman and archer, and
trained his men carefully. An expedition of thirty thousand cavalry was
to be sent to attack the Hun Worthy King of the West at the T'ien
Mountains (north of the present Chinese Turkestan). Emperor Wu
summoned Li Ling, intending to put him in charge of the baggage train,
whereupon the latter suggested that it would be better to send him on an
independent expedition into the present Mongolia, in order to divide the
Hun forces. Emperor Wu replied that there was no more cavalry
(who fought as horse-archers) available, but Li Ling answered that he
wanted only his five thousand infantry, saying that he liked to fight
with a few against many.
Previous to this time, because the Huns fought on horseback, cavalry
had always been sent to attack them; Li Ling for the first time opposed
infantry, to the Hun cavalry in Hun territory. Emperor Wu approved
his plan, and ordered Lu Po-tê to support Li Ling and to meet him halfway
on his return. But Lu Po-tê was a General, while Li Ling was only
a Chief Commandant; Lu Po-tê did not want to appear subordinate to
Li Ling, and memorialized that the expedition should be delayed.
Emperor Wu misunderstood his meaning, thought that Li Ling had
regretted his proposal, became very angry (for he would not tolerate
cowardice among his officers), and ordered Lu Po-tê off to another part
of the border, while he commanded Li Ling to set out against the Huns in
November.
Li Ling sent back the Emperor correct information concerning what
had happened between him and Lu Po-tê and, after getting no reply,
started out with his men northwards from the present Chü-yen (Etzina)
towards the present Urga, then approximately the seat of the Shan-yü.
He marched for about thirty days, mapping the mountains and streams
and sending a subordinate back to report to Emperor Wu. The force
was then opposite the Shan-yü's location. The latter discovered the
Chinese and surrounded Li Ling with a troop said to have consisted of
and used his large carts to wall his camp. He led his troops out of the
camp and arrayed them, ordering the front ranks to bear pikes and
shields and the rear ranks to bear bows and crossbows. At the sound of
the drum they were to advance; at the sound of the bell they were to
stop. The Huns attacked, and Li Ling's footmen awaited them unflinchingly,
while a thousand cross-bows, which outranged the Hun
longbows, were discharged at the Huns. The effect was terrible; the
Huns fled to the mountains with the Chinese in pursuit. Several
thousand Huns were killed. The Parthians, at the battle of Carrhae
(54 B.C.) and in Antony's retreat from Phraaspa (36 B.C.), showed that
the best foot soldiers of the time (Roman legionaries) were no match for
horse-archers adequately supplied with arrows; Li Ling showed that
footmen, when properly organized and supplied with enough crossbows,
could vanquish an overwhelming force of horse-archers.
But without support Li Ling could not follow up his victory. The
Shan-yü summoned reinforcements, while Li Ling led his men southeastwards,
towards the Chinese border, fighting as he went, always
beating off overwhelming numbers and inflicting severe punishment upon
the Huns. Crossbows that shot several arrows at a time were used so
effectively that the Shan-yü himself had to dismount and flee on foot.
The severely wounded Chinese were carried in carts; the moderately
wounded pushed carts; while the slightly wounded kept on fighting.
When the Chinese reached a place only a hundred-odd li from the frontier,
they had to pass through a narrow valley. The Shan-yü was going to
cease the pursuit, but his chiefs warned him that it would be a great
shame for him not to be able to destroy several thousand Chinese with
several ten-thousands of Hun horsemen. If Li Ling got forty or fifty li
further on to level ground, he could not be stopped. Just then a Chinese
captain turned traitor and surrendered to the Huns, bringing the news
that there were no supporting troops coming to assist Li Ling, and that
his arrows were almost exhausted. The Huns attacked with renewed
vigor, surrounded the Chinese, blocked the valley, and rolled rocks and
stones down, while their arrows fell like rain. Without arrows, the
Chinese were helpless. They abandoned their carts and fled. Only
three thousand were left; the men fought with cart axles, the officers
used their short swords. Although many were killed, they could not
win through the valley.
It was then the chivalric Chinese tradition that a defeated leader must
die with his men. Li Kuang3 had once escaped after his men had all
been killed and he had been captured; Emperor Wu had pardoned him
A second time he had been trapped by the Huns and almost all his men
killed before he was rescued; this time he had not been punished, because
he had not been actually defeated. Thus exceptions could be made to the
code at the Emperor's will, but he expected his defeated generals to die
in battle.
Li Ling saw that the situation was hopeless. After dark he cut off his
banners and flags and buried his army's treasure. He told his men to
scatter and try to escape, while he and his second in command set out on
horseback with only ten-odd followers. His second in command was
killed, while Li Ling, remembering his grandfather's unjust fate, surrendered
to the Huns. Only four hundred-odd of Li Ling's troops arrived
safely at the Chinese fortifications.
When the news of Li Ling's defeat reached Emperor Wu, the latter
merely hoped that Li Ling had died with his men. But when the news
came that he had surrendered, Emperor Wu became very angry. His
officials accordingly condemned Li Ling, all except Szu-ma Ch'ien, the
historian, who had originally recommended Li Ling. He now defended
him, saying that Li Ling had had no support; he had been defeated only
when his ammunition had been exhausted; in marching deep into enemy
territory and defeating ten-thousands of horsemen with only five
thousand infantry he had performed the most glorious exploit in history.
Emperor Wu sentenced Szu-ma Ch'ien to castration because of the implied
criticism. A year later, the Emperor recognized that he had been
to blame for not ordering Li Ling supported, and sent for Li Ling, but
the latter would not return to China. His family was later exterminated.
Thus a chivalric code and an irascible emperor deprived China of its
most brilliant military genius.
| THE HISTORY OF THE FORMER HAN DYNASTY The history of the former Han dynasty | |