University of Virginia Library

BRITISH GOVERNMENT.[49]

The boasted equilibrium of this government (so far as it is
a reality) is maintained less by the distribution of its powers,
than by the force of public opinion. If the nation were in
favour of absolute monarchy, the public liberty would soon
be surrendered by their representatives. If a republican form
of government were preferred, how could the monarch resist
the national will? Were the public opinion neutral only, and
the public voice silent, ambition in the House of Commons
could wrest from him his prerogatives, or the avarice of its
members, might sell to him its privileges.

The provision required for the civil list, at every accession
of a king, shews at once his dependence on the representative
branch, and its dependence on the public opinion. Were this
establishment to be made from year to year, instead of being
made for life (a change within the legislative power) the monarchy,
unless maintained by corruption, would dwindle into a
name. In the present temper of the nation, however, they
would obstruct such a change, by taking side with their king,
against their representatives.

Those who ascribe the preservation of the British government
to the form in which its powers are distributed and
balanced, forget the evolutions which it has undergone.—
Compare its primitive with its present form.

A king at the head of 7 or 800 barons, sitting together in
their own right, or (admitting another hypothesis) some in
their own right, others as representatives of a few lesser
barons, but still sitting together as a single House; and the
judges holding their offices during the pleasure of the king;
such was the British government at one period.

At present a king is seen at the head of a legislature, consisting
of two Houses, each jealous of the other, one sitting
in their own right, the other representing the people; and the
judges forming a distinct and independent department.

In the first case the judiciary is annexed to the executive,

and the legislature not even formed into separate branches.
In the second, the legislative, executive and judiciary are distinct;
and the legislative subdivided into rival branches.

What a contrast in these forms. If the latter be self balanced,
the former could have no balance at all. Yet the
former subsisted as well as the latter, and lasted longer than
the latter, dating it from 1688, has been tried.

The former was supported by the opinion and circumstances
of the times, like many of the intermediate variations, through
which the government has passed; and as will be supported,
the future forms through which it probably remains to be
conducted, by the progress of reason, and change of circumstances.