University of Virginia Library

IMPRESSMENTS.

The British Government is under an egregious mistake
in supposing that "no recent causes of complaint have occurred,"
on this subject. How far the language of Mr. Lyman's
books may countenance this error I cannot say, but
I think it probable that even there the means of correcting
it may be found. In the American Seas, including the West
Indies, the impressments have perhaps at no time been more
numerous or vexatious. It is equally a mistake therefore
to suppose "that no probable inconvenience can result from
the postponement of an Article" for this case.

The remedy proposed in the Note from the British Commissioners,
however well intended, does not inspire the
confidence here which gave it so much value in their judgment.
They see the favorable side only, of the character of
their naval Commanders. The spirit which vexes neutrals
in their maritime rights, is fully understood by neutrals
only. The habits generated by naval command, and the

interest which is felt in the abuse of it, both as respects captures
and impressments, render inadequate every provision
which does not put an end to all discretionary power in the
commanders. As long as the British navy has so complete
an ascendency on the high seas, its commanders have not
only an interest in violating the rights of neutrals within the
limits of neutral patience, especially of those whose commerce
and mariners are unguarded by fleets: they feel moreover
the strongest temptation, as is well known from the occasional
language of some of them, to covet the full range for spoliation
opened by a state of War. The rich harvest promised by the
commerce of the United States, gives to this cupidity all its
force. Whatever general injuries might accrue to their nation,
or whatever surplus of reprisals might result to American
Cruizers, the fortunes of British Cruizers would not be
the less certain in the event of hostilities between the two
nations.

Whilst all these considerations require in our behalf the
most precise and peremptory security against the propensities
of British naval commanders, and, on the tender subject of
impressments more than any other, it is impossible to find
equivalent or even important motives on the British side for
declining a security. The proposition which you have made,
aided by the internal regulations which the British Government
is always free to make, closes all the considerable avenues
through which its seamen can find their way into our service.
The only loss consequently which could remain, would be
in the number at present in this service; with a deduction of
those who might from time to time voluntarily leave it,
or be found within the limits of Great Britain or of her possessions;
and in the proportion of this reduced number who
might otherwise be gained by impressment. The smallness
of this loss appears from the annual amount of impressments,
which has not exceeded a few hundred British seamen, the
great mass consisting of real Americans and of subjects
of other neutral powers. And even from the few British

seamen ought to be deducted those impressed within neutral
ports, where it is agreed that the proceeding is clearly
unlawful.

Under this view of the subject the sacrifice which Great
Britain would make dwindles to the merest trifle; or rather,
there is just reason to believe that instead of a loss, she
would find an actual gain, in the excess of the deserters who
would be surrendered by the United States, over the number
actually recoverable by impressment.

In practice, therefore Great Britain would make no sacrifice
by acceding to our terms; and her principle, if not expressly
saved by a recital as it easily might be, would in effect be so
by the tenor of the arrangement; inasmuch as she would obtain
for her forbearance to exercise what she deems a right,
a right to measures on our part which we have a right to
refuse. She would consequently merely exchange one right
for another. She would also, by such forbearance, violate
no personal right of individuals under her protection. The
United States on the other hand in yielding to the claims of
Great Britain, on this subject, would necessarily surrender
what they deem an essential right of their flag and of their
Sovereignty, without even acquiring any new right; would
violate the right of the individuals under the protection of both;
and expose their native Citizens to all the calamitous mistakes
voluntary and involuntary, of which experience gives such
forcible warning.

I take for granted that you have not failed to make due use
of the arrangement concerted by Mr. King with Lord Hawksbury
in the year 1802 for settling the question of impressments.
On that occasion, and under that administration,
the British principle was fairly renounced in favor of the
right of our flag; Lord Hawksbury having agreed to prohibit
impressments altogether on the High seas; and Lord
St. Vincent requiring nothing more than an exception of the
narrow seas, an exception resting on the obsolete claim of Great
Britain to some peculiar dominion over them. I have thought

it not amiss to inclose another extract from Mr. King's letter
giving an account of that transaction.

In the Note of Novr 8th from the British Commissioners,
the Security held out to the crews of our vessels is that instructions
have been given, and will be repeated, for enforcing
the greatest caution &c. If the future instructions are to be
repetitions of the past, we well know the inefficacy of them.
Any instructions which are to answer the purpose, must
differ essentially from the past, both in their tenor and their
sanctions. In case an informal arrangement should be substituted
for a regular stipulation, it may reasonably be expected
from the candor of the British Government, that the
instructions on which we are to rely, should be communicated
to you.