University of Virginia Library

TO CHARLES PINCKNEY.

Since my last of July 29, I have received your several letters
of April 12 & 20 May 2d & 4th June 12 and July 18th.

Mr. Monroe has already informed you of his having proceeded
to London, and of his intention not to repair to Madrid,
for the present. He will have since received instructions
given on a contrary supposition; but it is probable he will
wait where he is for the determination of the President on the
reasons which kept him from proceeding to Madrid. I have
just informed him that the President approves the course he
has taken, so that he is not to be expected to join you at Madrid,
until he shall be so instructed, or until a change of circumstances,
shall in his view clearly invite him to do so. My

last letter to you having provided for the case of Mr. Monroe's
postponing this trip, I need not repeat the instructions
and observations then made to you. I shall only add, that
it is more proper now than ever that you should not be in
haste without the concurrence of your colleague, to revive
the negotiation jointly committed to you.

Among the reasons which weighed with the President as
well as with Mr. Monroe, against attempting at present, to
procure from the Spanish Government the residuum of territory
desired by the United States, is the ill humour shewn
by that Government at the acquisition already made by them
from France; and of which the language held to you by M.
Cevallos as communicated in your letter of is a
sufficient proof. A still fuller proof of the same fact, is contained
in three letters lately received from the Spanish Minister
here, copies of which with my answer to the two first, are
herewith inclosed. I inclose also a copy of a letter written on
the occasion to Mr. Livingston, which was rendered more
proper, by the probability as well as by information from
Paris, that efforts would be used with Spain to draw the
French Government into her views of frustrating the Cession
of Louisiana to the United States.

In these documents you will find the remarks by which the
objections made by the Spanish Government to the Treaty
of Cession between the U. S. and France are to be combated.
The President thinks it proper that they should without delay
be conveyed to the Spanish Government, either by a note
from you, or in conversation, as you may deem most expedient;
and in a form and stile best uniting the advantages of
making that Government sensible of the absolute determination
of the United States to maintain their right, with the
propriety of avoiding undignified menace, and unnecessary
irritation.

The conduct of Spain on this occasion is such as was in several
views little to be expected, and as is not readily explained.
If her object be to extort Louisiana from France
as well as to prevent its transfer to the U States it would seem

that she must be emboldened by an understanding with some
other very powerful quarter of Europe. If she hopes to prevail
on France to break her engagement to the United States,
and voluntarily restore Louisiana to herself, why has she so
absurdly blended with the project the offensive communication
of the perfidy which she charges on the First Consul? If
it be her aim to prevent the execution of the Treaty between
the United States and France, in order to have for her neighbor
the latter instead of the United States, it is not difficult
to shew that she mistakes the lesser for the greater danger,
against which she wishes to provide. Admitting as she may
possibly suppose, that Louisiana as a French Colony, would
be less able as well as less disposed than the United States, to
encroach on her Southern possessions, and that it would be
too much occupied with its own safety against the United
States, to turn its force on the other side against her possessions,
still it is obvious, in the first place, that in proportion
to [as] the want of power in the French Colony would be safe
for Spain, compared with the power of the United States, the
Colony would be insufficient as a barrier against the United
States; and in the next place, that the very security which
she provides would itself be a source of the greatest of all
dangers she has to apprehend. The Collisions between the
United States and the French would lead to a contest in which
Great Britain would naturally join the former, and in which
Spain would of course be on the side of the latter; and what
becomes of Louisiana and the Spanish possessions beyond it,
in a contest between powers so marshalled? An easy and
certain victim to the fleets of Great Britain and the land armies
of this Country. A combination of these forces was always
and justly dreaded by both Spain and France. It was
the danger which led both into our revolutionary war, and
[as] much inconsistency as weakness is chargeable on the projects
of either, which tend to reunite for the purposes of war,
the power which has been divided. France returning to her
original policy, has wisely by her late Treaty with the United
States, obviated a danger which could not have been very
remote. Spain will be equally wise in following the example
and by acquiescing in an arrangement which guards against
an early danger of controversy between the United States,
first with France then with herself, and removes to a distant
day the approximation of the American and Spanish settlements,
provide in the best possible manner for the security
of the latter and for a lasting harmony with the United States.
What is it that Spain dreads? She dreads, it is presumed, the
growing power of this country, and the direction of it against
her possessions within its reach. Can she annihilate this
power? No.—Can she sensibly retard its growth? No.—
Does not common prudence then advise her, to conciliate by
every proof of friendship and confidence the good will of a
nation whose power is formidable to her; instead of yielding
to the impulses of jealousy, and adopting obnoxious precautions,
which can have no other effect than to bring on
prematurely the whole weight of the Calamity which she fears.
Reflections, such as these may perhaps enter with some
advantage into your communications with the Spanish
Government, and as far as they may be invited by favorable
occasions, you will make that use of them.

Perhaps after all this interposition of Spain it may be intended
merely to embarrass a measure which she does not hope
to defeat, in order to obtain from France or the United States
or both, concessions of some sort or other as the price of her
acquiescence. As yet no indication is given, that a resistance
by force to the execution of the Treaty is prepared or meditated.
And if it should, the provisions depending on Congress,
whose Session will commence in two days, will, it may
be presumed, be effectually adapted to such an event.