University of Virginia Library

AN EXAMINATION OF THE BRITISH DOCTRINE,
WHICH SUBJECTS TO CAPTURE
A NEUTRAL TRADE, NOT OPEN IN TIME OF PEACE.[26]

In times of peace among all nations, their commercial intercourse
is under no other restrictions than what may be imposed
by their respective laws, or their mutual compacts. No one or
more nations can justly control the commerce between any two
or more of the others.

When war happens between any two or more nations, a question
arises, in what respect it can affect the commerce of nations
not engaged in the war?

Between the nations not engaged in the war, it is evident
that the commerce cannot be affected at all by a war between
others.

As a nation not engaged in the war remains in the same relations
of amity and of commercial pursuits, with each of the
belligerent nations, as existed prior to the war, it would seem
that the war could not affect the intercourse between the neutral
and either of the belligerent nations; and that the neutral
nation might treat and trade with either, or both the belligerent
nations, with the same freedom as if no war had
arisen between them. This, as the general rule, is sufficiently
established.

But inasmuch as the trade of a neutral nation with a belligerent
nation might, in certain special cases, affect the safety of
its antagonist, usage, founded on the principal of necessity, has
admitted a few exceptions to the general rule.

Thus, all instruments of war, going into the hands of one
belligerent nation, may be intercepted, on the high seas, by
its adversary.

In like manner, a neutral trade with a place actually besieged
is liable to be interrupted by the besiegers.

It is maintained also on one side, though strongly contested
on the other, that the property of a nation at war, in a neutral
ship, may be seized and condemned by the enemy of that
nation.

To these exceptions, Great Britain has undertaken to add
another, as important as it is new. She asserts a right to intercept
the trade of neutrals with her enemies, in all cases,
where the trade, as it respects the ship, the cargo, or even the
individual port of destination, was not as free before the war,
as it is made during the war.

In applying this doctrine, the British government and courts
have not, as yet, extended it beyond the trade of neutrals on
the coasts, and with the colonies of enemies. But it is manifest,
that this limitation is founded in considerations of expediency
only; and that the doctrine is necessarily applicable

to every other branch of neutral commerce with a belligerent
nation, which was not open to the same nation in time of
peace. It might indeed with equal reason be extended farther.
It might be applied to the case of a trade legally permitted to
foreign nations in time of peace, but not actually carried on by
them in time of peace; because in time of peace actually carried
on by the nation itself; and which is taken up by foreign nations
in time of war only, in consequence of the war, which, by
increasing the risk or by finding other employment for the
vessels and seamen of the nation itself, invites neutral traders
into the deserted channels. In both cases, the neutral intervention
may be said to result from the pressure of the war;
and in both cases, the effect is the same to the belligerent;
since in both, neutrals carry on for him, a trade auxiliary to
his prosperity and his revenue, which he could no longer carry
on for himself; and which at the same time, by liberating his
naval faculties for the purposes of war, enables him to carry
on the war, with more vigor and effect. These inferences cannot
be impaired by any sound distinction, between a trade of
foreigners with colonies, and a trade of foreigners with the
ports of the mother country. Colonies, more especially when
they are altogether subject to the same authority which governs
the parent state, are integral parts of the same dominion
or empire. A trade, therefore, between a colonial port and a
port of the parent or principal State, is precisely of the same
nature with a trade between one and another port of the latter:
and a trade between a colony and a foreign port is, in like manner,
precisely the same with the trade between a foreign port
and the parent country; which is only a more considerable,
as a colony may be a less considerable, part of the same
country or empire. Previous to the late political union of
Ireland with Great Britain, the relation between those two
islands was strictly analogous to the relation between Great
Britain and the West Indies. Was any difference ever
entertained between a coasting trade from a British to a
British port, and a trade from a British to an Irish port? or
between a trade from a foreign port to an Irish port, and
a trade from a foreign to a British port? In the nature of
things, and in the eye of foreign nations, the cases were the
same. If any difference existed, it was merely circumstantial,
such as may be incident to all cases essentially the same; or
merely municipal, such as may result from those regulations of
trade, which all sovereigns have an acknowledged right to
make. It would not be unfair, therefore, in examining the
doctrine asserted by Great Britain, to view it in the whole
extent of which it is susceptible. But the latitude in which
it is avowed, and carried into operation, sufficiently demands
the serious attention of all nations; but more than any, that
of the United States, whose commerce more than any is the
victim to this belligerent pretension. To prepare the way for
this examination, several remarks are to be premised.

First.

• The general rule being, that the trade between a
  neutral and belligerent nation is as free as if the latter were
  at peace" "with all nations, and the cases in which it is not as
  free being exceptions to the general rule, the exceptions, according
  to a received maxim of interpretation, are to be
  taken strictly, against those claiming the benefit of the exceptions,
  and favorably for those claiming the benefit of the
  general rule.

Secondly.

• The exceptions being founded on a principle of
  necessity, in opposition to ordinary right, the necessity ought
  to be evident and urgent. In proportion as the necessity may
  be doubtful, and still more, in proportion as the sacrifice of
  neutral interests would exceed the advantage to the belligerent,
  the exception fails.

Thirdly.

• The progress of the law of nations, under the influence
  of science and humanity, is mitigating the evils of war,
  and diminishing the motives to it, by favoring the rights of
  those remaining at peace, rather than of those who enter into
  war. Not only are the laws of war tempered between the parties
  at war, but much also in relation to those at peace.

Repeating then, that every belligerent right to controul neutral

commerce must, as an exception to the general freedom of
commerce, be positively and strictly proved, and the more
strictly, as the exceptions are in a course of restriction rather
than extension, the question is ready for examination, whether
it be a part of the law of nations, that a trade ordinarily shut
in time of peace, and opened to neutrals in time of war, on account
of the war, is liable, as much as a trade in contraband of
war or with a blockaded port, to capture and condemnation.

It will not be overlooked, that the principle, as thus laid
down, does not extend to any of the cases, where a new trade,
though opened during a war, is not opened on account of the
war, but on considerations which would produce the same
measure, if no war existed: from which follows another important
observation, that taking into view the probable occurrence
of such considerations, the still greater probability of a mixture
of such with considerations derived from the war, the impossibility
of distinguishing the proportion of these different
ingredients in the mixture, with the evident disadvantage of
rendering more complicated, instead of simplifying, a rule
of conduct between independent nations, to be expounded
and enforced by one of the parties themselves, it would seem
to require no great effort of candor, to acknowledge the powerful
objection in practice, to such a principle, were it really
embraced by the most specious theory.

But without dwelling on this view of the subject, however
just in itself, the principle in question will be tried:

First

• by the writings most generally received as the depositaries
  and oracles of the law of nations;

Secondly

• by the evidence of treaties;

Thirdly

• by the judgment of nations, other than Great
  Britain;

Fourthly

• by the conduct of Great Britain herself;

Fifthly

• by the reasoning employed in favor of the
  principle.

First. The written authorities on this subject.

It cannot be necessary to examine the historical fragments

which have been gleaned by modern authors, as evidence of the
usage and tenets of the civilized nations of antiquity. The
great change which has taken place in the state of manners,
in the maxims of war, and in the course of commerce, make
it pretty certain, that either nothing would be found relating
to the question, or nothing sufficiently applicable, to deserve
attention in deciding it. There is but little hazard in saying,
that in none of the learned collections, is a single fact presented,
which countenances the British pretension; or even
shews, that a single ancient nation asserted or acted on it.

On a cursory review of the naval laws of Rhodes, of Oleron,
of Wisbuy, and of the Hanse Towns, they appear to be perfectly
barren of information. They are confined to subjects
within the law-merchant, taking no notice of questions between
nations; and are no further binding on particular nations,
than [as] they may be respectively adopted into their
municipal codes.

The ancient compilation under the title of Consolato del
Mare, a work of great authority with British jurists, has two
chapters which treat particularly of captures and recaptures.
They do not, however, touch any cases but those where either
the ship or the cargo, in whole or in part, might be enemy's
property; and consequently are inapplicable to the case under
examination.[27]

Descending to more modern times, the first authority which
offers itself, is the work of Albericus Gentilis.

He was the immediate precursor of Grotius, and has the
merit of preparing the way for the great work supplied by the
genius and erudition of the latter. Gentilis being so soon
eclipsed by a superior authority, is but little known beyond a
few occasional citations, which, as far as they may not coincide
with the doctrines of Grotius, are, for the most part,
superseded by them.

Grotius is not unjustly considered, as in some respects, the
father of the modern code of nations. Great, however, as his
authority deservedly may be, it yields, in a variety of instances,
to that of later jurists; who, to all the lights furnished by this
luminary, have added those derived from their own sources,
and from the improvements made in the intercourse and
happiness of nations.

On the relations between belligerent and neutral nations,
Grotius has but a single, and that a short chapter, (B. III,
Ch. 17,) with three short sections, Ch. 1, sec. 5, of the same
book with a note, and B. II, Ch. 2, sec. 10, and B. Ill, Ch. 6,
sec. 6, with a note.[28] The chapter begins with following
paragraph:

"It may seem needless for us to treat of those that are not
engaged in war, when it is manifest that the right of war cannot
affect them: but because upon occasion of war, many things are
done against them on pretence of necessity; it may be proper
here briefly to repeat what we have already mentioned[29] before,
that the necessity must be really extreme, to give any right to
another's goods: that it is requisite that the proprietor be not
himself in the like necessity. When real necessity urges us to
take, we should then take no more than what it requires; that
is, if the bare keeping of it be enough, we ought to leave the

use of it to the proprietor; and if the use be necessary, we ought
not to consume it; and if we cannot help consuming it, we ought
to return the full value of it."

Having illustrated this exemption of neutral property from
the effect of war between others, with the sole exception of cases
of extreme necessity, by a train of examples, he proceeds to lay
down the duty of neutrals towards the belligerent parties, as
follows:

"On the other side it is the duty of those who are not engaged
in the war, to sit still and do nothing that may strengthen him
that prosecutes an ill cause or to hinder the motions of him that
hath justice on his side, as we have said before. [Ch. 1, of this
B., sec. 5.] But in a dubious cause to behave themselves alike
to both parties; as in suffering them to pass through their
country, in supplying them with provisions, and in not relieving
the besieged." In illustration of the impartiality here
enjoined, a number of instances are specified in the sequel of
the chapter and the notes.

The 5th section of chapter 1, above referred to, makes up the
whole of what Grotius teaches on this branch of the subject.
As it is more definite and particular than the other extracts,
the insertion of it, though of greater length, will be proper.

[30] "Here also there uses to arise another question, what we

"may lawfully do to those who are not our enemies, nor are
"willing to be thought so, and yet supply our enemies with
"certain things. There have been formerly, and still are
"great disputes about this matter, some contending for the
"rigors [[31] of the laws] of war, and others for a freedom of
"commerce.

"But first we must distinguish between the things them"selves.
For there are some things which are of use only
"in war, as arms, &c. Some that are of no use in war, as those
"that serve only for pleasure; and lastly, there are some things
"that are useful both in peace and war, as money, provisions,
"ships, and naval stores. Concerning the first (things useful
"only in war) it is true what Amalasuintha said to the Emperor
"Justinian, he is to be reputed as siding with the enemy, who
"supplies him with things necessary for war. As to the second
"sort of things [for pleasure only, of which sort he gives
"examples from Seneca] there is no just cause of complaint.
"As to the third sort of things, that are useful at all times,
"we must distinguish the present state of the war. For if I
"cannot defend myself without interrupting those things that
"are sent to my enemy, necessity[32] (as I said before) will give

"me a good right to them, but upon condition of restitution,
"unless I have just cause to the contrary. But if the supply
"sent hinder the execution of my designs, and the sender might
"have known as much; as if I have besieged a town or blocked
"up a port, and thereupon I quickly expect a surrender, or a
"peace, that sender is obliged to make me satisfaction for the
"damage that I suffer upon his account, as much as he that
"shall take a prisoner out of custody that was committed for a
"just debt, or helps him to make his escape, in order to cheat
"me; and proportionably to my loss I may seize on his goods
"and take them as my own, for recovering what he owes me.
"If he did not actually do me any damage, but only designed
"it, then have, a right by detaining those supplies, to oblige
"him to give me security for the future, by pledges, hostages,
"or the like. But further, if the wrongs, done to me by the
"enemy, be openly unjust, and he, by those supplies, puts him
"in a condition to maintain his unjust war, then shall he not
"only be obliged to repair my loss, but also be treated as a
"criminal, as one that rescues a notorious convict out of the
"hands of justice; and in this case it shall be lawful for me
"to deal with him agreeably to his offence, according to those
"rules which we have set down for punishments; and for that
"purpose I may deprive him even of his goods."

The following extracts explain the principles of Grotius on
the cases, where the property of an enemy is found in a neutral
ship, or neutral property in a belligerent ship.

In a note to B. III, Ch. 1, sec. 5, Grotius cites the Consolato
del Mare for the doctrine that enemy's property might be taken
in neutral ships, but that the ship of an enemy did not affect
the neutral cargo, nor the cargo of an enemy, the neutral ship.
The residue of this long note recites and disapproves the attempts
of Great Britain, France and other nations, to prohibit
altogether the trade of neutrals with their enemies.

[33] B. III, Ch. 6, sec. 6: "Wherefore the common saying that
goods found in our enemies' ships are reputed theirs, is not so
to be understood, as if it were a constant and invariable law of
the right of nations; but a maxim, the sense of which amounts
only to this, that it is commonly presumed, in such a case, the
whole belongs to one and the same master; a presumption,
however, which, by evident proofs to the contrary, may be
taken off. And so it was formerly adjudged in Holland, in a
full assembly of the sovereign court during the war with the
Hanse Towns in 1338, and from thence hath passed into a law."

In a note to this section, Grotius adds:[34] "Neither do the
ships of friends become lawful prize on the account of the enemies'

goods; unless it is done by the consent of the owner of the
ship;" referring in this case to the authority of several writers,
and the practice of several nations."

The spirit of these passages, taken altogether, can leave no
doubt, as to the side on which the authority of Groyus is to be
placed.

In the first place he expressly limits the general right of war
against the property of neutrals, to cases of that evident and
extreme necessity, which must always make a law for itself
whenever it exists, but which can never be applied to the cases
falling within the belligerent claim asserted by Great Britain.

In the next place he particularly limits to the case of a necessity
of self-defence, the right of intercepting neutral supplies,
even to á blockaded or besieged place; and makes it â condition,
moreover, that a surrender of the place, or a peace, be
quickly expected as the effect of the blockade.

In the third place it is to be observed, that as in these passages,
Grotius has taken express notice of the several questions
of contraband, of blockades, and of the carriage of enemy's
property, which formed all his exceptions to the freedom of
neutral commerce; his silence with respect to the British exception
is an abundant proof, that this last had either never been
then asserted, or that he considered it so manifestly groundless
as not to merit notice.

This is, in fact, the material inference to be drawn from the
review here taken of this celebrated jurist: and for the sake of
this inference principally, the review has been made thus full
and minute; for it must be admitted, that in general his ideas
are much less precise and satisfactory than those which are to
be found in succeeding authorities. In distinguishing wars, by
their justice or injustice, on which neutrals have no right to decide;
in not distinguishing supplies, as they may be sold only
or sent; or as they may be sent by a government, or by private
persons; nor sufficiently distinguishing between the right of a
belligerent to prevent supplies by intercepting them, and the
right to do so, by punishing the offenders; he gives a proof

that his work is more to be admired for the novelty and magnitude
of the undertaking, than for the accuracy of its doctrines
and definitions.

Pufendorf, who may next be consulted, contents himself
with a simple reference to Grotius on the question—"How
they are to be dealt with, who supply the enemy with what
he wants."

In a note by Barbeyrac on this reference to Grotius, he himself
refers to a letter from Pufendorf to Groningius, as conveying
the judgment of Pufendorf with respect to the question
"whether we may hinder neutral nations from trading during
the war with the enemy." Groningius, it seems, having consulted
Pufendorf on a treatise he had planned upon "free navigation,"
received the following answer; which, having undergone
much discussion, and as found in the English translation,
seeming to glance at the British principle of intercepting a
commerce opened to neutrals in time of war, is copied at full
length, and receives an attention which would not otherwise
be bestowed on it:

"The work, sir, that you have in view, relating to the liberty
of navigation, excites my curiosity. It is a curious subject,
and what no person as yet, that I know of, has particularly
handled. I very much however fear, if I may judge from
your letter, that you will find people who will dispute your
notions. The question is, certainly, one of those which have
not yet been settled upon any clear or undeniable principles;
so far as to afford a general rule to mankind. In all the examples
brought upon this subject, there is a mixture of right
and fact. Each nation usually allows or forbids the maritime
commerce of neutral people with its enemy, either according
as it is its interest to preserve the friendship of those people,
or it finds itself strong enough to obtain from them what it
requires. For example, the English and Dutch may say, without
absurdity, that it is lawful for them to do all the ill they
can to the French, with whom they are at war; and consequently
to employ the method the most proper to weaken them, which

is to traverse and ruin their trade. They say it is not reasonable
that neutral nations should enrich themselves at their
expence; and by engrossing to themselves a commerce which
the English and Dutch want, furnish the French with money
to continue the war. This seems the rather just, because
England and Holland commonly favor the trade of neutral
nations, by suffering them to transport and sell in foreign
markets merchandizes of their own growth and manufacture.
In short, they say that they are willing to leave them the trade
they usually carry on in time of peace; but they cannot see them
take advantage of the war, to extend their commerce to the prejudice
of England and Holland. But as this matter of trade
and navigation does not so much depend upon rules founded
on a general law, as upon conventions made between particular
nations; so in order to form a solid judgment of the point
in question, we ought previously to examine what treaties subsist
between the northern crowns and England and Holland;
and whether these last powers have offered the former just
and reasonable conditions. On the other hand, nevertheless, if
the northern princes can maintain their trade with France, by
sending strong convoys with their fleets, see nothing to
blame in it, provided their vessels do not carry contraband
goods. The laws of humanity and equity between nations
do not extend so far as to require, without any apparent necessity,
that one people should give up its profit in favour of another.
But as the avarice of merchants is so great that for the
smallest gain they make no scruple of exceeding the just
bounds of commerce; so nations that are at war may certainly
visit neutral ships, and, if they find prohibited goods on
board, have a full right to confiscate them. Besides I am no
way surprised that the northern crowns have a greater regard
to the general interest of Europe, than to the complaints of
some greedy merchants who care not how matters go, provided
they can satisfy their thirst of gain. These princes
wisely judge that it is not at all convenient for them to take
precipitate measures, while other nations unite all their forces
to reduce within bounds an insolent and exorbitant power,
which threatens Europe with slavery, and the Protesant
religion with destruction. This being the interest of the
northern crowns, it is neither just nor necessary, that for a
present advantage, they should interrupt so salutary a design,
especially as they are at no expence in the affair and run no
hazard," &c.

Without knowing more of the plan of "free navigation"
espoused by Groningius, it is not easy to understand precisely
the sentiments of Pufendorf on the subject. It deserves to be
remarked, however, that, in the argument on the belligerent
side, he states not what he thought, but what they said. On the
neutral side he expresses his own opinion: "On the other
hand, nevertheless, if the northern princes can maintain their
trade by sending strong convoys with their fleets, I see nothing
to blame in it, provided their vessels do not carry
contraband goods."

But what is most material to be observed is, that the expression,
"that they (the belligerent nations) are willing to leave
them (the neutrals) the trade they usually carry on in time of
peace; but that they cannot see them take advantage of the war to
extend their commerce to the prejudice of England and Holland,"
cannot possibly refer to the British distinction between a trade
usually permitted in peace, and a trade permitted only in war.
Such a construction, by no means countenanced either by the
general tenor of the letter, or the commercial history of the
period, is absolutely precluded by the preceding sentence.
"They say, qu'il n'est pas just que les peuples neutres s'enrichissent
a leurs depens, et en attirant a eux un commerce
interrompu pour VAngleterre et la Holland, fournissent a la
France des secours, &c." The English translation of this
sentence is equivocal, if not false. The true meaning of it
is, that it was not deemed just that neutrals should enrich
themselves by entering into a commerce interrupted, for England
and Holland, by the war. The commerce in question,
therefore, was not a commerce opened to neutrals during the

war; but a commerce which England and Holland had carried
on with France previous to the war, which the war had shut
against them, and which they did not like to see transferred
to commercial competitors remaining at peace.[35]

Pufendorf, then, not derogating in this explanation of his
sentiments, from his reference to Grotius for the law of nations
concerning neutral rights and duties, but rather strengthening
the neutral rights asserted by Grotius, must be placed in the
same scale in which Grotius has been placed.

Bynkershoeck is the authority next in order of time. He
treats the subject of belligerent and neutral relations with
more attention, and explains his ideas with more precision,
than any of his predecessors.

His 9th chapter is professedly on the question,[36] "what neutrals
may or may not do, during a war between other nations."
After stating, hypothetically, an unlimited claim, on the neutral
side, to trade with belligerents, in every thing, as if there
was no war; rejecting the distinction made by Grotius between
a just and unjust war; and urging the duty of impartiality
towards those engaged in it, he proceeds to observe,[37] "that

"the enemies of our friends arc to be viewed in a two-fold char"acter;
either as our friends, or the enemies of our friends.
"If you consider them as friends, it would be lawful to aid
"them with our counsel, and to succor them with military
"forces, with arms, and with all other things whatsoever useful
"in war. But, inasmuch as they are the enemies of our
"friends, that cannot, lawfully be done by us; because we should
"in so doing, prefer one to another in the war, contrary to the
"equality of friendship, which is of primary obligation. It is
"better to preserve friendship with both, than, by favoring
"one in the war to renounce tacitly the friendship of the other.

"And, indeed, what I have just said is taught not only by
"reason, but also by the usage received among almost all na"tions.
For although the commerce with the enemy of our

"friends be free, it is agreeable to usage, as in the next chapter
"I shall shew more at large, that we should assist neither one
"nor another, with those things which may furnish and foment
"the war against our friends. It is not lawful, therefore, to
"carry to either, those things which are needful in making war;
"as are cannon, arms, and what are of principal use in war,
"soldiers; who are also excepted by various treaties between
"nations: materials for ships are also sometimes excepted,
"where an enemy is in absolute want of them for building ships
"to be employed against our friends. Provisions even, are
"often excepted, when an enemy is pressed by the siege of our
"friends, or is otherwise labouring under the want of food.
"On the best ground, therefore, are we interdicted to supply
"any of these things to belligerents; because by these things
"we should, in a manner, appear to make war ourselves on our
"friends. If, therefore, we consider belligerents, simply, in the
"light of friends, we may rightfully carry on commerce with
"them, and send them merchandises of whatever kind; if
"we consider them as the enemies of our friends, merchandizes
"are to be excepted, which, in war, might annoy our friends;
"and this consideration prevails over the former one; for in
"whatever manner we succour one against the other, we take
"part in the war, which would be incompatible with the preser"vation
of friendship.

Thus far the doctrine of this jurist cannot be mistaken. He
lays it down as a general rule, that the trade of neutrals with
the nations at war, provided it be impartial, is as if there were
no war; but that certain articles, as instruments of war, form
an exception to this general rule; to which he suggests as a
further exception, the case of a siege, or of a similar pressure
of famine. It cannot be pretended that there is either a single
general expression, or particular allusion, that can be tortured
into an exception of any trade, merely for the British reason,
that it was not open to neutrals before, as well as during, the
war.

The residue of the chapter is chiefly employed in discussing

the legality and construction of treaties of succour and subsidy,
between a nation at peace and nations at war; after which he
proceeds to the tenth chapter, in which he treats of the list of
contraband, with several questions incident to it. His doctrine
here, the same precisely as in the preceding chapter, is laid
down in the following words:[38] "The rule, confirmed almost
"invariably by treaties is, that neutrals are not to carry con"traband
articles to our enemies. If they carry them and are
"intercepted, they incur a forfeiture. But with the exception
"of these articles, they trade freely both backward and forward;
"and carry with impunity, all other articles whatever to the
"enemy."

That under the term contraband, he could mean to class so
vague and novel a description of trade, as that which distinguishes
between commercial regulations, as existing before the
war, and as made in the course of the war, is rendered the more
impossible, by the definition given of contraband:[39] "Hence
by contraband, are to be understood, things which in their
actual state are adapted to war; without considering whether
apart from war, they may also be of use; there being few instruments
of war, which may not be used for other purposes."
For this he gives as a just reason, that[40] "if you prohibit every
material out of which anything may be formed for warlike
use, great would be the catalogue of prohibited articles; since
there is scarcely any material, out of which something at least,
adapted to war may not be fabricated."

In the ensuing chapter, he treats of the case of sieges and
blockades, as an exception to the freedom of neutral character.

In the 11th chapter, he examines the question, "whether the
contraband character of a part of the cargo, can affect the residue
of the cargo or the ship;" with several other questions incident
to such mixed cases.

Chapter 13th relates to neutral property in the ships of an
enemy; which he exempts from confiscation. His position son
this subject shew how much the turn of his judgment must
have been adverse to any such restrictions on neutral commerce,
as that instituted by Great Britain.[41] "According to
reason, a right of that sort [to confiscate neutral property in a
belligerent vessel] cannot be defended; for why may I not be
allowed to use the ship of my friend, though your enemy, in
transporting my merchandize? When treaties do not prohibit,
I have a right, as I said above, to carry on commerce with your
enemy; and if this be lawful, it is also lawful to enter into any
contracts whatever with him; to buy, to sell, to let, to hire,
&c. Wherefore, if I shall have engaged his ship and his service
to transport my effects by sea, it was a transaction on every
principle lawful. You, as his enemy, may take his ship; but
with what right can you take what belongs to me, that is, to
your friend? If, indeed, I prove them to be mine; otherwise
I agree with Grotius, that there is some room for presuming
things found in the ship of an enemy, to be enemy's property."

Finally, in his 14th chapter, he treats the case of enemy's

effects in neutral vessels; deciding with Grotius and others,
that the neutrality of the ship does not protect the cargo from
capture and condemnation. He consequently makes this case
also an exception to the general freedom of neutral commerce,
in favor of belligerent privileges.

From this distinct and full view of the sentiments of Bynkershoeck,
it is clear, that the whole weight of his authority is opposed
to the principle advanced by Great Britain. He is the
first writer who seems to have entered into a critical and systematic
exposition of the law of nations, on the subject of maritime
commerce between neutral and belligerent nations; and
the plan which he adopted was well calculated to do justice to
the subject. Instead of undertaking, after the example of Grotius
and Pufendorf, an entire code of public law, he selected
for a more thorough discussion, the particular questions which
were deemed most important, and most frequent in the transactions
and intercourse of modern nations. Among these, he
very properly classed the question of neutral commerce, and
bestowed on it, the formal investigation which we have seen.
He begins with the general question, how far a war between
two nations can affect the rights, particularly the commercial
rights, of a nation at peace with both, deciding in favor of neutral
nations, that their commerce remains free as a general rule;
and in favor of belligerent nations, that in certain cases, exceptions
to that general freedom are prescribed by the principle
of self-defence. He goes on then to examine the several cases
which had been allowed or claimed, as exceptions. He establishes
the belligerent right to intercept articles on the list of
contraband. He establishes also the right to controul supplies
to places besieged or blockaded. He concurs in the doctrine,
that the flag of a friend does not protect the property of an enemy.
He discusses the claim, maintained by some, to confiscate
the property of a friend under the flag of an enemy, which
he disproves. He discusses, moreover, several other minor
questions, which were incident to the main subject. He appears,
in short, to have taken a comprehensive view of the

commercial relations between neutral and belligerent nations;
and to have omitted no question, belonging to those relations,
which was of sufficient importance to deserve his attention.
And yet, it appears, that he has not even glanced at the question,
"whether a neutral commerce, in articles not contraband,
nor going to a besieged or blockaded place, was unlawful, for
the reason that the belligerent party had been induced by the
war, to new-model its commercial regulations." Does it not
necessarily and undeniably follow, either that no such pretension
had, at that period, ever been started, or that it had received
no countenance, which could entitle it to notice? It is
impossible to conceive that a question of such magnitude could
be otherwise passed over, by a pen which dwelt with such minute
attention on questions less nearly allied to the main subject.

The authority of Bynkershoeck, in this case, ought to have
the greater weight with Great Britain, because, in other cases,
so much weight is claimed for it, by the champions of her
favorite doctrines.

The reputation which Vattel enjoys in Great Britain, greater
perhaps than he enjoys any where else, requires that he should
be particularly consulted on this subject. The work of Vattel
unquestionably possesses great merit; not so much, indeed, for
the originality of his plan, or his matter, which he admits to
have been derived from Wolf; as for the agreeable dress which
he has given to the dry treatise of his prototype, and for the
liberal spirit which has, in many instances, improved the doctrines
of all his predecessors. Vattel is, however, justly
charged with failing too much in the merit of a careful discrimination;
and sometimes with delivering maxims, which he
either could not reconcile, or does not take pains to explain. In
the chapter on neutrality (B. III, Ch. 7,) he might perhaps
have been more exact in his definitions, and more lucid in the
order of his ideas. His meaning, nevertheless, is, on the whole,
sufficiently clear, and arranges him beyond all controversy,
with Grotius, Pufendorf, and Bynkershoeck, in opposition to
the doctrine under consideration.

As the basis of the true doctrine, on the subject of neutral
commerce, he lays down these principles:

That a neutral nation is bound to an exact impartiality;

That this impartiality relates solely to the war;

That it includes two obligations: the first forbidding succours
in troops, not stipulated before the war, arms, ammunition,
or any thing of direct use in the war; the second, requiring
that in whatever does not relate to the war, one of the parties
must not be refused, on account of its present quarrel, what is
granted to the other. He observes "that this does not trespass
on the liberty of the neutral nation, in negotiations, connexions
of friendship, or its trade, to govern itself by what is most advantageous
to the State. When this consideration induces it
to preferences in things of which every one has the free disposal,
it only makes use of its right, and is not chargeable with partiality.
But to refuse any one of these things, to one of the parties,
purely as being at war with the other, and for favoring the
latter, would be departing from an exact neutrality."

Having laid this foundation, and recommended to nations,
intending, as they have a right, to remain neutral, that they
should secure their neutrality by treaties for the purpose, he
proceeds to state more particularly—

1st. "That whatever a nation does in use of its own rights,
and solely with a view to its own good, without partiality, without
a design of favoring one power to the prejudice of another,
cannot, in general, be considered as contrary to neutrality; and
becomes such, only upon, particular occasions, when it cannot
take place without injury to one of the parties, who has then
a particular right to oppose it. Thus, the besieger has a right
to prohibit access to the place besieged. Exclusively of this
kind of cases, the quarrels of another cannot deprive me of the
free disposal of my rights in the pursuit of measures which I
judge advantageous to my country." Hence he infers a right
to permit, in certain cases, levies of troops to one of the parties,
and to deny it to the other, where there may be good reason
for the distinction; and where it is the custom, as among the

Swiss, to grant levies; and, consequently, where the custom
would of itself be a proof that the grant was not the effect of
partiality in relation to the war. He asserts, in like manner,
for the sovereign, as well as private citizens, in the habit of
lending money at interest, the right to lend it to one of the
parties at war, "who may possess their confidence, without
lending it to the other;" observing, that "whilst it appears that
this nation lends out its money purposely for improving it
by interest, it is at liberty to dispose of it according to its own
discretion, and I have no reason to complain. But if the loan
be manifestly for enabling the enemy to attack me, this would
be concurring in the war against me." He applies the same
remark to the case of troops furnished to an enemy, by the
State itself, at its own expence; and of money lent without
interest: adding, at the same time, as a further instance of
neutral rights, that if a nation trades in arms, timber, ships,
military stores, &c., I cannot take it amiss that it sells such
things to my enemy, provided it does not refuse to sell them
to me also. It carries on its trade without any design of injuring
me, and in continuing it, the same as if I was not engaged
in war, that nation gives me no just cause of complaint.

Making, thus, impartiality the test of lawfulness in the conduct
of neutrals, and the mere pursuit of their own interest,
without a design to injure any of the belligerents, the test of
impartiality, he enters more particularly on the discussion of
the active trade which neutral nations carry on with those at
war.

"It is certain," he says, "that, as they [neutrals] have no part
in my quarrel, they are under no obligation to abandon their
trade that they may avoid furnishing my enemy with the
means of making war. Should they make it a point[42] not to
sell to me any of these articles, whilst they take measures for
transporting great quantities of them to my enemy, with a
manifest intention of favouring him, such a partiality would
exclude them from the neutrality they enjoyed. But if they

simply pursue their commerce[43] [suivre tout uniment leur commerce]
they do not thereby declare themselves against my interest;
they only exercise a right, which they are under no obligation
of sacrificing to me."

The general freedom of neutral commerce, being thus asserted,
the writer goes on to lay down the exceptions which
war makes to it.

"On the other hand, whenever I am at war with a nation,
both my safety and welfare prompt me to deprive it as much as
possible of every thing which may enable it to resist or hurt me.
Here the law of necessity shews its force. If this law warrants
me on occasion to seize what belongs to another, shall it not
likewise warrant me to stop every thing relative to war, which
neutral nations are carrying to my enemy? Even if I should,
by taking such measures, render all these neutral nations my
enemies, I had better run the hazard than suffer him who is actually
at war to be thus freely supplied to the great increase of
his power. It is therefore very proper and very suitable to the
law of nations which disapproves of multiplying the causes of
war, not to consider those seizures of the goods of neutral nations
as acts of hostility. When I have notified to them my
declaration of war against such or such a people, if they will
afterwards run the risk of supplying them with things relative
to war, let them not complain if their goods fall into my
hands, for I do not declare war against them, because they attempted
to carry such goods. They suffer indeed by a war in
which they have no concern, but it is accidentally. I do not

oppose their right, I only make use of my own, and if our
rights clash, and reciprocally injure each other, it flows from
the effect of inevitable necessity," &c.

"But that limits may be set to these inconveniences; that
the commerce of neutral nations may subsist in all the freedom
which the laws of war will admit, there are rules to be
observed, and on which Europe seems to be generally agreed."

What are the rules which fix these limits?

"The first is carefully to distinguish common goods which
have no relation to war, from those peculiarly subservient to it.
In the trade of the former neutral nations are to enjoy an entire
liberty, the parties at war cannot with any reason deny it, or
hinder the importation of such goods into the enemy's country,"
&c. He observes that the good she referred to, as having
relation to war, are those called contraband, of which he
gives a description; proceeding thence to shew how far they
are subject to confiscation, and to infer from the right of confiscation
the right of search on the high seas.

He next mentions, as a limit to the freedom of neutral commerce,
that the effects of an enemy found in a neutral ship are
subject to capture; deciding otherwise as to neutral effects on
board an enemy's ship, which some nations had been in the
practice of capturing.

He specifies, as his last limit or exception to the general freedom
of neutral commerce, the belligerent right to prohibit all
commerce with a place besieged or blockaded; closing the discussion
of this particular subject with an emphatic deduction in
these words—"A neutral nation continues with the two parties
at war, in the several relations which nature has placed between
nations. It is ready to perform towards them both all the duties
of humanity reciprocally due from nation to nation. It is
in every thing not directly relating to war to give them all the
assistance in its power, and of which they may stand in need.
But this assistance is to be given with impartiality, that is, in
not refusing to one of the parties any thing on account of his
being at war with the other. This does not hinder a neutral

State having particular connections of friendship and good
neighborhood with one of the parties at war, from granting
him in whatever does not relate to military transactions the preference
due to friends: much more may he without giving
offence continue to him, for instance in commerce, such indulgencies
as have been stipulated in their treaties, &c."

We see then that the authority of Vattel coincides perfectly
with the preceding authorities, more especially that of
Bynkershoeck, in establishing the general freedom of neutral
commerce, with the exception of things relating to the war,
and in limiting this exception to the several cases of supplying
the enemy with military contraband, of trading with places
besieged or blockaded, and of carrying enemy's property.

Perhaps this author, not remarkable as already intimated
for well-defined ideas, has in no particular branch of his work
left less room for mistaking or perverting his meaning.

It would be improper not to add Martens to the authorities,
who ought to be heard on this question. Martens was a professor
of law in a Hanoverian University, with a salary from
the King of Great Britain as Elector of Hanover, and has distinguished
himself by several publications, which demonstrate
his critical judgment of the law of nations, and the extent of
his researches in order to verify and elucidate it. His Summary
of this law is a work which was received by the public
with a due portion of that respect which constituted his predecessors
authentic depositaries and expositors of the code,
by which the society of nations ought to be governed. We
find him accordingly on the same shelf already with Grotius,
Pufendorf, Bynkershoeck, and Vattel. In Great Britain indeed,
notwithstanding his being a subject of her sovereign,
and a professor under his patronage, the doctrine he teaches
on the question whether free ships make free cargoes, has
drawn on him the censure of the zealous advocates for the side
taken by Great Britain on that question. In opposing, however,
a favorite doctrine of that nation, under the relation in
which he stood to it, he gave a proof of integrity and independence,

which justly inspire the greater esteem for his character,
at the same time that they give the greater weight to his
opinions. Even there, however, his censors have done justice
to his eminent talents, and been ready to avail themselves of
his authority, in cases where it supported British principles
and interests.

On the present subject the authority of Martens is clear and
full.

He first speaks of neutral commerce according to the universal
law of nations, and next of the modern law of nations with
respect to neutral commerce, and its freedom, as acknowledged
by the powers of Europe.

The first he lays down as follows: "The right that a nation
enjoys in time of peace of selling and carrying all sorts of merchandize
to every nation who chooses to trade with it, it enjoys
also in time of war, provided that it remains neuter." He admits
at the same time that necessity may authorize a power at
war to hinder the conveyance of warlike stores to its enemies, so
far as to sequester them till the end of the war, or to take them
at their full value for his own use.[44] He admits again that the
power at war may prohibit all commerce with such places "as
he is able to keep so blocked up as to prevent any foreigner
from entering." But he maintains that "since a belligerent
power cannot exercise hostilities in a neutral place, nor confiscate
property belonging to neutral subjects, such power ought
not to confiscate the goods of an enemy found in a neutral vessel
navigating on a free or neutral sea, nor neutral goods found
in the vessel of an enemy: provided, however, in both cases
that these goods are not warlike stores."

In explaining what he styles the modern law of nations with
respect to neutral commerce, and its liberty as acknowledged
by the powers of Europe, he states it "as generally acknowledged
that a neutral power ought not to transport to either
of the belligerent powers merchandizes unequivocally intended

for warlike purposes, that treaties have at some times swelled
out this list with articles not evidently and unequivocally intended
for such purposes; at others have expressly declared
these not to be contraband, and that this last ought to be presumed
to be the case between powers having no treaties on
the subject."

"With respect to merchandizes which are not contraband"
he says, "it is generally acknowledged by the powers of Europe,
that neutral powers have a right to transport them to the
enemy,[45] except it be to places blockaded, with which all commerce
is prohibited."

These two exceptions, namely contraband of war, and the
case of blockaded or besieged places, are the only ones which
he allows against the freedom of neutral commerce. For with
respect to enemy's property in neutral ships, he considers the
new principle which identifies the cargo with the vessel, and
thereby avoids the disputes and embarrassments arising from
the old principle, as having been sufficiently established to take
the place of the old one in the law of nations.

The authority of Martens, then, unequivocally and undeniably
concurs with that of his great predecessors, in deciding
that the commerce between neutral and belligerent nations,
with a very few exceptions, is entirely free, and that these exceptions
do not include any such pretension as that of Great
Britain, to prohibit a trade otherwise lawful, merely because it

might have been laid open to neutrals in consequence of the
war.

It would have been easy to add to the authorities here
selected, other respectable jurists within the same period; as
well as a phalanx of authorities of later date, both in the South
and the North of Europe; but the testimony of Grotius, of
Pufendorf, of Bynkershoeck, of Vattel, and of Martens, is more
than sufficient for the occasion. They are the luminaries and
oracles, to whom the appeal is generally made by nations, who
prefer an appeal to law, rather than to power; an appeal which
is made by no nation more readily than by Great Britain, when
she has sufficient confidence in the justice of her cause.

Two feeble objections may be thought to claim attention, on
this branch of the investigation.

First. In describing the general freedom of neutral commerce
with a nation at war, the writers who have been reviewed,
being strangers to the distinction now introduced between the
legal regulations of the latter in time of war, and those in time
of peace, have sometimes used expressions, which, though they
do not favor, do not necessarily exclude, such a distinction.
Thus Bynkershoeck, speaking of the neutral trade of the Belgians
with the French, who were at war with the Spaniards,
says that it was of right, as free as before the war.[46] The freedom
of neutral commerce is laid down, in similar phrases, by
other jurists, both before and after Bynkershoeck. Many of
the more modern writers, not apprized of the misconstruction
which might be attempted on their phraseology, have also
described the general freedom of neutral commerce in time of
war, by a reference to the freedom which it enjoyed in time of
peace.

The obvious and decisive answer to these criticisms is, that
the freedom of commerce between two nations in time of peace
does not refer to the actual footing on which it happened to be

placed by the mutual regulations of the parties, a continuance
of which would, on a subject so fluctuating as that of commerce
be often inconvenient, sometimes absurd; but to the
right which the parties have to regulate their commerce, from
time to time, as their mutual interest may suggest, or, to
adopt the language of Vattel, to the relations in which nature
has placed independent nations.

This construction is not only the most obvious and rational
in itself, but is enforced by several additional reflections.

It is most consistent, and sometimes alone consistent, with
other passages in the same authors. An example may be seen
in Bynkershoeck, Lib. I, Ch. 9, where the expressions "ut ante
bellum constabat," and "ut cum pax esset inter eos, &c.,"
are evidently meant to comprehend every right, as well as the
existing state of commerce between the neutral and belligerent
parties, previous to the war.

As there is no evidence that the distinction was known in
the dates of the elder writers, it would be absurd to suppose
them alluding to a state of things which had never existed;
rather than to a state of things which was familiar in practice.
And with respect to the more modern writers, to most of whom
the distinction appears to have been equally unknown, the
absurdity of the supposition is doubled by its inconsistency
with the whole tenor and complexion of their doctrines and
reasonings in behalf of neutral rights. Many of them are, in
fact, champions for the principles of the armed neutrality;
one of which is, that neutrals may trade freely with, and between
any of, the ports of an enemy not blockaded.

Finally—As all the writers on the general subject of neutral
commerce, discuss the several other exceptions to its rights,
which have, at any time, been claimed by belligerent nations,
it would be absurd to suppose that an exception, more extensive
than any of them, should be pretermitted. Their silence
alone, therefore, is an unanswerable proof, that the exception
now contended for, could not be known, or could not be recognized
by those writers.

A second objection may be that the practice of opening colonies
to neutral trade, had not been introduced, at the dates of
these publications, particularly the more early of them.

The fact on which this objection relies, might be disproved
by a mass of historical testimony. Two authorities will be sufficient:
the first shewing that Spain, represented as the most
rigid in her colonial monopoly, began to relax it as early as
1669, even during peace: the second, that France had adopted
the same policy, in time of war, as early as the year 1705.

The first is from Long's History of Jamaica, vol. 1, p. 598.

"In 1669, Spain, for want of ships and sailors of her own, be"gan
openly to hire Dutch shipping to sail to the Indies, though
"formerly so careful to exclude all foreigners from thence.
"And so great was the supply of Dutch manufactures to Spain,
"&c., that all the merchandize brought from the Spanish West
"Indies was not sufficient to make returns for them; so that
"the Dutch carried home the balance in money." The date of
this Spanish relaxation of the colonial monopoly was prior
to the work of Pufendorf, which was published in 1672; and
two-thirds of the century prior to that of Bynkershoeck, which
was published in 1737; and which entered so systematically
into the question of neutral rights of commerce.

The other will be found in a Note of Robinson, in his Appendix
to Vol. 4, page 17, of his Admiralty Reports. It is there
stated, with his authority for the fact, that about the year 1705,
it being then a time of war, friendly nations were admitted into
the trade of the French colonies as a better mode of supplying
their wants, and getting away their productions, than
that of convoys. It is added, that the first vessels thus introduced
having been captured, the French minister returned to
the old, as the only efficacious, expedient.

The reporter would conclude, from the capture of the neutral
vessels, that a neutral trade with colonies was then held to
be illegal. But it would be manifestly wrong to resort to an
explanation not warranted by any ideas otherwise known to
exist at that period; especially when it is so easy to suppose

that the capture was directed against the French property on
board the neutral vessels. That the property was French is
the more to be presumed, as the Dutch, the only nation whose
capital might have neutralized the property, were parties to
the war. Had they indeed been neutral, their treaties with
Great Britain would have protected the trade in their vessels,
on the two-fold ground that it was lawful to trade, without
restriction, with and between the ports of an enemy; and that
the freedom of the ship protected the cargo. The true inference
on the subject is, that the neutral carriers were Danes,
or of some other nation who had no such treaties with Great
Britain, and whose capitals did not neutralize the cargoes
of French produce.

TREATIES.[47]

All writers on the law of nations, as well didactic as polemic,
avail themselves, whenever they can, of the authority of
Treaties.

Treaties may be considered under several relations to the
law of nations, according to the several questions to be decided
by them.

They may be considered as simply repeating or affirming
the general law: they may be considered as making exceptions
to the general law, which are to be a particular law between
the parties themselves: they may be considered as explanatory
of the law of nations, on points where its meaning is otherwise
obscure or unsettled; in which case they are, first, a law
between the parties themselves, and next, a sanction to the
general law, according to the reasonableness of the explanation
and the number and character of the parties to it: lastly,

Treaties may be considered as constituting a voluntary or
positive law of nations.

Whether the stipulations in a treaty are to be considered as
an affirmance, or an exception, or an explanation, may sometimes
appear on the face of the treaty: sometimes being naked
stipulations, their character must be determined by resorting
to other evidences of the law of nations. In other words, the
question concerning the treaty must be decided by the law,
not the question concerning the law by the treaty.[48]

In the present case, it has been shewn, from the sources
generally allowed to be the most authentic, that the law of
nations is violated by the principle asserted by Great Britain.
It is a just inference, therefore, that every article in treaties
contradicting that principle, is an affirmance and direct proof
of the general law; and that any stipulation of the principle
would, as an exception to the general law, be an indirect proof
of it.

But supposing, for a moment, the present case to belong to
that class, in which the great oracles of the law of nations are
obscure, or at variance among themselves; and in which, moreover,

the practice of nations, not being uniform, is an unsatisfactory
guide; and consequently, that the evidence of treaties
were necessary in order to ascertain the law; still, it will be
found that the result of an appeal to that evidence is conclusive
against the British pretension. It may be confidently
affirmed, that on no point ever drawn into question, the
evidence of Treaties was more uniform, more extensive, or
more satisfactory.

Nay more; it may he affirmed that the treaties applicable
to this case may fairly be considered in their relation to the
law of nations last noticed; that is, as constituting a law of
themselves. If, in any case, Treaties can be sufficiently
general, sufficiently uniform, and of sufficient duration, to
attest that general and settled concurrence of nations in a principle
or rule of conduct among themselves, which amounts to
the establishment of a general law; such an effect cannot reasonably
be refused to the number and character of the treaties
which are applicable to the present case.

That Treaties may amount to a law of nations, follows from
the very definition of that law; which consists of those rules of
conduct which reason deduces, as consonant to justice and
common good, from the nature of the society existing among
independent nations; with such definitions and modifications
as may be established by general consent.

One evidence of general consent is general usage, which implies
general consent.

Can treaties which express consent be an inferior evidence,
where nothing on the face of the treaties, nor in any collateral
authority on the law of nations is found to impair the evidence?

Treaties may indeed in one point of view be considered as
a higher authority than usage, when they have a generality
and continuance, equal to the generality and continuance
which give to usage the authority of law; because all treaties
involve a usage commensurate with the sphere in which they
are obligatory. Whilst usage, therefore, implies consent;

treaties imply the usage, at the same time that they express
the consent of the parties to them.[49]

But there is another point of view in which the influence of
treaties, those at least of peace and of commerce, in modifying
and defining the rules of public law applicable to periods of
war, ought, in preference to the influence of mere practice,
to be promoted by all governments which respect justice
and humanity, and by all jurists who aspire to the authority
of commentators on that subject.

The law of nations, as derived from mere usage or practice
during those periods, is evidence for the most part by ex parte
ordinances, issued by belligerent governments, in the midst of
the passions or policy of war; and by judicial decisions, also ex
parte, and biassed more or less by the same causes, if not by
the interest also, which weighty individuals, or perhaps
bodies of individuals have, in widening the field of predatory
wealth.

Treaties are formed under very different circumstances.
Those of peace imply that the hostile passions and pursuits
have spent their force, and that a neutral spirit of liberality
and accommodation have taken their place: treaties of commerce
again are necessarily founded in principles of reciprocal
justice and interest, wholly at variance with the violent spirit
of war: whilst in the negociation of treaties of both kinds the
respective efforts and interests of the parties form those mutual
checks, require those mutual concessions, and involve those
mutual appeals to a moral standard of right, which are most
likely to make both parties converge to a just and reasonable
conclusion. Nor is a sense of character without its effect on
such occasions. Nations would not stipulate in the face of the

world things, which each of them would separately do, in pursuit
of its selfish objects.

It will accordingly be found, as might be expected, that the
violent and cruel maxims of war, those still remaining, as well
as those from time to time exploded, have had their origin
and their continuance in the separate usages of belligerent
nations, not in treaties; whilst on the other hand, it will be
found that the reformation of those abuses has been the gradual
work of treaties; that the spirit of treaties is, with few, if any
exceptions, at all times more just, more rational, and more
benevolent, than the spirit of the law derived from practice
only; and consequently, that all further meliorations of the
code of public law, are to be expected from the former, not
the latter source; and consequently, again, that all enlightened
friends to the happiness of nations ought to favor the
influence of treaties on the great code by which their intercourse
is to be regulated.

The authority of every treaty is to be considered as opposed
to the principle asserted by Great Britain, where it either
stipulates a general freedom of neutral commerce with a specification
of exceptions to it, and an omission of this British exception;
or where it stipulates not only a neutral right generally
to a free trade with belligerent nations, but particularly
a right to trade freely to and between the ports of such nations.
These stipulations, by the force of the terms, necessarily comprehend
the coasting and colonial trades, as well as other
branches of commerce.

It would be a waste of time to bestow it on the treaties of a
remote period, partaking too little of the civilization and spirit
of more modern times, to edify them by its examples. It will
be sufficient to commence this review with the treaty of Westphalia
in 1648, which forms an important epoch in the commercial
and political history of Europe, and to remark as the
result of some enquiry into antecedent treaties, that they contain
nothing which can give the least countenance to the
principle under examination.

It will be sufficient also to limit the review of treaties, where
Great Britain is not a party, to those of most importance,
either for the tenor of the stipulations, or for the particular
parties to them, with marginal references to others of analogous
import; remarking again generally, that these others are
all, either negatively or positively, authorities against Great
Britain.

As a more convenient distribution also, the first review will
stop with the epoch of the armed neutrality. The relation,
which the treaties subsequent to that event have to the subject,
will be noticed by itself.

Examples to which Great Britain is not a party.

By a treaty concerning navigation and commerce in 1650,
preceded by a particular article on the same subject concluded
in 1648, it is stipulated between the United Provinces
and Spain "that the subjects and inhabitants of the United
Provinces (and those of Spain reciprocally), may sail and trade
with all freedom and safety in all the kingdoms, States, and
countries which are or shall be in peace, amity, or neutrality,
with the State of the said United Provinces; and that they
shall not be disquieted or molested in this liberty by the ships
or subjects of the King of Spain, upon the account of hostilities
which may exist, or may happen afterwards, between the said
King of Spain and the aforesaid kingdoms, countries, and
States, or any of them that may be in amity or neutrality with
the said lords the States as above."[50]

This liberty, in relation to France, was to extend to all
sorts of merchandize which might be carried thither before she
was at war with Spain; even contraband of war,[51] not proceeding

from the States of Spain herself, and capable of being used
against the Spanish dominions.

With respect to other countries at peace with the United
Provinces, and at war with Spain, the enumerated articles of
contraband were not to be carried to them by the United Provinces,
but all articles not contraband were to be freely carried,
with the exception only of cities and places invested or
blockaded.

The Pyrenean treaty, between France and Spain in 1659,
established so close a friendship between the two nations, that
they were mutually restrained from giving either of them to
those attacking the other, any assistance in men, money, or
victuals, or with passage through his dominions. Yet it is
stipulated in Arts. X—XVI, which are reciprocal, that the
French shall have liberty to trade to all parts whatsoever,
though they should be in war with his Catholic Majesty, excepting
Portugal,[52] whilst it continued in the condition it then was
in; all merchandize may be transported to other countries in
war with Spain, as was allowed before the said war, excepting[53]
such as proceed from the Spanish dominions, and as may be
serviceable against Catholic King or his dominions, and contraband
goods. By contraband goods are understood all sorts
of arms and warlike stores; but corn and all manner of provision
and goods, not being arms and warlike stores, are not
reputed contraband, and they may be carried to places
in war with Spain, excepting to Portugal and blockaded
places. The French vessels, passing from the ports of Spain
to any port in enmity with that crown, shall not be in any way

retarded or molested, after producing their passes, specifying
their lading.[54]

It here appears, that the parties were at liberty, when neutral,
to trade to all parts of a belligerent country, not blockaded,
and in all merchandizes not contraband.

The expression "as was allowed before the said war," in this
and in the preceding examples, clearly falls within the observations
made on the like expressions, used by the writers on
the law of nations. They are merely a mode of describing
the indefinite right to trade, as if no war had arisen, and consequently
to enter into any new channels of trade which might
be opened to them.

In a treaty in 1662, between France and the United Provinces,
it is stipulated, Arts. XXVI, XXVII, &c., that the parties
reciprocally are to trade and navigate with all freedom and
safety to countries respectively at war with one and at peace
with the other, without any exceptions made by the treaty,
other than a trade in contraband, or to a place blockaded.[55]

The treaty between France and the United Provinces, Arts,
XXVII—XXIX, as incorporated with the treaty of Breda in
1667, between the latter power and England, declares that the
subjects of either party may sail and traffic in all countries at
any time, in peace with one and at war with the other, and this
transportation and traffic shall extend to all articles not contraband,
and to all places not blockaded.[56]

In a treaty in 1672, between France and Sweden, Arts.
XXIII—XXIX, are of corresponding import.[57]

A treaty in 1675, between Sweden and the United Provinces,
contains like stipulations in the three first and following
articles.[58]

A declaration made in 1676, by Spain and the United Provinces,
confirming the treaty of 1650, stipulates the right of
either party to trade with the enemy of the other, as well directly
as between enemy's ports, whether the ports belong to
the same or different enemies, contraband goods and places
blockaded being excepted.[59]

In Art. XIII, &c., of another treaty in 1678, between
France and the United Provinces, the same points are again
stipulated,[60]

The 13th Art. of another treaty in 1679, between Sweden
and the United Provinces, contains a like stipulation.[61]

So again the like stipulation is contained in Art. XIII of
another treaty in 1679, between France and the United
Provinces.[62]

In a treaty in 1701, between Denmark and the United Provinces,
the stipulations import an uninterrupted commerce of
the neutral with an enemy of the other party, with the usual
exception of contraband.[63]

The like stipulation is found in a treaty of 1716, Art. VIII,
between France and the Hanse Towns.[64]

A treaty, Art. VI, between the Emperor Charles VI, and
Philip V, of Spain, May 1, 1725, is of like import.[65]

The same is the language of a treaty in 1752, between Naples
and Holland.[66]

A treaty, Art. XVI, in 1767, between France and Hamburg,
and another between France and the Duke of Mecklenburg in
1779, maintain the same doctrine.[67]

To these authorities derived from the conventional law of
Europe, against the British principle under investigation.[68]

might be added, if it were necessary, references to other treaties
of the like tenor.

Treaties to which England first, and then Great Britain, was
a party.

By a treaty with Sweden, in 1654, and another in 1656, confirming
and explaining the former, it is stipulated, Art. II—IV,
that it shall be lawful for the subjects of either of the confederates
to trade with the enemies of the other; and, without
impediment, to carry to them, except to places blockaded or
besieged, any goods whatsoever not contraband, of which a
specification is inserted. Provision is also made for the efficacy
of passports in certain cases, and against the abuse of
them for covering enemies' property.[69]

The weight of these examples is not diminished by the name
of Cromwell, under whose authority the treaties were concluded
in behalf of England. In foreign transactions, as well
as at home, his character was distinguished by a vigor not
likely to relinquish or impair rights, in which his country,
as a warlike and maritime power, was interested.

On the other hand, it adds weight to the examples, that they
are treaties of alliance, containing mutual engagements of
friendship and assistance; and, consequently, the less apt to
indulge the parties in an intercourse with the enemies of
each other, beyond the degree required by the law of nations.
This observation is applicable to all the succeeding examples,
where the treaties are of the same kind.

On the restoration of Charles II, a treaty of alliance was concluded
with Sweden in 1661, the 11th Article of which, in pursuance
of those above copied from the treaties of 1654 and
1656, stipulates anew, that neither party shall be impeded in
carrying to the enemies of the other, any merchandize whatever,

with the exceptions only of articles of contraband, and
of ports or places besieged.[70]

In a treaty with Spain, May 13, 1667, the Articles XXI—
XXVI import, that the subjects of each shall trade freely in
all kingdoms, estates, and countries at war with the other, in all
merchandizes not contraband; with no other exception of
places but those besieged or blockaded.[71]

In July, 1667, a treaty was concluded with the United Provinces,
of which Art. III provisionally adopts certain articles
from the treaty of Breda, between the United Provinces and
France, on the subject of maritime commerce; until a fuller
treaty could be perfected between the parties. The articles
adopted, in relation to the trade between the subjects of one
of the parties and the enemies of the other, declare that the
trade shall extend, without impediment, to all articles not
contraband, and to all places not besieged or blockaded.[72]

In February, 1667–8, the same parties, then under a perpetual
defensive alliance by virtue of a treaty of 21st July,
1667, and in a league moreover with Sweden by the triple
league of 1668, resumed the subject of maritime and commercial
affairs, and repeated, in the first article of their treaty,
the precise stipulations adopted provisionally from the treaty
between France and the United Provinces.[73]

A treaty with Denmark, in 1669, stipulates, that they may
trade each with the enemies of the other, in all articles not
contraband, and to all places not blockaded, without any
other exceptions.[74]

On the 11th July, 1670, another treaty of alliance was concluded
with Denmark, the 16th Art. of which declares that
"neither of the parties shall be impeded in furnishing to the
enemies of the other any merchandizes whatever; excepting
only articles of contraband, as described in the treaty, and
ports and places besieged by the other."[75]

It is worthy of notice in this treaty, and the remark is applicable
to others, that the 5th Art. having stipulated a right
mutually to trade in the kingdoms, provinces, marts, towns,
ports, and rivers of each other, it was immediately provided
in the next article, that prohibited ports and colonies should
be excepted. If it had been conceived that such ports or colonies
of enemies were not to be traded with, under the general
right to trade with enemies acknowledged in the 16th Article,
it is manifest that they would have been as carefully excepted
in this, as in the other case, out of the meaning of general
terms equally comprehending them. This treaty proves also,
that as early as 1670, colonies began to fall under attention in
making treaties.

In a maritime treaty of December 1, 1674, with the United
Provinces, stating in the title that it was "to be observed
throughout all and every the countries and ports of the world by
sea and land," it is stipulated again, in Art. I, to be "lawful for
all and every the subjects of the most serene and mighty prince,
the King of Great Britain, with all freedom and safety to sail,
trade, and exercise any manner of traffic in all those kingdoms,
countries, and estates, which are, or any time hereafter shall be
in peace, amity, or neutrality with his said majesty; so that
they shall not be any ways hindered or molested in their navigation
or trade, by the military forces, nor by the ships of war
or any kind of vessels whatsoever, belonging either to the
High and Mighty States General of the United Netherlands,
or to their subjects, upon occasion or pretence of any hostility
or difference which now is, or shall hereafter happen between
the said Lords the States General, and any princes, or people
whatsoever, in peace, amity, or neutrality with his said majesty;"
and so reciprocally.

Art. II. "Nor shall this freedom of navigation and commerce
be infringed by occasion or cause of any war, in any
kind of merchandizes, but shall extend to all commodities
which may be carried in time of peace, those only excepted

which follow in the next article, and are comprehended under
the name of contraband."

Art. III enumerates the articles of contraband.

Art. IV contains a negative list, which, with all other articles
not expressly included in the list of contraband, may be freely
transported and carried to places under the obedience of enemies[76]
except only towns or places besieged, environed, or invested.[77]

This recital has been made the more minute, because it is
necessary, in order to understand the whole force of the explanatory
declaration between the parties bearing the same
date; a document so peculiarly important in the present discussion,
that its contents will be recited with equal exactness.

This document, after stating "that some difficulty had
arisen concerning the interpretation of certain articles, as
well in the treaty marine concluded this first day of December,
1674, as in that which was concluded the 17th February,
1667—8, between his majesty of Great Britain on the one part,
and the States General, &c., on the other part," proceeds to
state "that Sir William Temple, &c., on one part with eight
commissioners on the other, have declared, and do by these
presents declare, that the true meaning and intention of the
said articles is, and ought to be, that ships and vessels belonging
to the subjects of either of the parties, can and might, from

the time that the said articles were concluded, not only pass,
traffic and trade, from a neutral port or place, to a place in
enmity with the other party, or from a place in enmity to a
neutral place, but also from a port or place in enmity to a port
or place in enmity with the other party, whether the said places
belong to one and the same prince or State, or to several princes
or States, with whom the other party is in war. And we
declare that this is the true and genuine sense and meaning
of the said articles; pursuant whereunto we understand that
the said articles are to be observed and executed on all occasions,
on the part of his said majesty, and the said States General,
and their respective subjects; yet so that this declaration
shall not be alleged by either party for matters which happened
before the conclusion of the late peace in the month of February,
1673–4.[78]

Prior to the peace, neither of them could claim the rights
of neutrality against the other.

This declaratory stipulation has been said to be peculiarly
important. It is so for several reasons:

1st.

• Because it determines the right of the neutral party,
  so far as may depend on the belligerent party, to trade not only
  between its own ports and those of the enemies of the belligerent
  party, without any exception of colonies, but between any
  other neutral port and enemies' ports, without exception of
  colonial ports of the enemy; and moreover, not only between
  the ports colonial as well as others, of one enemy and another
  enemy, but between the different ports of the same enemy;
  and consequently between one port and another of the principal
  country; between these and the ports of its colonies; between
  the ports of one colony and another; and even to carry
  on the coasting trade of any particular colony.

2d.

• Because it fixes the meaning not only of the articles in
  the two specified treaties; but has the same effect on all other
  stipulations by Great Britain, expressed in the same or equivalent
  

  ---

  250

  
  
  
  terms; one or other of which are used in most, if not all
  her treaties on this subject.

3d.

• Because it made a part of the treaties explained, that
  free ships should make free goods; and consequently, the coasting
  and colonial trade, when combined with that neutral advantage,
  was the less likely to be acknowledged, if not considered
  as clearly belonging to the neutral party.

4th.

• Because the explanatory article was the result of the[79]
  solicitation of England herself, and she actually claimed and
  enjoyed the benefit of the article, she being at the time in
  peace, and the Dutch in war with France.[80]

In the treaty with France, February 24, 1677, Articles I, II,
and III, import that each party may trade freely with the enemies
of the other, with the same merchandize as in time of
peace, contraband goods only excepted, and that all merchandizes
not contraband "are free to be carried from any port in
neutrality, to the port of an enemy, and from one port of an
enemy to another; towns besieged, blocked up or invested,
only excepted."[81]

In 1689, England entered into the convention with Holland,
prohibiting all neutral commerce with France, then the enemy
of both.[82] In consequence of the counter treaty of Sweden
and Denmark, for defending their neutral rights against this
violent measure, satisfaction was made, according to Vattel,
for the ships taken from them; without the slightest evidence,
as far as can be traced, that any attempt was made by either
of the belligerent parties, to introduce the distinction between
such part of the trade interrupted, as might not have been
allowed before the war, and as was therefore unlawful, and

such part as having been allowed before the war, might not
lawfully be subject to capture.

We are now arrived at the treaties of Utrecht, an epoch so
important in the history of Europe, and so essentially influencing
the conventional law of nations, on the subject of
neutral commerce.

The treaty of navigation and commerce, March 31, 1713, between
Great Britain and France, Article XVII, imports, that
all the subjects of each party shall sail with their ships with all
manner of liberty and security, no distinction being made who
are the proprietors of the merchandizes laden, thereon, from
any port, to the places of those who now are, or shall hereafter
be, at enmity with the queen of Great Britain and the Christian
king, and "to trade with the same liberty and security from
the places, ports and havens of those who are enemies of both
or of either party, without any opposition or disturbance whatsoever,
not only directly from the places of the enemy aforementioned
to neutral places, but also from one place belonging
to an enemy, to another place belonging to an enemy, whether
they be under the jurisdiction of the same prince or under
several."

Art. XVIII. "This liberty of navigation and commerce,
shall extend to all kind of merchandizes, excepting those only
which follow in the next article, and which are specified by the
name of contraband."

Art. XIX gives a list of contraband, which is limited to
warlike instruments.

Art. XX specifies others, many of which are in other
treaties on the list of contraband, declaring that these with
all other goods, not in the list of contraband in the preceding
article, "may be carried and transported in the freest manner
by the subjects of both confederates, even to places belonging
to an enemy, such towns or places being only excepted
as are at that time, beseiged, blocked up round about, or
invested."[83]

Could the principle maintained against Great Britain be
more clearly laid down, or more strongly fortified by her
sanction?

To give to this example the complete effect which it ought
to have, several remarks are proper.

In the first place, on comparing the description given of the
free trade, which might be carried on between the neutral
party and an enemy of the other party, with the description
of the free trade allowed between the parties themselves,
by the 1st article of the treaty, it appears that in order to
except the colonial trade in the latter case, the freedom stipulated
in Article I, is expressly limited to Europe. The terms
are, "that there shall be a reciprocal and entirely perfect
liberty of navigation and commerce between the subjects
on each part, through all and every the kingdoms, States,
dominions of their royal majesties in Europe," In the stipulation
relating to the neutral commerce of either with the
enemy of the other (who, if a maritime enemy, could not
fail to possess colonies out of Europe), the terms are, "that
all merchandizes, not contraband, may be carried in the
freest manner to places belonging to an enemy, such towns
or places only being excepted, as are at that time besieged,
or blockaded, &c.," without any limitation to Europe, or
exception of colonies any where. It is obvious, that the
terms here used comprehend all colonies, as much as the terms
in the first article would have done, if colonies had not been
excepted by limiting the freedom, of trade to places "in
Europe;" and consequently that if any distinction between
the colonial and other places of an enemy, had been contemplated
in the neutral trade of either party with him, as it
was contemplated between the colonies and European possessions
of the parties in their commerce to be carried on between
themselves, the distinction would have been expressed in the
latter case, as it was in the former; and not being so expressed,
the trade in the latter case was to be as free to the colonies
as it would have been in the former, if the colonies

had not been excepted by the limitation of the trade to
Europe.[84]

Secondly. But the treaty not content with this necessary
construction, in favor of a neutral commerce with the colonies
of an enemy, proceeds, in conformity to the example in the
declaratory convention between England and Holland in
1674, explicitly to declare the freedom of the neutral party,
to trade not only from any port, to the places of an enemy,
and from the places of an enemy to neutral places, but also
from one place to another place belonging to an enemy, whether
the places be under the same or different sovereigns. Here
both the coasting trade and the colonial trade, which, in
relation to the parent country, is in the nature of a coasting
trade, are both placed on the same footing with every other
branch of commerce between neutral and belligerent parties,
although it must have been well known, that both those
branches are generally shut to foreigners in time of peace,
and if opened at all, would be opened in time of war, and for
the most part, on account of the war.

Thirdly. It is well known, that this particular treaty underwent
great opposition and discussion, both without and
within the British Parliament; and that it was for some time,
under a legislative negative. Yet it does not appear, either
from the public debates, or from the discussions of the press,
as far as there has been an opportunity of consulting them,
that the difficulty arose in the least from this part of the
treaty. The contest seems to have turned wholly on other
parts, and principally on the regulations of the immediate
commerce between the two nations. This part of the treaty
may be considered, therefore, as having received the complete
sanction of Great Britain. Had it indeed been otherwise,
the repeated sanctions given to it on subsequent occasions,
would preclude her from making the least use of any repugnance
shewn to it on this.

On the 28th November, 1713, a treaty of peace and another
of commerce and navigation, were concluded at Utrecht
with Spain, renewing and inserting the treaty of May 13th,
1667, the 21st and 26th Articles of which have been seen to
coincide with the rules of neutral commerce, established by
the treaty at Utrecht, between Great Britain and France.[85]

Genoa and Venice were comprehended in the treaty of
Utrecht, between Great Britain and Spain.[86]

The above treaty of 1713, was confirmed by Article XII, of
a treaty of December 3, 1715, between Great Britain and
Spain.[87]

From the above date to the treaty of 1748, at Aix la Chapelle,
the following treaties between England and other
powers took place; in each of which, the principles established
by her treaties at Utrecht, are reiterated.

With Sweden, January 21, 1720, Article XVIII.[88]

With Spain, June 13, 1721, Article II.—Confirming the
treaty of 1667 and 1713.[89]

With France and Spain, November, 9, 1729, Article, I.—
Renewing all treaties of peace, of friendship, and of commerce,
and consequently those of Utrecht.[90]

With the Emperor of Germany and the United Netherlands,
March 16, 1731, Article I.—Renewing all former treaties of
peace, friendship, and alliance.[91]

With Russia, December 2, 1734.—Stipulating in Article II,
a free trade between either party and the enemy of the other,
in all articles except munitions of war; and consequently
articles permitted after, though not permitted before, the
war.[92]

With Spain, (a convention,) January 14, 1739, Article I.—
Reiterating among former treaties, those of 1667 and 1713,
above cited.[93]

The treaty of Aix la Ohapelle concluded in 1748, forms
another memorable epoch in the political system of Europe.
The immediate parties to it were Great Britain, France, and
the United Provinces.

The 3d[94] Art. of this treaty renews and confirms, among
others, the treaties of Utrecht.[95]
This treaty was acceded to by Spain, Austria, Sardinia,
Genoa, and Modena.

In 1763,[96] in the treaty between Great Britain, France, and
Spain, to which Portugal acceded, the 1st Art. expressly renews
and confirms, among other treaties, the treaties of peace
and commerce at Utrecht.[97]

The treaty with Russia in 1766, Art. X, stipulates a free
trade between either party, being neutral, and an enemy of
the other, with the sole exception of military stores, and
places actually blockaded.[98]

In a convention with Denmark, July 4, 1780, explanatory
of a list of contraband settled in a former treaty, it is expressly
determined that merchandize not contraband, may be transported
to places in possession of enemies, without any other
exception than those beseiged or blockaded.[99]

The treaty of peace in 1783 with France, by Art. II, renews
and confirms, among others, the treaties of Westphalia in
1648, of Utrecht in 1713, of Aix la Chapelle in 1748, and of
Paris, 1763; in all of which the neutral right, now denied by
Great Britain, was formally sanctioned by her stipulations.[100]

In her treaty of the same date, with Spain, the same confirmation
is repeated.[101]

In the treaty of commerce again with France in 1786,
deliberately undertaken in pursuance of Art. XVIII, of the
treaty of 1783, the articles above recited from the treaty of
Utrecht are inserted word for word; and thus received, anew
the most deliberate and formal sanction.—Chalm., vol. 1, p.
350.

It may be here again remarked, that although this treaty
underwent the most violent opposition in Great Britain, it
does not appear that the opposition was at all directed against
the articles on the subject of neutral commerce.

The treaty of 1786 was explained and altered in several particulars,
by a convention bearing date August 31, 1787; without
any appearance of dissatisfaction, on either side, with the
articles on neutral commerce.

In the negotiations at Lisle, in 1797, it was proposed on
the part of Great Britain, by her ambassador, Lord Malmesbury,
to insert, as heretofore usual in the articles of peace, a
confirmation of the treaties of Utrecht, Aix la Chapelle, &c.,
which was opposed by the French negotiators, for reasons
foreign to the articles of those treaties in question.

On this occasion, Lord Malmesbury, in urging the proposed
insertion, observed, "that those treaties had become the law
of nations, and that if they were omitted[102] it might produce confusion."
This fact is attested by the negotiations, as published
by the British Government.[103]

If the treaties had become, or were founded in, the law
of nations, such an omission, although it might be made a
pretext for cavil between the parties, could certainly have no
effect on the law of nations; and if the treaties expressed the

law of nations on any subject at all, on what subject, it might
be asked, have they been more explicit than on that of the
maritime rights of neutrals?

This series of treaties, to which Great Britain is an immediate
party, lengthy and strong as it is, has not exhausted the
examples by which she stands self-condemned. One, in particular,
remains for consideration; which, if it stood alone,
ought forever to silence her pretensions. It is the treaty
with Russia on the 5–17 of June, 1801.

A very important part of the treaty is the preamble:

"The mutual desire of his majesty the King of the United
"Kingdoms, &c., and his majesty the Emperor of all the
"Russias, being not only to come to an understanding be"tween
themselves with respect to the differences which
"have lately interrupted the good understanding and friendly
"relations which subsist between the two States; but also
"to prevent, by frank and precise explanations upon the
"navigation of their respective subjects, the renewal of
"similar altercations and troubles which might be the con"sequence
of them; and the common object of the solicitude
"of their said majesties being to settle, as soon as can be done,
"an equitable arrangement of those differences, and an in"variable
determination of their principles upon the rights of
"neutrality, in their application to their respective monarchies,
"in order to unite more closely the ties of friendship and
"good intercourse, &c., have named for their plenipotentiaries,
"&c., who have agreed," &c.

With this declaratory preamble in view, attend to the following
sections in Article III:

"His Britannic majesty and his Imperial majesty of all the
"Russias having resolved to place under a sufficient safeguard
"the freedom of commerce and navigation of their subjects, in
"case one of them shall be at war while the other shall be
"neuter, have agreed;

"1st.

• That the ships of the neutral power may navigate
  freely to the ports and upon the coasts of the nations at war.

---

258





"2d.

• That the effects embarked on board neutral skips shall
  be free, with the exception of contraband of war and of enemy's
  property; and it is agreed not to comprize under the denomination
  of the latter, the merchandize of the produce, growth, or
  manufactures of the countries at war which should have been
  acquired by the subjects of the neutral power, and should be
  transported on their account; which merchandize cannot be excepted
  in any case from the freedom granted to the flag of the
  said power," &c., &c.

These extracts will receive additional weight from the following
considerations:

First.

• This treaty, made with Russia, the power that took
  the lead in asserting the principles of the armed neutrality, was,
  with exceptions not affecting the point in question, acceded to
  by Sweden and Denmark, the two other European powers most
  deeply interested in, and attached to, those principles. It is a
  treaty, therefore, of Great Britain, as to this particular point, as
  well as to most of the others, with Russia, Sweden, and Denmark.

Secondly.

• The treaty had for its great object, as appears by
  its adoption of so many of the definitions of the armed neutrality,
  to fix the law of nations on the several points therein, which
  had been so much contested; the three northern powers yielding
  the point of free ships, free goods; and Great Britain yielding
  to all of them, those relating to the coasting, as well as every
  other branch of neutral trade; to blockades, and to the mode
  of search; and yielding to Russia, moreover, the point relating
  to the limitation of contraband. With respect to the case of
  convoys, a case not comprehended in the armed neutrality of
  1780, but of much subsequent litigation, and inserted in that
  of 1800; a modification, satisfactory to the northern Powers,
  was yielded by Great Britain; with a joint agreement that the
  subjects on both sides should be prohibited from carrying
  contraband or prohibited goods, according to an article in the
  armed neutrality of both dates.

Thirdly.

• The treaty is expressly declared to be an invariable
  determination [fixation], of their principles upon the rights of
  

  ---

  259

  
  
  
  neutrality, in their application to their respective monarchies.

It cannot be pretended that this stipulated application of the
rights of neutrality to the contracting parties, limits the declaratory
effect, which is equally applicable to all neutral nations.
Principles and rights must be the same in all cases, and in relation
to all nations; and it would not be less absurd than it
would be dishonorable, to profess one set of principles or rights
in the law of nations towards one nation, and another set
towards another nation.

If there be any parts of the treaty, to which this declaratory
character is regarded as not applicable, it cannot be pretended
that they are the parts relating to the rights of neutrals to trade
freely to the ports and on the coasts of nations at war; because,
as already observed, the main object of the treaty was to settle
the questions involved in the armed neutrality; of which this
was a primary one, and is here placed by the structure of the article
under the same precise stipulation, with the liability to confiscation,
of enemy's property in neutral ships; a point above all
others which Great Britain must have wished to consecrate
as the law of nations, by declaratory acts for that purpose.

It cannot be pretended that the neutral rights here declared,
do not extend to the colonial as well as coasting trade of belligerent
nations, because the colonial trade is not only included
in a "free trade to the ports and on the coasts" of such nations,
but because it is expressly declared that the effects belonging
to neutrals, and transported on their account from countries
at war, cannot be excepted from the freedom of the neutral flag
in any case, and consequently not in the case of colonies, more
than any other portion of such countries. It is not improper to
remark that this declaratory stipulation is not only included in
the same article, which recognised the principle that enemy's
property is excepted from the freedom of the neutral flag, but
is associated with that recognition in the same section of the
article, and even in the same sentence.[104]

If it were possible to controvert the construction here given
to the treaty, a reference might be made to a very able speech
delivered by Lord Grenville in the British House of Lords in
November 1801, in which this very construction is fully demonstrated.
The demonstration is rendered the more striking by
the embarrassed and feeble opposition made to it by the ingenuity

of the very able speakers who entered the list against
him.[105]

Such is the accumulated and irresistible testimony borne by
Great Britain, in her own treaties, against the doctrine asserted
by her.

It will be in order now to resume the notice of treaties to
which she was not a party, but which authorize some inferences
and observations contributing still further, if possible,
to invalidate her novel pretensions.

The review heretofore taken of this class of treaties was limited

to such as preceded the armed neutrality. Those now to
be added, are principally the treaties and conventions entered
into in the years 1780 and 1800.

The treaties of 1780 declare the right of neutrals in the case
under discussion, in the following terms: "that all vessels shall
be permitted to navigate from port to port, and on the coasts
of the belligerent powers." Those of 1800 are in terms too
little varied to require recital.

It has never been questioned, that these definitions of the
neutral right were as applicable to colonies as to any other of
the territories belonging to a belligerent nation. All the British
writers have so understood the text, and in that sense, have
employed their pens against it.

It need scarcely be remarked that the treaties in question
were framed with a view, not of making a new law of nations,
but of declaring and asserting the law as it actually stood.
The preamble to the convention of 1800, for the re-establishment
of an armed neutrality between Russia and Sweden, explains
the object in the terms following: "In order that the
freedom of navigation and the security of merchandize of the
neutral powers may be established, and the principles of the law
of nations be fully ascertained, &c."

The preamble to the convention of 1780, states the principles
avowed by the parties to be the principles derived from the
primitive rights of nations."

The treaty of 1780 was originally concluded between Russia
and Denmark. But it was acceded to by Sweden, Prussia, the
United Provinces, Austria, Portugal and Naples; and in effect,
by France and Spain. The principles of the treaty had the

sanction also of the United States of America in their cruising
ordinances. Thus it is seen, that with the exception of Great
Britain alone, all the powers of Europe, materially interested
in the maritime law of nations, have given a recent and repeated
sanction to the right of neutrals to trade freely with
every part of the countries at war. And although several of
those nations have, on some of the points contained in these
treaties, as on the points of contraband and enemy's property
under neutral flags, entered since into adverse stipulations;
not one of them has by treaty or otherwise relinquished the
particular right under consideration,[106] whilst Great Britain, as
we have seen in her treaty with Russia, has herself, expressly
acceded to the right.

The importance of treaties in deciding the law of nations, or
that portion of it, which is founded in the consent of nations,
will justify the extent which has been given to this review of
them; and the conclusion which this review justifies is, that the
tenor of treaties, throughout the whole period deserving attention,
confirms the neutral right contended for; that for more
than one and a half centuries, Great Britain has, without any
other interruptions than those produced by her wars with particular
nations, been at all times bound by her treaties with the
principal maritime nations of the world, to respect this right;
and what is truly remarkable, that throughout the long period
of time, and the voluminous collection of treaties, through
which the research has been carried, a single treaty only

(putting aside the explanatory article between Great Britain
and Russia, noted above) has occurred, which forms an
exception to the general mass.

The exception will be found in an article of a Danish treaty
of June, 1691,[107] with England and Holland. In that article
(the 3d) though somewhat obscure, either from inaccuracy in
the original text, or in the printed copy, it seems that Denmark
relinquished her neutral right of commerce between
the ports of France, then at war with the other parties. But
this exception, instead of availing in any respect the belligerent
claim in question, corroborates the testimony furnished
by treaties against it; as will appear from the following
observations:

1st.

• In other parts of the treaty, there are stipulations favorable
  to Denmark, which may have been regarded as some compensation
  for the restriction imposed on herself.

2d.

• Admitting, however, the restriction to have been made
  without any compensating advantages; the sacrifice might
  fairly be ascribed to the dreadful oppressions on the Danish
  commerce, practised by England and Holland, and to the
  desire of Denmark, as a weaker power, to effect some mitigation
  of her sufferings. These sufferings cannot be better explained,
  than by an extract from the preamble to a treaty
  concluded in 1693, between Denmark and Sweden, for the
  purpose of putting in force a preconcerted plan of reprisals.
  "Although their majesties, the kings of Sweden and Denmark
  had hoped, that after they had concluded their treaty of
  March, 1691, for maintaining their navigation and commerce,
  the many unjust piracies exercised on their subjects, would
  at length have ceased; they have nevertheless been grieved
  to find that, notwithstanding the reclamations and remonstrances
  which they have from time to time made to the parties
  engaged in the war, in order that an end might be put to them,
  they have rather increased and augmented, even to a point
  

  ---

  266

  
  
  
  that it is in a manner impossible to express, the pretexts, the
  artifices, the inventions, the violences, the chicaneries, the
  processes which have been practised, not only against the
  vessels and goods of the subjects of their majesties, but also
  against their public convoys, to the prejudice of the customs
  and tolls of their majesties, to the considerable diminution of
  their duties and imports, and to the irreparable injury of their
  kingdoms and provinces, the subjects of which have suffered
  and lost infinitely, in their persons, their crews, their vessels,
  goods and merchandizes. Hence it is that their majesties
  have been obliged, &c."

  Distresses, such as are here painted, might sufficiently account
  for concessions on the part of a sufferer, without supposing
  them to flow from a deliberate or voluntary acquiescence
  in the principle on which they were founded.

3.

• But admitting the stipulation to have been both gratuitous
  and deliberate, and to form a fair exception to the general rule
  of treaties, still being but a single exception to stipulations as
  numerous and as uniform as have been brought into view, the
  exception must be considered as having all the effect in confirming
  the general rule, which can be ascribed, in any case,
  to a confirmation of that sort.

4.

• The exception is limited to a trade between one French
  port and another. It implies, therefore, and recognizes a freedom
  of trade between foreign and French ports, as well colonial
  as others.

To this ample sanction, drawn from the conventional monuments
of Europe, it will be allowable to add the testimony of
the only nation at once civilized and independent, in the American
hemisphere. The United States have, or have had, treaties
with France, Holland, Sweden, Russia, Spain, and Great
Britain.[108] In all of these, except the treaty with Great Britain,

they have positively maintained the principle that neutrals
may trade freely between neutral and belligerent ports,
and between one belligerent port and another, whether under
the same or different jurisdictions; and the treaty with Great
Britain contained not even an implication against the principle.
It merely omitted a stipulation on the subject, as it
did on many others, contained in other treaties.[109]

The Conduct of Other Nations

The evidence from this source is merely negative; but is not
on that account without a convincing effect. If the doctrine
advanced by Great Britain had been entertained by other nations,
it would have been seen in the documents, corresponding

with those which contain the British doctrine. Yet, with all
the research which could be employed, no indication has been
met with, that a single nation, besides herself, has founded on
the distinction between a trade permitted and a trade not permitted
in time of peace, a belligerent right to interrupt the
trade in time of war. The distinction can be traced neither in
their diplomatic discussions, nor their manifestoes, nor their
prize ordinances, nor their instructions to their cruizers, nor
in the decisions of their maritime courts. If the distinction
had been asserted or recognized, it could not fail to have exhibited
itself, in some or other of those documents. Having
done so in none of them, the inference cannot be contested,
that Great Britain is the only nation that has ever attempted
this momentous innovation on the law of nations.

Conduct of Great Britain

If it be not enough to have shewn, that the belligerent claim
asserted by Great Britain is condemned by all the highest authorities
on the law of nations, by the clearest testimony of
treaties among all the principal maritime nations of the world,
herself included, and by the practice of all other nations; she
cannot surely demur to the example of her own proceedings.
And it is here, perhaps, more than any where else, that the
claim ought to shrink from examination. It will be seen, in
the course of the following observations, that Great Britain is
compelled, under every appeal that can be made to herself, to
pronounce her own condemnation; and what is much worse,
that the innovation, which she endeavors to enforce as a right
of war, is under that name a mere project for extending the
field of maritime capture, and multiplying the sources of
commercial aggrandizement; a warfare, in fact, against the

commerce of her friends, and a monopolizing grasp at that of
her enemies.

1st.

• Whilst Great Britain denies to her enemies a right to
  relax their laws in favor of neutral commerce, she relaxes her
  own, those relating as well to her colonial trade, as to other
  branches.

2d.

• Whilst she denies to neutrals the right to trade with
  the colonies of her enemies, she trades herself with her enemies,
  and invites them to trade with her colonies.

1st.

• That Great Britain relaxes in time of war her trade
  laws, both with respect to her colonies and to herself, is a fact
  which need not be proved, because it is not denied. A review
  of the progress and modifications of these relaxations will be
  found in Reeves'[110] Law of Shipping and Navigation; and in the
  

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  270

  
  
  
  successive orders of the British council, admitting in time of
  war neutral vessels, as well as neutral supplies, into her West
  India colonies. It will not be improper, however, to shew,
  that in these relaxations of her peace system, she has been
  governed by the same policy of eluding the pressures of war,
  and of transferring her merchant ships and mariners from
  the pursuits of commerce to the operations of war, which she
  represents as rendering unlawful the like relaxations of her
  enemies.

The object of dispensing, in time of war, with the navigation
act, was avowed by the legislature itself, in the preamble to one
of its acts, which was passed not long after the navigation act
was adopted. The preamble recites, "And whereas by the laws
"no win force, the navigating of ships or vessels in divers cases,
"is required to be, the master and three-fourth parts of the
"mariners being English, under divers penalties and forfeitures
"therein contained: And whereas great numbers of seamen
"are employed in her majesty's service for the manning of the

"Royal Navy, so that it is become necessary, during the pres"ent
war, to dispense with the said laws, and to allow a greater
"number of foreign mariners for the carrying on of trade and
"commerce: Be it enacted, &c., that during the present war,"
&c.

Without pursuing the series of similar recitals during successive
wars, one other example of later date will be given, in
which the same object is avowed. The preamble of 13 G. 2,
Ch. 3, is in the following words: "For the better supply of
mariners and seamen to serve in his majesty's ships of war, and
on board merchant ships and other trading vessels and privateers,
and for the better carrying on the present or any future
war, and the trade of Great Britain during the continuance
thereof," &c.

The British orders of council, and proclamations of governors,
issued from time to time during war, and opening, on account
of war, the colonial trade to neutrals, in cases where it
was shut to them in times of peace, are too well known to require
particular recital or reference. Orders to that effect are

now in operation; and fully justify the position, that, as well in
the case of the colonial trade as of the trade with the parent
country, the same thing is done by Great Britain herself, which
she denies the right of doing to her enemies.

2d. That she trades with her enemies, and invites them to
trade with herself, during war, are facts equally certain and
notorious.

The efforts of Great Britain to maintain a trade at all times
with the colonies of other nations, particularly of Spain, both
in peace and in war, and both by force, and clandestinely, are
abundantly attested by her own, as well as other historians.
The two historians of Jamaica, Long and Edwards, are alone
sufficient authorities on the subject.

It has been already noticed, that, in the infancy of her beltogerent
pretension against the trade of neutrals with the colonies
of her enemies, she favored, by special licences, a trade of
her own subjects with the same colonies.

The like inconsistency might be verified by a train of examples
since the pretension was, during the war of 1793, brought
again into action. But it would be a waste of time to multiply
proofs of what is avowed and proclaimed to all the world by
her acts of parliament; particularly by the act of June 27, 1805,
"to consolidate and extend the provisions respecting the free
ports in the West Indies."

This act establishes certain free ports in Jamaica, Grenada,
Dominica, Antigua, Trinidad, Tobago, Tortola, New Providence,
Crooked Island, St. Vincent's, and Bermuda. These
ports, distributed throughout the West Indies, with a view to
the most convenient intercourse with the colonies, and settlements
of her enemies in that quarter, are laid open to all the
valuable productions thereof, and to small vessels with single
decks, belonging to, and navigated by, inhabitants of such colonies
and settlements. In like manner, the enemies of Great
Britain are allowed to export from the enumerated ports, rum,
negroes, and all goods, wares, and merchandizes, excepting naval
stores, which shall have been imported thither in British vessels.

Provision is, at the same time, made for the re-exportation,
in British vessels, of the enumerated productions imported
from the colonies and settlements of her enemies, to Great
Britain and her possessions, according to the regulations prescribed
by her navigation act.

In pursuance of the same principle exercised in her laws, we
find her entering into a treaty in time of war, which, in one of
its articles, opened a branch of colonial trade to neutrals not
open to them in time of peace, and which being to continue in
force only two years after the end of the war, may be considered
as made in effect for the war.

The 12th Article of the treaty with the United States in
1794, stipulated that American vessels not exceeding a given
size, may trade between the ports of the United States and the
British West Indies, in cases prohibited to them by the cplonial
system in times of peace. This article, it is true, was frustrated
by the refusal of the United States to ratify it; but the refusal
did not proceed from any supposed illegality of the stipulation.
On the part of Great Britain the article had a deliberate and
regular sanction; and as it would not have been a lawful stipulation,
but on the supposition that a trade not open in peace
may be opened in war, the conduct of Great Britain, in this
case also, is at variance with the rule she lays down for others.

But a most interesting view of the conduct of Great Britain
will be presented by a history of the novel principle which she
is endeavoring to interpolate into the code of public law, and
by an examination of the fallacies and inconsistencies to which
her Government and her courts have resorted, in maintaining
the principle.

It is a material fact that the principle was never asserted or
enforced by her against other nations, before the war of 1756.

That at the commencement of the preceding war of 1739, it
did not occur, even to the ingenuity of British statesmen
labouring for parliamentary topics of argument, is proven by
the debate which, on that occasion, took place in the House
of Lords.

In the course of the debate on the expediency of the war, this
particular point having fallen under consideration, the following
observations were made by Lord Hervey against the war:
"Some people may perhaps imagine that great advantages
"might be made by our intercepting the Spanish plate fleets,
"or the ships that are employed in the trade with their settle"ments
in America, because no Spanish ships can be employed
"in that trade; but even this would be precarious, and might
"in several shapes be entirely prevented; for if they should
"open that trade to the French and Dutch, it is what those two
"nations would be glad to accept of, and we could not pretend
"to make prize of a French or Dutch ship on account of her being
"bound to or from the Spanish Settlements in America,
no
"more than we could make prise of her on account of her being
"bound to or from any port in Spain. We could not so much
"as pretend to seize any treasure or goods (except contraband
"she had on board) unless we could prove that those goods
"or treasure actually belonged to the King or subjects of
"Spain. Thus the Spanish treasure and effects might safely
"be brought, &c."

Lord Bathurst in answer:

"We may do the Spaniards much, damage by privateering,
&c. If they bring their treasure home in flotas, we intercept
them by our squadrons; if in single ships our privateers take
them. They cannot bring it home either in French or Dutch
ships,[111] because by the 6th Article of the treaty of Utrecht, the

King of France is expressly obliged not to accept of any other
usage of navigation to Spain and the Spanish Indies, than what
was practised in the reign of Charles II, of Spain, or than what
shall likewise be fully given and granted at the same time to
other nations and people concerned in trade. Therefore, the
Spaniards could not lay the trade in America open to the
French, or at least the French could not accept of it; and if the
Dutch should, they would be opposed by France as well as by
us; an opposition they would not, I believe, chuse to struggle
with."[112]

Through the whole of the debate the subject is taken up, not
on the ground of a belligerent right, or of a neutral duty, but
merely on that of commercial jealousy and policy. Had the
distinction between a trade allowed in peace as well as war, and
a trade allowed in war only, been maintained by British statesmen
then, as it is maintained by them now, the same ready
answer would have been given then, as in a like discussion,
would be given now, viz: that neither France nor Holland
could enter into a trade with the Spanish colonies, because,
being a trade not open in time of peace, it could not be laid
open in time of war.

In the debates also, which took place in the House of Lords,
concerning the Spanish captures in America, and the war which
followed, several of the Lords in their speeches lay down in detail,
the cases in which belligerent nations may search, capture,
and confiscate neutral vessels in time of war; yet, although colonial
trade was the immediate subject of discussion, the distinction
now employed, seems never to have entered into the
thoughts of the speakers.

Again, in the course of this war to which France became a
party on the side of Spain in 1744, it appears that the tribunals
of Great Britain proceeded on the same principle, that the
trade of neutrals with the colonies of her enemies, though not
open in time of peace, might be a lawful trade in time of war.

For this there is the testimony of Robinson's reports, in which
it is stated, that ships taken on a voyage from the French
colonies, were released before the Lords of Appeal.[113]

We find then, that prior to the war of 1756, this belligerent
claim of attacking all neutral commerce not permitted in time
of peace, a claim so broad in its principle and so baneful in its
operation, never had a place among the multiplied pretensions
enforced by power, or suggested by avarice. At some times
nations have been seen engaged in attempts to prevent all commerce
whatever with their enemies; at others to extend the list
of contraband to the most innocent and necessary articles of
common interchange; at others to subject to condemnation
both vessel and cargo, where either the one or the other was the
property of an enemy; at others to make the hostility of the
country producing the cargo, a cause of its confiscation. But
at no time, as seems to be admitted by Sir William Scott himself,[114]
was this encroachment on the rights of neutrality devised
by any nation until the war of 1756. Then it was that
the naval resources of Great Britain augmented by her prosperous
commerce, more especially that of her then colonies,
now the United States of America, gave her an ascendancy
over all her rivals and enemies, and prompted those abuses
which raised the voice of all Europe against her.

The first effect of this overgrown power was seen in the bold
enterprise of seizing on the whole trade of France within her
grasp, in contempt of all forms of commencing hostilities, required
by the usage of nations. It was next seen in the extensive
depredations on the trade of neutrals, particularly of the
Dutch, in defiance not only of the law of nations, but of the
most explicit stipulations of treaty. The losses of that single
nation, within the first two years of the war, amounted to
several millions sterling.[115] The Dutch, by their ambassador
at London, remonstrated. The British ambassador at the

Hague was instructed to enter into explanations. Among
these it came out,[116] for the first time, that Great Britain meant,
notwithstanding the admonitions of prudence as well as of
justice, to deny the right of neutrals to carry on with her
enemies any trade beyond the precise trade usually carried
on in time of peace.

The origin of this novel principle deserves a more particular
development. The English Government had no sooner made
war on the French commerce, than the Dutch began to avail
themselves of their neutral and stipulated rights to enter into
it; particularly the commerce of the colonies, both to their own
ports, and to French ports. The English immediately made
war on this commerce, as indeed they did on the commerce to
Spain, Portugal, and other countries. The Dutch vessels were
even pillaged on the high seas, and their seamen very badly
treated. In the years 1757 and 1758 alone, the number of vessels
captured and pillaged amounted to no less than three hundred;
and the damages were estimated at eleven millions of
florins, between five and six millions of dollars. The Dutch
appealed to their treaties with England [those in 1674 and
1675] which made enemy's goods free in their ships, contraband
only excepted, and the Dutch trade free from and to the
enemy's ports, and from one enemy's port to another. The
English were driven to the pretext, that the treaty of 1674
said only that the liberty of trade should extend to all merchandizes
which were transported in time of peace, those of
contraband excepted; and was, therefore, not applicable to the
colonial trade in time of war. Besides that the time of peace,
if it had been any thing more than a mode of expressing the
entire freedom of commerce, could refer only to the kind of
merchandizes, not to the ports or channels of trade, the Dutch
were able to appeal to the declaratory treaty of 1675, which
stipulated an unlimited freedom of trade from and to ports
of enemies, without saying any thing as to times of peace.

This admitting no reply, the English found no refuge but in
the pretext, that the Dutch vessels, being engaged in the
colonial trade, were to be considered as French vessels. This
lucky thought eluded the stipulation that free ships make
free goods, as well as that which embraced the right of trade
on the coasts and with the colonies of enemies. It was alledged
also, but with little seeming reliance on such an argument,
that the commerce with the French islands was not
known in 1674, and therefore could not be comprised in that
treaty. These pretexts being very little satisfactory to the
Dutch, the Province of Holland, the chief sufferer, talked of
reprisals. The English answer is in Tindal's Cont., vol. 9,
P. 577–8. Undertaking to decide on a constitutional question
within an independent nation, they said, if the Province
of Holland, which had no authority, should fit out ships, they
would be treated as pirates; and if the States General should
do it, it would be taken as a declaration of war. Such was the
birth of this spurious principle.

Being avowed, however, on the part of the Government, it
was to be expected that it would have its effect on the courts
of admirality. As the decisions of these, during that period,
were never reported, the best knowledge of them is to be gathered
from references incidentally made to them, in the proceedings
of other British courts, and in the proceedings of the high
court of admiralty, since the reports of them have been published.
The most precise information which has been obtained
through the first channel, appears in the case of Berens vs.
Rucker, before the court of King's bench, reported in 1 Blackstone,
p. 313. This was the case of a Dutch ship which had
taken in sugars at sea, off the Island of St. Eustatius, brought
along side of her by French boats from a French island; which
ship was captured in 1758, on her return with that cargo to
Amsterdam. Lord Mansfield in pronouncing on the case in
1760, expressed himself as follows:

"This capture was certainly unjust. The pretence was that
"part of this cargo was put on board off Saint Eustatius by

"French boats from a French island. This is now a settled
"point by the lords of appeals to be the same thing as if they
"had been landed on the Dutch shore, and then put on board
"afterwards, in which case there is no color for seizure. The
"rule is, that if a neutral ship trades to a French colony with
"all the privileges of a French ship, and is thus adopted and
"naturalized, it must be looked upon as a French ship, and is
"liable to be taken—not so, if she has only French produce on
"board, without taking it at a French port, for it may be pur"chased'
of neutrals."

Here the ground of capture must be distinctly noted. It
is not that the trade, as a trade allowed in war only, was unlawful,
and thence incurred a forfeiture of both ship and
cargo; the ground and measure of forfeiture, which are now
alleged. The vessel is condemned on the ground, or presumption,
that it had, by adoption, been made the property of the
enemy; whilst the cargo is not liable to condemnation, if not
proved to be enemy's property. In other words, the vessel
is, in spite of the fact, presumed from the mere circumstance
of navigating in a French channel, to be French property; and
the cargo, although of French production, and found in a
vessel looked upon as French, is notwithstanding these considerations,
open to the presumption that it might be neutral
property.

This shews only that the Herculean principle was at that
time in its cradle; and that neither the extent of its powers, nor
the wonders which it was to be called to perform, were at first
understood. Its capacities were to be learnt and applied, as
they might be unfolded by time and occasions. At that time,
neutral vessels being admitted into new channels of French
trade by grants of special licences to the vessels, the occasion
was thought to be best answered with respect to the vessels,
by the presumption, or rather the fiction, that they were
French vessels; and with respect to the neutral cargo, as it
did not fall precisely under the presumption applied to the
vessels, it was left to escape until further time and occasions

should teach the other shapes and uses, of which the innovation
was susceptible.

These shapes and uses soon began to disclose themselves: for
it appears from the references made in the case of the Providentia,[117]
tried before Sir W. Scott in 1799, that French West
India produce, conveyed by neutrals from Monte Christi, a
Spanish neutral port, was, in the progress of the war of 1756,
condemned, on the pretext that the intervention of a neutral
port, was a fraudulent evasion of the rule which condemned the
trade with a French port; notwithstanding the previous rule of
the Lords of appeal, according to which the landing or even
trans-shipment of such produce, at a neutral port, neutralized
the trade, and made it lawful.

There is some obscurity, it must be owned, as to the principle
on which a neutral trade with the French colonies was condemned,
after the discontinuance of special licences; it being
sometimes stated in the arguments referring to that period,
that the condemnation was founded on the principle, that
the trade was virtually or adoptively, a French trade; and
sometimes, that it was founded on the general principle
that it was a trade not open in time of peace. Certain it is,
that the original principle was that of a virtual adoption, this
principle being commensurate with the original occasion;
and that, as soon as this original principle was found insufficient
to reach the new occasions, a strong tendency was seen
towards a variation of the principle, in order to bring the
new occasions within its reach.

It is remakarble that, notwithstanding the broad principle
asserted by the cabinet through its diplomatic organ at the
Hague, which interdicted to neutrals every trade not allowed
to them in time of peace, the courts of Admiralty not only
limited the principle at first, and hesitated afterwards to
extend it, in the manner which has been seen; but never
undertook to apply it to the coasting trade; though so strongly

marked as a peace monopoly, and therefore so clearly within
the range of the principle; nor does it appear, even, that the
principle was applied to the trade with the Spanish colonies,
after Spain joined in the war, notwithstanding the rigorous
monopoly under which they are known to be generally kept,
in time of peace.

It is still more important to remark, as a proof of the
inconsistency always resulting from false principles, and the
indulgence of unjustifiable views, that the English themselves,
if the Annual Register is to be believed, were acutally trading
by means of flags of truce equivalent to licences, both directly
with the French islands, and indirectly through Monte Christi,
during the very period when they were confiscating the property
of neutrals carrying on precisely the same trade, in
the same manner.

Such is the state of the question as presented during the
war of 1756. The next enquiry relates to the war of the
American Revolution, or the French war of 1778.

Here it is conceded on the British side, that the new principle
was, throughout that period, entirely suspended. On
the other side, it may be affirmed, that it was absolutely
abandoned.

One proof is drawn from the course of decisions, in the
British high court of Admiralty, by Sir James Marriott, the
predecessor of Sir Wm. Scott.

The first volume only of his decisions has yet found its way
to this country. In that are contained the cases referred to
below;[118] all of which are adjudged on the principle, that the
coasting trade, and of course every other branch of trade, not
allowed to foreigners by a nation at peace, and which may be

opened to neutral foreigners by such nation when at war, are
lawful trades.

Although some of the ships, in these cases, were Danish, and
others Dutch, and consequently within the stipulations of
treaties which have been heretofore cited; yet there is no
appearance that the Judge was guided in his decisions by that
authority; nor is it in the least probable, that they will now
be explained by a resort to it. But should such an attempt be
made, it could be of no avail; because, among the cases, there
are two, one of a Lubeck and the other of a Prussian vessel,
which could be decided by no other rule than the general
law of nations; there being no British treaty, with either
Prussia or Lubeck, applicable to the question. There is
another case, a colonial one too, decided 21st January, 1779,
in which the law of nations must of necessity have been the
sole guide. It was that of a French ship, bound from St.
Domingo to Nantz. The general cargo, as well as the vessel,
were condemned as enemies' property; reserving the question
concerning the claims of considerable value, made by two
passengers as neutrals, the one asserting himself to be a
subject of Bohemia, the other of Tuscany. The articles
claimed were ultimately condemned as enemies' property;
without the slightest allusion to the illegality of a neutral
trade between a belligerent country and its colonies; which,
if then maintained, as it is now, would at once have put
an end to the claims.

It is strictly and incontrovertibly just, then, to say, that
these decisions maintain the law of nations as asserted in
this investigation; and abandon and renounce it, as asserted
in the decisions of the same court, under its present Judge.
During the war of 1778, the Judge had no guide whatever in
prize cases, turning on this question, but the law of nations.
Neither treaties, nor acts of parliament, nor any known orders
of council, interposed any special rule controuling the operation
of that law. That law, consequently, was the sole rule
of the decisions; and these decisions, consequently, complete

evidence of the law, as then understood and maintained by
the court: and let it be repeated, that if such was the law
in the case of the coasting trade, it was equally the law as to
every other channel of trade, shut in peace, and laid open
in war.

These decisions were, indeed, made by the high court of
Admiralty, and not by the Lords Commissioners of Appeal,
the authority in the last resort, on such subjects. But this
consideration does not impeach the inference drawn from the
decisions; which having not been reversed, nor appealed from,
are fair evidence for the purpose to which they are applied.
It is impossible to account for an omission to enter appeals,
where the captors were in their own country, and must have
had the best counsel, without supposing that the appeals
afforded not the smallest chance of a more favorable decision.

But as a further and more unexceptionable proof that the
principle was abandoned, it is stated by Sir Wm. Scott himself,
that "in the case of the Verwagtig,[119] (a vessel trading between
France and Martinique during the war of 1778) and in many
other succeeding cases, the Lords of Appeal decreed payment
of freight to the neutral ship owner." This, it must be observed,
is a case of colonial trade; and a colonial trade of the
most exclusive kind in time of peace; a trade between the
colony and the parent country.

To these authorities, an explanation equally singular and
unsatisfactory is opposed. It was understood, says Sir
William Scott, that "France in opening her colonies, during
"the war [of 1778] declared that this was not done with a
"temporary view relative to the war, but on a general and
"permanent purpose of altering her colonial system, and
"of admitting foreign vessels, universally and at all times,
"to a participation of that commerce. Taking that to be
"the fact, (however suspicious its commencement might be,
"during the actual existence of the war,) there was no ground

"to say that neutrals were not carrying on a commerce, as
"ordinary as any other in which they could be engaged;
"and therefore, in the case of the Verwagtig, and many other
"succeeding cases, the lords decreed payment of freight to
"the neutral ship owner."

At what particular time, and in what particular terms, this
important declaration by France was made, is not mentioned;
nor has any such declaration been discovered by a search
which has been carried through all the French codes, and
such of the annals of the time, as were most likely to contain
it; and without some further account of this "declaration,"
or this "profession" on the part of France, as it is elsewhere
called in Rob. Reports, it is impossible to decide on the
precise character and import of it.

But supposing the fact, as it was taken to be, how account
for so unexampled an instance of blind confidence by Great
Britain, in the sincerity of an enemy, always reproached by
her with the want of sincerity; and on an occasion too, so
peculiarly suspicious, as that of a profession at the commencement
of war, calculated to disarm Great Britain of a most
precious branch of her rights of war?

If her suspension of the new principle is not to be explained
by an intentional return to the established law of nations;
and the explanation of the fact lies in the alternative between
her respect for a suspicious declaration of France, made in the
suspicious crisis of a war, more than any other charged by her
on the perfidious ambition of France; and her respect for those
prudential motives which her own situation may have suggested
for abandoning, rather than renewing, the attempt
to maintain such a principle; it will not be easy to avoid preferring
the explanation drawn from the following review of
her situation.

However bold it may have been in Great Britain to advance
and act upon the new principle in the war of 1756, it has been
seen that she went but a small part of the length of it; and
with an evident desire to make the innovation as little conspicious

and obnoxious as was consistent with her object. In
this caution she was probably influenced by a regard, not only
to the progress of opinion in Europe in favor of neutral rights;
but particularly to the King of Prussia, whose friendship she
courted, and who was known to be a patron of those rights.
His dispute with Great Britain, produced by her seizure of
Prussian vessels in the preceding war, and by his seizing
in return, the Silesian funds mortgaged to Great Britain, is
well known. The issue of this dispute has been represented
as a complete triumph of the belligerent claims of Great
Britain, over the pretensions of the neutral flag. The fact,
however, is, that she was obliged to redeem the Silesian debt
from the attachment laid on it, by paying to Prussia the sum
of 20,000 pounds sterling, as an indemnity for the prizes
made of Prussian ships.[120]

At the commencement of the war of 1778, the public opinion
had become still more enlightened and animated on the
subject of neutral rights. The maritime success of Great
Britain in the war of 1756, had alarmed, and the abuses of her
power had sharpened the feelings of every commercial nation.
Champions had started up all over Europe, maintaining with
great learning and strong reasoning, the freedom of the seas,
and the rights of the neutral flag. The principle that free
ships make free goods, more especially employed a variety
of very able pens; and had made a rapid progress. Other
principles, the offspring or auxiliaries of this, and equally
adverse to the maritime claims of Great Britain, were also
gaining partizans. In a word, that state of fermentation
in the public mind was prepared, which being nourished
by the example and the policy of France, enabled Russia,
in concert with France, to unite and arm all the maritime
nations of Europe, against the principles maintained by Great
Britain. To these discouraging circumstances in the situation
of Great Britain, it must be added, that the cause in which

she was fighting against her colonies, who had separated from
her, was unpopular; that their coalition with her enemies, weakening
her and strengthening them, had a double effect in depressing
her; and that it happened, as was to be foreseen,
that the fleets and cruisers brought against her, and the
distress to which her own West Indies were reduced by her
inability to supply their wants, made it questionable, whether
she might not lose, rather than gain, by renewing the principle
which she had formerly asserted. Early in that war, Mr.
Burke, in the House of Commons, exclaimed, "we are masters
of the sea, no farther than it pleases the house of Bourbon
to permit."

The effect of this state of things, in tempering the policy
and pretensions of Great Britain during the war of 1778, is
attested by a series of her public acts too tedious to be here
inserted, but which may be seen in Hennings' collection.

But to whatever causes, the relinquishment by Great Britain
of the new principle, is to be ascribed, the fact of the relinquishment
remains the same; and that it did not proceed
from any declaration made by France, that she had permanently
abolished her colonial monopoly, is fully demonstrated
by the following considerations.

The fact is, that such a declaration, or such an abolition by
France, however satisfactory the evidence of it might be to
the British Cabinet, could have no legal effect on the decisions
of a Court, without some notification of instruction which
is not pretended; and which is sufficiently contradicted, by
the guarded terms used by Sir William Scott in speaking
of the declaration. And that the then judge of the court, Sir
James Mariott, was not in fact influenced in his decisions,
either by the declaration of France itself, or by any instruction
of his own government founded on such a declaration, is
put beyond the possibility of doubt, not only by the want of
reference thereto in the decisions, but by an acknowledgment
made by Sir William Scott, in the case of the Emanuel
in 1799, (1 Rob., p. 253;) the case of a neutral vessel carrying

from one Spanish port to another, salt owned by the king of
Spain, then at war with Great Britain. "With respect to
authorities (says he) it has been much urged, that in three
cases, this war, the Court of Admiralty has decreed payment
of freight to vessels so employed: and I believe that such
cases did pass, under an intimation of the opinion of the
very learned person who preceded me, in which the parties
acquiesced, without resorting to the authority of a higher
tribunal." If the decisions of Sir James Mariott in the war
of 1778, had been guided by the declaration of France, and
not by the law of nations, it is evident, as that delcaration
was inapplicable to the war of 1793, and had even been falsified
on the return of peace in 1783, as stated by Sir William Scott
himself, that the opinion intimated by Sir James Mariott
with respect to cases, Spanish too, and not French cases, in the
beginning of the war of 1793, could have no other basis than the
principle, that according to the law of nations taken by itself,
the trade of neutrals on belligerent coasts was a rightful trade.

Secondly. Were it admitted that a declaration by France
had been so made and communicated, as to become a rule
binding on the admiralty court, it is clear that the rule must
have been restricted to cases of trade with the French colonies,
and could have no effect on those of a trade with Spanish or
Dutch colonies, whose governments had made no such declaration
as is attributed to France: yet it is not pretended, nor is
it known, that any distinction was made by the British courts,
between the former and latter cases. The principle in question
seems to have been equally renounced in all.[121]

Thirdly. The alleged change in the system of France was restricted
to her colonies. It is not pretended that any permanent
change was either made, or declared in the system of her
coasting trade. But the decisions of the British court above
cited, relate principally to the coasting trade. The principle
then must have been drawn, not from the alleged change of
France, but from the law of nations: and if the law of nations
authorized in the judgment of the court, a coasting trade shut
in peace and opened in war, it must have authorized, in the
same judgment, the colonial and any other trade shut in peace
and opened in war.

It is an inevitable conclusion, therefore, not only that the
trade of neutrals to belligerent coasts and colonies, was sanctioned
by the British courts, throughout the war of 1778, but
that the sanction was derived from the law of nations; and,
consequently, that the new principle, condemning such a
trade, was not merely suspended under the influence of a
particular consideration which ceased with that war, but was,
in pursuance of the true principle of the law of nations, judicially
abandoned and renounced.

Passing on to the war of 1793, it appears, however, that the
policy of the British government, yielding to the temptations
of the crisis, relapsed into the spirit and principle of her conduct
towards neutral commerce, which had been introduced,
in the war of 1756.

The French revolution which began to unfold itself in 1789,
had spread alarm through the monarchies and hierarchies of
Europe. Forgetting former animosities, and rival interests, all
the great powers on the continent were united, either in arms
or in enmity, against its principles and its examples: some of
them, doubtless were stimulated, also, by hopes of acquisition
and aggrandizement. It was not long before the British government
began to calculate the influence of such a revolution,
on her own political institutions; as well as the advantages to
which the disposition of Europe, and the difficult situation of
her ancient rival and enemy might be turned. War was, indeed,

first declared by the French government; but the British
government was, certainly, the first that wished it, and never
perhaps entered into a war against France, with greater eagerness,
or more sanguine hopes. With all Europe on her side,
against an enemy in the pangs of a revolution, no measure
seemed too bold to be tried; no success, too great to be
expected.

One of her earliest measures was accordingly that of interdicting
all neutral supplies of provisions to France, with a
view to produce submission by famine.[122]

The project, however, had little other effect, than to disgust
those most interested in neutral commerce, and least hostile
to France. This was particularly the case with the United
States, who did not fail to make the most strenuous remonstrances
against so extraordinary a proceeding. The correspondence
of their Secretary of State with the British
plenipotentiary, (Mr. Hammond), and of Mr. Pinckney the
American plenipotentiary with Lord Grenville, the British
Secretary of State, are proofs of the energy with which the
innovation was combated, and of the feebleness and fallacy
with which it was defended. The defence was rested on a
loose expression of Vattel. Bynkershoeck, who had not altogether
got rid of the ideas of the former century, and by
whom Vattel probably was misled, could have furnished a still
stronger authority.[123]

The next experiment of depredation on neutral commerce
was directed, notwithstanding the former abandonment of
the principle, and the continuance of the abandonment into the
early cases of the war[124] of 1793, against that carried on with the

possessions of France in the West Indies. This experiment
too fell with peculiar weight on the United States. For some
time the irregularities went on, without any known instructions
from the government reviving the abandoned principle; but
without the licentious excesses which followed.

As early, however, as November 6, 1793, instructions were
issued, which struck generally at the neutral commerce with
the French West Indies. That of the United States was the
principal victim. The havoc was the greater, because the instructions
being carried into operation before they were promulged,
took the commerce by surprize.

This instruction of November 6th, 1793, was addressed
to the commanders of ships of war, and to privateers
having letters of Marque against France, in the following
terms:

"That they shall stop and detain all ships laden with goods
the produce of any colony belonging to France, or carrying provisions
or other supplies for the use of any such colony, and

shall bring the same with their cargoes to legal adjudication
in our courts of admiralty."

In some respects this instruction went farther than the new
principle asserted by Great Britain; in others it fell short of
that principle.

It exceeded the principle in making the produce of a French
colony, although owned by neutrals, and going from a neutral
port where it might have been regularly naturalized, the criterion
of the trade. The principle would have extended only to
produce exported immediately from the colony, in a trade not
permitted in time of peace.

Again, the principle was not applicable to an immediate
trade from certain ports[125] and places in the colonies, authorized
by permanent regulations antecedent to the war. The instruction
extends to any colony, and consequently violates a trade
where it was permitted and customary before the war.

On the other hand it falls short of the principle, in as much—
1, as it spares articles directly exported from, though not the
produce of, the colonies—2, as it does not affect the coasting
trade of France, and other branches of French trade, laid open
in time of war, on account of the war.

With these mitigations, however, the instruction had a
sweeping operation on the neutral commerce with the French
colonies, carried on chiefly from the United States.

The resentment produced by it, and which was doubled by
the ensnaring concealment of the instruction, appeared not only
in the outcry of the suffering merchants, but in the discussions
and proceedings of the government. Important restrictions
on the commerce of Great Britain were agreed to by one branch
of the Congress, and negatived by a single vote in the other.
A sequestration of British funds and effects in the United
States was proposed and strongly supported. And an embargo
withholding supplies essential to the subsistence of
the British West Indies, actually passed into a law, and remained

in force for some time. These measures, at length,
gave way to the mission of a plenipotentiary extraordinary
to the British court, which terminated in the treaty of 1794.

The British government, in the mean time, aware of the
powerful tendency of such depredations, to drive the United
States into a commercial, if no other warfare, against her,
prudently retreated from the ground taken by this instruction,
as early as the 8th of January, 1794, when she revoked the
instruction to her cruisers, of November 6th, 1793, and subtituted
the following:

"1.

• That they shall bring in for lawful adjudication all
  vessels with their cargoes, that are loaded with goods the
  produce of the French West India Islands, and coming directly
  from any port of the said islands to any port in Europe."

"2.

• That they shall bring in for lawful adjudication, all
  ships with their cargoes, that are loaded with goods the
  produce of the said islands, the property of which goods shall
  belong to subjects of France, to whatsoever ports the same
  may be bound."

"3d.

• That they shall seize all ships that shall be found attempting
  to enter any port of the said islands that is, or shall
  be, blockaded by the arms of his majesty or his allies, and shall
  send them in with their cargoes for adjudication, according to
  the terms of the 2d article of the former instructions, bearing
  date the 8th day of June, 1793."

"4th.

• That they shall seize all vessels laden wholly or in
  part with naval or military stores, bound to any port of the
  said islands, and shall send them into some convenient port
  belonging to his majesty, in order that they, together with
  their cargoes, may be proceeded against according to the rules
  of the law of nations."

As the three last articles cannot be regarded as any relaxation
or re-modification of the instructions of November, 1793,
since they relate only to principles well known to have been
long enforced by Great Britain, as a part of the law of nations,
it is not easy to discern the motive to them. The only effect

of the articles, as an enumeration and definition of belligerent
rights, in certain branches of trade, seems to be, to beget perplexing
questions with respect to these rights, in the branches
of trade pretermitted.

The material article is the first. It varies the preceding
instructions in three respects: 1st, in substituting "the French
West India islands" for "any colony of France;" of which
there are some not islands, and others not West India islands:
2d, in limiting the seizure, to produce "coming directly" from
any port of the said islands: 3d, in the very important limitation
of the seizure, to vessels bound from those islands to any
port in Europe.

By these limitations it was, apparently, intended to take the
direct trade from the French West Indies to the United States,
out of the operation of the order of 1793: and, probably also,
the trade from the United States to the West Indies; leaving
the trade to Europe, from the French West Indies, a prey to
British cruisers. Whether it was also meant, as seems to be
implied, that the neutral trade from Europe to the French
West Indies was to be undisturbed, is a distinct question.
This question was actually raised under the ambiguity of the
instruction, and decided, not without some marks of self
distrust, by Sir Wm. Scott, in the case of a trade from France
herself to a West India colony.[126]

The explanation of this change in the instructions of the
British Government is given, by the Reporter of Sir Wm.
Scott's decisions, in the following passage extracted from the
appendix to 4 Rob., p. 4: "The relaxations that have since
[the instructions of November 6, 1793] been adopted, have
originated chiefly in the change that has taken place in the
trade of that part of the world, since the establishment of an
independent Government on the continent of America. In
consequence of that event, American vessels had been admitted
to trade in some articles, and on certain conditions,

with the colonies both of this country and of France. Such
a permission had become a part of the general commercial
arrangements, as the ordinary state of their trade in time
of peace. The commerce of America was therefore abridged
by the foregoing instructions, and debarred of the right generally
ascribed to neutral trade in time of war, that it may be
continued with particular exceptions, on the basis of its ordinary
establishment. In consequence of representations made
by the American Government, to this effect, new instructions
to our cruizers were issued, 8th January, 1794, apparently
designed to exempt American ships trading between their own
country and the colonies of France."

One remark suggested by this explanation is, that if it be
a just defence of the orders of January, 1794, it is a severe
imputation on those of November, 1793; for tne sole reason
which is stated, as requiring this revocation of the orders of
1793, was in existence at the date of those rigorous orders; and
ought, therefore, to have prevented them. Yet they were
not only not prevented, but were permitted to have a secret
and extensive operation on the American commerce. Nor
does it appear, that in any of the decisions on the captures
made within that period, conformably to the instructions, but
contrary, as is here admitted, to the law of nations, which, on
the British principle, authorized the American commerce, at
least as far as it had been actually enjoyed with the French,
in time of peace, the court ever undertook to modify the
instructions; as is alleged to have been done, in the war of
1778, in consequence of the professions of France that she
had opened her colonial ports, generally, to the permanent
trade of other nations.

The explanation calls for two other remarks. The first is,
that the instruction goes beyond the reason assigned for it.
The reason assigned is, that the trade between the United
States and the French islands had, by the permission of France,
become "the ordinary state of their trade in time of peace."
Now so far as this was the fact, the trade is expressly and

truly stated, in the explanation itself, to have been limited
to "some articles," and "on certain conditions." But the
instruction is admitted to have been designed to exempt,
without any such limitations, American ships trading between
their own country and the colonies of France.

The second remark is, that it is not a fact, that the representations
of the American Government were made to the effect
here stated; namely, that the instructions of 1793 debarred
them of the right of trading with the French colonies in time
of war, according to the ordinary state of the trade permitted to
them in time of peace. The representations of the American Government
recognized no such principle, nor included any such
complaint; as is proved by official documents[127] on the subject.

A third remark might be added. If the ordinary permissions
of France to trade with her colonies, was a good reason
for exempting the trade of the United States from the order
of November, 1793, the exemption ought to have been coextensive
with the permissions; and, consequently, to have
embraced the neutrals of Europe, who enjoyed the same permissions
as the United States; instead of being restricted to
the latter.

One is really at a loss, which most to admire, the hasty and
careless facility with which orders proceed from the Government
of a great and an enlightened nation, laying prostrate
the commerce and rights of its friends; or the defective and
preposterous explanations given of such orders, by those who
undertake to vindicate or apologize for them.

But whatever may have been the origin, or the intention of
the second orders of 1794, revoking the restraints imposed by
those of 1793, on the United States; whilst they suffered those
restraints to continue, in great part at least, on other nations;
two consequences resulted, which seem not to have been taken
sufficiently into foresight.

One of them was, that the nations of Europe, excluded from
the trade not forbidden to the United States, were not a little
soured by the distinction; and which, very possibly, may have
contributed to the revival of the sympathies which brought
about the armed neutrality of 1800.

The other was, the vast growth of the carrying trade of the
United States, which supplied all parts of Europe, with the produce
of the West Indies, and without affording to Great Britain
any of the profits of an entrepot.

The development of these consequences could not fail to
awaken the attention of the British Government, and is the
best key to the instruction which was issued January 25, 1798;
and which was extended to the possessions of Spain and Holland,
then united with France against Great Britain.

It revoked the instructions of January, 1794, reciting as the
consideration which rendered the alteration expedient, "the
present state of the commerce of Great Britain, as well as that
of neutral countries;" and in lieu thereof, the following was
issued:

"That they should bring in for lawful adjudication, all vessels
with their cargoes, that are laden with goods, the produce
of any island or settlement belonging to France, Spain, or the
United Provinces, and coming directly from any port of the
said islands or settlements, to any port in Europe, not being a

port of this kingdom, nor a port of that country, to which such
ships, being neutral ships, shall belong." The residue of the articles
merely extend to the islands and settlements of France,
Spain, and Holland, the three last articles in the instructions
of January, 1794.

The effect of this new change in the instructions was, to
sanction a direct trade from all the French islands, as well as
from those in the West Indies, and also from the French settlements
which were not islands, with a like sanction, to a like
trade, from the islands and settlements of the other enemies of
Great Britain; to extend to neutrals in Europe, the enjoyment
of this trade, with a refusal to the American States, of the
direct trade, from those islands and settlements to such European
neutrals; and finally, to permit to these States, as well as
to the neutrals of Europe, a direct trade from the hostile
islands and settlements to Great Britain herself.

The explanation attempted by the reporter, Dr. Robinson,
in his appendix to the 4th vol., p. 4–5, is, that "In consequence
of the relaxation [in 1794] of the general principle in favor of
American vessels; a similar liberty of resorting to the colonial
market, for the supply of their own consumption, was conceded
to the neutral States of Europe, a concession rendered
more reasonable by the events of war, which, by annihilating
the trade of France, Spain, and Holland, had entirely deprived
the States of Europe of the opportunity of supplying themselves
with the articles of colonial produce in those markets."

With regard to the permission to all neutrals to convey the produce
of the enemies' colonies, directly to British ports, he is silent.

From a summary, however, of the discussions which had
taken place on cases before the Lords of Appeal, as it is given
in the appendix to 4 Rob., p. 6, an explanation of this part
of the regulation, might be easily collected, if it were not otherwise
sufficiently obvious. Among the arguments used for
so construing the last order of 1798, as to justify a Danish
vessel in trading from a Spanish colony, to a neutral country,
to which the vessel did not belong; it is observed, "that, originally,

the pretension to exclude all neutrals, was uniformly applied
on the part of the belligerent; by which the effect of
reducing such settlements for want of supplies, became a
probable issue of the war; now, since the relaxations have conceded
to neutral merchants the liberty of carrying thither
cargoes of innoxious articles, and also of withdrawing the
produce of the colony, for the purpose of carrying it to their
own ports; now, to restrict them from carrying such cargoes
directly to the ports of other neutral States, becomes a rule apparently
capricious in its operation, and one, of which the
policy is not evident. From the northern nations of Europe,
no apprehensions are to be entertained of a competition injurious
to the commercial interests of our own country. To exclude
them for this mode of traffic [that is of trafficking directly
from such colonies to other neutral countries] in the produce of
the enemy's colonies, is to throw a farther advantage into the
hands of American merchants, who can, with greater ease,
import it first into their own country, and then, by re-exportation,
send it on to the neutral nations of Europe."

No other key is wanted to let us into the real policy of the
orders of 1798; which placed the neutral nations of Europe, and
the United States on the same footing, by extending the rights
of the former, and thereby abridging the advantages of the latter.
This change of "the actual state of the commerce of this
country (G. B.) as well as that of neutral countries" was expedient
for two purposes: It conciliated the Northern nations,
then perhaps listening to a revival of the armed neutrality, and
from whom "no apprehensions were to be entertained" of an
injurious competition with the commercial interests of Great
Britain; and at the same time, it so far took the advantages of
re-exportation out of the hands of the American merchants,
from whom such a competition, probably was apprehended.

But a mere adjustment of the balance between neutrals in
their advantageous trade with the enemy colonies, did not
answer all the purposes which were to be consulted. It gave
Great Britain herself, no share of the forbidden fruit. She

took at once, therefore, the determination, whilst she would
permit none of the neutral merchants of any country to
carry on this colonial trade of her enemies with another
neutral country, to authorize them all to carry it on with
herself; disguising, as well as she could, the policy of making
herself the centre and thoroughfare of so extensive a branch
of profit, under the general expediency of changing "the state
of commerce both British and neutral" as it had resulted
from her regulations of 1794; and avoiding, as much as she
could, to present to notice, the palpable inconsistency of
making herself a party to a trade with her colonial enemies,
at the very moment when she was exerting a belligerent
pretension, having no other basis, than the probable reduction
of them, by suppressing all trade whatever with them.

This subject is too important not to be a little further pursued.
Unpleasant as the task is, to trace into consequences,
so selfish and so abounding in contradictions, the use made
by Great Britain of the principle assumed by her, the development
is due to truth and to the occasion. It will have the important
effect, at the same time, of throwing further light
on the checkered scene exhibited by the admiralty jurisprudence
of Great Britain.

It must be added then, that the commercial policy for which
she employs her new belligerent principle, is the more apparent
from two subsidiary pretensions, as new, as they are at variance
with the maritime rights of neutral nations.

The object of drawing through her own warehouses and
counting-houses, the colonial trade of her enemies, on its way
from the West Indies to the other countries of Europe, being
counteracted by the extensive intercourse between the United
States and those colonies, and by the re-exportation from the
United States, of the imported surplus of colonial produce, the
project was adopted, of forcing this trade directly from the
West Indies to, and through Great Britain; 1st, by checking
the West India importations into the United States, and thereby
lessening the surplus for re-exportation; 2d, by embarrassing

the re-exportation from the United States; both
considerations seconded, no doubt, by the avidity of her cruizers
and by the public interest, supposed to be incorporated
with their success in making prizes; and the first consideration,
seconded also, perhaps, by a desire to give an indirect
check to the exportation of contraband of war from the
United States.

In order to check importations, the principle is advanced,
that the outward and the return voyage are to be regarded, as
forming but a single voyage; and consequently, if a vessel is
found with an innocent cargo on board, but on her return
from a hostile port, her outward cargo to which, was as contraband
of war subject to capture, the vessel is thereby rendered
liable to capture, and the chance for capture, by that means,
doubled.

That this principle is of modern date, can be shewn by
more than negative evidence; and from a source highly respectable.
When Sir L. Jenkins was judge of the high court of
admiralty, in the latter period of the 17th century, it was the
practice, sometimes for the king, at others for the commissioners
of appeal, to call for his official opinions in writing, on
cases depending in other courts, or diplomatically represented
to the government. These rescripts are valuable, not only
as one of the scattered and scanty materials composing the
printed stock of admiralty precedents in Great Britain; but
as the testimony of a man, who appears to have been not
undeservedly regarded as an oracle in his department
of law; and to have delivered his opinions with a candor
and rectitude, the more meritorious as he served a sovereign
who gave little encouragement to these virtues, and as
he was himself of a temper and principles sufficiently courtly.

The case of a Swedish vessel, which had conveyed enemy's
goods, having been seized on her return, with neutral goods,
was represented to the government by the Swedish Resident;
and by the Government referred to Sir L. Jenkins, the judge
of the high court of admiralty. His report is so interesting

in another respect, as well as that for which it was required,
that it shall be given in his own words:

"The question which I am (in obedience to his Majesty's
most gracious pleasure) to answer unto, being a matter of fact,
I thought it my duty not to rely wholly on my own memory
or observation, but further to inquire of Sir Robert Wiseman,
his majesty's advocate general; Sir William Turner, his
royal highness, the lord high admiral's advocate; Mr. Alexander
Check, his majesty's proctor; Mr. Roger How, principal
actuary and register in the high court of admiralty in England;
whether they, or any of them, had observed, or could call to
mind, that in the late war against the Dutch, any one ship
otherwise free, (as belonging to some of his majesty's allies,)
having carried goods belonging to his majesty's enemies,
from one enemy's port to another, and being seized (after it had
discharged the said goods) laden with the proceeds of that freight
which it had carried and received of the enemy upon the
account of the ship's owners, had been adjudged prize to his
majesty; they all unanimously resolved that they had not
observed, nor could call to mind that any such judgment or
condemnation ever passed in the said court; and to this
their testimony I must (as far as my experience reaches)
concur: and if my opinion be (as it seems to be) required, I
do not (with submission to better judgment) know any thing,
either in the statutes of this realm, or in his majesty's declarations
upon occasion of the late war, nor yet in the laws and
customs of the seas, that can (supposing the property of the
said proceed to be bona fide vested in the ship owners his majesty's
allies) give sufficient ground for a condemnation in this
case. And the said advocates (upon the debate I had with
them) did declare themselves positively of the same opinion.
Written with my hand this 6th day of February, 1667."[128]
Sir L. Jenkins' works, 2 vol., p. 741.

Here the point is clearly established, that a vessel found
with a lawful cargo, on a return voyage, cannot be affected by
the unlawfulness of the cargo immediately preceding it; and,
consequently, that an outward and return voyage, cannot be
considered as but one voyage, or the character of one as transfused
into the other.

It is true that, in this case, the cargo in question was not
contraband of war, but enemy's property. But there is no
room for a distinction in the principle applicable to the two
cases. If the two voyages in fact make one and the same
voyage in law, an outward cargo of enemy's property must
authorize capture in the returned voyage as much as an
outward cargo of contraband would authorize it. If the two
voyages do not make one and the same; the contraband of war
in one voyage, can no more affect another voyage, than enemy's
property, in one voyage, can effect another voyage.

It will not have escaped attention that, in the case stated in
the report of Jenkins, the voyage in which enemy's property

had been carried, and which it was imagined might thence have
vitiated the return voyage, was a coasting voyage from one
enemy's port to another. Yet so immaterial was that circumstance,
at that time, that it appears not even to have been taken
into his consideration, much less to have influenced his opinion.
Had it been otherwise, it would indeed have made his decision
so much the stronger against the amalgamation of two voyages,
on account of the unlawfulness of one of them: for on that supposition
the first of the two voyages would have been doubly
unlawful, as engaged both in carrying enemy's property, and
in carrying it from one enemy's port to another.

But this particular principle is not only of modern date, but
of very recent date indeed. Its history, like that of many
other belligerent innovations by Great Britain, is not unworthy
of attention.

In December, 1798, in the case of the Frederick Molke, a
Danish vessel that had got into Havre, then deemed in a state
of blockade, and was taken on her way out, August 18th, 1798,
it was urged to be like the case of a return voyage, where the
cargo of the outward voyage had been contraband. Sir William
Scott admitted that, in the latter case, "the penalty does
not attach on the returned voyage" but denied the affinity between
the cases: "there is this essential difference," said he,
"that in contraband the offence is deposited with the cargo
whilst in such a case as this, it is continued and renewed in the
subsequent conduct of the ship;"[129] the act of egress being, according
to him, as culpable as the act of ingress.

In August, 1799, in the case of the Margaretha Magdalena;
a vessel returning to Copenhagen from Batavia, her outward
cargo having consisted of contraband goods, was seized at St.
Helena, September, 1798. On the ground, however, that the
ship and cargo were neutral, and that the outward shipment
from Copenhagen was contingent and not absolutely for Batavia,
but sent under the management of the master to invest the
proceeds in the produce of Batavia, restitution was decreed by

Sir William Scott, notwithstanding the fact that the contraband
"articles were actually s.ld at Batavia," with a remark
only, that there was great reason to bring this case to adjudication,
as a case very proper for enquiry. On this occasion the
judge made the following observations: "It is certainly an
alarming circumstance in this case, that although the outward
cargo appears to have consisted of contraband goods, yet the
principal owner appears publicly at Copenhagen, and makes
oath, "that there were no prohibited goods on board, destined
to the ports of any party now at war." The master himself
describes the cargo that he carried out as naval stores, and in
looking into the invoice I find that they are there represented
as goods to be sold. That being so, I must hold that it was a
most noxious exportation, and an act of very hostile character,
to send out articles of this description to the enemy, in direct
violation of public treaties, and of the duty which the owners
owe to their own government. I should consider it as an
act that would affect the neutral in some degree on this returned
voyage, for although a ship on her return is not liable to confiscation
for having carried a cargo of contraband on her outward
voyage, yet it would be a little too much to say, that all
impression is done away; because if it appears that the owner
had sent such a cargo, under a certificate obtained on a false
oath, that there was no contraband on board, it could not but
affect his credit at least, and induce the court to look very
scrupulously into all the actions and representations of such
a person."[130]

That the judge was beginning to be a little unquiet under
the rule imposed on himself, not to consider a ship on her
return voyage as liable to confiscation for having carried a
cargo of contraband on her outward voyage, is sufficiently
visible. He is found, nevertheless, still submitting to the
restriction.

The case of the Immanuel succeeded November 7th, 1799.
It is the case of a Hamburg ship, taken 14th August, 1799, on

a voyage from Hamburg to St. Domingo, having in her voyage
touched at Bordeaux, where she sold part of her cargo, and
took a quantity of other articles for St. Domingo. The question
was started, whether the stores which had been discharged
at Bordeaux, though originally destined for St. Domingo, were
contraband or not. The inference of the judge was, that they
were not of a contraband nature, at least that they were left
ambiguous, and without any particular means remaining of
affording a certainty upon the matter. "If so," said he, "it is
useless to imagine what the effect of contraband, in such circumstances,
would have been. I shall say no more, than that
I incline to think that the discharge of the goods at Bordeaux
would have extinguished their powers of infection. It would
be an extension of this rule of infection, not justified by any
former application of it, to say, that after the contraband was
actually withdrawn, a mortal taint stuck to the goods, with
which it had once travelled, and rendered them liable to confiscation,
even after the contraband itself was out of its reach."[131]

This was not indeed a return voyage, but one link of an outward
voyage. The reason, however, given why contraband,
after being discharged, could not leave a confiscating taint on
the expedition, namely, because itself was out of the reach of
confiscation, is precisely common to the two cases; yet it would
seem that the judge is becoming not a little languid in maintaining
the opinion, "that the offence of contraband is deposited
with the cargo." He now "inclines to think that such
would be the effect."

February 5, 1800, the case of the Rosalie and Betsey, was
that of a ship taken May 31, 1799, on a voyage from the Isle
of France, asserted to be to Hamburg. It was made a question
of property, turning on a question of fraud; the fraud in the
returned voyage was held to be reinforced by the fraud in the
outward voyage; and that fraud is stated by Sir William
Scott, "as more noxious on account of the contraband nature
of several of the articles of the outward cargo."

Here contraband in an outward voyage was, in spite of the
maxim that its offence was deposited with the cargo, allowed
to have an influence on the character of the returned voyage.
Still it was but an indirect and partial influence. It was held
to be an aggravation only of the fraud, the fraud being the
gist of the offence.

In 1800, June 24, occurs the case of the Nancy, Knudson
master, a ship taken on a voyage to Copenhagen from Batavia,
whither she had carried contraband of war. The cargo appears
to have been condemned, on the ground of fraud in the papers
and destination, combined with the contraband quality of the
outward cargo. The complexion and weight, however, which
the last ingredient had assumed in the mind of the judge, are
seen in the following extract from the judgment pronounced
by him:

"But it is said, this is a past transaction, and that in case of
contraband, the returned voyage has not usually been deemed
connected with the outward. In European voyages of no great
extent, where the master goes out on one adventure, and
receives at his delivering ports, new instructions and further
orders, in consequence of advice obtained of the state of
the markets, and other contingent circumstances, that rule has
prevailed; but I do not think, in distant voyages to the East
Indies, conducted in the manner this has been, the same rule
is fit to be applied. In such a transaction, the different parts
are not to be considered as two voyages, but as one entire
transaction, formed upon one original plan, conducted by
the same persons, and under one set of instructions, ab ovo
usque ad mala."[132] This condemnation of the cargo was
confirmed by the lords of appeal, and the indulgence even
allowed with respect to the ship, by the high court of admiralty,
reversed by that superior tribunal.

The existence of contraband in an outward voyage, not
only figures more considerably in this, than in any preceding
case; but the judge gets hold of a new implement of judicial

warfare on neutral commerce. In aid of presumptive fraud,
of the alleged continuity of fraud from the outward into the
returned voyage, and of the aggravation given to fraud by the
ingredient of contraband in the outward voyage; in aid of all
these, the distance of the voyage, makes for the first time,
its appearance. In the case of the Margaretha Magdalena,
the voyage, like this, was a voyage to Batavia. In the case
of the Rosalie and Betsey, the voyage was also into the
East Indian seas. In neither of these cases, the slightest
allusion is made to that criterion of right and wrong. The
discovery then may fairly be dated with the case of the Nancy,
of no older date than June, 1800.

But mark the reason, why distant voyages to the East
Indies are distinguished from European voyages of no great
extent. It is, because in the latter the master "receives at
his delivering ports, new instructions and further orders, in
consequence of advice obtained of the state of the markets, and
other contingent circumstances;" whereas, in distant voyages
to the East Indies, conducted in the manner this has been, the
two voyages are to be considered as one entire transaction,
formed upon one original plan, conducted by the same persons,
and under one set of instructions.

If the reason here given for the distinction between distant
voyages and voyages of no great extent, be a good one, it is
not easy to see the reason for requiring, in addition to the
distance of the voyage to the East Indies, that it should be
conducted in the manner of this particular voyage; unless
indeed it be, as there is too much room to remark in the
decisions of the Judge, with a view to rest every case, as
much as possible, on its own particular circumstances; and
thereby avoid the judicial fetters formed by a chain of
definite precedents.

Certain it is, that if the outward and returned voyages are
to be taken as one, where the distance of them is such, that
new orders cannot be given, in consequence of new advices
from the foreign ports of delivery, as may be done in voyages

of no great extent; but that the whole business must be executed
under one original set of instructions; every voyage
to the East Indies, in whatever manner conducted, must fall
within the rule which determines the outward and returned
voyage to be but one voyage; in other words, that in that
extensive branch of neutral commerce, the outward and
returned voyage, making but one, contraband in the outward
cargo, though deposited at its place of destination, is to have the
same effect on the returned voyage, as it would have had on
the outward voyage, if actually intercepted on the outward
voyage.

Nay more; the rule must be applicable to every European
voyage, of great extent; an extent so great as to require that
the sale of the outward cargo at the ports of delivery, and the
purchase of a return cargo, should be provided for, in the
same original instructions.

In no view can the rule be less applicable to distant voyages
between Europe and the West Indies, than between Europe
and the East Indies; nor more to European voyages than to
American voyages to the West Indies, where these are of so
great extent as to require that the returned voyage should
be provided for in the same set of instructions with the outward
voyage.

Whether these analogies and inferences entered into the contemplation
of the Judge on this occasion, is an enquiry which
may be waived. Nor is it known to the public, whether any
intermediate steps were taken by him, or by the superior tribunal,
between that date and the 24th June, 1803, conducting the
policy or opinion of the cabinet, towards the instructions of
this last date. These form, however, a very natural result of
those preliminary ideas, as appears by the tenor of the instructions,
which is as follows:

"In consideration of the present state of commerce, we are
pleased hereby to direct the commanders of our ships of war
and privateers, not to seize any neutral vessel which shall be
carrying on trade directly between the colonies of enemies and

the neutral country to which the vessel belongs, and laden
with the property of inhabitants of such neutral country:
Provided, that such neutral vessel shall not be supplying, nor
shall have, on the outward voyage supplied, the enemy with
any articles of contraband of war; and shall not be trading
with any blockaded port."

In these instructions we find the principle formally adopted,
and the returned cargoes of West India produce actually obstructed,
on their way to the United States, by the application
of the principle, wherever the outward cargo had included contraband.
We find, of course, the West India trade so far
forced out of the channel to Europe through the United
States, into such channels to and through Great Britain, as she
may chuse to prescribe.

This being necessarily and obviously the commercial effect
of the instructions, it may fairly be supposed that it corresponds
with the intentions of a nation so clear-sighted in
whatever affects her commerce; and, consequently, that
the principle on which this instruction is founded, was assumed
as subsidiary to the commercial policy on which was
founded the main principle under investigation.

Another observation, with respect to this instruction, forces
itself upon us. It was a heavy reproach against the instruction
of November 6th, 1793, that it was not promulged until
it had for some time been ensnaring, and laying waste, the
commerce of neutral nations with the West Indies. The
instruction of June 24, 1803, first found its way (probably
by chance) to public notice in the United States, from the obscure
island of Tortola, in the summer of 1805. It must, then,
have been in the pockets of cruisers, ensnaring and destroying
the commerce of this country, as far as that degree of innovation
could have that effect, for a period of about two years
The reproach is heightened, too, by the consideration that the
snare, in this case, was successful in proportion to the respect
observed towards former instructions, the faith of which
was violated by the ex post facto operation of that in question.

A reparation of the damage is the least atonement that a just
and wise nation can wish to make, for such a trespass on all
the maxims of public morality, as well as of national honor.

The second pretension subsidiary to the commercial policy
of instructions, clothed with the language of belligerent rights,
is that of subjecting to capture, colonial produce, re-exported
from a neutral country to countries to which a direct transportation
from the colonies by vessels of the re-exporting country,
has been disallowed by British regulations. The effect of this
pretension evidently is, to check neutral nations, particularly
the United States, in the circuitous transportation of West
India produce; and in the same proportion, to force the trade
into channels terminating in British ports. And the effect is
the more particularly in her favor, as the re-exportation of
the surplus carried into her ports can be regulated by her own
laws, for her own interests; whilst she will not permit the
laws of other countries to regulate the re-exportation of the
surplus carried into their respective ports.

That this pretension, also, is as new as it is arbitrary, will be
best seen by a review of its rise and progress; which will at the
same time, as in the other instance, illustrate the inconstancy
and inconsistency of the maritime proceedings of Great Britain
toward other nations.

Prior to the war of 1756, no trace of any such pretension is
discovered; and it is testified by the authority of Lord Mansfield,
as already seen, that a principle was, during that war,
judicially settled in opposition to it. A neutral vessel, off the
neutral island of St. Eustatius, had received on board a part of
her cargo from French boats, from a French colony. "This,"
says his lordship, "is now a settled point by the lords of appeals,
to be the same thing as if they had been landed on the Dutch
shore, and then put on board afterwards; in which case there
is no color for seizure."

Here the rule was solemnly settled by the highest admiralty
tribunal in Great Britain, that the trans-shipment, off a
neutral port, of colonial goods from an enemy's vessel, protected

the goods from capture, and that where such goods
had been landed and reladen, there was not even a color for
seizure.

Notwithstanding this solemn recognition of the neutral
right, it was found, as also has been seen, that French produce
exported by neutrals from the neutral port of Monte
Christi, during the war of 1756, was not protected by the rule.

During the war of 1778, the whole claim of disturbing neutral
commerce on the ground of its not being open in peace
as well as in war, having been relinquished, the question could
not occur until the war of 1793. And what is not to pass
unnoticed, the first case in which the point fell under judicial
observation, appears to have been that of the Immanuel in
November, 1799. During the six preceding years, as may
be inferred from what then fell from the judge, no doubt had
existed, that an importation of colonial produce into a neutral
country, converted it into the commercial stock of the country,
with all the rights, especially those of exportation, incident
to the produce or manufactures of the country itself.

It will be most satisfactory to present the opinion of Sir
William Scott on that occasion, in the words of his reporter.
"It is argued that the neutral can import the manufactures of
France to his own country, and from thence directly to the
French colony; why not immediately from France, since the
same purpose is effected? It is answered, that it is effected
in a manner more consistent with the general rights of neutrals,
and less subservient to the special convenience of the enemy.
If a Hamburg merchant imports the manufactures of France
into his own country (which he will rarely do if he has like
manufactures of his own, but which in all cases he has an incontrovertible
right to do) and exports them afterwards to
the French colony, which he does not in their original French
character, but as goods which, by importation had become
part of the national stock of his own neutral country, they
come to that colony with all the inconvenience of aggravated
delay and expense; so if he imports from the colony to Hamburg,

and afterwards to France, the commodities of the
colony, they come to the mother country under a proportional
disadvantage; in short, the rule presses on the supply at
both extremities, and, therefore, if any considerations of
advantage may influence the judgment of a belligerent country
in the enforcement of the right, which upon principle it
possesses, to interfere with its enemy's colonial trade, it
is in that shape of this trade, that considerations of this nature
have their chief and most effective operation."[133]

Although the judge is somewhat guarded in his terms, more
consistent with the general rights, and less subservient to the
special convenience of the enemy; and somewhat vague, if not
obscure, in his reasoning; yet he admits that an importation
of goods from a belligerent country, into a neutral country,
had the effect of making them a part of the national stock
of the neutral country, equally entitled with the national
stock itself, to be exported to a belligerent country. What
circumstances would constitute an importation are not specified;
nor does it appear in what light a mere trans-shipment,
at a neutral port, would have been regarded.

The next occasion, on which the judge delivered an opinion
on this subject, occurred in a case before the court, February
5, 1800, and which came before it again on farther proof,
April 29, 1800. It was the case of an American ship taken
October 16, 1799, on a voyage from Marblehead to Bilboa,
with a mixed cargo of fish, sugar and cocoa. The fish, which
made the principal part of the cargo, could not enter into
the question. The sugar was part of a whole cargo brought
from the Havanna in the same ship, had been warehoused
from some time in June till some time in August, during the
repair of the ship, and was then reshipped. The cocoa, small
in quantity, was originally from a Spanish settlement, and had
been trans-shipped from another vessel, lying at Marblehead,
after having been entered at the custom-house. The ship
had been restored by the captors. The property of the cargo

was proved. The legality of the voyage was the sole question.
On this question, Sir William Scott pronounced the following
judgment:

"There remains then only the question of law, which has
been raised, whether this is not such a trade as will fall under
the principle that has been applied to the interposition of
neutrals in the colonial trade of the enemy. On which it is
said that if an American is not allowed to carry on this trade
directly, neither can it [he?] be allowed to do it circuitously.
An American has undoubtedly a right to import the produce of
the Spanish colonies for his own use; and after it is imported
bona fide into his own country, he would be at liberty to carry
them on to the general commerce of Europe: Very different
would such a case be from the Dutch cases, in which there was
an original contract from the beginning, and under a special
Dutch licence to go from Holland to Surinam, and to return
again to Holland with a cargo of colonial produce. It is not
my business to say what is universally the test of a bona fide
importation. It is argued that it would not be sufficient that
the duties should be paid, and that the cargo should be landed.
If these criteria are not to be resorted to, I should be at a loss to
know what should be the test; and I am strongly disposed to
hold, that it would be sufficient that the goods should be landed
and the duties paid. If it appears to have been landed and
warehoused for a considerable time, it does, I think, raise a
forcible presumption on that side; and it throws it on the other
party to shew how this could be merely insidious and colorable.
There is, I think, reason to believe that the sugar was a part
and parcel of a cargo said to have been brought from a Spanish
colony in this vessel; and if so, the very distribution of the
remainder is some proof that they were not brought with an
intention only of sending them on. But I have besides positive
proof in the affidavit of Mr. Asa Hooper, who swears
that the duties had been paid for them. Then the only difficulty
remains as to the cocoa, and it is said by one of the witnesses,
and by one only, that it was trans-shipped from another vessel,

and that it had been brought into America only ten days before;
but although there is something of a difficulty arising on this
small part of the cargo, yet upon the whole I cannot think it
weighty enough to induce me to send the case across the
Atlantic for still further proof, as to the facts of this recent
importation and trans-shipment, or of its having been transferred
to the present proprietors, or of having been exported
without a previous payment of import duties. If it had composed
a larger part of the cargo, I might have deemed it
reasonable to have had somewhat more of satisfaction on some
of these points, which do not appear with sufficient certainty
to found any legal conclusion against it. It appears by the
collector's certificate that it had been entered and imported, and
I think that these words are sufficient to answer the fair demands
of the court."

It must be confessed that we perceive, in this opinion of the
judge, somewhat of that customary forecast, which in tying a
knot to bind himself, avoids drawing it too close to be loosened
a little, if there should be occasion. It is, nevertheless, established
by the precedent, that the landing of the goods and paying
the duties, is a sufficient test of the importation; and that
the certificate of the collector that "they have been entered
and imported, is all the evidence of the fact, that can fairly
be demanded by the court."

It might indeed have been expected that the rule stated by
Lord Mansfield to have been settled by the lords of appeals,
[which makes the trans-shipment to be equivalent to the landing
and reshipment of goods, and this last procedure to take
away all color for seizure,] would have found its way into the
notice of the judge. That rule, however, cannot be impaired
by any thing in his decision for two reasons. One is, that the
further satisfaction, which, if the part of the cargo transshipped
had been more considerable, he might have deemed
reasonable on some of the questions; might refer not to the
legality of the voyage, but to the question of property; and it
is certainly agreeable to all the just rules of interpretation so

to understand it, rather than to suppose a purpose in an inferior
court, to decide in direct opposition to a rule settled
by the superior court. The other reason is still more conclusive;
it is, that on the supposition of such a purpose in an
inferior court, it could have no legal effect in controuling the
rule settled by the superior court, the rule by which alone the
conduct of individuals could be governed.

Such has been the judicial exposition of the neutral right,
even under the British restrictions. The acknowledgment by
the cabinet itself, was officially disclosed on the following occasion,
and to the following effect:

The cruisers of Great Britain having seized, and the vice
admiralty courts having condemned, American vessels bound
from the United States to the Spanish West Indies, on the
pretext that their cargoes consisted of articles the growth of
Spain, then at war with Great Britain; the American Minister
in London, in March, 1801, represented to the British Government
the iniquity of the proceeding, with the indignation
which it inspired: and required that precise instructions
should be dispatched to the proper officers in the West Indies
and Nova Scotia, to put an end to the depredations. The subject
was referred to the king's advocate general, an extract
from whose report was communicated by the British Secretary
of State to the American minister, with information that
the king had ordered the doctrine laid down in the report, to
be immediately transmitted to the several inferior judges,
as the law for their future guidance and direction.

The extract containing this doctrine shall be literally
recited:

"I have the honor to report, that the sentence of the vice admiralty
court appears to be erroneous, and to be founded in a
misapprehension or misapplication of the principles laid down
in the decision of the court of admiralty referred to, without
attending to the limitations therein contained.

"The general principle respecting the colonial trade has in
the course of the present war been to a certain degree relaxed

in consideration of the present state of commerce. It is now
distinctly understood, and has been repeatedly so decided by
the high court of appeals, that the produce of the colonies of
the enemy may be imported by a neutral into his own country,
and may be re-exported from thence, even to the mother country
of such colony; and in like manner the produce and manufactures
of the mother country may, in this circuitous mode,
legally find their way to the colonies. The direct trade, however,
between the mother country and its colonies has not, I
apprehend, been recognized as legal, either by his majesty's
Government or by his tribunals.

"What is a direct trade, or what amounts to an intermediate
importation into the neutral country, may sometimes be a
question o some difficulty. A general definition of either applicable
to all cases, cannot well be laid down. The question
must depend upon the particular circumstances of each case;
perhaps the mere touching in the neutral country, to take
fresh clearances, may fairly be considered as a fraudulent
evasion, and as in effect the direct trade; but the high court
of admiralty has expressly decided (and I see no reason
to expect that the court of appeal will vary the rule) that
landing the goods and paying the duties In the neutral country,
breaks the continuity of the voyage, and is such an
importation as legalizes the trade; altho' the goods be reshipped
in the same vessel, and on account of the same
neutral proprietors, and forwarded for sale to the mother
country."[134]

It is impossible to express the law meant to be here laid down
in clearer terms, so far as it determines "that landing the goods
and paying the duties" in a neutral country, legalizes the circuitous
trade, even between a belligerent country and its own
colonies. What inferior circumstances would have the same
effect are not specified. It is not decided without a "perhaps"
that the mere touching, &c., would be insufficient to legalize the
trade. Nor is the legality even of a direct trade between the

mother country and its colonies, denied in stronger terms than
"I apprehend it has not been recognized."

Thus stood the admiralty in Great Britain, as announced by
British tribunals, and officially communicated by the British
Cabinet to the neutral world. So it had continued to stand, as
a pledge and safeguard to neutrals, conforming themselves to
it, from the dates of those authorities, the last of which is as
far back as the spring of the year 1801.

With what astonishment, then, must the neutral world now
learn, from the decision of Sir William Scott on the 23d July,
1805, that, according to the rule of law just laid down, after
much deliberation, by the lords of appeals, "the circumstances
of landing the goods or securing the duties, do not
furnish complete evidence of the termination of the voyage;"
and that without this complete evidence, derived from the
original intention of the importing voyage, the voyage from
the neutral port will be treated as the continuance of the
voyage from the colony to the mother country.

This political change in the judicial rules of condemnation,
admits no other satisfactory, than a commercial explanation;
for the loss of character, which it induces, is a greater sacrifice
than could be made to the cupidity of cruisers, or the value
of their prizes to the public.

The whole course, indeed, of modifications pursued by the instructions,
and by the decisions of the courts as they appear
from day to day, can leave no doubt that the primary object
with Great Britain has been to transfer to herself as large a
share as possible of the commercial advantages yielded by the
colonies of her enemies. An absolute monopoly was embarrassed
by the irresistible pretensions of neutral countries;
more especially of the United States, whose neighborhood and
habits of intercourse, together with other considerations, forbade
a perseverance in the original attempt to exclude them.
They were accordingly the first of the neutral nations towards
which a relaxation was afforded. The relaxation, after considerable
delay, was extended, by the instruction of 1798, to

the neutral nations of Europe. That instruction was founded
on a compromise between the interest and the prudence of
Great Britain. It permitted neutral nations to trade directly
with the colonies of her enemies; without trading in colonial
productions with one another; and permitted all of them to
carry those productions directly to Great Britain. This arrangement
was manifestly calculated to limit the importations
of each neutral country to the amount of its own consumption;
and consequently to turn the immense residue of colonial
wealth, through neutral vessels, into her own market; whence
it might be dispensed, under her own regulations, to the neutral
countries of Europe having no direct commerce with the West
Indies, and even to the belligerent nations whose commerce
with their respective colonies she has as completely destroyed,
as she has their commerce with foreign countries. The arrangement
was specious, but proved to be deceptive. It was
expected that the expense and delay of a circuitous trade
through the United States would prevent importations and
re-exportations, interfering with the projected trade directly
from the West Indies to herself; and as long as this expectation
was in any degree indulged, the right of re-exportation was
admitted, though reluctantly, both by the Government and
the courts. Experience, however, finally shewed, that the
activity, the capital, and the economy employed by the American
traders, overpowered the disadvantages incident to the
circuit through the ports of the United States; and secured to
them the profits of supplying Europe with the colonial productions
of her enemies. In proportion as this unforeseen
operation disclosed itself, the commercial jealousy of Great
Britain began to take alarm. Obstructions were to be thrown
in the way of importations. Re-exportations were seen with
growing discontent. The idea of continuity, by which two
voyages were consolidated into one, came into vogue. The
Vice Admiralty courts, regardless of the superior decisions in
England, would not allow that the landing of a cargo, and
paying the duties, protected it against condemnation. At
length appeared the sentence of Sir Wm. Scott, above cited,
carrying into effect the construction of the inferior courts, as
having been deliberately sanctioned by the Lords of Appeal.
The doctrine established by that decision has been followed
by other decisions and dicta, at first requiring the re-exportation,
in another ship, then a previous sale of the articles in
the neutral market, then other conditions, one after another,
as they were found necessary; till it is finally understood, that
no precautions whatever are to bar the cruisers from suspecting,
nor the courts from scrutinizing, the intention of the
original importer, and that the proof of this intention not to
re-export the articles, is to fall on the claimant. To fill up
the measure of judicial despotism, these wanton innovations
are now extended to vessels returning from the belligerent
mother countries, as well as to those going thither from the
United States; with the addition of demands of proof never
before heard of in prize courts, on points utterly unknown to
the law of nations.

These unexampled and vexatious proceedings manifestly
have in view the entire obstruction of colonial re-exports
from the United States; and it would be more candid in
Great Britain, if not more just, to give public notice, at once,
that in all such cases capture and condemnation would be
authorized.

Her present system, as subsidiary to the extension of her
commerce, will be still further seen in her concurrent measures,
of a type not less extraordinary than that of any which have
preceded them.

According to the instructions issued within the period of the
existing war, or to the received interpretation of them, the permission
given to neutrals by those of 1798, to carry the produce
of enemy's colonies, directly therefrom to Great Britain, has
not been continued. At first view this might appear to be inconsistent
with the policy ascribed to her, in obstructing reexportations
from the United States. The act of Parliament,
of June 27, 1805, however, which has been already noticed,

changes this appearance of departure from that policy, into a
new proof, and even an extension of that policy. By the regulations
of that act a direct trade is opened between the British
colonies in the West Indies and those of her enemies; and her
enemies themselves are invited to enter into the trade. Whilst
neutrals, therefore, are excluded from carrying colonial
produce directly from the colonies to Great Britain, the commercial
views of Great Britain are answered by the substitution
of another channel through her own colonies; with the additional
advantage of a monopoly to her own ships, in the transportation
from her colonies across the Atlantic; and for the
sake of this advantage, or for that of repressing the growth of
neutral rivalship, or on both these accounts, she has been
willing to encounter all the reproach of cultivating an avowed
commerce with her enemies, in the very moment of laying
new restrictions on that of neutrals with them.

Further; the act of Parliament, of June 27, 1805, providing
for a trade between Great Britain and the colonies of her enemies,
through the medium of free ports in her own colonies,
was preceded by an act of April 10, 1805, authorizing licences
to British subjects, to import, during the war, into Great Britain,
in neutral vessels, for their own or neutral account, from the
American colonies of her enemies, most of their productions;
requiring, at the same time, that all sugar and coffee so imported
should be re-exported; and that the value of a certain
portion of the imports from such colonies should be returned
in goods and commodities from Great Britain.

Again; in concert with the act of June 27, instructions,
founded on another act of Parliament, were issued, June 29,
1805, authorizing British subjects to export in neutral vessels
to France, Spain, and Holland, a long list of articles, including
their respective colonial productions; and to import therefrom
a long list of such articles as suited her own wants.

To complete the arrangement, in all its forms, it has been
officially announced in the American Gazettes, conformably to
a resolution of the British privy council, of August 3, 1805,

that the trade with the settlements and islands belonging to
the enemy, in America and the West Indies, is to be carried
on through the medium of the British free ports in the West
Indies, and not otherwise.

The system of Great Britain may, therefore, now be considered
as announced to all the world, without disguise, and by
the most solemn acts of her government. Her navy having destroyed
the trade of her enemies, as well between the mother
countries and their colonies, as between the former and neutral
countries; and her courts, by putting an end to re-exportations
from neutral countries, reducing the importations into these, to
the mere amount of their own consumption; the immense surplus
of productions accumulating in the American possessions
of her enemies can find no outlet but through the free ports provided
for it; nor any other market than the British market, and
those to which she finds it for her interest to distribute it; with
a view to which, she not only allows her enemies to trade
with her possessions, but allows her own subjects to trade
with her enemies. And thus, in defiance as well of her treason
laws and of her trade laws, as of the rights of neutrality, under
the law of nations, we find her, in the just and emphatic language
of the President, "taking to herself, by an inconsistency
at which reason revolts, a commerce with her own enemy, which
she denies to a neutral, on the ground of its aiding that enemy
in the war."[135]

But let us return for a moment to the series of instructions
of which an historical review has been taken; and advert
to some additional lights in which the judicial construction
and application of them present the conduct of Great
Britain.

Prior to the order of November 6, 1793, the general principle
forbidding to neutrals a trade opened to them during the
war, must, if it be a principle of the law of nations, as asserted
by Great Britain, have been the rule of Admiralty decisions.
Accordingly, it appears, by 4 Rob. Appendix, p. 12, that condemnations

in cases prior to that date were, in the court of Appeals,
made to rest on that principle.

The orders of November 6, 1793, designated for the operation
of the principle, the trade with the colonies of the enemy;
as well the trade to, as the trade from, them.

The orders of January, 1794, expressly revoking the orders
of November, 1793, designated for the capture, the trade only
from the West India Islands of the enemy, and bound directly
to Europe, only.

The orders of January, 1798, revoking expressly the orders
of January, 1794, designated for capture the trade from the
islands or settlements of the enemies, bound directly to any
port in Europe; excepting what might be bound to British
ports, or to the ports of the country to which the neutral vessels
should belong.

Without entering into a variety of minute questions growing
out of the varied and very inaccurate expressions in which the
orders are penned, several of very great importance occur, in
expounding and applying the rules laid down.

The first question is, whether the first order of 1793, which
made no express reference to the general principle, and which
was limited to the colonial branch of the enemy's trade, was to
be understood as merely a specification of certain cases, to
which the general principle was applicable, leaving the general
principle in force as to all unspecified cases; or whether this
specification of certain cases was to be understood as implying
a legalization of cases unspecified.

The question arises, also, under the successive orders, each
of them revoking the orders immediately preceding, whether it
was to be understood, that the specification of certain cases
did, or did not, legalize the cases omitted in the same order,
but specified in the orders preceding.

The more obvious construction of the original order, even,
seems to be, rather that it was meant to define the only cases
to which the general belligerent claim was to be applied, than
that it was meant merely to notify the claim in those particular

cases; a claim not more requiring notification in those cases,
than in the cases not notified.

With respect to the orders of posterior dates, the fair construction
implies, that the belligerent claim was narrowed,
first, by all the difference between the orders of 1793 and those
of 1794; and finally, by all the difference between the orders
of 1794, and those of 1798.

Taking the whole together under these constructions, the
application of the general principle of capture was restricted
by these orders to the trade of neutrals from the colonies of enemies,
directly to ports, other than their own respective ports
and the British ports, and consequently there remained exempt
from capture:

1st.

• The coasting trade, and every branch of trade not
  colonial.

2d.

• The trade from any neutral country, to belligerent
  colonies.

3d.

• The trade by neutrals from any belligerent country to
  its own colonies, and to the colonies of another belligerent
  country.

4th.

• The trade between belligerent colonies, whether
  belonging to the same or to different belligerent countries.

Applying this rule of implication to the two orders only of
1794 and 1798; and admitting those of 1793 not to have superseded
by implication, the claims to capture in cases not therein
specified, there will be no other exception to the relations or
exemptions just enumerated in favor of neutral commerce, but
the coasting trade, and other trades not colonial, to which
Great Britain has applied, or may choose to apply, the general
principle.

In general the high court of admiralty seems, by applying
the assumed principle to the coasting trade, to have pursued
that construction of the original order of 1793, which left the
general principle in force as to cases not specified in it; and
to have considered the relaxations in the succeeding orders of
1794 and 1798, as referring solely to the colonial trade.

There appears, however, at no time to have been any clear
and fixed opinion in the court, with respect to the illegality
and penal consequences of the coasting trade.

Few cases are reported, perhaps few have occurred, of
discussions relative to this branch of trade. In 1 Rob., p. 104,
the subject is incidentally brought into view, in a case where
a French vessel had been purchased. The doctrine held by
the judge is expressed as follows: "We certainly do allow it,
"[the purchase,] but only to persons conducting themselves
"in a fair neutral manner, &c.; besides, this vessel appears
"to have been engaged in the coasting trade of France. The
"court has never gone so far as to say, that pursuing one
"voyage of that kind would be sufficient to fix a hostile char"acter:
but in my opinion, a habit of such trading would.

"Such a voyage however must raise a strong degree of suspicion
against a neutral claim; and the plunging at once into
"a trade so highly dangerous, creates a presumption that there
"is an enemy proprietor lurking behind the cover of a neutral
"name." Here, not the coasting trade itself, but the presumption
of enemy's property found in it, is made the ground
of animadversion.

In the case of the Speculation, the same idea presents itself.[136]

The Emanuel[137] was itself the case of a coasting trade. In
this case the judge descanted with great energy and rigor, on
the manifest illegality of the coasting trade. "Can there be
"described, "says he, "a more effective accommodation that
"can be given to an enemy during war than to undertake it
"for him during his own inability?" He did not however
proceed further than to refuse freight on the principle settled
by ancient judgments, that "neutrals are not permitted to trade
on freight." He particularly refers to the case of the Mercurius
[Lords, March 7, 1795,] in which freight was refused. Why
were not the ships confiscated in these cases? that being laid
down in other cases as included in the penalty for illegal voyages,
and actually applied ultimately to cases of a trade between

a colony and the mother country, to which the coasting
trade is strictly analogous; both being trades from one port to
another port of the same nation. It is not even to be inferred
from the authorities here cited, that a coasting trade, in the
produce of the country, if carried not on freight, but as property
belonging to the neutral owner of the ship, is subject to
any penalty. This indulgence to the coasting, and rigor
towards the colonial trade, is it to be explained by the fertility
of the one, and the little value of the other, as a source of
captures and commercial profit, or in what other way?
With respect to the orders of '94 and '98, and the colonial
trade, it appears to have been in general understood,
that they were to be construed as successively enlarging the
trade of neutrals with the colonies of enemies, in the manner
and to the extent above explained.

The dilemma was indeed unavoidable; either the orders were
to be considered as relaxations, (and if relaxations at all, in that
extent,) or as leaving the general principle in force in cases not
specified in the orders, and therefore as no relaxations at all.

This latter decision would have given a character of mockery
to the profession and parade of making, in their orders,
so many sacrifices of belligerent rights to a spirit of moderation
and amity towards neutrals. The former side of the
dilemma, therefore, was necessarily taken. The orders, those
of '94 and '98 at least, were relaxations.

As relaxations however in the extent required by an obvious
and consistent interpretation, the door, opened to neutral
commerce with the belligerent colonies, was found to be wider
than was compatible either with the interests of British commerce,
and the avidity of British cruizers, or the probable
intentions of the British government.

What was to be the remedy? The first tried was that of
shutting the door gradually, by the dint of constructions,
as may be seen by tracing the colonial cases adjudged by Sir
William Scott, and reported by Robinson, and the decisions of
the Lords of Appeals referred to by the reporter.

The task was assuredly not a little difficult, of which there is
the strongest demonstration in the crooked and contradictory
reasonings and decrees, into which it forced the very eminent
talents of the judge who presides in the high court of admiralty.

In addition to the evidence already presented, take the
following comparison between his rule of construction in the
case of the Providentia,[138] and the rule of construction in the
case of the Immanuel.[139]

In the former case, August 16, 1799, he observes, "the first
"instructions were to bring in all ships which had been trading
"with any colony of the enemy: but this country afterwards
"receded from these directions; and the second orders were to
"bring in all ships laden with produce of the West India
"islands coming directly from the ports of the said islands to
"any port in Europe. I cannot but consider this as an aban"donment
of the former law, [instruction,] and I cannot but
"think that a cruiser taking this instruction, in conjunction
"with those given before must have inferred that it was no longer
"the intention of government to bring in, and much less to con"fiscate,"
[was there room for this distinction?] "cargoes of
"West India produce, unless coming to some port in Europe:
"this was followed by instructions now in force, which direct
"the bringing in of all vessels laden with the produce of the
"French and Spanish settlements, coming from the ports of
"such settlements to any port of Europe, other than the ports
"of that country to which the vessel belongs. It is certainly
"not laid down in the negative that they shall not bring in such
"vessels as are coming from such settlements to their own
"ports; but looking at the former instruction, I think it was a
"strong admonition to cruisers not to bring in such ships,
"and I believe it has been generally so understood and acted
"upon by them; and in this court cargoes brought from Suri"nam
to ports in Europe to which the vessels belonged,
"have been uniformly restored on proof of the neutrality
"of the property."

The reasoning here is plain and just. The first instructions
designated for capture the colonial trade, without distinguishing
between Europe and America: the second designated the
trade to Europe only: therefore, by fair inference, the trade to
America was exempted from capture.

Again, the second orders designated for capture the trade to
Europe: the third orders designated the trade to ports of
Europe not being of Great Britain or of the country owning
the vessel: therefore by fair inference the trade to Great
Britain and to countries owning the vessels, was exempted
from capture.

In the Immanuel, November 7, 1799, the case was that of a
neutral ship taken on a voyage last from France to a French
colony. According to the reasoning of Sir William Scott, just
quoted, the inevitable inference ought to have been that the
voyage was legal.

The first instructions designated for capture the trade to and
from the colonies. Both the second and third designated for
capture the trade only from the colonies; therefore, according
to that reasoning, the trade to the colonies was exempted from
capture.

Hear nevertheless the reasoning employed by the judge himself
in this case.

After combating the neutral right to trade with the colonies
of an enemy, by arguments applicable, in principle, as well to a
trade between neutral ports and the colonies, as to a trade between
the mother country and its colonies; he proceeds to state,
in answer to all pleas for a neutral trade from the mother country
to its colonies, "that the true rule to this court is the text
"of the instructions; what is not found therein permitted, is
"understood to be prohibited, upon this plain principle, that
"the colony trade is generally prohibited, and that whatever
"is not specially relaxed, continues in a state of interdiction."

Now as what is not permitted, not specially relaxed, is by the
instruction to continue prohibited, the question to be decided
is, what it is that is permitted, or specially relaxed by the instructions.

Is it what is positively and expressly permitted or
relaxed? Then there is no permission or relaxation at all; for
every thing positive and express in the instruction is for the
capture, not for the permission or relaxation. Is it to be a permission
or relaxation implied and inferred from a positive and
specified prohibition in one order, and an omission of that or
of a part of that prohibition, in a succeeding order? Then the
neutral trade from a belligerent country to its colonies, which
was prohibited in the order of 1793, and omitted in the orders
of 1794 and 1798, was as much permitted, as specially relaxed,
as the trade from a neutral country to the colonies of an enemy,
is permitted or relaxed by the omission in the orders of 1794
and '98, to prohibit the trade to the colonies, which as well
as the trade from the colonies, was positively and specially
prohibited by the previous order of 1793; or to recur to the
reasoning of Sir William Scott, in the former case of the
Providentia, as much permitted or relaxed as the trade from
the colonies going not to Europe, was inferred to be so from the
order of 1794, taken in conjunction with the order of 1793; the
order of '93 having prohibited the trade from the colonies generally,
and the order of '94 having omitted to prohibit more of
the trade from the colonies than what was bound to some port
in Europe.

The judge concludes with declaring, "I see no favorable distinction
between an outward and return voyage. I consider
the intent of the instruction to apply equally to both communications,
though the return voyage is the only one specially
mentioned."

What favorable distinction, then, could the judge see between
the outward and the return voyage, in a trade between
a neutral country, and the colonies of an enemy, more than
between the two voyages to Spain, a mother country, and the
colonies? Is not the return voyage the only one specially
mentioned, whether the instruction be applied to the former
trade or to the latter trade? This is self evident. Either
then he must admit the distinction in both, and say that the

return voyage only being specially mentioned, the outward
voyage is in both trades permitted; or he must reject the distinction
in both, and say, that the outward voyage, tho' the
return voyage only be specially mentioned, is prohibited in
both. A different course however was pursued. The instruction
was applied to the outward voyage in the neutral trade
from the mother country to the colony, without being considered
as applicable to the outward voyage in the trade
from the neutral country to a colony; which last has not as
yet been subjected to condemnation. Whether that is to
be its future destiny, as has happened to some other branches
of commerce, where it was equally precluded by legal decisions
and even official assurances, is among the arcana of the admiralty
cabinet of Great Britain.

The judgment in this case, it is to be observed, did not go
beyond the condemnation of the goods. The vessel was
restored, but with a forfeiture of freight and expences.

By degrees, however, with the aid of alleged fraud, of false
destination, and of contraband in the outward voyages, the
ship as well as the cargo were brought within the rules of condemnation
in the high court of admiralty. The decision of
the lords of appeal has finally established, in the case of a voyage
from a Spanish colony to a neutral, but forbidden port in
Europe, that any illegal trade of neutrals with the colonies of
an enemy forfeits both ship and cargo.[140]

Other examples might be drawn from the proceedings in the
British courts of admiralty, to illustrate the constructive return
towards the general principle which had been mitigated
by successive instructions, and the anomalous and entangled
decisions, which have been employed for the purpose. These
illustrations cannot be here pursued, without too great an
addition to the prolixity which has already been incurred.
It will only therefore be remarked generally; first, that the
course of proceedings, as they relate to the coasting, and different
branches of the colonial trade; to the grounds on which

these have been interdicted to neutrals; and to the penalties
attached to breaches of the interdictions, compose a labyrinth
for which no concatenation of principles, no thread of reasoning
whatever, affords a clue: secondly, that constructive decisions,
as appears in the last volume of Robinson's reports,
have not only restored, in a great measure, the operation of
the general principle; but have introduced collateral principles,
greatly extending the mischiefs of its operation.

Whilst all the considerations therefore which originally led
to the examination of this principle, are acquiring additional
force, it is fortunate that so irresistible a testimony against its
legitimacy, should have been furnished by the conduct of
Great Britain herself.

Review of the reasons urged in defence of the British principle.

Although some of the reasons by which this belligerent claim
of Great Britain is defended, have incidentally fallen under consideration
in the course which the subject has taken, yet a
more particular notice of those most relied on, may be necessary
to complete the present examination.

The principal champions for the claim, are the judge of the
high court of admiralty himself, Sir William Scott; Mr. Ward,
now under Secretary of State in Great Britain, who is sufficiently
known by his treatises on the law of nations, one of
which embraces this precise subject; and Mr. Browne, a professor
of civil law in the University of Dublin, and author of a
work on civil and admiralty law.

Sir William Scott has, in every view, the first title to be
heard.

In the judgment delivered by him in the case of the Immanuel,
his eloquence has painted the belligerent claim in very
glowing colours. The passage shall be given in his own words:

"It is an indubitable right of the belligerent to possess himself
of such places, as of any other possession of his enemy.
This is his common right, but he has the certain means of carrying
such a right into effect, if he has a decided superiority

at sea: such colonies are dependent for their existence, as
colonies, on foreign supplies; if they cannot be supplied and
defended they must fall to the belligerent of course—and if
the belligerent chooses to apply his means to such an object,
what right has a third party, perfectly neutral, to step in and
prevent the execution? No existing interest of his is affected
by it; he can have no right to apply to his own use the beneficial
consequences of the mere act of the belligerent, and
say, 'True it is, you have, by force of arms, forced such places
out of the exclusive possession of the enemy, but I will share
the benefit of the conquest, and by sharing its benefits prevent
its progress. You have in effect, and by lawful means,
turned the enemy out of the possession which he had exclusively
maintained against the whole world, and with whom
we had never presumed to interfere, but we will interpose
to prevent his absolute surrender, by the means of that very
opening, which the prevalence of your arms alone has effected;
supplies shall be sent and their products shall be exported;
you have lawfully destroyed his monopoly, but you shall not
be permitted to possess it yourself; we insist to share the fruits
of your victories, and your blood and treasure have been
expendedxs, not for your own interests, but for the common
benefit of others.' Upon these grounds it cannot be contended
to be a right of neutrals, to intrude into a commerce which
had been uniformly shut against them, and which is now
forced open merely by the pressure of war; for when the enemy,
under an entire inability to supply his colonies and to export
their products, affects to open them to neutrals, it is not
his will but his necessity that changes his system; that change
is the direct and unavoidable consequence of the compulsion
of war, it is a measure not of French councils, but of British
force."

The first remark to be made is, that were the intrinsic
reasonableness of the claim admitted, it would not follow that
the claim is justified by the law of nations as actually established.
Reason is indeed the main source from which the law

of nations is deduced; and in questions of a doubtful nature,
is the only rule by which the decision ought to be made. But
the law of nations, as an established code, as an actual rule
of conduct among nations, includes, as already explained,
a variety of usages and regulations, founded in consent, either
tacit or express, and superadding to the precepts of reason,
rules of conduct of a kind altogether positive and mutable.
If reason and conveniency alone, without regard to usage and
authority, were to decide all questions of public law, not a few
of the received doctrines would at once be superseded; and
among the first, some to which Great Britain is most pertinaciously
attached. What would become of her favorite claim,
to seize and condemn all enemy's property, laden in neutral
vessels, if the claim were brought to the simple test of reason?
a claim which gives so much more vexation to the nations at
peace, than it contributes to any just advantage of those at
war. On this question, it is well known, that the appeal
has been constantly made by Great Britain from the reasoning
of her adversaries, to the authority of celebrated jurists,
and other testimonies of the established rules and practice
of nations. She must not expect to vary her test of right,
according to her individual interest: to appeal to authority
when reason is against her, and to reason, when authority is
against her.

In testing the British claim, then, by the law of nations,
recurrence must be had to other sources than the abstract
dictates of reason; to those very sources from which it has
been shewn that her claim is an unauthorized innovation on
the law of nations.

But let us examine this appeal of the eloquent Judge to
the reasonableness of his cause, and see what is gained
by it.

"It is an indubitable right of the belligerent to possess himself
of such places, viz: colonies, [but the argument extends to
all places shut against neutral commerce in time of peace,] as
of any other possession of his enemy." Without question he

has the right to possess himself of any place belonging to his
enemy.

"But he has the certain means of carrying such a right into
effect if he has a decided superiority at sea." This is not so
universally true as is assumed. A land force will be also necessary;
unless both the superiority at sea and the situation
of the colony be such as to admit a complete interruption of
supplies; and then, a blockade must be the only legitimate
expedient.

"Such colonies are dependent for their existence as colonies,
on foreign supplies: if they cannot be supplied and defended
they must fall to the belligerent of course." It is certainly
true that they must fall, if they can be neither fed nor defended.
But it is not so true that colonies, as such, are dependent
on foreign supplies. Some insular colonies are so
dependent; others are not. Few, if any, of the continental colonies
or settlements are dependent on foreign supplies.

"And if the belligerent chooses to apply his means to such
an object, what right has a third party perfectly neutral to step
in, and prevent the execution?" No right at all to step in;
provided the belligerent does, in fact, apply his means to that
object, and, in the mode, conformable to the law of nations;
that is, by intercepting contraband of war, and availing himself
of his decided superiority at sea, to blockade the places,
which if deprived of foreign supplies, must fall into his hands
of course.

Take the argument under another aspect. Colonies must
fall without foreign supplies; therefore, it is said, a belligerent,
without invading or investing them, may prevent neutrals from
supplying them.

The argument has one tendency which ought not to have
escaped the penetration of its author. If the dependence of
a place for its existence and defence on foreign supplies, be the
ground of the belligerent right to intercept all neutral trade
whatever with it, it will not be very easy to find a reasonable
ground for the belligerent right to obstruct neutral supplies to

a place blockaded, where the place, as frequently occurs,
does not depend on foreign supplies for its existence and
defence.

Or the argument may take another turn, which ought not
to escape the attention of neutrals. If the applicability,
without an actual application of the means, to the legitimate
object of possessing himself of the colonies of enemies, can
justify the capture of netural trade with such places, the
mere existence of a force applicable to the purpose of a blockade
any where, will, without an actual blockade, equally authorize
the capture of a neutral trade with ports susceptible
of blockade; and thus the neutral trade becomes interdicted
with every part of the dominions of her enemy; on the same
principle as interdicts it with the colonial part of their dominions;
a blockade being as legitimate an object of war as
conquest; and a decided superiority at sea being at least as
applicable to the former, as to the latter object.

But an essential vice of the argument lies in the fallacy of
the inference. It no more follows from the dependence of
colonies on foreign supplies, that neutrals have no right to trade
with them, with the exceptions of contraband and of blockaded
ports, than it follows from the dependence of other countries
or parts of countries on foreign supplies, that neutrals
have no such right. Is not Holland, is not Portugal, is not
even Spain, at all times, dependent on foreign supplies for
their subsistence; not less perhaps than some of the insular
colonies in the West, and much more than some in the East
Indies? Yet since the usurped power of obstructing all neutral
trade with an enemy was abandoned by belligerent nations
has it ever been pretended that that dependence gave a right
to the enemies of those countries to prevent neutral supplies
to them?

The argument fails when brought to another test, If the
dependence on foreign necessaries constitutes the belligerent
claim against the neutral trade to colonies, the principle of
the claim limits it to such colonies as labour under this dependence.

The continental colonies or settlements, which have
within themselves resources, necessary for their existence, and
which therefore no decided superiority at sea can reduce into
the possession of a belligerent, are clearly not within the
utmost range of the principle. Yet no distinction is made in
the application of it, either in argument or practice, between
the most sterile and indefensible island, and the vast and
fertile provinces on the continent of South America.

Thus far, then, the judge has found no foothold for the belligerent
pretension which he endeavors to support.

But he must be heard further: "No existing interest of his
[the neutral] is affected by it," [an exclusion, &c.]

The interests of neutrals may be materially affected by the
loss of the customary supplies from belligerent colonies, as
must happen, if they can neither trade directly with the colonies,
nor receive supplies from them thro' the mother country.
This is the consideration expressly assigned, in the appendix
to 4 Rob., for the orders of 1798: "Neutral vessels were by
this relaxation allowed to carry on a direct commerce between
the colony of an enemy and their own country; a concession
rendered more reasonable by the events of war, which by
annihilating the trade of France, Spain, and Holland, had
entirely deprived the States of Europe, of the opportunity of
supplying themselves with the articles of colonial produce, in
those markets." This is a view of the subject very different
from that given by Sir William Scott here, and in another
paragraph; where he represents "Guadaloupe and Jamaica,
as no more to Germany, than if they were settlements in the
mountains of the moon, to commercial purposes, as not in
the same planet."

The judge proceeds, "He [the neutral] can have no right to
apply to his own use, the beneficial consequences of the mere
act of the belligerent."

Why not? In many respects, as will hereafter be seen, the
neutral suffers by war; is it unreasonable that in some respects,
he should profit by its effects?

Waiving this consideration, it does not follow that one belligerent
has a right to deprive a neutral of a colonial market
opened to him under the pressure of war, by another belligerent,
any more than of any new market or new channel of trade,
in relation to the mother country, opened under a like pressure.

As yet, however, the latter pretension has not appeared.[141] It
is even disavowed in a succeeding passage of this very judgment.
Is it not the pressure of war, which at this time, obliges
the enemies of Great Britain, to abandon in great measure,
to neutral vessels, the trade between themselves and other
countries? Is it not the pressure of war, during which more
food is consumed, with fewer hands to raise it, that often compels
nations at war, to open their ports to the supplies
and ships of neutrals, contrary to their ordinary regulations
in time of peace? In a word, the whole commercial policy
of belligerent towards neutral nations, undergoes changes,
which the latter is in the constant practice of "applying to
their own use." And it is manifest that Great Britain is as
ready, as any of her enemies, to lay open her navigation and
her colonial markets, though so rigorously shut in time of
peace, whenever the pressure of war, makes it her interest,
that neutrals should apply the benefit of these changes to their
own use.

It is perfectly clear, then, that the mere circumstance of an
increase of profit to neutrals, from a participation in branches
of trade opened under the pressure of war, does not render
that participation unlawful.

The sequel of the argument assumes a very singular shape.

The neutral has no right to say to the belligerent,—"True it is
you have by force of arms forced such places out of the exclusive
possession of the enemy, but I will share the benefit of the

conquest; and by sharing its benefits, prevent its progress.
You have, in effect, and by lawful means, turned the enemy
out of the possession which he had exclusively maintained
against the whole world, and with whom we had never presumed
to interfere; but we will interpose to prevent his absolute
surrender, by the means of that very opening which the
prevalence of your arms alone has effected."

Here let it be observed, the case first stated is, that the place
has been forced by one belligerent out of the possession of another
belligerent, and that the neutral is undertaking to share
the benefit of the conquest. Were that the real intention, as it
is the inevitable import of the statement, there could be no advocate
for a neutral pretension to interfere. But with an inaccuracy
(a harder term will not be applied) little to have been
looked for where it is found, this conquest, this turning of the
enemy out of exclusive possession, does not in the least mean,
as is quickly disclosed, a transfer of the place or colony to a
new sovereign. The colony remains precisely as it did; not
even attacked or threatened by a military operation. The conquest
really meant turns out to be nothing more than the creation
of a certain degree of difficulty and danger in the trade
between the colony and the mother country. With this
change in the statement of the fact, the inference with respect
to the intrusion of a neutral commerce must, unfortunately for
the argument, undergo a correspondent change. As the conquest
of the colony would have justified the conqueror stepping
into the exclusive possession, out of which his arms had forced.

his enemy, in prohibiting a neutral interference with its trade,
it is equally certain, that he is not justified in any such prohibition
by the mere obstruction thrown in the way of the
ordinary colonial trade; any more than he would be justified
by obstructions thrown equally in the way of other branches
of his enemy's trade, in prohibiting the entrance of neutrals
into them.

That the meaning of the judge is shifted from an expulsion
of the enemy from his colony, to an obstruction of his trade

with his colony, is put beyond all question by the conclusion of
this hypothetical address of the neutral to the belligerent,—
"Supplies shall be sent, and their products shall be exported;
you have lawfully destroyed his monopoly, but you shall not be
permitted to possess it yourself."

Thus the right of a belligerent to possess himself of the colonies
of his enemies depending on foreign supplies, which, in
the beginning of the argument, was the ground of the unlawfulness
of such neutral supplies, as might prevent the colonies
from falling into the hands of the belligerent, undergoes a
complete transformation in its progress, and ends in a right
of the belligerent to supply the colonies himself, in exclusion of
neutrals. The neutral is interdicted from sending supplies to
an enemy's colony, and exporting its produce; not because it
would interfere with the reduction of an enemy's possession;
but because it would interfere with a commercial monopoly.
This at least would be a new principle in the law of nations.

But it is worth while to enquire how the right of a belligerent
to subdue the colonies of his enemy, and for that purpose to
obstruct neutral supplies to them, can be reconciled with the
actual regulations of the British Government on this subject.
Whilst this claim is exercised, in general, so much to the disadvantage
and dissatisfaction of neutrals, it is relaxed in some
respects which are fatal to the very purpose of the belligerent
to subdue the colonies of his enemy; which purpose alone could
give a colour to any such obstruction of neutral commerce.
The orders both of 1794 and of 1798 limit their restrictions on
neutrals to the trade from colonies; leaving by implication,
unrestricted, the trade to the colonies; or they manifest, at
least, under every construction, a solicitude rather against
the trade from, than against the trade to the colonies. Now
if the object and the pretext, in controuling the trade with
the colonies, be the conquest of the colonies, is it not extraordinary
that whilst checks are opposed to the exports, which
can, at the most, have but a remote influence in preserving
them from the necessity of surrender, the channel should be

left open for the importation of those foreign supplies, for the
want of which, they might fall to the belligerent of course?
How is this to be explained? Not, certainly, by a belligerent
policy, which is completely defeated by the relaxation. There
is but one explanation that is satisfactory, and it must not be
deemed uncandid to resort to it. As the orders have endeavored
to give to the trade from the colonies such a course as
was most favorable to imports into Great Britain, the course
allowed to the conveyance of supplies to the colonies is
equally favorable to the export of manufactures from Great
Britain. British manufactures, it must have been supposed,
could find their way to hostile colonies, through no channel
so conveniently and certainly, as through that of neutrals
which conveys the means of subsistence. Whilst the regulation,
therefore, defeats the measure of conquest, it extends
the market for manufactures. Every fold of this belligerent
claim wraps up some commercial project.

In prosecuting his argument, the judge occupies another
ground for this belligerent pretension: "Different degrees of
relaxation," he observes, "have been expressed in different instructions
issued at various times during the war. It is admitted
that no such relaxation has gone the length of authorizing
a direct commerce of neutrals, between the mother country and
its colonies; because such a commerce could not be admitted
without a total surrender of the principle: for allow such a
commerce to neutrals, and the mother country of the enemy recovers,
with some increase of expence, the direct market of the
colonies, and the direct influx of their productions; it enjoys as
before, the duties of import and export, the same facilities of
sale and supply, and the mass of public inconvenience is very
slightly diminished."

It was lately the object of dispossessing the enemy of his colonies
altogether, that authorized the obstruction of neutral
supplies. It was next the object of securing to the belligerent
himself, the monopoly of the commerce with those colonies,
that gave him such an authority. Now the authority is derived

from the policy of withholding from the mother country
of the colony, the public conveniencies arising from the revenue
and from the commercial profits supplied by her direct intercourse
with her colonies.

It cannot be necessary to dwell on the hollowness of this
foundation, for the claim to make war on the participation of
neutrals in a colonial trade. It will be merely observed, or
rather repeated, that if neutrals have no right to trade with an
enemy, where the enemy in consequence of the pressure of the
war, would otherwise lose the revenues and other public advantages
flowing from the trade, the inference fairly is, that
Great Britain, by driving the ships of her enemies, as she does
at this moment, altogether from the sea, may renew with
effect the old and exploded tyranny of interdicitng all neutral
commerce whatever with her enemies.

This last argument only against the neutral trade to colonies,
was applicable to the coasting trade. There, neither conquest,
nor the substitution of the belligerent's own commerce, could
be the object. It will accordingly be seen in the case of the
Immanuel,[142] that the belligerent claim is founded, as it is here,
on its general effect in cramping the revenues of the enemy, and
in inflicting a pressure which may compel a due sense and observance
of justice.

It only remains to advert to a reply, from the judge to the
counsel at the bar, with which he closes the argumentative
part of his judgment.

The inconsistency of Great Britain, in making, in time of
war, the same relaxations in her navigation and colonial monopolies,
which she denies the right of her enemies to make, is
so obvious that it could not possibly escape the notice of the
counsel for neutral claimants. The more striking the inconsistency,
however, the greater the delicacy which was to be
observed in pressing it on the court. It appears accordingly
to have been brought into view, in one instance only, in
Robinson's Admiralty Reports, which was in this case of the

Immanuel; and here it is managed with much tenderness, and
seasoned, finally, with some material concessions to the known
opinions of the Bench and the government. In order to do
justice to Mr. Arnold and Mr. Sewell, charged on that occasion
with the defence of the neutral claimants, and for the sake of
some very judicious reflections of a more general nature, with
which they introduce their particular argument, no abridgment
will be made of the following passage:

"It is true that the general colonial law of Europe has cre"ated
a monopoly, from which other countries are generally
"precluded; at the same time laws respecting colonies, and laws
"respecting trade in general, have always undergone some
"change and relaxation after the breaking out of hostilities; it
"is necessary that it should be so, with regard to the rights of
"neutral nations; because as war cannot be carried on between
"the principal powers of Europe, in such a manner as to con"fine
the effects of it to themselves alone, it follows that there
"must be some changes and variation in the trade of Europe,
"and it cannot be said that neutrals many not take the benefit
"of any advantages that may offer from these changes—be"cause
if so, it would lead to a total destruction of neutral
"trade; if they were to suffer the obstructions in their old
"trade, which war always brings with it, and were not per"mitted
to engage in new channels, it would amount to a
"total extinction of neutral commerce: such a position, there"fore,
cannot be maintained, that they may not avail them"selves
of what is beneficial in these changes, in lieu of what
"they must necessarily suffer, in other parts of their trade, in
"time of war. It is not meant that they should be entirely
"set at liberty from all the restrictions of peace—that would
"be going too far. But that, as there has been a regular
"course of relaxations, as well in our navigation laws, as in
"the colonial trade, in admitting importations and exporta"tions
not allowed in time of peace; it seems not to be too
"much to say, that if they have been regularly relaxed in
"former wars, neutral merchants may think themselves at

"liberty to engage in it, in any ensuing war, with impunity;
"and it does justify a presumption, that as a belligerent country
"allows a change in its own system as necessary, and invites
"neutrals to trade in its colonies under relaxations, so it would
"allow them to trade in the same manner, with the colonies of
"the enemy."

In reply:—

"It is an argument," says the judge, "rather of a more legal
nature than any derived from those general topics of commercial
policy, that variations are made in the commercial systems
of every country in wars and on account of wars, by means of
which neutrals are admitted and invited into different kinds of
trade, from which they stand usually excluded; and if so, no
one belligerent country has a right to interfere with neutrals
for acting under variations of a like kind made for similar reasons
in the commercial policy of its enemy. And certainly if
this proposition could be maintained without any limitation,
that wherever any variation whatever is made during a war,
and on account of the state of war, the party who makes it,
binds himself in all the variations to which the necessities of
the enemy can compel him, the whole colony trade of the enemy
is legalized; and the instructions which are directed against
any part are equally unjust and impertinent; for it is not
denied that some such variations may be found in the commercial
policy of this country itself; although some that have
been cited are not exactly of that nature. The opening of
free ports is not necessarily a measure arising from the demands
of war; it is frequently a peace measure in the colonial
system of every country: there are others, which more directly
arise out of the necessities of war;—the admission of foreigners
into the merchant service as well as into the military service
of this country;—the permission given to vessels, to import
commodities not the growth, produce, and manufacture of
the country to which they belong, and other relaxations of the
act of navigation, and other regulations founded thereon:
these, it is true, take place in war, and arise out of a state of

war; but then they do not arise out of the predominance of
the enemies force, or out of any necessity resulting therefrom;
and this I take to be the true foundation of the principle. It
is not every convenience, or even every necessity arising out
of a state of war; but that necessity which arises out of the
impossibility of otherwise providing against the urgency of
distress inflicted by the hand of a superior enemy, that can
be admitted to produce such an effect. Thns, in time of war,
every country admits foreigners into its general service—
every country obtains, by the means of neutral vessels, those
products of the enemy's country which it cannot possibly
receive, either by means of his navigation or its own. These
are ordinary measures, to which every country has resort in
every war, whether prosperous or adverse: they arise, it is
true, out of a state of war, but are totally independent of its
events, and have therefore no common origin with those compelled
relaxations of the colonial monopoly; these are acts of
distress, signals of defeat and depression; they are no better
than partial surrenders to the force of the enemy, for the mere
purpose of preventing a total dispossession. I omit other
observations which have been urged and have their force:
it is sufficient that the variations alluded to stand upon
grounds of a most distinguishable nature."

On comparing the argument of the counsel with the discourse
of the judge, there is but too much room to remark, that there
are in the former a coolness and clearness not unworthy of the
Bench; and in the latter a florid and fervid stile, which might
have been less unsuitable to the zeal of the bar. But it is more
important to examine and weigh the effect which their respective
reasonings, so far as those of the judge can be extricated
from the general and somewhat obscure expressions employed
by him, ought to have on the point in question.

The reasoning at the bar is simply this—that as Great Britain
is herself in the practice of opening to neutrals, in time of
war, channels of navigation and colonial markets, which she
shuts to them in time of peace; she ought to allow, or might

reasonably be presumed to allow, as equally lawful in time of
war, a like relaxation of the colonial system of her enemies.

The judge does not deny the fact that Great Britain is in
the practice of relaxing in time of war her system of colonial
trade. He does not deny the inference that a like relaxation
would be equally lawful on the part of her enemies. It might
have been expected, therefore, that in his reply he would have
allowed to the enemies of Great Britain the same right to capture
neutrals trading with her colonies, as is exercised by
Great Britain against neutrals trading with the colonies of her
enemies; and have contented himself with the advantage enjoyed
by Great Britain in her superior means of intercepting
the neutral trade with her enemies, and of preventing her enemies
from intercepting the neutral trade with herself. This,
it would seem, was a more consistent, and also a more politic
ground to have taken. The judge was of a different opinion.

Unwilling to make even that degree of concession, he attempts
to retain the privilege claimed by Great Britain, and at the
same time withhold it from her enemies; by certain distinctions
between the two cases. With what success the distinctions
are made is now to be seen.

One of the distinctions is between a colonial trade which is
frequently opened in peace, as in the case of free ports, and a
colonial trade opened in war only.

The example of free ports was not very happily chosen; for it
has been seen that the trade from such ports in the French West
Indies to the United States, was not excepted in the British
orders on the subject of neutral trade with the colonies of
France; nor is it known that any such exception has been
made in the British courts of admiralty.

The distinction, however, fails in its essential point. It is
not an uncommon thing for relaxations to take place in time of
peace as well as in time of war, in the colonial monopolies of
all the European nations. The Spaniards, the French, and the
Dutch,[143] never fail to open their colonies to foreign supplies,

whenever a scarcity, or other cause, renders it inconvenient to
supply them from European sources. Even on this ground
then, as admitted by the judge himself, a neutral trade with
enemy's colonies would be lawful in time of war.

Another distinction is intimated between the ordinary
measures of relaxation, to which every country has resort in
every war, whether prosperous or adverse, and unusual
measures of relaxation produced by a peculiar state of the
war.

Here again the distinction directly militates against the object
for which it is made, it being well known to be an ordinary
measure, with the enemies of Great Britain, in all modern wars
at least, to open their colonial ports to neutral supplies.

Prior to the American revolution, Great Britain had, in these
States, resources which rendered it unnecessary for her colonies
to invite supplies, if indeed they could have been obtained,
from any foreign sources. In her wars since that event,
she has followed the example of her enemies in relaxing her
colonial system, as far as was necessary to obtain supplies,
from the sources and through the channels which furnish her
enemies. At this moment, her islands are as open as the
colonies of her enemies to the supplies and the vessels of the
United States, with this difference, indeed, that her ports
are opened by regulations more temporizing and more special,
than those of some, if not all, of her enemies; and therefore
with pretensions to legality, according to her own standard,
inferior to those of her enemies.

The remaining distinction is the sole fortress on which the
defence of the principle maintained by the judge, must depend.
This distinction is so novel, and in its appearance so refined,
that in explaining it some difficulty was naturally felt, in the
selection of apposite expressions. A critic, tinctured with
want of candor, might be tempted to exclaim, that a distinc

tion between a necessity arising out of a state of war, and a
necessity arising out of an impossibility, which impossibility
arises out of a state of war, was a subject less proper for
discussion, than for a less serious treatment.

The judge, however, cannot be justly charged with a want
of meaning, whatever may have been his difficulty or his caution
in expressing it. It may be collected, with sufficient
certainty, that he meant to establish the right of Britain, and
the want of right in her enemies to interrupt neutral commerce,
on the predominance of force, on the decided superiority
at sea, which she enjoys, and on the inferiority of force,
under which her enemies labour. When she opens her colonial
ports to neutrals, although it arises out of a state of war, it
does not arise, like theirs, out of the predominance of the
enemy's force. This predominance he frankly declares to be
the true foundation of the principle.

And thus we are arrived at the true foundation of the principle
which has so often varied its attitudes of defence, and when
driven from one stand, has been so ready to occupy another.
Finding no asylum elsewhere, it at length boldly asserts, as its
true foundation, a mere superiority of force. It is right in Great
Britain to capture and condemn a neutral trade with her
enemies, disallowed by her enemies in time of peace, for the
sole reason that her force is predominant at sea. And it is
wrong in her enemies to capture and condemn a neutral trade
with British colonies, because their maritime force is inferior
to hers. The question no longer is, whether the trade be right
or wrong in itself, but on which side the superiority of force
lies? The law of nations, the rights of neutrals, the freedom
of the seas, the commerce of the world, are to depend, not on
any fixt principle of justice, but on the comparative state
of naval armaments, which itself may change at every moment,
may depend on the event of a battle, on the skill of an
admiral, on the tack of the wind; on one of those thousand casualties
which verify the admonition, that the battle is not always
given to the strong, any more than the race to the swift.

A government, which avows such a principle of conduct
among nations, must feel great confidence in the permanence,
as well as the predominance of its own power.

It would nevertheless not be unwise in any nation, to reflect
on the vicissitudes of human affairs, and to ask herself the honest
question, how she would relish the application of the principle,
if in the course of events, a maritime superiority should
happen to change sides? Should Great Britain ever find the
state of things thus reversed, she might wish, in vain perhaps,
to let her claim pass silently into abeyance, as she alleges was
done in the war of 1778.

Nor would it be less unworthy of her wisdom to reflect, that
if a predominance of force on one element confers right, a
similar right might result from a predominance of force on
another element.

The supposition may be made to press more immediately on
her reflections. Great Britain as a maritime power is as dependent
on external commerce, as the insular dominions of her
enemies are, as colonies, dependent on external supplies. In
this general view, the principle which she employs against the
colonies of her enemies, may be turned by her enemies against
herself. But a more particular view demands her attention.
She has already beheld her principal enemy on a coast little
distant from her own, by a decided preponderance of force on
land, and a threatened co-operation of naval armaments
giving to the war an unexampled pressure on her faculties and
resources. The wheel of fortune may reproduce the crisis.
Her seamen may be taken from her merchant ships, to man
her fleets. Her fleets may be called home from the protection
of commerce, to the defence of the State. In this posture of
things, her harvest may fail, her existence may depend on
foreign food; its importation on neutral commerce; and the
successful use of this resource, on the right of neutral ships to
a navigation not open to them in times of peace. With such
monitory possibilities in view, ought an enlightened nation
by her own example, and her own language, to authorize her

enemies to say to her friends-you have no right to step into
a trade with our enemy, from which his monopoly of the
navigation excluded you in times of peace; you have no right
to import for him supplies which are absolutely necessary for
his support, and which the distress I am inflicting, renders
it impossible for him otherwise to obtain. Neither have you
any right by a trade, also forbidden in time of peace, to furnish
to his colonies the supplies which his command of the sea
no longer ensures to them, and without which they must fall
of course into our possession.

What reply could be made to such an expostulation, by a
neutral, who had not refused to recognise a like claim on the
part of Great Britain; and, by the refusal, consulted better
the interest of Great Britain, than she had consulted it herself
in advancing the claim?

Taking leave of the very distinguished judge, with these
observations, some notice is next due to Mr. Ward and Mr.
Browne.

A remark that soon occurs on opening the volumes of these
writers is, that both of them confound the principle here in
question, with the question whether free ships make free goods,
and under this confusion, bring the former within the arguments
and authorities belonging to the latter only. The
confusion results not only from the more general expressions
in which they describe the controversy between neutral and
belligerent nations, on the subject of commerce; but is promoted
by their frequent use of the terms "carrying trade,"
without distinguishing between the carriage of enemies property
in neutral vessels, and the neutral carriage of neutral
property in channels navigated in time of peace by domestic
carriers only. These questions are evidently and essentially
distinct; and the distinction answers, of itself, much of the
reasoning employed by those writers; and most, of the authorities
cited by them.

With respect to the consolato del mare, so much appealed
to by Mr. Ward, it has been already observed that however

direct its authority may be against the principle that enemy's
property in neutral vessels is subject to confiscation, there
is not a sentence in that compilation which directly or indirectly
recognizes or favors a belligerent claim, to confiscate neutral
property, on the principle that it is found in channels of trade
not open at all to other than subjects or citizens of the belligerent,
in time of peace. The negative testimony of the consolato,
therefore, is completely in favor of the contrary principle.

In recurring to Grotius, Mr. Ward is led, by his own comment
on the passage which describes the rights of belligerents
against the trade of neutrals, to conclude that the real question
before Grotius, was that which Grotius said had been so much
and so sharply agitated, namely, whether a belligerent had a
right to interdict all neutral commerce with his antagonist;
and Mr. Ward accordingly takes the defensive ground of maintaining
that the neutral "claim to a carrying trade had never
entered the mind of Grotius."

If by the "carrying trade" Mr. Ward means the carriage of
enemy's property, it must have been within the view of Grotius;
because he has furnished Mr. Ward himself with an authority
against the lawfulness of such a trade. If by the "carrying
trade" he meant a trade carried on in war, where it was not
allowed in peace, it is strictly true, that it appears never to
have entered the mind of Grotius. It did not enter his mind,
because no such particular claim had ever been asserted or
exercised against neutrals. The general claim to intercept all
neutral commerce with an enemy, did enter into his mind and
into his discussion, as well as the other particular claims of
belligerents in the case of contraband and of blockades; because
as well that general claim, as those particular claims,
had, at different periods, been asserted and exercised against
neutrals. To suppose that the carrying trade could be unnoticed
by Grotius, for any other reason than that no belligerent
right to intercept that particular branch of trade, had
been asserted, would be the more preposterous, for the reason
suggested by Mr. Ward, "that Grotius lived in a time when his

countrymen were raising to its height the source of their commerce,
by rendering their State the emporium of trade, and
becoming the carriers of the rest of the world;" carriers as well
of their own property as of the property of others, and in every
channel which might be opened to them with profit to the
carriers.

Notwithstanding this relinquishment of the authority of
Grotius, in relation to the carrying trade, Mr. Ward has
shewn a strong inclination to extract from certain terms employed
by Grotius, on the subject before him, some general
countenance to the British principle.

Grotius, it must be admitted, is less definite in explaining
himself in this particular instance, than he is in others; and
much less so, than other jurists who have succeeded him. It
is impossible at the same time to put on his words, any construction
that will avail Mr. Ward.

Although the passage has been heretofore analyzed, it will
not be improper to re-examine it with a particular reference to
the argument of this writer.

Grotius having made his distribution of the articles of neutral
commerce into three classes—1st, of such as are wholly
of pacific use—2d, such as are wholly military, and 3d, such
as are, usus ancipitis—of a doubtful or double use, enlarges
on this 3d class in the words following—"In tertio illo genere,
usûs ancipitis, distinguendus erit belli status. Nam si tueri
me non possum nisi quæ mittuntur intercipiam, necessitas ut
alibi exposuimus jus dabit sub onere restitutionis, nisi causa
alia accedat. Quod si juris mei executionem rerum subvectio
impedierit, id que sciri potuerit qui advexit, ut si oppidum
obessum tenebam, si portus clausos, et jam deditio aut pax
expectabatur, tenebitur ille mihi de damno culpa dato, ut qui
debitorem carceri eximit,"[144] &c., &c. He proceeds next to

graduate the injuries done to the belligerent and the penalties
due to the neutral, according to certain distinctions since exploded,
particularly the distinction between a just and unjust
war, on which he founds a rule; "Quod si prœterea evidentissima
sit hostis mei in me injustitia, et ille eum in bello
iniquissimo confirmet, jam non tantum civiliter tenebitur de
damno sed et criminaliter, &c."

From this text, Mr. Ward makes the following deduction:
"The tenor of these words 'status belli' which is a general de"scription;
of 'juris executione' which is the very right to take
"arms; of 'pax expectabatur' which is a final termination of
"hostilities, not surrender of the besieged place; and lastly of
" 'bello confirmet' which is demonstrably applicable to the
"whole field of war: these (he says) prove him to be occupied
" with the general plan of operations, and the general exigen"
cies of a state of hostility."

The great importance attached to this passage in Grotius,
and the extensive consequences drawn from it by this learned
champion of the British principle, will be apologies for a more
critical attention to the passage, than it could be thought, of
itself, to require.

Whether Grotius did or did not limit his meaning to the
nature of contraband articles, and the case of blockades; it is
demonstrable that his words are inapplicable to the distinction
between a trade permitted, and a trade not permitted in
peace.

1.

• According to Grotius, the articles in question are of the
  third class only, the class of a doubtful or double use: the principle
  of Great Britain makes no such distinction. Articles of
  every class and kind found in the new channel of trade, are
  

  ---

  352

  
  
  
  rendered unlawful by the channel itself, however inapplicable
  they may be to the uses of war,

2.

• According to Grotius, it is one state of war compared to
  another state of war, that is to be distinguished—" distinquendus
  erit belli status:" According to Great Britain, the essence
  of the distinction is, between the state of war, and the state of
  peace; or rather between the state of the municipal laws of
  commerce in time of war, and the state of those laws in time
  of peace.

3.

• According to Grotius, the right to intercept the neutral
  commerce accrues from its particular necessity, as a measure
  of defence: according to Great Britain, the necessity is not the
  criterion. If there be no such necessity, the trade is condemned,
  in case the channel were unlawful before the war.
  Be the necessity what it may, the trade is free, if the channel
  was lawful before the war.

4.

• According to Grotius it must be such a necessity as he
  had elsewhere pointed out—"ut alibi exposuimus." The
  British advocates have not undertaken to show any other
  passage of Grotius, giving the explanation which their principle
  requires. No such passage exists.

5.

• According to Grotius, the articles intercepted, if no other
  cause prevent, are to be restored. According to the British
  decisions, no such restitution is due. Both vessel and cargo
  are confiscated.

6.

• Finally—The war to which Grotius refers, when he uses
  the expression "bello confirmet" is a war of the most evident
  injustice—"evidentissima injustitia; bello INIQUISSIMO confirmet,"
  not bello confirmet, as cited by Mr. Ward. The distinction
  between just and unjust wars, does not enter into the
  principle, on which Great Britain founds her belligerent claim.
  It is, in fact, disclaimed by Bynkershoeck,[145] who succeeded
  

  ---

  353

  
  
  
  Grotius; and tho' countenanced by Vattel, is generally understood
  to be excluded from questions affecting belligerent and
  neutral rights.

Whether the text of Grotius, therefore, is to be understood
as confined, or not confined to the case of contraband and
blockade, it cannot possibly be applied to the case of a trade
asserted to be unlawful in war, merely as being a trade not
permitted in peace.

It may be observed nevertheless, in justice to Grotius, that
his meaning, ought in fairness, not to be extended beyond the
cases of contraband and blockades: First, because it is the
only construction that can satisfy one part of the text; whilst
the terms used in the other part, are by no means, inconsistent
with that construction. The expression least apposite
to the case of a blockade, is that of "pax expectabatur" or
"the expectation of peace," as an event which might be frustrated
by the neutral commerce. But there may certainly
be wars, where peace itself might depend on a blockade. It
is obvious that a blockade of particular ports, such as that of
Amsterdam, the chief emporium of the country of Grotius,
might influence the question of peace, as well as the question
of capitulation. Or to state a case still more decisive: a state
at war, may consist of little more than the place actually
blockaded. Venice and Genoa, formerly, Hamburgh at present,
are examples. A close and continued blockade of such
places as these, would necessarily involve a question of
peace, with that of a surrender.

Again; the meaning of Grotius ought not to be extended,
as Mr. Ward extends it, beyond those two cases of contraband
and blockade "to the general plan of operations, and the general
exigencies of a state of hostility;" because this construction
is directly at variance with the principle heretofore cited
from Grotius; particularly in the note where he condemns
the practice of England and Holland, in their general prohibition
of neutral trade with their enemy.

But the construction attempted by Mr. Ward not only puts

Grotius at variance with himself; it puts Mr. Ward at variance
with himself also; as well as with the limits affixed to
the principle by his own government. For if the belligerent
right laid down in the passage of Grotius be not restricted to
contraband and blockades, and cannot be applied to the British
distinction between a trade in war and a trade in peace;
but extends to the general exigency of hostilities; it is impossible
to deny to belligerents a right to intercept all neutral
trade with their enemy, whenever the state of the war, the
accomplishment of justice, or the expectation of peace, prescribe
it; or whenever a neutral trade may be calculated to
confirm an enemy in the war. The consequence is inevitable,
Yet Mr. "Ward, expressly,[146] in another place, disclaims any such
a latitude in the rights of war, with an exultation that his
country had once, and once only, attempted it; and, on seeing
its injustice, candidly renounced the attempt.

The observations which have been already made on Pufendorf,
and on his letter to Groningius, cited by Barbeyrac,
afford a conclusive reply to the use which Mr. Ward faintly
endeavors to make of that authority, on the point here in
question. He seems, indeed, in general, rather to combat it
as an authority claimed by an opponent, than to claim it as
of much weight in his own scale.

Bynkershoeck and Heineccius, though jointly cited as explicit
authority for the principle that free ships do not make
free goods, are neither of them appealed to by Mr. Ward as
supporting the principle that a trade not allowed in peace was
unlawful in war. This silence of Mr. Ward, considering his
spirit of research, and his zeal for this latter principle, may
reasonably be ascribed to his discovery that he could gain
nothing by bringing it to the test of those authorities.

The same inference may be drawn from his silence with
respect to the authority of Vattel, as to a trade of that
description.

In Hubner, whose authority it is a great object with Mr.

Ward to discredit, he finds a half concession, to which he does
not fail to summon a marked attention. Hubner, it seems,
referring[147] to the case of a neutral trade with an enemy's colonies
opened on account of the war, admits that it is subject
to some uncertainty, "quelque incertitude." He immediately
subjoins, however, "that he does not see why neutral sover"eigns
should refuse themselves so considerable a benefit
"when it offers; provided they abstain from supplying those
"colonies with any merchandize which is prohibited in war.

"It is true," he adds, "if, besides that, they are careful not to
"carry provisions thither, by which I mean, articles of the
"first and second necessity, which, in time of war, are fully
"and more than equivalent to contraband of war properly
" so called; then it is evident that neutral nations may lawfully
" carry on that commerce, because the principal cause of its
"being opened to them during the war, will not have had the
"effect intended to be produced; by means of which that
"commerce will no longer have any thing that may directly
"influence the war, and which consequently may be an object
"of the right which belligerent nations have of opposing every
"thing which tends to the immediate assistance of their ene"mies."
In this ramble of Hubner, from the plain path in
which he commenced his answer to the uncertainty suggested
by himself, he bewilders both himself and his subject, and lays
a foundation for real uncertainties, in his attempt to remove
an imaginary one. How could distinctions be maintained,
in practice, between provisions of the first and those of the
second necessity, and between both and all other provisions?
What is meant by the right which belligerent nations have
of opposing every thing, which tends to the immediate assistance
of their enemies?

But were the concession free from these incumbrances, it
could not avail the advocates for the British doctrine: First.
because the concession is limited to the colonial trade, not
extending even to the coasting trade: Secondly, because it is

limited to the case of those necessary supplies to the colonies,
which were the object in opening the trade to neutrals; whereas
the British doctrine extends to all trade to and from the
colonies.

If any thing further be requisite to invalidate this fugitive
concession, or rather hesitation of Hubner, it is amply furnished
by Hubner himself, in sec. 5, of the same chap. and
book, in which he systematically establishes principles, by
which the rights of neutral commerce are to be determined.

"But let us suppose," says he, "that the commerce of a
"neutral nation with one of the belligerent parties, however
"innocent it may be, should indirectly strengthen the latter,
"does it follow, that his adversary has a right to hinder it,
"to the detriment of the neutral nation? who, in carrying it
"on, neither had nor could have that particular object in view;
"which merely exercises her industry as in time of peace;
"and which, besides, will be very glad to trade with that
"same adversary, upon the like terms, as far as his commercial
"laws will permit, and the nature and interest of its own
"commerce may require.

"To attempt to render a neutral State responsible for the
"increase of the strength of an enemy, because that increase
"arises from the commerce which that State carries on with
"him, is to impute to one, a thing which he has caused by
"mere accident."

Again—"Neutral nations by trading with those who are at
"war, merely avail themselves of their incontestible right.
"Now whoever makes use of his right, and merely does so,
"never can do an injury to another, which he can have a right
"to complain of. The possible consequences of just, innocent,
"and lawful acts, never can hinder us from doing them, at least
"there is no one who has a right to prohibit us, &c."

With such principles in his mind, it is not wonderful, that if
Hubner was startled, as Mr. Ward expresses it, by the terms
of his own premises, he should be more startled at his own concession;
and that finding himself at a loss to explain the ground

on which such a claim as that of Great Britain could in any
degree be reconciled with the rights of neutral commerce, he
should be in a hurry to resume his principle, "that there is no
reason why sovereign States who are neuter, should refuse the
advantage presenting itself, provided they abstain from supplying
colonies with contraband."

Hubner wrote in the war of 1756. Another Danish writer,
Hennings, published a treatise on "neutrality," in the interval
between the war of 1778 and the war of 1793. His authority
is precise and peremptory against Mr. Ward.

After the capture of Grenada, and the Grenadines by the
French, in the war of 1778, an act was passed by the British
parliament[148] to "protect goods or merchandize of the growth,
produce, or manufacture of those islands, on board neutral
vessels bound to neutral ports during the present hostilities,"
with provisoes, that the protection should not extend to cargoes
from any other island, nor affect any sentence of any vice
admiralty court, which prior to a given day should have condemned
productions of the said islands.

There is some obscurity in the object and the text of this act.
To make it consistent, however, with itself, as well as with the
acknowledgment on all hands, that a neutral trade in neutral
property was free, during that period, with French colonies, it
must be understood, as intended either to exempt the trade of
those islands, which had become French, from the operation of
British laws, and to put them on the same footing with other
French islands; or to exempt from capture the property of the
inhabitants of the islands, become French property and French
subjects; an indulgence[149] that might be thought due to those

who had but just ceased to be British subjects, and who might
be restored to that character by a peace.[150]

Hennings, however, conceiving the act to have been intended
to legalize a neutral trade with French colonies, which otherwise
might be subjected by the British courts to condemnation,
is led to the following assertion of the law of nations in opposition
to such a principle:

"An important subject which ought to be here noticed, is the
"trade with the colonies in America. Is there any principle
"on which the sugar islands in the West Indies ought to be
"considered as blockaded? And if there is no such principle,
"why is the permission of Great Britain required for neutral
"ships to take sugars from the islands of Grenada and the
"Grenadines, since those islands have fallen into the hands
"of the French, and the French had opened a free trade to
"Martinico, and to their other islands, &c.?"

"This law is evidently contrary to the rights of neutral
"powers, and they might refuse to acknowledge its obligation,
"as France alone has a right to permit or prohibit trading with
"her colonies, and as long as she permits it, no neutral ought
"to be molested therein."

Hubner and Hennings appear to be the only writers who
have taken notice of the principle in question. The former
having written at a period when the principle was in operation
was doubtless influenced by that consideration. The attention
of the latter seems to have been drawn to the subject by
the act of parliament concerning Grenada and the Grenadines,
which he was inserting in his collection of State papers, and by
the construction which he gave to the purport of that act.

The other numerous writers of most modern date, though

generally strenuous advocates for the neutral rights of commerce,
make no allusion to the British principle: For it would
be absurd to regard in the light of an allusion to, and consequently
a recognition of this particular principle, the language
they happen to use in stating the general principle, that when
war arises between some nations, the nations at peace with all,
are to proceed in their trade with all, on the same footing in
time of war as they did before the war broke out. The obvious
meaning of these phrases is, that with the particular
exceptions of contraband and blockades made by all of them,
the neutral right to trade with a nation at war remains the
same as if that nation was at peace; and consequently the right
to trade to whatever places, in whatever articles, and in whatever
vessels, their regulations might mutually permit. That
such must have been the intention of such writers as Galiani,
Azuni, and even Lampredi, as well as of Schlegel and the German
writers, cannot be questioned, without setting up a forced
construction of a particular phrase, in opposition to the whole
tenor of their publications; without supposing that whilst they
contend for the general system of the armed neutrality, of
which this is an essential principle, and have for their main
object the enlargement of neutral rights, they could, by a
loose stroke of the pen sacrifice a neutral right, far more important
than those which they took up their pens to maintain.

Such suppositions cannot for a moment be entertained. Nor
indeed have any of the partizans of Great Britain undertaken
to advance them.

With respect to the opinion of these very late writers, indeed,
it is impossible to doubt that their sentiments are in opposition
to the belligerent principle of Great Britain. If they
have not been more expressly so, their silence is readily explained
by the period when they wrote, that is, after the abandonment
of the principle during the war of 1778, and before
their attention could be called to the subject by the occurrences
of the war of 1793. As late even as the year 1799, it was affirmed
at the bar of the high court of admiralty, that "in the

late practice of this court, during this war, there have been a
variety of cases from the French and Dutch colonies, in which
the court has either ordered further proof, or restored in the
first instance."[151] And in a prior case, in the same year, Sir
William Scott in reply to an argument at the bar, that the illegality
of a trade between the mother countries and their West
Indies had been in a good measure abandoned in the decisions
of the lords of appeal, does not pretend that any contrary decisions
had taken place. He says only–" I am not acquainted
with any decision to that effect; and I doubt very much whether
any decision yet made has given even an indirect countenance
to this supposed dereliction of a principle rational in itself, and
conformable to all general reasoning on the subject."[152] Even
the orders of council, commencing in January, 1793, could not
have been known to these writers; and if they had, were so
loosely expressed, so frequently changed, and had their effects
at so great a distance from European jurists, that the innovation
could not be expected to become an immediate subject of
their attention and discussion.

To the incidental hesitation of Hubner, then, opposed by his
own deliberate explanation of his principles, are to be opposed
the direct authority of one of his countrymen, and the unanimous
authority of a host of modern writers, all of a date later
than Hubner, and many of them more distinguished for their
talents and their erudition on subjects of public law.

It will be found that Mr. Ward is not more successful in his
definitions and reasonings on this subject, than in his appeal to
the authority of Jurists.

That the obscurity and uncongruity into which this heresy
in public law betrays the votaries who engage in its defence,
may be the better seen, Mr. Ward shall be exhibited in his
own words:

"Let it be remembered, therefore, that the question on the
"part of the belligerent is not, as has been grossly supposed,
"whether he has a right to interfere with the neutral; but

merely whether he cannot prevent the neutral from interfering
with him? In other words, whether, when the former
extends the bounds of his trade not with but for a belligerent;
not only purchases what he wants for his own consumption,
or sells his usual peace supply of articles; but sells to him
articles which may be easily converted into the means of
annoyance; or even turns carrier for his oppressed friend
who uses the surplus strength which is thus afforded him
against his opponent; whether in such case the other belligerent
has no reason to be offended, and to reclaim those
rights which the pretended neutral is disposed to deny him?
"This is in fact the true state of the question."[153]

"In granting, therefore, the fair and reasonable enjoyment
of their privileges to neutral nations, there must always be
added the fair and reasonable caution that they use them so
as not to hurt the belligerent; and that I may not seem to entrench
myself in general 'ubi sœpe versatur error,' I would
add that they have certainly no right to use them in any one,
the smallest degree more than they did in times of peace, nor
even in so great a degree, if such augmented, or the ordinary
use of them, bears immediate mischief to either belligerent.
For example, they may increase their purchases to any
amount in the belligerent countries, provided their own
consumption required it, and provided they remain domiciled
in their own country. But if they persist in carrying,
much more, if they extend their faculty of carrying for the
belligerent, where the latter was in the habit of carrying
before; and if, in consequence, he is enabled to come to the
battle, and to stand the shock of war, with augmented
strength, which he never would nor could have possessed
without it, I see little or no difference between this and an
actual loan of military assistance. All the distinction is,
that he substitutes his own people in the place of taking
foreigners, for every man which the neutral lends to his
trade enables him to furnish a man to his own hostile fleets.

In other words, it enables him to meet his enemy with undiminished
forces, and yet preserve entire his sources of
revenue; when, if it was not for this conduct of the neutral,
either the forces or the revenue of the belligerent must be
diminished.[154]

"According to our principles, the same reason which applies
to contraband, applies to all nocent cases whatsoever."

A complaint in general terms that a power, which had hitherto
stood by, should step in and do that for the belligerent
which he was no longer able to do himself, introduces the following
passage: "to come a little more into the detail and
application of this argument, let us suppose, as was the case
with France, a heavy duty on foreign freight had formed an
almost fundamental law of her own commercial code; which
in times of peace, was a kind of navigation act amounting to
an interdiction of foreign interference; and that of a sudden,
while engaged in war, wanting her sailors, perhaps her merchant
ships, for hostile expeditions, at the same time wanting
the pecuniary and other sources of her trade, which would
thus be extinguished, she applied to nations calling themselves
neutral, by taking off this duty, or even by bounties,
to carry on this trade. Here is a proof how necessary this
trade is to her exigencies, and how impossible it is to preserve
it, consistently with her warfare. But where is the
man of plain understanding, and uninterested in the question,
who would not determine, that if the neutral accepted
the offer, that instant he interfered in the war, &c.?"[155]

"These observations apply very generally to all the carrying
trade, but they more particularly apply to that specific
claim in the first article of the armed neutrality of 1780, to
navigate freely on the coasts, and from port to port of nations
at war. In so far as the coasting trade of a nation is
more valuable and more necessary to its existence than its
foreign commerce; in just so far is the interposition of neutrals
more powerful in its favor."[156]

These extracts cannot be charged with perverting or mutilating
the argumentative part of Mr. Ward's vindication of the
belligerent claim in question.

The views of this claim, which Mr. Ward here gives, are,
it must be confessed, so vague and so confused that it is difficult
to fix on the real meaning of the writer. As far as it
can be reduced to any thing like precision, he appears to be at
variance with himself; and what is perhaps, not less extraordinary,
at variance with Sir William Scott; sometimes going
beyond the belligerent claims of the judge, and sometimes relinquishing
a part of them.

Thus, on comparing him with himself, he first allows neutrals
to increase their purchases to any amount; provided their
own consumption require it. He next states, that the neutral
privilege is not only not to be used in the smallest degree
more than in peace, but not in the ordinary degree, if it bears
immediate mischief to either belligerent. Finally, he maintains,
that the same reason which applies to contraband, applies
to all nocent cases whatsoever.

On comparing him with Sir William Scott, Mr. Ward admits
that neutrals have a right to trade, so far as to purchase
and increase their purchases, to the amount of their own consumption.
It has been sufficiently seen that Sir William
Scott, and indeed his superiors both in the admiralty and
executive departments, consider the trade of neutrals, beyond
the permission to trade in peace, as merely a relaxation of the
rights of war. Here then he stops short of Sir William Scott.

If we are not to consider that, as his real meaning, but pass
on to his next position, which denies to neutrals a trade, even
in the ordinary degree, if it bears immediate mischief to a belligerent
(by which the context will not permit us to understand
any possible allusion to contraband) he here expressly
contradicts Sir William Scott, who lays it down with emphasis
"that the general rule is, that the neutral has a right to carry
on in time of war, his accustomed trade, to the utmost extent
of which that accustomed trade is capable."

If we recur to his last and most rigorous position, that
all nocent cases whatever are within the reason applicable to
contraband; he must be still more extensively at variance
with Sir William Scott.

In support of the claim, whatever be the extent in which he
means to give it, Mr. Ward urges the unlawfulness of a neutral
trade, which "is not with, but for an enemy." This has been
a very favorite phrase with the patrons of the British claim.
It probably was first used in expressing the fiction by which
neutral ships, licensed to trade with the French colonies,
were converted into French ships. In its application to the
subsequent pretext, which determines the channel of trade
itself to be unlawful, it is not easy to find any distinct signification:
If by trading for an enemy be meant, carrying in
neutral vessels enemy's property, the phrase has no connection
with the present question; which is not, whether enemy's property
in a neutral ship be liable to capture, but whether neutral
property in a neutral ship, in a particular channel, be a lawful
trade: If by trading for an enemy be meant, carrying to or
from his ports, neutral property, where he used to carry it himself;
then it cannot be any thing more than trading with, not
for him, during the war; as he traded with, not for the neutral
nation, before the war; and the case is nothing more than
a relaxation of a navigation act: If by trading with an enemy
be meant, carrying neutral articles of trade, which he would
neither carry himself nor permit to be carried by neutrals before
the war, but the carriage of which he permits both to
neutrals and to himself during the war; this can no more be
trading for, not with him, than it was trading for, not with
each other, for either to carry to the other during war or peace,
articles at one time prohibited, and then permitted by the other;
and the case is nothing more than a relaxation with respect to
the articles of commerce; as the former was a relaxation with
respect to the vessels transporting the articles. The same
distinctions and inferences are generally applicable where particular
ports shut, at one time, come to be opened, at another.

The essence of the argument supposed to be compressed
into this equivocal phrase, thus, evaporates altogether in the
analysis. It either means nothing that is true, or nothing
that is to the purpose.

But the real hinge on which the reasoning of Mr. Ward
turns, is, the injury resulting to one belligerent, from the advantage
given to another, by a neutral whose ships and mariners
carry on a trade previously carried on by the belligerent
himself, and which, consequently, enables the belligerent to
employ his own ships and mariners in the operations of war;
without even relinquishing the revenue which has its sources
in commerce. Between this and an actual loan of military
assistance by the neutral, Mr. Ward can see no difference;
and this is the most plausible consideration perhaps which
could be urged in the cause which he defends.

But unfortunately for this defence, it is completely subverted
by three other considerations:

1.

• The argument is just as applicable to cases where the vessels
  of the nation, before it was at war, were actually employed,
  without any legal exclusion of those of the neutral nation, as
  to cases where there was a legal exclusion of foreign vessels
  before, and a legal admission of them during, the war. In
  both cases, the belligerent vessels and seamen, as far as they
  are liberated by the substitution of foreign vessels and seamen,
  may be added to his military strength, without any
  diminution of his exports and imports, or of the revenues connected
  with them. Either, therefore, the argument must be
  extended (which will not be undertaken) to the latter case, or
  it loses its force, as to the former.

2.

• It has been shewn that Great Britain does herself, thus
  relax her navigation act; and avowedly for the purposes of substituting
  neutral vessels and mariners in place of those which
  she finds it expedient to employ in the operations of war. Mr.
  Ward must therefore either relinquish his argument, or condemn
  the practice of his own government.

3.

• This fundamental argument of Mr. Ward is expressly
  

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  thrown out of the question by Sir William Scott, who admits
  that Great Britain, like all countries, in all wars, relaxes her
  navigation acts and other regulations founded thereon, in order
  to obtain the service of foreigners with their vessels, where she
  did without it in times of peace; but that these relaxations,
  though they arise out of a state of war, do not arise from that
  predominance of force which he takes to be the true foundation
  of the principle.[157]

When Mr. Ward then asks, "where is the man of plain understanding,
and uninterested in the question, who would not
determine, that if the neutral accepted the offer, [of a trade
from which the ships and seamen of the belligerent were withdrawn
for the purposes of war,] that instant he interfered in
the war?" A man may be named whose determination of the
question, Mr. Ward, as may be inferred from his eulogies on
Sir William Scott, would of all men be the last to contest.

On turning to the work of Mr. Browne, it does not appear
that he has presented any views of the subject, which require
particular examination. He has, in fact, done little more
than appeal to the authority of Sir William Scott, and praise
and repeat the arguments of Mr. Ward.

It may be thought, that some notice ought to be taken of a
discourse of the present Earl of Liverpool, prefixed to his collection
of treaties. It would be injustice to the distinguished
author of that defence of the maritime principles of Great
Britain, to deny it the merit of learning, ingenuity, and a vein
of candor more than is always found in such discussions. His
attention, however, was almost wholly directed to the question
whether free ships make free goods, a question not within the
limits of this investigation. He has, indeed, a few cursory
observations, such as could not be here noticed without going
into unnecessary repetitions, in favor of the doctrine that a
trade not customary in peace cannot be lawful in war. These
observations, he concludes, with one referred to by Mr. Ward
as of great force, on the general question between belligerent

and neutral nations; namely, "that if this right were admitted,
it would be the interest of all commercial States "to promote
dissentions among their neighbors."

If there be any plausibility in this argument, it is certainly
all the merit that can be claimed for it. The wars which afflict
mankind, are not produced by the intrigues or cupidity of the
weaker nations, who wish to remain in peace, whilst their
neighbors are at war. They are the offspring of ambitious,
and not unfrequently commercial rivalships, among the more
powerful nations themselves. This is a fact attested by all
history. If maxims of public law are to be tested, therefore,
by their pacific tendency, such maxims, it is evident, must
be favored as circumscribing, not the rights and interests of
neutral nations, but the belligerent and commercial interests,
of their more powerful and warlike neighbors.

As a further answer to the observations of this noble author,
and as a final answer to all the arguments which are drawn
from the intrinsic equity or conveniency of this principle, the
following considerations must have weight with all candid and
competent judges.

In the first place it may be repeated, that on a question
which is to be decided, not by the abstract precepts of reason,
but by the rules of law positively in force, it is not sufficient
to show on which side an intrinsic reasonableness can be
traced. It is necessary to shew, on which side the law as in
force, is found to be. In the present case, it has been shewn
that this law is not for, but against, the British side of the
question.

But secondly, it is denied that if reason, equity, or conveniency,
were alone to decide the question, the decision would
be different from that which the law in force pronounces on it.

War imposes on neutral commerce a variety of privations
and embarrassments. It is reasonable, therefore, as well as
lawful, that neutrals should enjoy the advantages which may
happen to arise from war.

1.

• In the case of contraband, the articles of which, especially
  

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  according to the British catalogue, may compose an important
  branch of exports in time of peace, the commerce of particular
  nations remaining at peace may suffer material defalcations
  from the exercise of the rights of war.

2.

• In the case of enemy's property carried by neutral ships,
  (as Great Britain, at least, understands and enforces the law
  of nations,) a branch of trade more or less important to all
  commercial nations, and constituting the most profitable
  branch of trade with some in times of peace, becomes an
  object of belligerent interruption and confiscation.

3.

• In the case of blockades the abridgment and embarrassment
  to which the trade of neutrals, especially those at a distance,
  is subjected by war, form other important items of loss
  on either side. This is a belligerent claim, on which much
  might be said, if the notoriety of its effects, to say nothing of
  its extravagant abuses, did not render it unnecessary.

4.

• The interruptions, proceeding from searches of neutral
  vessels on the high seas, the erroneous suspicions and inferences
  which send them into port for trial, the difficulty of
  obtaining all the requisites proofs thereon by the claimant,
  the delays and expences incident to the judicial proceedings,
  more especially where the trial is at a great distance, and above
  all when appeals still more distant become necessary, the
  changes in the state of markets during all these delays, which
  convert into loss the gains promised by the expedition, the
  suspension of the mercantile funds, the heavy sacrifices, and
  sometimes bankruptcies thence ensuing; all these injuries,
  which war brings on neutral commerce, taken together, must
  surely, during war, require a very great weight in the opposite
  scale to balance them, and the weight of these injuries is sometimes
  not a little increased by the piracies which a state of war
  generates and emboldens.

The injuries, besides, which are here enumerated, are limited
to such proceedings as the laws of war may be thought to
authorize. To a fair estimate of the evils suffered by neutral
commerce, must be added all those abuses which never fail

to be mingled with the exercise of belligerent rights on the
high seas; the protracted interruptions, the personal insults,
the violent or furtive spoliations, with a thousand irregularities,
which are more or less inseparable from the proceeding,
and which can seldom be so far verified and prosecuted to
effect against the wrong-doers, as to amount to a reparation.

If the evils, brought on neutrals by a state of war, were to
be traced to their full extent, a long list of a distinct kind ought
moreover to be thrown into the same scale. How many condemnations
are made either directly contrary to the law
of nations, or by means of unjust presumptions, or abitrary
rules of evidence, against neutral claimants! How often and
how severely are the neutral appellants aggrieved by measuring
the restitution awarded to them, not according to the
actual loss, but according to the deficient estimates, or the
scanty proceeds of sales, decreed by ignorant or corrupt vice
admiralty courts,[158] in places and under circumstances, which
reduce the price to a mere fraction of the value! Examples
of this sort might easily be multiplied; but they may be thought
of the less weight in the present case, as they furnish a just
ground of resort from the ordinary tribunals of justice, to
those ulterior remedies, which depend on negotiations and
arrangements between the belligerent and neutral governments.
But whatever may be the provisions for indemnity,
obtained in these modes, it remains an important truth on
the present subject, that besides the intermediate disadvantage
to neutral traders from the mere delay of diplomatic and
conventional remedies, the justice stipulated is always rendered

very incomplete, by the difficulties in verifying the
losses and damages sustained.

The principle urged against a neutral trade in time of war,
not permitted in peace, is the more unreasonable, because it
gives to a tribunal established by the belligerent party only, a
latitude of judgment improper to be confided to courts of justice,
however constituted.[159]

In cases, even where the tribunal has an equal relation to
both the parties, it has ever been deemed proper, that the rules
of decision should be as plain and as determinate as possible;
in order not only, that they might be the surer guide to those
who are to observe them; but also a better guard against the
partialities and errors of those who are to apply them. Say,
then, whether it be not an abandonment of every reasonable

precaution, while the judges have in their national prejudices,
in the tenure of their official emoluments, and in their hopes of
personal advancements, an exclusive relation to one of the
parties; say whether it be not unreasonable to leave to the
opinion, perhaps to the conjectures of a tribunal so composed,
the questions whether in a distant quarter of the globe a particular
trade[160] was or was not allowed before the war, whether
if not allowed before the war, its allowance during the war,
proceeded from causes distinct from the war, or arising out
of the war; whether the allowance had or had not been
common to all wars; whether again, if resulting from the particular
pressure of the war, the pressure amounted to a necessity;
whether if amounting to a necessity, the necessity
resulted from an impossibility, imposed by a decided predominance
and superiority at sea, of the adverse party? These are
not questions of fancy or of unfairness. They are questions
which it has been seen, that the enlightened judge in the
British high court of admiralty has himself recognized as involved
in the principle for which he contends. But they are
questions in their nature improper to be decided by any judicial
authority whatever; and in their importance, they are
questions too great to be left even to the sovereign authority
of a country where the rights of other sovereigns are to be the
object of the decision.

Finally:—The belligerent claim, to intercept a neutral trade
in war not open in peace, is rendered still more extravagantly
preposterous and pernicious, by the latitude which it is now
assuming. According to late decisions in the British courts,
it is in future to be a rule, that produce of an enemy's colony,
lawfully imported into a neutral country, and incorporated
into its commercial stock, as far as the ordinary regulations of
a sovereign State can work such an effect, is to be subject on
re-exportation to capture and condemnation; unless it can
be shewn that it was imported in the proceeding voyage, with

an intention that it should not be re-exported. Consider for
a moment the indignity offered to a neutral sovereign in subjecting
the integrity of its internal regulations to the scrutiny
of foreign courts, and to the interested suspicions of belligerent
cruizers; consider the oppression on the individual traders,
inseparable from a trial in a distant court, and perhaps an appeal
to another court still more distant, where the intention
of an antecedent voyage is to be traced through all the labyrinth
of mercantile transactions. A neutral vessel goes to sea,
with a cargo consisting, in whole or in part, of colonial produce.
It may be the produce of a neutral colony. It may be the
produce of the country exporting it: The United States already
produce cotton, sugar, rice, &c., as well as the West Indies.
The cruizer does not forget, that the proof will probably be
thrown on the claimants; that besides the possibility that it
may be a licensed capture, the difficulty of proof may have
the same effect in producing condemnation. He recollects
also that in the event of an acquittal the costs[161] will,
where there is the least color for seizure, be thrown on the
claimants; and that, at the worst, he can only be put to
the inconvenience of giving up a few men to take charge of
the prize, in exchange for a few others, not unfrequently impressed
into the vacancy. In a word, his calculation is,
that he may gain, and cannot lose. Will not, under such
circumstances, every hogshead of sugar, or bale of cotton,
or barrel of rum, &c., be a signal for detention? Could
ingenuity devise a project holding out a more effectual
premium for the multiplication of vexations searches and
seizures, beyond even the ordinary proportion of condemnations?
A project, in fact, more unjust in itself, more disrespectful
to neutral notions, or more fatal to the liberty and
interests of neutral commerce? Would Great Britain be patient
under such proceedings against her, if she held in her
hands, the means of controuling them? If she will not answer
for herself all the world will answer for her, that she
would not, and what is more, that she ought not.