University of Virginia Library

ART: 26.

It is particularly desirable that the duration of the Treaty
should be abridged, to the term limited in the instructions
of the 5th Jany 1804.

Having taken this view of the subject with reference to a
formal Treaty under new modifications, it is necessary to
recollect that you were authorized by my letter of Feby 3d, to
enter into informal arrangements and that before the receipt
of my letter of March 18th a plan of that sort may have been
definitively settled. In such a state of things, it is impossible
to do better than to leave your own judgments, aided by a
knowledge of circumstances unknown here, and by the sentiments

of the President now communicated, to decide how
far it may be eligible, or otherwise, to attempt to supersede
that informal arrangement, by opening the negotiation
herein contemplated.

Should, on another hand, the negotiation be found in the
state authorized by my letter of March 18th, that is to say,
matured provisionally only, and consequently leaving the
door open for the experiment now provided for, it must equally
remain with your own judgments, guided by a comparison
of the terms of the provisional arrangement, with the present
instructions, to decide how far it may be best to close the
former, or to pursue the objects of the latter with a view in
case of failure, to return to and close the former.

Whatever may be the course recommended by the actual
state of things, you will feel the propriety of smoothing
the way for it, by the explanations which will best satisfy
the British Government that the several steps taken on the
part of the United States have proceeded from their solicitude
to find some ground on which the difficulties and differences
existing between the two Countries, might be amicably and
permanently terminated. You will be equally aware of the
importance of transmitting hither as early and as circumstantial
information of your proceedings and prospects, as
opportunities will permit; and will particularly keep in
mind the earnest desire of the President to possess, in due time,
every material preparatory to the Communications relating
to our affairs with Great Britain, which will be so anxiously
expected on the meeting of Congress the first Monday in
December.

Since the contents of this Dispatch were determined on,
and mostly prepared, advices have been received of the
change which is taking place in the British administration.
Composed as the new one is likely to be, or rather is said to
be the event will subject our British affairs to new calculations.
The difference in the general complexion ascribed to the
politics of the rival parties towards the United States and the

language held by some individuals of the one now entering
the Cabinet, augur, on one hand, fresh obstacles to a favorable
negotiation. On the other hand, however, a less degree of
confidence in their own strength than was felt by their
predecessors, and a dread of furnishing these with such a topic
as might be found in a real or impending collision with this
Country, may be a powerful controul on illiberal dispositions
towards it. Another favorable consideration is, that an
important member of the New Ministry, Lord Hawksbury,
was formerly as the head of the foreign Department, the
person who negotiated with Mr. King a relinquishment of impressments
on the high seas, who made to the same public
minister, the Communications assuring to neutrals a re-exportation
of Colonial produce unfettered in any respect other
than by the condition of its having been landed and paid the
ordinary duties, and finally who communicated to this Government
thro' Mr. Merry, the instructions given to the British
Commanders and Courts in the West Indies, in which blockades,
and the mode of giving notice of them were defined in
terms liable to no objection. His concurrence therefore in an
admissible provision, on these cardinal points, is due to that
consistency which all men value more or less; and to which you
will of course appeal, as far as circumstances may invite and
delicacy permit. The inducement to touch that string is
the greater as it has not appeared that in any of the late
Parliamentary discussions, this nobleman has joined in the
unfriendly language held in relation to the neutral and commercial
rights of this Country. It is to be recollected also
that Lord Sidmouth, was at the Head of the administration
at the period alluded to, and consequently ought to be induced
by a like regard for his character to promote the adjustment
we claim, in case he should be excepted, as is said to be
not improbable, out of the dismission of his colleagues.

There are considerations moreover which cannot be without
weight with a prudent Cabinet, however composed. They
must know that apart from the obstacles which may be

opposed here to the use of British manufactures, the United
States, by a mere reciprocation of the British navigation and
Colonial laws, may give a very serious blow to a favorite system,
a blow that would be felt perhaps as much too in its
example, as in its immediate operation. Should this policy
be adopted by the United States, as it respects the British
West Indies, the value of those possessions would be either
speedily lost, or be no otherwise than by a compliance with
the fair reciprocity claimed by this Country. It can no
longer be unknown to the most sanguine partizan of the
Colonial Monopoly, that the necessaries of life and of cultivation,
can be furnished to those Islands from no other source
than the United States; that immediate ruin would ensue
if this source were shut up; and that a gradual one would be
the effect of even turning the supplies out of the present direct
channel, into a circuitous one thro' neutral ports in the West
Indies. In this latter alternative, the least unfavorable that
presents, the produce of this Country would be carried to,
probably a Danish Island with the same mercantile profit, and
the same employment of our navigation, as if carried to the
British Island consuming it; and would thence be transported
to the British Island with little advantage to British Ships,
which would necessarily be sent in ballast, and confined
to a sickly climate; whilst the enhanced price of the supplies
would be fatal first to the prosperity and finally to the existence
of those dependencies.

It ought to occur moreover to the British Government
that its marine may become as dependant as its Colonies
on the supplies of the United States. As an auxiliary resource
for naval stores, this Country must be at all times important
to Great Britain. But it will be the sole and therefore an
essential one in case that of the Baltic and even of the black
sea, should fail. And it may be justly remarked that a
prohibition of this branch of our exports would be a less
sacrifice than that of any other important one; inasmuch as
some of the Articles of which it consists, being necessary to

ourselves, and of an exhaustible nature, make it a problem
whether the regulation would not in itself accord with our
permanent interests.

Lastly it should not be forgotten that the United States
are one of the Granaries which supply the annual deficit
of the British harvests. The northern part of Europe, the
usual concurrent resource is in a situation that must disable
it, for some time, whatever the course of events may be, to
spare any of its stock of food; nor can any substitute, other
than the redundant harvests of the United States, be relied
on to make up that deficiency. Add to this prospect, the
possibility of an unfavorable season requiring enlarged importations
of bread from the only source that can furnish
it, and the risk of losing this would be an evil which no
provident Counsels would neglect to guard against, by any
measures equitable in themselves, or even by concessions
neither dishonorable nor materially injurious.

On the other hand Great Britain having been led by her
peculiar system to carry her commercial exclusions and restrictions
to the utmost limit permitted by her immediate
wants, would find no countervailing resources to be turned
against the United States. She could not prohibit the importation
of our productions: These are necessaries which
feed her people, which supply her manufactories, which keep
up her navy, and which, by direct and indirect contributions
to her revenue and credit strengthen all her faculties as a
great power. As little could she prohibit the exportation of
her manufactures to the United States: This is the last evil
she would think of inflicting on herself. If it withheld from
us the means of enjoyment, it would take from her own
people the means of existence.

Would War be a better resort? That it would be a calamity
to the United States is so well understood by them that
peace has been cherished in the midst of provocations which
scarcely permitted honor to listen to interest, to reason or to
humanity. War they will continue to avert by every policy

which can be reconciled with the essential duties which a
nation owes to itself. But what will be the gain and the
loss to Great Britain by a choice of this resort? The spoils
of our defenceless commerce might enrich her greedy cruizers
and flatter the sentiments of national wealth. A temporary
spasm might, at the same time, be produced in the affairs of
the United States. But these effects weigh little against
the Considerations which belong to the opposite scale. To
say nothing of the hostile use that might be made against
Great Britain of 50,000 seamen, not less hardy or enterprising
than her own, nor of her vulnerable possessions in our neighbourhood,
which tho' little desired by the United States,
are highly prized by her, nor of the general tendency of
adding the United States to the mass of nations already
in arms against her; it is enough to observe, that a war with
the United States involves a complete loss of the principal remaining
market for her manufactures, and of the principal,
perhaps the sole, remaining source of supplies without which
all her faculties must wither. Nor is it an unimportant
circumstance, tho' it seems to have engaged little of her
attention, that in the loss would be included, all the advantages
which she now derives from the neutrality of our flag, and of
our ports, and for which she could find no substitutes in
distributing her manufactures, and even her fish to their
necessary markets, and in obtaining the returns which she
wants. The more these collateral advantages are enquired
into, the more important will the interest appear which
Great Britain has in preserving them.

These are views of the subject, which, tho' not to be presented
to Great Britain with an air of menace or defiance, equally forbidden
by respect to ourselves, and to her, may find a proper
way to her attention. They merit hers as well as ours; and if
they ought to promote on both sides, a spirit of accommodation,
they shew at the same time that Great Britain is not the
party which has the least interest in taking Counsel from them.