Livy's History of Rome: Book 22
The Disaster of Cannae
22.1
Spring was now
coming on; Hannibal accordingly moved out of his winter quarters. His
previous attempt to cross the Apennines had been frustrated by the
insupportable cold; to remain where he was would have been to court
danger. The Gauls had rallied to him through the prospect of booty and
spoil, but when they found that instead of plundering other people's territory
their own had become the seat of war and had to bear the burden of
furnishing winter quarters for both sides, they diverted their hatred from the
Romans to Hannibal. Plots against his life were frequently hatched by their
chiefs, and he owed his safety to their mutual faithlessness, for they betrayed
the plots to him in the same spirit of fickleness in which they had formed
them. He guarded himself from their attempts by assuming different
disguises, at one time wearing a different dress, at another putting on false
hair. But these constant alarms were an additional motive for his early
departure from his winter quarters. About the same time Cn. Servilius
entered upon his consulship at Rome, on the 15th of March. When he had
laid before the senate the policy which he proposed to carry out, the
indignation against C. Flaminius broke out afresh. "Two consuls had been
elected, but as a matter of fact they only had one. What legitimate authority
did this man possess? What religious sanctions? Magistrates only take these
sanctions with them from home, from the altars of the State, and from their
private altars at home after they have celebrated the Latin Festival, offered
the sacrifice on the Alban Mount, and duly recited the vows in the Capitol.
These sanctions do not follow a private citizen, nor if he has departed
without them can he obtain them afresh in all their fulness on a foreign soil."
To add to the general feeling of apprehension, information was
received of portents having occurred simultaneously in several places. In
Sicily several of the soldiers' darts were covered with flames; in Sardinia the
same thing happened to the staff in the hand of an officer who was going his
rounds to inspect the sentinels on the wall; the shores had been lit up by
numerous fires; a couple of shields had sweated blood; some soldiers had
been struck by lightning; an eclipse of the sun had been observed; at
Praeneste there had been a shower of red-hot stones; at Arpi shields had
been seen in the sky and the sun had appeared to be fighting with the moon;
at Capena two moons were visible in the daytime; at Caere the waters ran
mingled with blood, and even the spring of Hercules had bubbled up with
drops of blood on the water; at Antium the ears of corn which fell into the
reapers' basket were blood-stained; at Falerii the sky seemed to be cleft
asunder as with an enormous rift and all over the opening there was a blazing
light; the oracular tablets shrank and shrivelled without being touched and
one had fallen out with this inscription, "MARS IS SHAKING HIS
SPEAR"; and at the same time the statue of Mars on the Appian Way and
the images of the Wolves sweated blood. Finally, at Capua the sight was
seen of the sky on fire and the moon falling in the midst of a shower of rain.
Then credence was given to comparatively trifling portents, such as that
certain people's goats were suddenly clothed with wool, a hen turned into a
cock, and a cock into a hen. After giving the details exactly as they were
reported to him and bringing his informants before the senate, the consul
consulted the House as to what religious observances ought to be
proclaimed. A decree was passed that to avert the evils which these portents
foreboded, sacrifices should be offered, the victims to be both full-grown
animals and sucklings, and also that special intercessions should be made at
all the shrines for three days. What other ceremonial was necessary was to
be carried out in accordance with the instructions of the decemvirs after they
had inspected the Sacred Books and ascertained the will of the gods. On
their advice it was decreed that the first votive offering should be made to
Jupiter in the shape of a golden thunderbolt weighing fifty pounds, gifts of
silver to Juno and Minerva, and sacrifices of full-grown victims to Queen
Juno on the Aventine and Juno Sospita at Lanuvium, whilst the matrons
were to contribute according to their means and bear their gift to Queen
Juno on the Aventine. A lectisternium was to be held, and even the
freedwomen were to contribute what they could for a gift to the temple of
Feronia. When these instructions had been carried out the decemvirs
sacrificed full-grown victims in the forum at Ardea, and finally in the middle
of December there was a sacrifice at the Temple of Saturn, a lectisternium
was ordered (the senators prepared the couch), and a public banquet. For a
day and a night the cry of the Saturnalia resounded through the City, and the
people were ordered to make that day a festival and observe it as such for
ever.
22.2
While the
consul was occupied in these propitiatory ceremonies and also in the
enrolment of troops, information reached Hannibal that Flaminius had
arrived at Arretium, and he at once broke up his winter quarters. There were
two routes into Etruria, both of which were pointed out to Hannibal; one
was considerably longer than the other but a much better road, the shorter
route, which he decided to take, passed through the marshes of the Arno,
which was at the time in higher flood than usual. He ordered the Spaniards
and Africans, the main strength of his veteran army, to lead, and they were
to take their own baggage with them, so that, in case of a halt, they might
have the necessary supplies; the Gauls were to follow so as to form the
centre of the column; the cavalry were to march last, and Mago and his
Numidian light horse were to close up the column, mainly to keep the Gauls
up to the mark in case they fell out or came to a halt through the fatigue and
exertion of so long a march, for as a nation they were unable to stand that
kind of thing. Those in front followed wherever the guides led the way,
through the deep and almost bottomless pools of water, and though almost
sucked in by the mud through which they were half-wading, half-swimming,
still kept their ranks. The Gauls could neither recover themselves when they
slipped nor when once down had they the strength to struggle out of the
pools; depressed and hopeless they had no spirits left to keep up their bodily
powers. Some dragged their worn-out limbs painfully along, others gave up
the struggle and lay dying amongst the baggage animals which were lying
about in all directions. What distressed them most of all was want of sleep,
from which they had been suffering for four days and three nights. As
everything was covered with water and they had not a dry spot on which to
lay their wearied bodies, they piled up the baggage in the water and lay on
the top, whilst some snatched a few minutes' needful rest by making couches
of the heaps of baggage animals which were everywhere standing out of the
water. Hannibal himself, whose eyes were affected by the changeable and
inclement spring weather, rode upon the only surviving elephant so that he
might be a little higher above the water. Owing, however, to want of sleep
and the night mists and the malaria from the marshes, his head became
affected, and as neither place nor time admitted of any proper treatment, he
completely lost the sight of one eye.
22.3
After
losing many men and beasts under these frightful .circumstances, he at last
got clear of the marshes, and as soon as he could find some dry ground he
pitched his camp. The scouting parties he had sent out reported that the
Roman army was lying in the neighbourhood of Arretium. His next step was
to investigate as carefully as he possibly could all that it was material for him
to know -what mood the consul was in, what designs he was forming, what
the character of the country and the kind of roads it possessed, and what
resources it offered for the obtaining of supplies. The district was amongst
the most fertile in Italy; the plains of Etruria, which extend from Faesulae to
Arretium, are rich in corn and live stock and every kind of produce. The
consul's overbearing temper, which had grown steadily worse since his last
consulship, made him lose all proper respect and reverence even for the
gods, to say nothing of the majesty of the senate and the laws, and this
self-willed and obstinate side of his character had been aggravated by the
successes he had achieved both at home and in the field. It was perfectly
obvious that he would not seek counsel from either God or man, and
whatever he did would be done in an impetuous and headstrong manner. By
way of making him show these faults of character still more flagrantly, the
Carthaginian prepared to irritate and annoy him. He left the Roman camp on
his left, and marched in the direction of Faesulae to plunder the central
districts of Etruria. Within actual view of the consul he created as
widespread a devastation as he possibly could, and from the Roman camp
they saw in the distance an extensive scene of fire and .massacre.
Flaminius had no intention of keeping quiet even if the enemy had
done so, but now that he saw the possessions of the allies of Rome
plundered and pillaged almost before his very eyes, he felt it to be a personal
disgrace that an enemy should be roaming at will through Italy and
advancing to attack Rome with none to hinder him. All the other members of
the council of war were in favour of a policy of safety rather than of display;
they urged him to wait for his colleague, that they might unite their forces
and act with one mind on a common plan, and pending his arrival they
should check the wild excesses of the plundering enemy with cavalry and the
light-armed auxiliaries. Enraged at these suggestions he dashed out of the
council and ordered the trumpets to give the signal for march and battle;
exclaiming at the same time: "We are to sit, I suppose, before the walls of
Arretium, because our country and our household gods are here. Now that
Hannibal has slipped through our hands, he is to ravage Italy, destroy and
burn everything in his way till he reaches Rome, while we are not to stir from
here until the senate summons C. Flaminius from Arretium as they once
summoned Camillus from Veii." During this outburst, he ordered the
standards to be pulled up with all speed and at the same time mounted his
horse. No sooner had he done so than the animal stumbled and fell and threw
him over its head All those who were standing round were appalled by what
they took to be an evil omen at the beginning of a campaign, and their alarm
was considerably increased by a message brought to the consul that the
standard could not be moved though the standard-bearer had exerted his
utmost strength. He turned to the messenger and asked him: "Are you
bringing a despatch from the senate, also, forbidding me to go on with the
campaign? Go, let them dig out the standard if their hands are too benumbed
with fear for them to pull it up." Then the column began its march. The
superior officers, besides being absolutely opposed to his plans, were
thoroughly alarmed by the double portent, but the great body of the soldiers
were delighted at the spirit their general had shown; they shared his
confidence without knowing on what slender grounds it rested.
22.4
In order
still further to exasperate his enemy and make him eager to avenge the
injuries inflicted on the allies of Rome, Hannibal laid waste with all the
horrors of war the land between Cortona and Lake Trasumennus. He had
now reached a position eminently adapted for surprise tactics, where the lake
comes up close under the hills of Cortona. There is only a very narrow road
here between the hills and the lake, as though a space had been purposely
left far it. Further on there is a small expanse of level ground flanked by hills,
and it was here that Hannibal pitched camp, which was only occupied by his
Africans and Spaniards, he himself being in command. The Balearics and the
rest of the light infantry he sent behind the hills; the cavalry, conveniently
screened by some low hills, he stationed at the mouth of the defile, so that
when the Romans had entered it they would be completely shut in by the
cavalry, the lake, and the hills. Flaminius had reached the lake at sunset. The
next morning, in a still uncertain light, he passed through the defile, without
sending any scouts on to feel the way, and when the column began to deploy
in the wider extent of level ground the only enemy they saw was the one in
front, the rest were concealed in their rear and above their heads. When the
Carthaginian saw his object achieved and had his enemy shut in between the
lake and the hills with his forces surrounding them, he gave the signal for all
to make a simultaneous attack, and they charged straight down upon the
point nearest to them. The affair was all the more sudden and unexpected to
the Romans because a fog which had risen from the lake was denser on the
plain than on the heights; the bodies of the enemy on the various hills could
see each other well enough, and it was all the easier for them to charge all at
the same time. The shout of battle rose round the Romans before they could
see clearly from whence it came, or became aware that they were
surrounded. Fighting began in front and flank before they could form line or
get their weapons ready or draw their swords.
22.5
In the
universal panic, the consul displayed all the coolness that could be expected
under the circumstances. The ranks were broken by each man turning
towards the discordant shouts; he re-formed them as well as time and place
allowed, and wherever he could be seen or heard, he encouraged his men
and bade them stand and fight. "It is not by prayers or entreaties to the gods
that you must make your way out," he said, "but by your strength and your
courage. It is the sword that cuts a path through the middle of the enemy,
and where there is less fear there is generally less danger." But such was the
uproar and confusion that neither counsel nor command could be heard, and
so far was the soldier from recognising his standard or his company or his
place in the rank, that he had hardly sufficient presence of mind to get hold
of his weapons and make them available for use, and some who found them
a burden rather than a protection were overtaken by the enemy. In such a
thick fog ears were of more use than eyes; the men turned their gaze in every
direction as they heard the groans of the wounded and the blows on shield or
breastplate, and the mingled shouts of triumph and cries of panic. Some who
tried to fly ran into a dense body of combatants and could get no further;
others who were returning to the fray were swept away by a rush of
fugitives. At last, when ineffective charges had been made in every direction
and they found themselves completely hemmed in, by the lake and the hills
on either side, and by the enemy in front and rear, it became clear to every
man that his only hope of safety lay in his own right hand and his sword.
Then each began to depend upon himself for guidance and encouragement,
and the fighting began afresh, not the orderly battle with its three divisions of
principes, hastati, and triarii, where the fighting line is in front of the
standards and the rest of the army behind, and where each soldier is in his
own legion and cohort and maniple. Chance massed them together, each man
took his place in front or rear as his courage prompted him, and such was
the ardour of the combatants, so intent were they on the battle, that not a
single man on the field was aware of the earthquake which levelled large
portions of many towns in Italy, altered the course of swift streams, brought
the sea up into the rivers, and occasioned enormous landslips amongst the
mountains.
22.6
For
almost three hours the fighting went on; everywhere a desperate struggle
was kept up, but it raged with greater fierceness round the consul. He was
followed by the pick of his army, and wherever he saw his men hard pressed
and in difficulties he at once went to their help. Distinguished by his armour
he was the object of the enemy's fiercest attacks, which his comrades did
their utmost to repel, until an Insubrian horseman who knew the consul by
sight -his name was Ducarius -cried out to his countrymen, "Here is the
man who slew our legions and laid waste our city and our lands! I will offer
him in sacrifice to the shades of my foully murdered countrymen." Digging
spurs into his horse he charged into the dense masses of the enemy, and slew
an armour-bearer who threw himself in the way as he galloped up lance in
rest, and then plunged his lance into the consul; but the triarii protected the
body with their shields and prevented him from despoiling it. Then began a
general flight, neither lake nor mountain stopped the panic-stricken fugitives,
they rushed like blind men over cliff and defile, men and arms tumbled
pell-mell on one another. A large number, finding no avenue of escape, went
into the water up to their shoulders; some in their wild terror even attempted
to escape by swimming, an endless and hopeless task in that lake. Either
their spirits gave way and they were drowned, or else finding their efforts
fruitless, they regained with great difficulty the shallow water at the edge of
the lake and were butchered in all directions by the enemy's cavalry who had
ridden into the water. About 6000 men who had formed the head of the line
of march cut their way through the enemy and cleared the defile, quite
unconscious of all that had been going on behind them. They halted on some
rising ground, and listened to the shouting below and the clash of arms, but
were unable, owing to the fog, to see or find out what the fortunes of the
fight were. At last, when the battle was over and the sun's heat had dispelled
the fog, mountain and plain revealed in the clear light the disastrous
overthrow of the Roman army and showed only too plainly that all was lost.
Fearing lest they should be seen in the distance and cavalry be sent against
them, they hurriedly took up their standards and disappeared with all
possible speed. Maharbal pursued them through the night with the whole of
his mounted force, and on the morrow, as starvation, in addition to all their
other miseries, was threatening them, they surrendered to Maharbal, on
condition of being allowed to depart with one garment apiece. This promise
was kept with Punic faith by Hannibal, and he threw them all into chains.
22.7
This was
the famous battle at Trasumennus, and a disaster for Rome memorable as
few others have been. Fifteen thousand Romans were killed in action; 1000
fugitives were scattered all over Etruria and reached the City by divers
routes; 2500 of the enemy perished on the field, many in both armies
afterwards of their wounds. Other authors give the loss on each side as many
times greater, but I refuse to indulge in the idle exaggerations to which
writers are far too much given, and what is more, I am supported by the
authority of Fabius, who was living during the war. Hannibal dismissed
without ransom those prisoners who belonged to the allies and threw the
Romans into chains. He then gave orders for the bodies of his own men to be
picked out from the heaps of slain and buried; careful search was also made
for the body of Flaminius that it might receive honourable interment but it
was not found. As soon as the news of this disaster reached Rome the
people flocked into the Forum in a great state of panic and confusion.
Matrons were wandering about the streets and asking those they met what
recent disaster had been reported or what news was there of the army. The
throng in the Forum, as numerous as a crowded Assembly, flocked towards
the Comitium and the Senate-house and called for the magistrates. At last,
shortly before sunset, M. Pomponius, the praetor, announced, "We have
been defeated in a great battle." Though nothing more definite was heard
from him, the people, full of the reports which they had heard from one
another, carried back to their homes the information that the consul had been
killed with the greater part of his army; only a few survived, and these were
either dispersed in flight throughout Etruria or had been made prisoners by
the enemy.
The misfortunes which had befallen the defeated army were not
more numerous than the anxieties of those whose relatives had served under
C. Flaminius, ignorant as they were of the fate of each of their friends, and
not in the least knowing what to hope for or what to fear. The next day and
several days afterwards, a large crowd, containing more women than men,
stood at the gates waiting for some one of their friends or for news about
them, and they crowded round those they met with eager and anxious
inquiries, nor was it possible to get them away, especially from those they
knew, until they had got all the details from first to last. Then as they came
away from their informants you might see the different expressions on their
faces, according as each had received good or bad news, and friends
congratulating or consoling them as they wended their way homewards. The
women were especially demonstrative in their joy and in their grief. They say
that one who suddenly met her son at the gate safe and sound expired in his
arms, whilst another who had received false tidings of her son's death and
was sitting as a sorrowful mourner in her house, no sooner saw him
returning than she died from too great happiness. For several days the
praetors kept the senate in session from sunrise to sunset, deliberating under
what general or with what forces they could offer effectual resistance to the
victorious Carthaginian.
22.8
Before
they had formed any definite plans, a fresh disaster was announced; 4000
cavalry under the command of C. Centenius, the propraetor, had been sent
by the consul Servilius to the assistance of his colleague. When they heard of
the battle at Trasumennus they marched into Umbria, and here they were
surrounded and captured by Hannibal. The news of this occurrence affected
men in very different ways. Some, whose thoughts were preoccupied with
more serious troubles, looked upon this loss of cavalry as a light matter in
comparison with the previous losses; others estimated the importance of the
incident not by the magnitude of the loss but by its moral effect. Just as
where the constitution is impaired, any malady however slight is felt more
than it would be in a strong robust person, so any misfortune which befell
the State in its present sick and disordered condition must be measured not
by its actual importance but by its effect on a State already exhausted and
unable to bear anything which would aggravate its condition. Accordingly
the citizens took refuge in a remedy which for a long time had not been
made use of or required, namely the appointment of a Dictator. As the
consul by whom alone one could be nominated was absent, and it was not
easy for a messenger or a despatch to be sent through Italy, overrun as it
was by the arms of Carthage, and as it would have been contrary to all
precedent for the people to appoint a Dictator, the Assembly invested Q.
Fabius Maximus with dictatorial powers and appointed M. Minucius Rufus
to act as his Master of the Horse. They were commissioned by the senate to
strengthen the walls and towers of the City and place garrisons in whatever
positions they thought best, and cut down the bridges over the various
rivers, for now it was a fight for their City and their homes, since they were
no longer able to defend Italy.
22.9
Hannibal
marched in a straight course through Umbria as far as Spoletum, and after
laying the country round utterly waste, he commenced an attack upon the
city which was repulsed with heavy loss. As a single colony was strong
enough to defeat his unfortunate attempt he was able to form some
conjecture as to the difficulties attending the capture of Rome, and
consequently diverted his march into the territory of Picenum, a district
which not only abounded in every kind of produce but was richly stored with
property which the greedy and needy soldiers seized and plundered without
restraint. He remained in camp there for several days during which his
soldiers recruited their strength after their winter campaigns and their
journey across the marshes, and a battle which though ultimately successful
was neither without heavy loss nor easily won. When sufficient time for rest
had been allowed to men who delighted much more in plundering and
destroying than in ease and idleness, Hannibal resumed his march and
devastated the districts of Praetutia and Hadria, then he treated in the same
way the country of the Marsi, the Marrucini, and the Peligni and the part of
Apulia which was nearest to him, including the cities of Arpi and Luceria.
Cn. Servilius had fought some insignificant actions with the Gauls and taken
one small town, but when he heard of his colleague's death and the
destruction of his army, he was alarmed for the walls of his native City, and
marched straight for Rome that he might not be absent at this most critical
juncture.
Q. Fabius Maximus was now Dictator for the second time. On the
very day of his entrance upon office he summoned a meeting of the senate,
and commenced by discussing matters of religion. He made it quite clear to
the senators that C. Flaminius' fault lay much more in his neglect of the
auspices and of his religious duties than in bad generalship and foolhardiness.
The gods themselves, he maintained, must be consulted as to the necessary
measures to avert their displeasure, and he succeeded in getting a decree
passed that the decemvirs should be ordered to consult the Sibylline Books,
a course which is only adopted when the most alarming portents have been
reported. After inspecting the Books of Fate they informed the senate that
the vow which had been made to Mars in view of that war had not been duly
discharged, and that it must be discharged afresh and on a much greater
scale. The Great Games must be vowed to Jupiter, a temple to Venus
Erycina and one to Mens; a lectisternium must be held and solemn
intercessions made; a Sacred Spring must also be vowed. All these things
must be done if the war was to be a successful one and the republic remain in
the same position in which it was at the beginning of the war. As Fabius
would be wholly occupied with the necessary arrangements for the war, the
senate with the full approval of the pontifical college ordered the praetor, M.
Aemilius, to take care that all these orders were carried out in good time.
22.10
After
these resolutions had been passed in the senate the praetor consulted the
pontifical college as to the proper means of giving effect to them, and L.
Cornelius Lentulus, the Pontifex Maximus, decided that the very first step to
take was to refer to the people the question of a "Sacred Spring," as this
particular form of vow could not be undertaken without the order of the
people. The form of procedure was as follows: "Is it," the praetor asked the
Assembly, "your will and pleasure that all be done and performed in manner
following? That is to say, if the commonwealth of the Romans and the
Quirites be preserved, as I pray it may be, safe and sound through these
present wars -to wit, the war between Rome and Carthage and the wars
with the Gauls now dwelling on the hither side of the Alps -then shall the
Romans and Quirites present as an offering whatever the spring shall
produce from their flocks and herds, whether it be from swine or sheep or
goats or cattle, and all that is not already devoted to any other deity shall be
consecrated to Jupiter from such time as the senate and people shall order.
Whosoever shall make an offering let him do it at whatsoever time and in
whatsoever manner he will, and howsoever he offers it, it shall be accounted
to be duly offered. If the animal which should have been sacrificed die, it
shall be as though unconsecrated, there shall be no sin. If any man shall hurt
or slay a consecrated thing unwittingly he shall not be held guilty. If a man
shall have stolen any such animal, the people shall not bear the guilt, nor he
from whom it was stolen. If a man offer his sacrifice unwittingly on a
forbidden day, it shall be accounted to be duly offered. Whether he do so by
night or day, whether he be slave or freeman, it shall be accounted to be duly
offered. If any sacrifice be offered before the senate and people have ordered
that it shall be done, the people shall be free and absolved from all guilt
therefrom." To the same end the Great Games were vowed at a cost of
333,333 1/3 ases, and in addition 300 oxen to Jupiter, and white oxen and
the other customary victims to a number of deities. When the vows had been
duly pronounced a litany of intercession was ordered, and not only the
population of the City but the people from the country districts, whose
private interests were being affected by the public distress, went in
procession with their wives and children. Then a lectisternium was held for
three days under the supervision of the ten keepers of the Sacred Books. Six
couches were publicly exhibited; one for Jupiter and Juno, another for
Neptune and Minerva, a third for Mars and Venus, a fourth for Apollo and
Diana, a fifth for Vulcan and Vesta, and the sixth for Mercury and Ceres.
This was followed by the vowing of temples. Q. Fabius Maximus, as
Dictator, vowed the temple to Venus Erycina, because it was laid down in
the Books of Fate that this vow should be made by the man who possessed
the supreme authority in the State. T. Otacilius, the praetor, vowed the
temple to Mens.
22.11
After
the various obligations towards the gods had thus been discharged, the
Dictator referred to the senate the question of the policy to be adopted with
regard to the war, with what legions and how many the senators thought he
ought to meet their victorious enemy. They decreed that he should take over
the army from Cneius Servilius, and further that he should enrol from
amongst the citizens and the allies as many cavalry and infantry as he
considered requisite; all else was left to his discretion to take such steps as
he thought desirable in the interests of the republic. Fabius said that he
would add two legions to the army which Servilius commanded; these were
raised by the Master of the Horse and he fixed a day for their assembling at
Tibur. A proclamation was also issued that those who were living in towns
and strongholds that were not sufficiently fortified should remove into places
of safety, and that all the population settled in the districts through which
Hannibal was likely to march should abandon their farms, after first burning
their houses and destroying their produce, so that he might not have any
supplies to fall back upon. He then marched along the Flaminian road to
meet the consul. As soon as he caught sight of the army in the
neighbourhood of Ocriculum near the Tiber, and the consul riding forward
with some cavalry to meet him, he sent an officer to tell him that he was to
come to the Dictator without his lictors. He did so, and the way they met
produced a profound sense of the majesty of the dictatorship amongst both
citizens and allies, who had almost by this time forgotten that greatest of all
offices. Shortly afterwards a despatch was handed in from the City stating
that some transports which were carrying supplies for the army in Spain had
been captured by the Carthaginian fleet near the port of Cosa. The consul
was thereupon ordered to man the ships which were lying off Rome or at
Ostia with full complements of seamen and soldiers, and sail in pursuit of the
hostile fleet and protect the coast of Italy. A large force was raised in Rome,
even freedmen who had children and were of the military age had been
sworn in. Out of these city troops, all under thirty-five years of age were
placed on board the ships, the rest were left to garrison the City.
22.12
The
Dictator took over the consul's army from Fulvius Flaccus, the second in
command, and marched through Sabine territory to Tibur, where he had
ordered the newly raised force to assemble by the appointed day. From there
he advanced to Praeneste, and taking a cross-country route, came out on the
Latin road. From this point he proceeded towards the enemy, showing the
utmost care in reconnoitring all the various routes, and determined not to
take any risks anywhere, except so far as necessity should compel him. The
first day he pitched his camp in view of the enemy not far from Arpi; the
Carthaginian lost no time in marching out his men in battle order to give him
the chance of fighting. But when he saw that the enemy kept perfectly quiet
and that there were no signs of excitement in their camp, he tauntingly
remarked that the spirits of the Romans, those sons of Mars, were broken at
last, the war was at an end, and they had openly foregone all claim to valour
and renown. He then returned into camp. But he was really in a very anxious
state of mind, for he saw that he would have to do with a very different type
of commander from Flaminius or Sempronius; the Romans had been taught
by their defeats and had at last found a general who was a match for him. It
was the wariness not the impetuosity of the Dictator that was the immediate
cause of his alarm; he had not yet tested his inflexible resolution. He began
to harass and provoke him by frequently shifting his camp and ravaging the
fields of the allies of Rome before his very eyes. Sometimes he would march
rapidly out of sight and then in some turn of the road take up a concealed
position in the hope of entrapping him, should he come down to level
ground. Fabius kept on high ground, at a moderate distance from the enemy,
so that he never lost sight of him and never closed with him. Unless they
were employed on necessary duty, the soldiers were confined to camp. When
they went in quest of wood or forage they went in large bodies and only
within prescribed limits. A force of cavalry and light infantry told off in
readiness against sudden alarms, made everything safe for his own soldiers
and dangerous for the scattered foragers of the enemy. He refused to stake
everything on a general engagement, whilst slight encounters, fought on safe
ground with a retreat close at hand, encouraged his men, who had been
demoralised by their previous defeats, and made them less dissatisfied with
their own courage and fortunes. But his sound and common-sense tactics
were not more distasteful to Hannibal than they were to his own Master of
the Horse. Headstrong and impetuous in counsel and with an ungovernable
tongue, the only thing that prevented Minucius from making shipwreck of
the State was the fact that he was in a subordinate command. At first to a
few listeners, afterwards openly amongst the rank and file, he abused Fabius,
calling his deliberation indolence and his caution cowardice, attributing to
him faults akin to his real virtues, and by disparaging his superior -a vile
practice which, through its often proving successful, is steadily on the
increase -he tried to exalt himself.
22.13
From
the Hirpini Hannibal went across into Samnium; he ravaged the territory of
Beneventum and captured the city of Telesia. He did his best to exasperate
the Roman commander, hoping that he would be so incensed by the insults
and sufferings inflicted on his allies that he would be able to draw him into
an engagement on level ground. Amongst the thousands of allies of Italian
nationality who had been taken prisoners by Hannibal at Trasumennus and
dismissed to their homes were three Campanian knights, who had been
allured by bribes and promises to win over the affections of their
countrymen. They sent a message to Hannibal to the effect that if he would
bring his army up to Campania there would be a good chance of his
obtaining possession of Capua. Hannibal was undecided whether to trust
them or not, for the enterprise was greater than the authority of those who
advised it; however, they at last persuaded him to leave Samnium for
Campania. He warned them that they must make their repeated promises
good by their acts, and after bidding them return to him with more of their
countrymen, including some of their chief men, he dismissed them. Some
who were familiar with the country told him that if he marched into the
neighbourhood of Casinum and occupied the pass, he would prevent the
Romans from rendering assistance to their allies. He accordingly ordered a
guide to conduct him there. But the difficulty which the Carthaginians found
in pronouncing Latin names led to the guide understanding Casilinum instead
of Casinum. Quitting his intended route, he came down through the districts
of Allifae, Callifae, and Cales on to the plains of Stella. When he looked
round and saw the country shut in by mountains and rivers he called the
guide and asked him where on earth he was. When he was told that he
would that day have his quarters at Casilinum, he saw the mistake and knew
that Casinum was far away in quite another country. The guide was
scourged and crucified in order to strike terror into the others. After
entrenching his camp he sent Maharbal with his cavalry to harry the
Falernian land. The work of destruction extended to the Baths of Sinuessa;
the Numidians inflicted enormous losses, but the panic and terror which they
created spread even further. And yet, though everything was wrapped in the
flames of war, the allies did not allow their terrors to warp them from their
loyalty, simply because they were under a just and equable rule, and rendered
a willing obedience to their superiors -the only true bond of allegiance.
22.14
When
Hannibal had encamped at the Vulturnus and the loveliest part of Italy was
being reduced to ashes and the smoke was rising everywhere from the
burning farms, Fabius continued his march along the Massic range of hills.
For a few days the mutinous discontent amongst the troops had subsided,
because they inferred from the unusually rapid marching that Fabius was
hastening to save Campania from being ravaged and plundered. But when
they reached the western extremity of the range and saw the enemy burning
the farmsteads of the colonists of Sinuessa and those in the Falernian district,
while nothing was said about giving battle, the feeling of exasperation was
again roused, and studiously fanned by Minucius. "Are we come here" he
would ask, "to enjoy the sight of our murdered allies and the smoking ruins
of their homes? Surely, if nothing else appeals to us, ought we not to feel
ashamed of ourselves as we see the sufferings of those whom our fathers
sent as colonists to Sinuessa that this frontier might be protected from the
Samnite foe, whose homes are being burnt not by our neighbours the
Samnites but by a Carthaginian stranger from the ends of the earth who has
been allowed to come thus far simply through our dilatoriness and
supineness? Have we, alas! so far degenerated from our fathers that we
calmly look on while the very country, past which they considered it an
affront for a Carthaginian fleet to cruise, has now been filled with Numidian
and Moorish invaders? We who only the other day in our indignation at the
attack on Saguntum appealed not to men alone, but to treaties and to gods,
now quietly watch Hannibal scaling the walls of a Roman colony! The smoke
from the burning farms and fields is blown into our faces, our ears are
assailed by the cries of our despairing allies who appeal to us for help more
than they do to the gods, and here are we marching an army like a herd of
cattle through summer pastures and mountain paths hidden from view by
woods and clouds! If M. Furius Camillus had chosen this method of
wandering over mountain heights and passes to rescue the City from the
Gauls which has been adopted by this new Camillus, this peerless Dictator
who has been found for us in our troubles, to recover Italy from Hannibal,
Rome would still be in the hands of the Gauls, and I very much fear that if
we go on dawdling in this way the City which our ancestors have so often
saved will only have been saved for Hannibal and the Carthaginians. But on
the day that the message came to Veii that Camillus had been nominated
Dictator by senate and people, though the Janiculum was quite high enough
for him to sit there and watch the enemy, like the man and true Roman that
he was, he came down into the plain. and in the very heart of the City where
the Busta Gallica are now he cut to pieces the legions of the Gauls, and the
next day he did the same beyond Gabii. Why, when years and years ago we
were sent under the yoke by the Samnites at the Caudine Forks, was it, pray,
by exploring the heights of Samnium or by assailing and besieging Luceria
and challenging our victorious foe that L. Papirius Cursor took the yoke off
Roman necks and placed it on the haughty Samnite? What else but rapidity
of action gave C. Lutatius the victory? The day after he first saw the enemy
he surprised their fleet laden with supplies and hampered by its cargo of
stores and equipment. It is mere folly to fancy that the war can be brought to
an end by sitting still or making vows to heaven. Your duty is to take your
arms and go down and meet the enemy man to man. It is by doing and daring
that Rome has increased her dominion not by these counsels of sloth which
cowards call caution." Minucius said all this before a host of Roman tribunes
and knights, as if he were addressing the Assembly, and his daring words
even reached the ears of the soldiery; if they could have voted on the
question, there is no doubt that they would have superseded Fabius for
Minucius.
22.15
Fabius
kept an equally careful watch upon both sides, upon his own men no less
than upon the enemy, and he showed that his resolution was quite unshaken.
He was quite aware that his inactivity was making him unpopular not only in
his own camp, but even in Rome, nevertheless his determination remained
unchanged and he persisted in the same tactics for the rest of the summer,
and Hannibal abandoned all hopes of the battle which he had so anxiously
sought for. It became necessary for him to look round for a suitable place to
winter in, as the country in which he was, a land of orchards and vineyards,
was entirely planted with the luxuries rather than the necessaries of life, and
furnished supplies only for a few months not for the whole year. Hannibal's
movements were reported to Fabius by his scouts. As he felt quite certain
that he would return by the same pass through which he had entered the
district of Falernum, he posted a fairly strong detachment on Mount
Callicula and another to garrison Casilinum. The Vulturnus runs through the
middle of this town and forms the boundary between the districts of
Falernum and Campania. He led his army back over the same heights, having
previously sent L. Hostilius Mancinus forward with 400 cavalry to
reconnoitre. This man was amongst the throng of young officers who had
frequently listened to the fierce harangues of the Master of the Horse. At
first he advanced cautiously, as a scouting party should do, to get a good
view of the enemy from a safe position. But when he saw the Numidians
roaming in all directions through the villages, and had even surprised and
killed some of them, he thought of nothing but fighting, and completely
forgot the Dictator's instructions, which were to go forward as far as he
could safely and to retire before the enemy observed him. The Numidians,
attacking and retreating in small bodies, drew him gradually almost up to
their camp, his men and horses by this time thoroughly tired. Thereupon
Carthalo, the general in command of the cavalry, charged at full speed, and
before they came within range of their javelins put the enemy to flight and
pursued them without slackening rein for nearly five miles. When Mancinus
saw that there was no chance of the enemy giving up the pursuit, or of his
escaping them, he rallied his men and faced the Numidians, though
completely outnumbered and outmatched. He himself with the best of his
riders was cut off, the rest resumed their wild flight and reached Cales and
ultimately by different by-paths returned to the Dictator. It so happened that
Minucius had rejoined Fabius on this day. He had been sent to strengthen the
force holding the defile which contracts into a narrow pass just above
Terracina close to the sea. This was to prevent the Carthaginian from
utilising the Appian road for a descent upon the territory of Rome, when he
left Sinuessa. The Dictator and the Master of the Horse with their joint
armies moved their camp on to the route which Hannibal was expected to
take. He was encamped two miles distant.
22.16
The
next day the Carthaginian army began its march and filled the whole of the
road between the two camps. The Romans had taken up a position
immediately below their entrenchments, on unquestionably more
advantageous ground, yet the Carthaginian came up with his cavalry and
light infantry to challenge his enemy. They made repeated attacks and
retirements, but the Roman line kept its ground; the fighting was slack and
more satisfactory to the Dictator than to Hannibal; 200 Romans fell, and 800
of the enemy. It now seemed as if Hannibal must be hemmed in. Capua and
Samnium and all the rich land of Latium behind them were furnishing the
Romans with supplies, while the Carthaginian would have to winter amongst
the rocks of Formiae and the sands and marshes of Liternum and in gloomy
forests. Hannibal did not fail to observe that his own tactics were being
employed against him. As he could not get out through Casilinum, and
would have to make for the mountains and cross the ridge of Callicula, he
would be liable to be attacked by the Romans whilst he was shut up in the
valleys. To guard against this he decided upon a stratagem which, deceiving
the eyes of the enemy by its alarming appearance, would enable him to scale
the mountains in a night march without fear of interruption. The following
was the ruse which he adopted. Torch-wood gathered from all the country
round, and faggots of dry brushwood were tied on the horns of the oxen
which he was driving in vast numbers, both broken and unbroken to the
plough, amongst the rest of the plunder from the fields. About 2000 oxen
were collected for the purpose. To Hasdrubal was assigned the task of
setting fire to the bundles on the horns of this herd as soon as darkness set
in, then driving them up the mountains and if possible mostly above the
passes which were guarded by the Romans.
22.17
As
soon as it was dark, the camp silently broke up; the oxen were driven some
distance in front of the column. When they had reached the foot of the
mountains where the roads began to narrow, the signal was given and the
herds with their flaming horns were driven up the mountain side. The
terrifying glare of the flames shooting from their heads and the heat which
penetrated to the root of their horns made the oxen rush about as though
they were mad. At this sudden scampering about, it seemed as though the
woods and mountains were on fire, and all the brushwood round became
alight and the incessant but useless shaking of their heads made the flames
shoot out all the more, and gave the appearance of men running about in all
directions. When the men who were guarding the pass saw fires moving
above them high up on the mountains, they thought that their position was
turned, and they hastily quitted it. Making their way up to the highest points,
they took the direction where there appeared to be the fewest flames,
thinking this to be the safest road. Even so, they came across stray oxen
separated from the herd, and at first sight they stood still in astonishment at
what seemed a preternatural sight of beings breathing fire. When it turned
out to be simply a human device they were still more alarmed at what they
suspected was an ambuscade, and they took to flight. Now they fell in with
some of Hannibal's light infantry, but both sides shrank from a fight in the
darkness and remained inactive till daylight. In the meantime Hannibal had
marched the whole of his army through the pass, and after surprising and
scattering some Roman troops in the pass itself, fixed his camp in the district
of Allifae.
22.18
Fabius
watched all this confusion and excitement, but as he took it to be an
ambuscade, and in any case shrank from a battle in the night, he kept his men
within their lines. As soon as it was light there was a battle just under the
ridge of the mountain where the Carthaginian light infantry were cut off from
their main body and would easily have been crushed by the Romans, who
had considerably the advantage in numbers, had not a cohort of Spaniards
come up, who had been sent back by Hannibal to their assistance. These men
were more accustomed to the mountains and in better training for running
amongst rocks and precipices, and being both more lightly made and more
lightly armed they could easily by their method of fighting baffle an enemy
drawn from the lowlands, heavily armed and accustomed to stationary
tactics. At last they drew off from a contest which was anything but an equal
one. The Spaniards being almost untouched, the Romans having sustained a
heavy loss, each retired to their respective camps. Fabius followed on
Hannibal's track through the pass and encamped above Allifae in an elevated
position and one of great natural strength. Hannibal retraced his steps as far
as the Peligni, ravaging the country as he went, as though his intention was
to march through Samnium upon Rome. Fabius continued to move along the
heights, keeping between the enemy and the City, neither avoiding nor
attacking him. The Carthaginian left the Peligni, and marching back into
Apulia, reached Gereonium. This city had been abandoned by its inhabitants
because a portion of the walls had fallen into ruin. The Dictator formed an
entrenched camp near Larinum. From there he was recalled to Rome on
business connected with religion. Before his departure he impressed upon
the Master of the Horse, not only as commander-in-chief but as a friend
giving good advice and even using entreaties, the necessity of trusting more
to prudence than to luck, and following his own example rather than copying
Sempronius and Flaminius. He was not to suppose that nothing had been
gained now that the summer had been spent in baffling the enemy, even
physicians often gained more by not disturbing their patients than by
subjecting them to movement and exercises; it was no small advantage to
have avoided defeat at the hands of a foe who had been so often victorious
and to have obtained a breathing space after such a series of disasters. With
these unheeded warnings to the Master of the Horse he started for Rome.
22.19
At the
commencement of this summer war began in Spain both by land and sea.
Hasdrubal added ten ships to those which he had received from his brother,
equipped and ready for action, and gave Himilco a fleet of forty vessels. He
then sailed from New Carthage, keeping near land, and with his army
moving parallel along the coast, ready to engage the enemy whether by sea
or land. When Cn. Scipio learnt that his enemy had left his winter quarters he
at first adopted the same tactics, but on further consideration he would not
venture on a contest by land, owing to the immense reputation of the new
auxiliaries. After embarking the pick of his army he proceeded with a fleet of
thirty-five ships to meet the enemy. The day after leaving Tarraco he came to
anchor at a spot ten miles distant from the mouth of the Ebro. Two despatch
boats belonging to Massilia had been sent to reconnoitre, and they brought
back word that the Carthaginian fleet was riding at anchor in the mouth of
the river and their camp was on the bank. Scipio at once weighed anchor and
sailed towards the enemy, intending to strike a sudden panic amongst them
by surprising them whilst off their guard and unsuspicious of danger.
There are in Spain many towers situated on high ground which are
used both as look-outs and places of defence against pirates. It was from
there that the hostile ships were first sighted, and the signal given to
Hasdrubal; excitement and confusion prevailed in the camp on shore before
it reached the ships at sea, as the splash of the oars and other sounds of
advancing ships were not yet heard, and the projecting headlands hid the
Roman fleet from view. Suddenly one mounted vidette after another from
Hasdrubal galloped up with orders to those who were strolling about on the
shore or resting in their tents, and expecting anything rather than the
approach of an enemy or battle that day, to embark with all speed and take
their arms, for the Roman fleet was now not far from the harbour. This order
the mounted men were giving in all directions, and before long Hasdrubal
himself appeared with the whole of his army. Everywhere there was noise
and confusion, the rowers and the soldiers scrambled on board more like
men flying from the shore than men going into action. Hardly were all on
board, when some unfastened the mooring ropes and drifted towards their
anchors, others cut their cables; everything was done in too much haste and
hurry, the work of the seamen was hampered by the preparations which the
soldiers were making, and the soldiers were prevented from putting
themselves in fighting trim owing to the confusion and panic which prevailed
amongst the seamen. By this time the Romans were not only near at hand,
they had actually lined up their ships for the attack. The Carthaginians were
paralysed quite as much by their own disorder as by the approach of the
enemy, and they brought their ships round for flight, after abandoning a
struggle which it would be more true to say was attempted rather than
begun. But it was impossible for their widely extended line to enter the
mouth of the river all at once, and the ships were run ashore in all directions.
Some of those on board got out through the shallow water, others jumped
on to the beach, with arms or without, and made good their escape to the
army which was drawn up ready for action along the shore. Two
Carthaginian ships, however, were captured to begin with and four sunk.
22.20
Though the Romans saw that the enemy
were in force on land and that their army was extended along the shore, they
showed no hesitation in following up the enemy's panic-stricken fleet. They
secured all the ships which had not staved their prows in on the beach, or
grounded with their keels in the mud by fastening hawsers to their sterns and
dragging them into deep water. Out of forty vessels twenty-five were
captured in this way. This was not, however, the best part of the victory. Its
main importance lay in the fact that this one insignificant encounter gave the
mastery of the whole of the adjacent sea. The fleet accordingly sailed to
Onusa, and there the soldiers disembarked, captured and plundered the place
and then marched towards New Carthage. They ravaged the entire country
round, and ended by setting fire to the houses which adjoined the walls and
gates. Re-embarking laden with plunder, they sailed to Longuntica, where
they found a great quantity of esparto grass which Hasdrubal had collected
for the use of the navy, and after taking what they could use they burnt the
rest. They did not confine themselves to cruising along the coast, but crossed
over to the island of Ebusus, where they made a determined but unsuccessful
attack upon the capital during the whole of two days. As they found that
they were only wasting time on a hopeless enterprise, they took to
plundering the country, and sacked and burnt several villages. Here they
secured more booty than on the mainland, and after placing it on board, as
they were on the point of sailing away, some envoys came to Scipio from the
Balearic isles to sue for peace. From this point the fleet sailed back to the
eastern side of the province where envoys were assembled from all the tribes
in the district of the Ebro, and many even from the remotest parts of Spain.
The tribes which actually acknowledged the supremacy of Rome and gave
hostages amounted to more than a hundred and twenty. The Romans felt
now as much confidence in their army as in their navy, and marched as far as
the pass of Castulo. Hasdrubal retired to Lusitania where he was nearer to
the Atlantic.
22.21
It now
seemed as though the remainder of the summer would be undisturbed, and it
would have been so as far as the Carthaginians were concerned. But the
Spanish temperament is restless and fond of change, and after the Romans
had left the pass and retired to the coast, Mandonius and Indibilis, who had
previously been chief of the Ibergetes, roused their fellow-tribesmen and
proceeded to harry the lands of those who were in peace and alliance with
Rome. Scipio despatched a military tribune with some light-armed auxiliaries
to disperse them, and after a trifling engagement, for they were undisciplined
and without organisation, they were all put to rout, some being killed or
taken prisoners, and a large proportion deprived of their arms. This
disturbance, however, brought Hasdrubal, who was marching westwards,
back to the defence of his allies on the south side of the Ebro. The
Carthaginians were in camp amongst the Ilergavonians; the Roman camp
was at Nova, when unexpected intelligence turned the tide of war in another
direction. The Celtiberi, who had sent their chief men as envoys to Scipio
and had given hostages, were induced by his representations to take up arms
and invade the province of New Carthage with a powerful army. They took
three fortified towns by storm, and fought two most successful actions with
Hasdrubal himself, killing 15,000 of the enemy and taking 4000 prisoners
with numerous standards.
22.22
This
was the position of affairs when P. Scipio, whose command had been
extended after he ceased to be consul, came to the province which had been
assigned to him by the senate. He brought a reinforcement of thirty ships of
war and 8000 troops, also a large convoy of supplies. This fleet, with its
enormous column of transports, excited the liveliest delight among the
townsmen and their allies when it was seen in the distance and finally
reached the port of Tarracona. There the soldiers were landed and Scipio
marched up country to meet his brother; thenceforward they carried on the
campaign with their united forces and with one heart and purpose. As the
Carthaginians were preoccupied with the Celtiberian war, the Scipios had no
hesitation in crossing the Ebro and, as no enemy appeared, marching straight
to Saguntum, where they had been informed that the hostages who had been
surrendered to Hannibal from all parts of Spain were detained in the citadel
under a somewhat weak guard. The fact that they had given these pledges
was the only thing that prevented all the tribes of Spain from openly
manifesting their leanings towards alliance with Rome; they dreaded lest the
price of their defection from Carthage should be the blood of their own
children. From this bond Spain was released by the clever but treacherous
scheme of one individual.
Abelux was a Spaniard of high birth living at Saguntum, who had at
one time been loyal to Carthage, but afterwards, with the usual fickleness of
barbarians, as the fortunes of Carthage changed so he changed his allegiance.
He considered that any one going over to the enemy without having
something valuable to betray was simply a worthless and disreputable
individual, and so he made it his one aim to be of the greatest service he
could to his new allies. After making a survey of everything which Fortune
could possibly put within his reach, he made up his mind to effect the
delivery of the hostages; that one thing he thought would do more than
anything else to win the friendship of the Spanish chieftains for the Romans.
He was quite aware, however, that the guardians of the hostages would take
no step without the orders of Bostar, their commanding officer, and so he
employed his arts against Bostar himself. Bostar had fixed his camp outside
the city quite on the shore that he might bar the approach of the Romans on
that side. After obtaining a secret interview with him he warned him, as
though he were unaware of it, as to the actual state of affairs. "Up to this
time," he said, "fear alone has kept the Spaniards loyal because the Romans
were far away; now the Roman camp is on our side the Ebro, a secure
stronghold and refuge for all who want to change their allegiance. Those,
therefore, who are no longer restrained by fear must be bound to us by
kindness and feelings of gratitude." Bostar was greatly surprised, and asked
him what boon could suddenly effect such great results. "Send the hostages,"
was the reply, "back to their homes. That will evoke gratitude from their
parents, who are very influential people in their own country, and also from
their fellow-countrymen generally. Every one likes to feel that he is trusted;
the confidence you place in others generally strengthens their confidence in
you. The service of restoring the hostages to their respective homes I claim
for myself, that I may contribute to the success of my plan by my own
personal efforts, and win for an act gracious in itself still more gratitude."
He succeeded in persuading Bostar, whose intelligence was not on
a par with the acuteness which the other Carthaginians showed. After this
interview he went secretly to the enemy's outposts, and meeting with some
Spanish auxiliaries he was conducted by them into the presence of Scipio, to
whom he explained what he proposed to do. Pledges of good faith were
mutually exchanged and the place and time for handing over the hostages
fixed, after which he returned to Saguntum. The following day he spent in
receiving Bostar's instructions for the execution of the project. It was agreed
between them that he should go at night in order, as he pretended, to escape
the observation of the Roman outposts. He had already arranged with these
as to the hour at which he would come, and after awakening those who were
in guard of the boys he conducted the hostages, without appearing to be
aware of the fact, into the trap which he had himself prepared. The outposts
conducted them into the Roman camp; all the remaining details connected
with their restoration to their homes were carried out as he had arranged
with Bostar, precisely as if the business were being transacted m the name of
Carthage. Yet though the service rendered was the same, the gratitude felt
towards the Romans was considerably greater than would have been earned
by the Carthaginians, who had shown themselves oppressive and tyrannical
in the time of their prosperity, and now that they experienced a change of
fortune their act might have appeared to be dictated by fear. The Romans, on
the other hand, hitherto perfect strangers, had no sooner come into the
country than they began with an act of clemency and generosity, and Abelux
was considered to have shown his prudence in changing his allies to such
good purpose. All now began with surprising unanimity to meditate revolt,
and an armed movement would have begun at once had not the winter set in,
which compelled the Romans as well as the Carthaginians to retire to their
quarters.
22.23
These
were the main incidents of the campaign in Spain during the second summer
of the Punic war. In Italy the masterly inaction of Fabius had for a short time
stemmed the tide of Roman disasters. It was a cause of grave anxiety to
Hannibal, for he fully realised that the Romans had chosen for their
commander-in-chief a man who conducted war on rational principles and not
by trusting to chance. But amongst his own people, soldiers and civilians
alike, his tactics were viewed with contempt, especially after a battle had
been brought about owing to the rashness of the Master of the Horse in the
Dictator's absence which would be more correctly described as fortunate
rather than as successful. Two incidents occurred which made the Dictator
still more unpopular. One was due to the crafty policy of Hannibal. Some
deserters had pointed out to him the Dictator's landed property, and after all
the surrounding buildings had been levelled to the ground he gave orders for
that property to be spared from fire and sword and all hostile treatment
whatever in order that it might be thought that there was some secret bargain
between them. The second cause of the Dictator's growing unpopularity was
something which he himself did, and which at first bore an equivocal aspect
because he had acted without the authority of the senate, but ultimately it
was universally recognised as redounding very greatly to his credit. In
carrying out the exchange of prisoners it had been agreed between the
Roman and the Carthaginian commanders, following the precedent of the
first Punic war, that whichever side received back more prisoners than they
gave should strike a balance by paying two and a half pounds of silver for
each soldier they received in excess of those they gave. The Roman prisoners
restored were two hundred and forty-seven more than the Carthaginians.
The question of this payment had been frequently discussed in the senate, but
as Fabius had not consulted that body before making the agreement there
was some delay in voting the money. The matter was settled by Fabius
sending his son Quintus to Rome to sell the land which had been untouched
by the enemy; he thus discharged the obligation of the State at his own
private expense. When Hannibal burnt Gereonium after its capture, he left a
few houses standing to serve as granaries, and now he was occupying a
standing camp before its walls. He was in the habit of sending out two
divisions to collect corn, he remained in camp with the third ready to move
in any direction where he saw that his foragers were being attacked.
22.24
The
Roman army was at the time in the neighbourhood of Larinum, with
Minucius in command, owing, as stated above, to the Dictator having left for
the City. The camp had been situated in a lofty and secure position; it was
now transferred to the plain, and more energetic measures more in harmony
with the general's temperament were being discussed; suggestions were
made for an attack either on the dispersed parties of foragers or on the camp
now that it was left with a weak guard. Hannibal soon found out that the
tactics of his enemies had changed with the change of generals, and that they
would act with more spirit than prudence, and incredible as it may sound,
though his enemy was in closer proximity to him, he sent out a whole
division of his army to collect corn, keeping the other two in camp. The next
thing he did was to move his camp still nearer the enemy, about two miles
from Gereonium on rising ground within view of the Romans, so that they
might know that he was determined to protect his foragers in case of attack.
From this position he was able to see another elevated position still closer to
the Roman camp, in fact looking down on it. There was no doubt that if he
were to attempt to seize it in broad daylight the enemy, having less distance
to go, would be there before him, so he sent a force of Numidians who
occupied it during the night. The next day the Romans, seeing how small a
number were holding the position, made short work of them and drove them
off and then transferred their own camp there. By this time there was but a
very small distance between rampart and rampart, and even that was almost
entirely filled with Roman troops, who were demonstrating in force to
conceal the movements of cavalry and light infantry who had been sent
through the camp gate farthest from the enemy to attack his foragers, upon
whom they inflicted severe losses. Hannibal did not venture upon a regular
battle because his camp was so weakly guarded that it could not have
repelled an assault. Borrowing the tactics of Fabius he began to carry on the
campaign by remaining in almost complete inaction, and withdrew his camp
to its former position before the walls of Gereonium. According to some
authors a pitched battle was fought with both armies in regular formation;
the Carthaginians were routed at the first onset and driven to their camp;
from there a sudden sortie was made and it was the Romans' turn to flee, and
the battle was once more restored by the sudden appearance of Numerius
Decimus, the Samnite general. Decimus was, as far as wealth and lineage go,
the foremost man not only in Bovianum, his native place, but in the whole of
Samnium. In obedience to the Dictator's orders he was bringing into camp a
force of 8000 foot and 500 horse, and when he appeared in Hannibal's rear
both sides thought that it was a reinforcement coming from Rome under Q.
Fabius. Hannibal, it is further stated, ordered his men to retire, the Romans
followed them up, and with the aid of the Samnites captured two of their
fortified positions the same day; 6000 of the enemy were killed and about
5000 of the Romans, yet though the losses were so evenly balanced an idle
and foolish report of a splendid victory reached Rome together with a
despatch from the Master of the Horse which was still more foolish.
22.25
This
state of affairs led to constant discussions in the senate and the Assembly.
Amidst the universal rejoicing the Dictator stood alone; he declared that he
did not place the slightest credence in either the report or the despatch, and
even if everything was as it was represented, he dreaded success more than
failure. On this M. Metilius, tribune of the plebs, said it was really becoming
intolerable that the Dictator, not content with standing in the way of any
success being achieved when he was on the spot, should now be equally
opposed to it after it had been achieved in his absence. "He was deliberately
wasting time in his conduct of the war in order to remain longer in office as
sole magistrate and retain his supreme command. One consul has fallen in
battle, the other has been banished far from Italy under pretext of chasing the
Carthaginian fleet; two praetors have their hands full with Sicily and
Sardinia, neither of which provinces needs a praetor at all at this time; M.
Minucius, Master of the Horse, has been almost kept under guard to prevent
him from seeing the enemy or doing anything which savoured of war. And
so, good heavens! not only Samnium, where we retreated before the
Carthaginians as though it were some territory beyond the Ebro, but even
the country of Falernum, have been utterly laid waste, while the Dictator was
sitting idly at Casilinum, using the legions of Rome to protect his own
property. The Master of the Horse and the army, who were burning to fight,
were kept back and almost imprisoned within their lines; they were deprived
of their arms as though they were prisoners of war. At length, no sooner had
the Dictator departed than, like men delivered from a blockade, they left
their entrenchments and routed the enemy and put him to flight. Under these
circumstances I was prepared, if the Roman plebs still possessed the spirit
they showed in old days, to take the bold step of bringing in a measure to
relieve Q. Fabius of his command; as it is I shall propose a resolution
couched in very moderate terms -'that the authority of the Master of the
Horse be made equal to that of the Dictator.' But even if this resolution is
carried Q. Fabius must not be allowed to rejoin the army before he has
appointed a consul in place of C. Flaminius."
As the line which the Dictator was taking was in the highest degree
unpopular, he kept away from the Assembly. Even in the senate he produced
an unfavourable impression when he spoke in laudatory terms of the enemy
and put down the disasters of the past two years to rashness and lack of
generalship on the part of the commanders. The Master of the Horse, he
said, must be called to account for having fought against his orders. If, he
went on to say, the supreme command and direction of the war remained in
his hands, he would soon let men know that in the case of a good general
Fortune plays a small part, intelligence and military skill are the main factors.
To have preserved the army in circumstances of extreme danger without any
humiliating defeat was in his opinion a more glorious thing than the slaughter
of many thousands of the enemy. But he failed to convince his audience, and
after appointing M. Atilius Regulus as consul, he set off by night to rejoin his
army. He was anxious to avoid a personal altercation on the question of his
authority, and left Rome the day before the proposal was voted upon. At
daybreak a meeting of the plebs was held to consider the proposal. Though
the general feeling was one of hostility to the Dictator and goodwill towards
the Master of the Horse, few were found bold enough to give this feeling
utterance and recommend a proposal which after all was acceptable to the
plebs as a body, and so, notwithstanding the fact that the great majority were
in favour of it, it lacked the support of men of weight and influence. One
man was found who came forward to advocate the proposal, C. Terentius
Varro, who had been praetor the year before, a man of humble and even
mean origin. The tradition is that his father was a butcher who hawked his
meat about and employed his son in the menial drudgery of his trade.
22.26
The
money made in this business was left to his son, who hoped that his fortune
might help him to a more respectable position in society. He decided to
become an advocate, and his appearances in the Forum, where he defended
men of the lowest class by noisy and scurrilous attacks upon the property
and character of respectable citizens, brought him into notoriety and
ultimately into office. After discharging the various duties of the
quaestorship, the two aedileships, plebeian and curule, and lastly those of the
praetor, he now aspired to the consulship. With this view he cleverly took
advantage of the feeling against the Dictator to court the gale of popular
favour, and gained for himself the whole credit of carrying the resolution.
Everybody, whether in Rome or in the army, whether friend or foe, with the
sole exception of the Dictator himself, looked upon this proposal as intended
to cast a slur on him. But he met the injustice done to him by the people,
embittered as they were against him, with the same dignified composure with
which he had previously treated the charges which his opponents had
brought against him before the populace. While still on his way he received a
despatch containing the senatorial decree for dividing his command, but as
he knew perfectly well that an equal share of military command by no means
implied an equal share of military skill, he returned to his army with a spirit
undismayed by either his fellow-citizens or the enemy.
22.27
Owing
to his success and popularity Minucius had been almost unbearable before,
but now that he had won as great a victory over Fabius as over Hannibal, his
boastful arrogance knew no bounds. "The man," he exclaimed, "who was
selected as the only general who would be a match for Hannibal has now, by
an order of the people, been put on a level with his second in command; the
Dictator has to share his powers with the Master of the Horse. There is no
precedent for this in our annals, and it has been done in that very State in
which Masters of the Horse have been wont to look with dread upon the
rods and axes of Dictators. So brilliant have been my good fortune and my
merits. If the Dictator persists in that dilatoriness and inaction which have
been condemned by the judgment of gods and men, I shall follow my good
fortune wherever it may lead me." Accordingly on his first meeting with Q.
Fabius, he told him that the very first thing that had to be settled was the
method in which they should exercise their divided authority. The best plan,
he thought, would be for them each to take supreme command on alternate
days, or, if he preferred it, at longer intervals. This would enable whichever
general was in command to meet Hannibal with tactics and strength equal to
his own should an opportunity arise of striking a blow. Q. Fabius met this
proposal with a decided negative. Everything, he argued, which his
colleague's rashness might prompt would be at the mercy of Fortune; though
his command was shared with another, he was not wholly deprived of it; he
would never therefore voluntarily give up what power he still possessed of
conducting operations with common sense and prudence, and though he
refused to agree to a division of days or periods of command, he was
prepared to divide the army with him and use his best foresight and judgment
to preserve what he could as he could not save all. So it was arranged that
they should adopt the plan of the consuls and share the legions between
them. The first and fourth went to Minucius, Fabius retained the second and
third. The cavalry and the contingents supplied by the Latins and the allies
were also divided equally between them. The Master of the Horse even
insisted upon separate camps.
22.28
Nothing that was going on amongst his
enemies escaped the observation of Hannibal, for ample information was
supplied to him by deserters as well as by his scouts. He was doubly
delighted, for he felt sure of entrapping by his own peculiar methods the wild
rashness of Minucius, and he saw that Fabius' skilful tactics had lost half
their strength. Between Minucius' camp and Hannibal's there was some rising
ground, and whichever side seized it would undoubtedly be able to render
their adversaries' position less secure. Hannibal determined to secure it, and
though it would have been worth while doing so without a fight, he
preferred to bring on a battle with Minucius, who, he felt quite sure, would
hurry up to stop him. The entire intervening country seemed, at a first
glance, totally unsuited for surprise tactics, for there were no woods
anywhere, no spots covered with brushwood and scrub, but in reality it
naturally lent itself to such a purpose, and all the more so because in so bare
a valley no stratagem of the kind could be suspected. In its windings there
were caverns, some so large as to be capable of concealing two hundred
men. Each of these hiding-places was filled with troops, and altogether 5000
horse and foot were placed in concealment. In case, however, the stratagem
might be detected by some soldier's thoughtless movements, or the glint of
arms in so open a valley, Hannibal sent a small detachment to seize the rising
ground already described in order to divert the attention of the enemy. As
soon as they were sighted, their small number excited ridicule, and every
man begged that he might have the task of dislodging them. Conspicuous
amongst his senseless and hot-headed soldiers the general sounded a general
call to arms, and poured idle abuse and threats on the enemy. He sent the
light infantry first in open skirmishing order, these were followed by the
cavalry in close formation, and at last, when he saw that reinforcements were
being brought up to the enemy, he advanced with the legions in line.
Hannibal on his side sent supports, both horse and foot, to his men wherever
they were hard pressed, and the numbers engaged steadily grew until he had
formed his entire army into order of battle and both sides were in full
strength. The Roman light infantry moving up the hill from lower ground
were the first to be repulsed and forced back to the cavalry who were
coming up behind them. They sought refuge behind the front ranks of the
legions, who alone amidst the general panic preserved their coolness and
presence of mind. Had it been a straightforward fight, man to man, they
would to all appearance have been quite a match for their foes, so much had
their success, a few days previously, restored their courage. But the sudden
appearance of the concealed troops and their combined attack on both flanks
and on the rear of the Roman legions created such confusion and alarm that
not a man had any spirit left to fight or any hope of escaping by flight.
22.29
Fabius'
attention was first drawn to the cries of alarm, then he observed in the
distance the disordered and broken ranks. "Just so," he exclaimed, "Fortune
has overtaken his rashness, but not more quickly than I feared. Fabius is his
equal in command, but he has found out that Hannibal is his superior both in
ability and in success. However, this is not the time for censure or rebuke,
advance into the field! Let us wrest victory from the foe, and a confession of
error from our fellow-citizens." By this time the rout had spread over a large
part of the field, some were killed, others looking round for the means of
escape, when suddenly the army of Fabius appeared as though sent down
from heaven to their rescue. Before they came within range of their missiles,
before they could exchange blows, they checked their comrades in their wild
flight and the enemy in their fierce attack. Those who had been scattered
hither and thither after their ranks were broken, closed in from all sides and
reformed their line; those who had kept together in their retreat wheeled
round to face the enemy, and, forming square, at one moment slowly retired,
and at another shoulder to shoulder stood their ground. The defeated troops
and those who were fresh on the field had now practically become one line,
and they were commencing an advance on the enemy when the Carthaginian
sounded the retreat, showing clearly that whilst Minucius had been defeated
by him he was himself vanquished by Fabius. The greater part of the day had
been spent in these varying fortunes of the field. On their return to camp
Minucius called his men together and addressed them thus: "Soldiers, I have
often heard it said that the best man is he who himself advises what is the
right thing to do; next to him comes the man who follows good advice; but
the man who neither himself knows what counsel to give nor obeys the wise
counsels of another is of the very lowest order of intelligence. Since the first
order of intelligence and capacity has been denied to us let us cling to the
second and intermediate one, and whilst we are learning to command, let us
make up our minds to obey him who is wise and far sighted. Let us join
camp with Fabius. When we have carried the standards to his tent where I
shall salute him as 'Father,' a title which the service he has done us and the
greatness of his office alike deserve, you soldiers will salute as 'Patrons'
those whose arms and right hands protected you a little while ago. If this day
has done nothing else for us, it has at all events conferred on us the glory of
having grateful hearts."
22.30
The
signal was given and the word passed to collect the baggage; they then
proceeded in marching order to the Dictator's camp much to his surprise and
to the surprise of all who were round him. When the standards had been
stationed in front of his tribunal, the Master of the Horse stepped forward
and addressed him as "Father," and the whole of his troops saluted those
who were crowding round them as "Patrons." He then proceeded, "I have
put you on a level, Dictator, with my parents as far as I can do so in words,
but to them I only owe my life, to you I owe my preservation and the safety
of all these men. The decree of the plebs, which I feel to be onerous rather
than an honour, I am the first to repeal and annul, and with a prayer that it
may turn out well for you, for me, and for these armies of yours, for
preserved and preserver alike, I place myself again under your auspicious
authority and restore to you these legions with their standards. I ask you, as
an act of grace, to order me to retain my office and these, each man of them,
his place in the ranks." Then each man grasped his neighbour's hand, and the
soldiers were dismissed to quarters where they were generously and
hospitably entertained by acquaintances and strangers alike, and the day
which had a short time ago been dark and gloomy and almost marked by
disaster and ruin became a day of joy and gladness. When the report of this
action reached Rome and was confirmed by despatches from both
commanders, and by letters from the rank and file of both armies, every man
did his best to extol Maximus to the skies. His reputation was quite as great
with Hannibal and the Carthaginians; now at last they felt that the were
warring with Romans and on Italian soil. For the last two years they had felt
such contempt for Roman generals and Roman troops that they could hardly
believe that they were at war with that nation of whom they had heard such a
terrible report from their fathers. Hannibal on his return from the field is
reported to have said, "The cloud which has so long settled on the mountain
heights has at last burst upon us in rain and storm."
22.31
While
these events were occurring in Italy, the consul., Cn. Servilius Geminus, with
a fleet of 120 vessels, visited Sardinia and Corsica and received hostages
from both islands; from there he sailed to Africa. Before landing on the
mainland he laid waste the island of Menix and allowed the inhabitants of
Cercina to save their island from a similar visitation by paying an indemnity
of ten talents of silver. After this he disembarked his forces on the African
coast and sent them, both soldiers and seamen, to ravage the country. They
dispersed far and wide just as though they were plundering uninhabited
islands, and consequently their recklessness led them into an ambuscade.
Straggling in small parties, they were surrounded by large numbers of the
enemy who knew the country, whilst they were strangers to it, with the
result that they were driven in wild flight and with heavy loss back to their
ships. After losing as many as a thousand men -amongst them the quaestor
Sempronius Blaesus -the fleet hastily put to sea from shores lined with the
enemy and held its course to Sicily. Here it was handed over to T. Otacilius,
in order that his second in command, P. Sura, might take it back to Rome.
Servilius himself proceeded overland through Sicily and crossed the Strait
into Italy, in consequence of a despatch from Q. Fabius recalling him and his
colleague, M. Atilius, to take over the armies, as his six months' tenure of
office had almost expired. All the annalists, with one or two exceptions, state
that Fabius acted against Hannibal as Dictator; Caelius adds that he was the
first Dictator who was appointed by the people. But Caelius and the rest
have forgotten that the right of nominating a Dictator lay with the consul
alone, and Servilius, who was the only consul at the time, was in Gaul. The
citizens, appalled by three successive defeats, could not endure the thought
of delay, and recourse was had to the appointment by the people of a man to
act in place of a Dictator ("pro dictatore"). His subsequent achievements, his
brilliant reputation as a commander, and the exaggerations which his
descendants introduced into the inscription on his bust easily explain the
belief which ultimately gained ground, that Fabius, who had only been
pro-dictator, was actually Dictator.
22.32
Fabius
army was transferred to Atilius, Servilius Geminus took over the one which
Minucius had commanded. They lost no time in fortifying their winter
quarters, and during the remainder of the autumn conducted their joint
operations in the most perfect harmony on the line which Fabius had laid
down. When Hannibal left his camp to collect supplies, they were
conveniently posted at different spots to harass his main body and cut off
stragglers; but they refused to risk a general engagement, though the enemy
employed every artifice to bring one on. Hannibal was reduced to such
extremities that he would have marched back into Gaul had not his departure
looked like flight. No chance whatever would have been left to him of
feeding his army in that part of Italy if the succeeding consuls had persevered
in the same tactics. When the winter had brought the war to a standstill at
Gereonium, envoys from Neapolis arrived in Rome. They brought with them
into the Senate-house forty very heavy golden bowls, and addressed the
assembled senators in the following terms: "We know that the Roman
treasury is being drained by the war, and since this war is being carried on
for the towns and fields of the allies quite as much as for the head and
stronghold of Italy, the City of Rome and its empire, we Neapolitans have
thought it but right to assist the Roman people with the gold which has been
left by our ancestors for the enriching of our temples and for a reserve in
time of need. If we thought that our personal services would have been of
any use we would just as gladly have offered them. The senators and people
of Rome will confer a great pleasure upon us if they look upon everything
that belongs to the Neapolitans as their own, and deign to accept from us a
gift, the value and importance of which lie rather in the cordial goodwill of
those who gladly give it than in any intrinsic worth which it may itself
possess." A vote of thanks was passed to the envoys for their munificence
and their care for the interests of Rome, and one bowl, the smallest, was
accepted.
22.33
About
the same time a Carthaginian spy who for two years had escaped detection
was caught in Rome, and after both his hands were cut off, he was sent
away. Twenty-five slaves who had formed a conspiracy in the Campus
Martius were crucified; the informer had his liberty given to him and 20,000
bronze ases. Ambassadors were sent to Philip, King of Macedon, to demand
the surrender of Demetrius of Pharos, who had taken refuge with him after
his defeat, and another embassy was despatched to the Ligurians to make a
formal complaint as to the assistance they had given the Carthaginian in men
and money, and at the same time to get a nearer view of what was going on
amongst the Boii and the Insubres. Officials were also sent to Pineus, King
of Illyria, to demand payment of the tribute which was now in arrears, or, if
he wished for an extension of time, to accept personal securities for its
payment. So, though they had an immense war on their shoulders, nothing
escaped the attention of the Romans in any part of the world, however
distant. A religious difficulty arose about an unfulfilled vow. On the occasion
of the mutiny amongst the troops in Gaul two years before, the praetor, L.
Manlius, had vowed a temple to Concord, but up to that time no contract
had been made for its construction. Two commissioners were appointed for
the purpose by M. Aemilius, the City praetor, namely, C. Pupius and Caeso
Quinctius Flamininus, and they entered into a contract for the building of the
temple within the precinct of the citadel. The senate passed a resolution that
Aemilius should also write to the consuls asking one of them, if they
approved, to come to Rome to hold the consular elections, and he would
give notice of the elections for whatever day they fixed upon. The consuls
replied that they could not leave the army in the presence of the enemy
without danger to the republic, it would be therefore better for the elections
to be held by an interrex than that a consul should be recalled from the front.
The senate thought it better for a Dictator to be nominated by the consul for
the purpose of holding the elections. L. Veturius Philo was nominated; he
appointed Manlius Pomponius Matho his Master of the Horse. Their election
was found to be invalid, and they were ordered to resign office after holding
it for four days; matters reverted to an interregnum.
22.34
(216
B.C.)Servilius and Regulus had their commands extended for another year.
The interreges appointed by the senate were C. Claudius Cento, son of
Appius, and P. Cornelius Asina. The latter conducted the elections amidst a
bitter struggle between the patricians and the plebs. C. Terentius Varro, a
member of their own order, had ingratiated himself with the plebs by his
attacks upon the leading men in the State and by all the tricks known to the
demagogue. His success in shaking the influence of Fabius and weakening
the authority of the Dictator had invested him with a certain glory in the eyes
of the mob, which was heightened by the other's unpopularity, and they did
their utmost to raise him to the consulship. The patricians opposed him with
their utmost strength, dreading lest it should become a common practice for
men to attack them as a means of rising to an equality with them. Q. Baebius
Herennius, a relation of Varro's, accused not only the senate, but even the
augurs, because they had prevented the Dictator from carrying the elections
through, and by thus embittering public opinion against them, he
strengthened the feeling in favour of his own candidate. "It was by the
nobility," he declared, "who had for many years been trying to get up a war,
that Hannibal was brought into Italy, and when the war might have been
brought to a close, it was they who were unscrupulously protracting it. The
advantage which M. Minucius gained in the absence of Fabius made it
abundantly clear that with four legions combined, a successful fight could be
maintained, but afterwards two legions had been exposed to slaughter at the
hands of the enemy, and then rescued at the very last moment in order that
he might be called 'Father' and 'Patron' because he would not allow the
Romans to conquer before they had been defeated. Then as to the consuls;
though they had it in their power to finish the war they had adopted Fabius'
policy and protracted it. This is the secret understanding that has been come
to by all the nobles, and we shall never see the end of the war till we have
elected as our consul a man who is really a plebeian, that is, one from the
ranks. The plebeian nobility have all been initiated into the same mysteries;
when they are no longer looked down upon by the patricians, they at once
begin to look down upon the plebs. Who does not see that their one aim and
object was to bring about an interregnum in order that the elections might be
controlled by the patricians? That was the object of the consuls in both
staying with the army; then, afterwards, because they had to nominate a
Dictator against their will to conduct the elections, they had carried their
point by force, and the Dictator's appointment was declared invalid by the
augurs. Well, they have got their interregnum; one consulship at all events
belongs to the Roman plebs; the people will freely dispose of it and give it to
the man who prefers an early victory to prolonged command."
22.35
Harangues like these kindled intense
excitement amongst the plebs. There were three patrician candidates in the
field, P. Cornelius Merenda, L. Manlius Vulso, and M. Aemilius Lepidus;
two plebeians who were now ennobled, C. Atilius Serranus and Q. Aelius
Paetus, one of whom was a pontiff, the other an augur. But the only one
elected was C. Terentius Varro, so that the elections for appointing his
colleague were in his hands. The nobility saw that his rivals were not strong
enough, and they compelled L. Aemilius Paulus to come forward. He had
come off with a blasted reputation from the trial in which his colleague had
been found guilty, and he narrowly escaped, and for a long time stoutly
resisted the proposal to become a candidate owing to his intense dislike of
the plebs. On the next election day, after all Varro's opponents had retired,
he was given to him not so much to be his colleague as to oppose him on
equal terms. The elections of praetors followed; those elected were Manlius
Pomponius Matho and P. Furius Philus. To Philus was assigned the
jurisdiction over Roman citizens, to Pomponius the decision of suits between
citizens and foreigners. Two additional praetors were appointed, M.
Claudius Marcellus for Sicily, and L. Postumius Albinus to act in Gaul.
These were all elected in their absence, and none of them, with the exception
of Varro, were new to office. Several strong and capable men were passed
over, for at such a time it seemed undesirable that a magistracy should be
entrusted to new and untried men.
22.36
The
armies were increased, but as to what additions were made to the infantry
and cavalry, the authorities vary so much, both as to the numbers and nature
of the forces, that I should hardly venture to assert anything as positively
certain. Some say that 10,000 recruits were called out to make up the losses;
others, that four new legions were enrolled so that they might carry on the
war with eight legions. Some authorities record that both horse and foot in
the legions were made stronger by the addition of 1000 infantry and 100
cavalry to each, so that they contained 5000 infantry and 300 cavalry, whilst
the allies furnished double the number of cavalry and an equal number of
infantry. Thus, according to these writers, there were 87,200 men in the
Roman camp when the battle of Cannae was fought. One thing is quite
certain; the struggle was resumed with greater vigour and energy than in
former years, because the Dictator had given them reason to hope that the
enemy might be conquered. But before the newly raised legions left the City
the decemvirs were ordered to consult the Sacred Books owing to the
general alarm which had been created by fresh portents. It was reported that
showers of stones had fallen simultaneously on the Aventine in Rome and at
Aricia; that the statues of the gods amongst the Sabines had sweated blood,
and cold water had flowed from the hot springs. This latter portent created
more terror, because it had happened several times. In the colonnade near
the Campus several men had been killed by lightning. The proper expiation
of these portents was ascertained from the Sacred Books. Some envoys from
Paestum brought golden bowls to Rome. Thanks were voted to them as in
the case of the Neapolitans, but the gold was not accepted.
22.37
About
the same time a fleet which had been despatched by Hiero arrived at Ostia
with a large quantity of supplies. When his officers were introduced into the
senate they spoke in the following terms: "The news of the death of the
consul C. Flaminius and the destruction of his army caused so much distress
and grief to King Hiero that he could not have been more deeply moved by
any disaster which could happen either to himself personally or to his
kingdom. Although he well knows that the greatness of Rome is almost
more to be admired in adversity than in prosperity, still, notwithstanding
that, he has sent everything with which good and faithful allies can assist
their friends in time of war, and he earnestly intreats the senate not to reject
his offer. To begin with, we are bringing, as an omen of good fortune, a
golden statue of Victory, weighing two hundred and twenty pounds. We ask
you to accept it and keep it as your own for ever. We have also brought
300,000 pecks of wheat and 200,000 of barley that you may not want
provisions, and we are prepared to transport as much more as you require to
any place that you may decide upon. The king is quite aware that Rome does
not employ any legionary soldiers or cavalry except Romans and those
belonging to the Latin nation, but he has seen foreigners serving as light
infantry in the Roman camp. He has, accordingly, sent 1000 archers and
slingers, capable of acting against the Balearics and Moors and other tribes
who fight with missile weapons." They supplemented these gifts by
suggesting that the praetor to whom Sicily had been assigned should take the
fleet over to Africa so that the country of the enemy, too, might be visited by
war, and less facilities afforded him for sending reinforcements to Hannibal.
The senate requested the officers to take back the following reply to the
king: Hiero was a man of honour and an exemplary ally; he had been
consistently loyal all through, and had on every occasion rendered most
generous help to Rome, and for that Rome was duly grateful. The gold
which had been offered by one or two cities had not been accepted, though
the Roman people were very grateful for the offer. They would, however,
accept the statue of Victory as an omen for the future, and would give and
consecrate a place for her in the Capitol in the temple of Jupiter Optimus
Maximus. Enshrined in that stronghold she will be gracious and propitious,
constant and steadfast to Rome. The archers and slingers and the corn were
handed over to the consuls. The fleet which T. Otacilius had with him in
Sicily was strengthened by the addition of twenty-five quinqueremes, and
permission was given him to cross over to Africa if he thought it would be in
the interest of the republic.
22.38
After
completing the enrolment the consuls waited a few days for the contingents
furnished by the Latins and the allies to come in. Then a new departure was
made; the soldiers were sworn in by the military tribunes. Up to that day
there had only been the military oath binding the men to assemble at the
bidding of the consuls and not to disband until they received orders to do so.
It had also been the custom among the soldiers, when the infantry were
formed into companies of 100, and the cavalry into troops of 10, for all the
men in each company or troop to take a voluntary oath to each other that
they would not leave their comrades for fear or for flight, and that they
would not quit the ranks save to fetch or pick up a weapon, to strike an
enemy, or to save a comrade. This voluntary covenant was now changed
into a formal oath taken before the tribunes. Before they marched out of the
City, Varro delivered several violent harangues, in which he declared that the
war had been brought into Italy by the nobles, and would continue to feed on
the vitals of the republic if there were more generals like Fabius; he, Varro,
would finish off the war the very day he caught sight of the enemy. His
colleague, Paulus, made only one speech, in which there was much more
truth than the people cared to hear. He passed no strictures on Varro, but he
did express surprise that any general, whilst still in the City before he had
taken up his command, or become acquainted with either his own army or
that of the enemy, or gained any information as to the lie of the country and
the nature of the ground, should know in what way he should conduct the
campaign and be able to foretell the day on which he would fight a decisive
battle with the enemy. As for himself, Paulus said that he would not
anticipate events by disclosing his measures, for, after all, circumstances
determined measures for men much more than men made circumstances
subservient to measures. He hoped and prayed that such measures as were
taken with due caution and foresight might turn out successful; so far
rashness, besides being foolish, had proved disastrous. He made it quite clear
that he would prefer safe to hasty counsels, and in order to strengthen him in
this resolve Fabius is said to have addressed him on his departure in the
following terms:
22.39
" L.
Aemilius, if you were like your colleague or, if you had a colleague like
yourself -and I would that it were so -my address would be simply a waste
of words. For if you were both good consuls, you would, without any
suggestions from me, do everything that the interests of the State or your
own sense of honour demanded; if you were both alike bad, you would
neither listen to anything I had to say, nor take any advice which I might
offer. As it is, when I look at your colleague and consider what sort of a man
you are, I shall address my remarks to you. I can see that your merits as a
man and a citizen will effect nothing if one half of the commonwealth is
crippled and evil counsels possess the same force and authority as good
ones. You are mistaken, L. Paulus, if you imagine that you will have less
difficulty with C. Terentius than with Hannibal; I rather think the former will
prove a more dangerous enemy than the latter. With the one you will only
have to contend in the field, the opposition of the other you will have to
meet everywhere and always. Against Hannibal and his legions you will have
your cavalry and infantry, when Varro is in command he will use your own
men against you. I do not want to bring ill luck on you by mentioning the
ill-starred Flaminius, but this I must say that it was only after he was consul
and had entered upon his province and taken up his command that he began
to play the madman, but this man was insane before he stood for the
consulship and afterwards while canvassing for it, and now that he is consul,
before he has seen the camp or the enemy he is madder than ever. If he raises
such storms amongst peaceful civilians as he did just now by bragging about
battles and battlefields, what will he do, think you, when he is talking to
armed men -and those young men -where words at once lead to action.
And yet if he carries out his threat and brings on an action at once, either I
am utterly ignorant of military science, of the nature of this war, of the
enemy with whom we are dealing, or else some place or other will be
rendered more notorious by our defeat than even Trasumennus. As we are
alone, this is hardly a time for boasting, and I would rather be thought to
have gone too far in despising glory than in seeking it, but as a matter of
fact, the only rational method of carrying on war against Hannibal is the one
which I have followed. This is not only taught us by experience -experience
the teacher of fools -but by reasoning which has been and will continue to
be unchanged as long as the conditions remain the same. We are carrying on
war in Italy, in our own country on our own soil, everywhere round us are
citizens and allies, they are helping us with men, horses, supplies, and they
will continue to do so, for they have proved their loyalty thus far to us in our
adversity; and time and circumstance are making us more efficient, more
circumspect, more self-reliant. Hannibal, on the other hand, is in a foreign
and hostile land, far from his home and country, confronted everywhere by
opposition and danger; nowhere by land or sea can he find peace; no cities
admit him within their gates, no fortified towns; nowhere does he see
anything which he can call his own, he has to live on each day's pillage: he
has hardly a third of the army with which he crossed the Ebro; he has lost
more by famine than by the sword, and even the few he has cannot get
enough to support life. Do you doubt then, that if we sit still we shall get the
better of a man who is growing weaker day by day, who has neither supplies
nor reinforcements nor money? How long has he been sitting before the
walls of Gereonium, a poor fortress in Apulia, as though they were the walls
of Carthage? But I will not sound my own praises even before you. See how
the late consuls, Cn. Servilius and Atilius, fooled him. This, L. Paulus, is the
only safe course to adopt, and it is one which your fellow citizens will do
more to make difficult and dangerous for you than the enemy will. For your
own soldiers will want the same thing as the enemy; Varro though he is a
Roman consul will desire just what Hannibal the Carthaginian commander
desires. You must hold your own single-handed against both generals. And
you will hold your own if you stand your ground firmly against public gossip
and private slander, if you remain unmoved by false misrepresentations and
your colleague's idle boasting. It is said that truth is far too often eclipsed but
never totally extinguished. The man who scorns false glory will possess the
true. Let them call you a coward because you are cautious, a laggard
because you are deliberate, unsoldierly because you are a skilful general. I
would rather have you give a clever enemy cause for fear than earn the
praise of foolish compatriots. Hannibal will only feel contempt for a man
who runs all risks, he will be afraid of one who never takes a rash step. I do
not advise you to do nothing, but I do advise you to be guided in what you
do by common sense and reason and not by chance. Never lose control of
your forces and yourself; be always prepared, always on the alert; never fail
to seize an opportunity favourable to yourself, and never give a favourable
opportunity to the enemy. The man who is not in a hurry will always see his
way clearly; haste blunders on blindly."
22.40
The
consul's reply was far from being a cheerful one, for he admitted that the
advice given was true, but not easy to put into practice. If a Dictator had
found his Master of the Horse unbearable, what power or authority would a
consul have against a violent and headstrong colleague? "In my first
consulship," he said, "I escaped, badly singed, from the fire of popular fury. I
hope and pray that all may end successfully, but if any mischance befalls us I
shall expose myself to the weapons of the enemy sooner than to the verdict
of the enraged citizens." With these words Paulus, it is said, set forward,
escorted by the foremost men amongst the patricians; the plebeian consul
was attended by his plebeian friends, more conspicuous for their numbers
than for the quality of the men who composed the crowd. When they came
into camp the recruits and the old soldiers were formed into one army, and
two separate camps were formed, the new camp, which was the smaller one,
being nearer to Hannibal, while in the old camp the larger part of the army
and the best troops were stationed. M. Atilius, one of the consuls of the
previous year, pleaded his age and was sent back to Rome; the other,
Geminus Servilius, was placed in command of the smaller camp with one
Roman legion and 2000 horse and foot of the allies. Although Hannibal saw
that the army opposed to him was half as large again as it had been he was
hugely delighted at the advent of the consuls. For not only was there nothing
left out of his daily plunder, but there was nothing left anywhere for him to
seize, as all the corn, now that the country was unsafe, had been everywhere
stored in the cities. Hardly ten days' rations of corn remained, as was
afterwards discovered, and the Spaniards were prepared to desert, owing to
the shortness of supplies, if only the Romans had waited till the time was
ripe.
22.41
An
incident occurred which still further encouraged Varro's impetuous and
headstrong temperament. Parties were sent to drive off the foragers; a
confused fight ensued owing to the soldiers rushing forward without any
preconcerted plan or orders from their commanders, and the contest went
heavily against the Carthaginians. As many as 1700 of them were killed, the
loss of the Romans and the allies did not amount to more than 100. The
consuls commanded on alternate days, and that day happened to be Paulus'
turn. He checked the victors who were pursuing the enemy in great disorder,
for he feared an ambuscade. Varro was furious, and loudly exclaimed that
the enemy had been allowed to slip out of their hands, and if the pursuit had
not been stopped the war could have been brought to a close. Hannibal did
not very much regret his losses, on the contrary he believed that they would
serve as a bait to the impetuosity of the consul and his newly-raised troops,
and that he would be more headstrong than ever. What was going on in the
enemy's camp was quite as well known to him as what was going on in his
own; he was fully aware that there were differences and quarrels between the
commanders, and that two-thirds of the army consisted of recruits. The
following night he selected what he considered a suitable position for an
ambuscade, and marched his men out of camp with nothing but their arms,
leaving all the property, both public and private, behind in the camp. He then
concealed the force behind the hills which enclosed the valley, the infantry to
the left and the cavalry to the right, and took the baggage train through the
middle of the valley, in the hope of surprising the Romans whilst plundering
the apparently deserted camp and hampered with their plunder. Numerous
fires were left burning in the camp in order to create the impression that he
wished to keep the consuls in their respective positions until he had traversed
a considerable distance in his retreat. Fabius had been deceived by the same
stratagem the previous year.
22.42
As it
grew light the pickets were seen to have been withdrawn, then on
approaching nearer the unusual silence created surprise. When it was
definitely learnt that the camp was empty the men rushed in a body to the
commanders' quarters with the news that the enemy had fled in such haste
that they left the tents standing, and to secure greater secrecy for their flight
had also left numerous fires burning. Then a loud shout arose demanding
that the order should be given to advance, and that the men should be led in
pursuit, and that the camp should be plundered forthwith. The one consul
behaved as though he were one of the clamorous crowd; the other, Paulus,
repeatedly asserted the need of caution and circumspection. At last, unable
to deal with the mutinous crowd and its leader in any other way, he sent
Marius Statilius with his troop of Lucanian horse to reconnoitre. When he
had ridden up to the gates of the camp he ordered his men to halt outside the
lines, he himself with two of his troopers entered the camp and after a
careful and thorough examination he brought back word that there was
certainly a trick somewhere, the fires were left on the side of the camp which
fronted the Romans, the tents were standing open with all the valuables
exposed to view, in some parts he had seen silver lying about on the paths as
though it had been put there for plunder. So far from deterring the soldiers
from satisfying their greed, as it was intended to do, this report only inflamed
it, and a shout arose that if the signal was not given they would go on
without their generals. There was no lack of a general, however, for Varro
instantly gave the signal to advance. Paulus, who was hanging back, received
a report from the keeper of the sacred chickens that they had not given a
favourable omen, and he ordered the report to be at once carried to his
colleague as he was just marching out of the camp gates. Varro was very
much annoyed, but the recollection of the disaster which overtook Flaminius
and the naval defeat which the consul Claudius sustained in the first Punic
war made him afraid of acting in an irreligious spirit. It seemed as though the
gods themselves on that day delayed, if they did actually do away, the fatal
doom which was impending over the Romans. For it so happened that whilst
the soldiers were ignoring the consul's order for the standards to be carried
back into camp, two slaves, one belonging to a trooper from Formiae, the
other to one from Sidicinum, who had been captured with the foraging
parties when Servilius and Atilius were in command, had that day escaped to
their former masters. They were taken before the consul and told him that
the whole of Hannibal's army was lying behind the nearest hills. The
opportune arrival of these men restored the authority of the consuls, though
one of them in his desire to be popular had weakened his authority by his
unscrupulous connivance at breaches of discipline.
22.43
When
Hannibal saw that the ill-considered movement which the Romans had
commenced was not recklessly carried out to its final stage, and that his ruse
had been detected, he returned to camp. Owing to the want of corn he was
unable to remain there many days, and fresh plans were continually cropping
up, not only amongst the soldiers, who were a medley of all nations, but
even in the mind of the general himself. Murmurs gradually swelled into loud
and angry protests as the men demanded their arrears of pay, and
complained of the starvation which they were enduring, and in addition, a
rumour was started that the mercenaries, chiefly those of Spanish nationality,
had formed a plot to desert. Even Hannibal himself, it is said, sometimes
thought of leaving his infantry behind and hurrying with his cavalry into
Gaul. With these plans being discussed and this temper prevailing amongst
the men, he decided to move into the warmer parts of Apulia, where the
harvest was earlier and where, owing to the greater distance from the enemy,
desertion would be rendered more difficult for the fickle-minded part of his
force. As on the previous occasion, he ordered camp-fires to be lighted, and
a few tents left where they could be easily seen, in order that the Romans,
remembering a similar stratagem, might be afraid to move. However,
Statilius was again sent to reconnoitre with his Lucanians, and he made a
thorough examination of the country beyond the camp and over the
mountains. He reported that he had caught a distant view of the enemy in
line of march, and the question of pursuit was discussed. As usual, the views
of the two consuls were opposed, but almost all present supported Varro,
not a single voice was given in favour of Paulus, except that of Servilius,
consul in the preceding year. The opinion of the majority of the council
prevailed, and so, driven by destiny, they went forward to render Cannae
famous in the annals of Roman defeats. It was in the neighbourhood of this
village that Hannibal had fixed his camp with his back to the Sirocco which
blows from Mount Vultur and fills the arid plains with clouds of dust. This
arrangement was a very convenient one for his camp, and it proved to be
extremely advantageous afterwards, when he was forming his order of battle,
for his own men, with the wind behind them, blowing only on their backs,
would fight with an enemy who was blinded by volumes of dust.
22.44
The
consuls followed the Carthaginians, carefully examining the roads as they
marched, and when they reached Cannae and had the enemy in view they
formed two entrenched camps separated by the same interval as at
Gereonium, and with the same distribution of troops in each camp. The river
Aufidus, flowing past the two camps, furnished a supply of water which the
soldiers got as they best could, and they generally had to fight for it. The
men in the smaller camp, which was on the other side of the river, had less
difficulty in obtaining it, as that bank was not held by the enemy. Hannibal
now saw his hopes fulfilled, that the consuls would give him an opportunity
of fighting on ground naturally adapted for the movements of cavalry, the
arm in which he had so far been invincible, and accordingly he placed his
army in order of battle, and tried to provoke his foe to action by repeated
charges of his Numidians. The Roman camp was again disturbed by a
mutinous soldiery and consuls at variance, Paulus bringing up against Varro
the fatal rashness of Sempronius and Flaminius, Varro retorting by pointing
to Fabius as the favourite model of cowardly and inert commanders, and
calling gods and men to witness that it was through no fault of his that
Hannibal had acquired, so to speak, a prescriptive right to Italy; he had had
his hands tied by his colleague; his soldiers, furious and eager for fight, had
had their swords and arms taken away from them. Paulus, on the other hand,
declared that if anything happened to the legions flung recklessly and
betrayed into an ill-considered and imprudent action, he was free from all
responsibility for it, though he would have to share in all the consequences.
"See to it," he said to Varro, "that those who are so free and ready with their
tongues are equally so with their hands in the day of battle."
22.45
Whilst
time was thus being wasted in disputes instead of deliberation, Hannibal
withdrew the bulk of his army, who had been standing most of the day in
order of battle, into camp. He sent his Numidians, however, across the river
to attack the parties who were getting water for the smaller camp. They had
hardly gained the opposite bank when with their shouting and uproar they
sent the crowd flying in wild disorder, and galloping on as far as the outpost
in front of the rampart, they nearly reached the gates of the camp. It was
looked upon as such an insult for a Roman camp to be actually terrorised by
irregular auxiliaries that one thing, and one thing alone, held back the
Romans from instantly crossing the river and forming their battle line -the
supreme command that day rested with Paulus. The following day Varro,
whose turn it now was, without any consultation with his colleague,
exhibited the signal for battle and led his forces drawn up for action across
the river. Paulus followed, for though he disapproved of the measure, he was
bound to support it. After crossing, they strengthened their line with the
force in the smaller camp and completed their formation. On the right, which
was nearest to the river, the Roman cavalry were posted, then came the
infantry; on the extreme left were the cavalry of the allies, their infantry were
between them and the Roman legions. The javelin men with the rest of the
light-armed auxiliaries formed the front line. The consuls took their stations
on the wings, Terentius Varro on the left, Aemilius Paulus on the right.
22.46
As
soon as it grew light Hannibal sent forward the Balearics and the other light
infantry. He then crossed the river in person and as each division was
brought across he assigned it its place in the line. The Gaulish and Spanish
horse he posted near the bank on the left wing in front of the Roman cavalry;
the right wing was assigned to the Numidian troopers. The centre consisted
of a strong force of infantry, the Gauls and Spaniards in the middle, the
Africans at either end of them. You might fancy that the Africans were for
the most part a body of Romans from the way they were armed, they were
so completely equipped with the arms, some of which they had taken at the
Trebia, but the most part at Trasumennus. The Gauls and Spaniards had
shields almost of the same shape their swords were totally different, those of
the Gauls being very long and without a point, the Spaniard, accustomed to
thrust more than to cut, had a short handy sword, pointed like a dagger.
These nations, more than any other, inspired terror by the vastness of their
stature and their frightful appearance: the Gauls were naked above the waist,
the Spaniards had taken up their position wearing white tunics embroidered
with purple, of dazzling brilliancy. The total number of infantry in the field
was 40,000, and there were 10,000 cavalry. Hasdrubal was in command of
the left wing, Maharbal of the right; Hannibal himself with his brother Mago
commanded the centre. It was a great convenience to both armies that the
sun shone obliquely on them, whether it was that they had purposely so
placed themselves, or whether it happened by accident, since the Romans
faced the north, the Carthaginans the South. The wind, called by the
inhabitants the Vulturnus, was against the Romans, and blew great clouds of
dust into their faces, making it impossible for them to see in front of them.
22.47
When
the battle shout was raised the auxiliaries ran forward, and the battle began
with the light infantry. Then the Gauls and Spaniards on the left engaged the
Roman cavalry on the right; the battle was not at all like a cavalry fight, for
there was no room for maneuvering, the river on the one side and the
infantry on the other hemming them in, compelled them to fight face to face.
Each side tried to force their way straight forward, till at last the horses were
standing in a closely pressed mass, and the riders seized their opponents and
tried to drag them from their horses. It had become mainly a struggle of
infantry, fierce but short, and the Roman cavalry was repulsed and fled. Just
as this battle of the cavalry was finished, the infantry became engaged, and as
long as the Gauls and Spaniards kept their ranks unbroken, both sides were
equally matched in strength and courage. At length after long and repeated
efforts the Romans closed up their ranks, echeloned their front, and by the
sheer weight of their deep column bore down the division of the enemy
which was stationed in front of Hannibal's line, and was too thin and weak to
resist the pressure. Without a moment's pause they followed up their broken
and hastily retreating foe till they took to headlong flight. Cutting their way
through the mass of fugitives, who offered no resistance, they penetrated as
far as the Africans who were stationed on both wings, somewhat further
back than the Gauls and Spaniards who had formed the advanced centre. As
the latter fell back the whole front became level, and as they continued to
give ground it became concave and crescent-shaped, the Africans at either
end forming the horns. As the Romans rushed on incautiously between them,
they were enfiladed by the two wings, which extended and closed round
them in the rear. On this, the Romans, who had fought one battle to no
purpose, left the Gauls and Spaniards, whose rear they had been
slaughtering, and commenced a fresh struggle with the Africans. The contest
was a very one-sided one, for not only were they hemmed in on all sides, but
wearied with the previous fighting they were meeting fresh and vigorous
opponents.
22.48
By this
time the Roman left wing, where the allied cavalry were fronting the
Numidians, had become engaged, but the fighting was slack at first owing to
a Carthaginian stratagem. About 500 Numidians, carrying, besides their
usual arms and missiles, swords concealed under their coats of mail, rode out
from their own line with their shields slung behind their backs as though they
were deserters, and suddenly leaped from their horses and flung their shields
and javelins at the feet of their enemy. They were received into their ranks,
conducted to the rear, and ordered to remain quiet. While the battle was
spreading to the various parts of the field they remained quiet, but when the
eyes and minds of all were wholly taken up with the fighting they seized the
large Roman shields which were lying everywhere amongst the heaps of slain
and commenced a furious attack upon the rear of the Roman line. Slashing
away at backs and hips, they made a great slaughter and a still greater panic
and confusion. Amidst the rout and panic in one part of the field and the
obstinate but hopeless struggle in the other, Hasdrubal, who was in
command of that arm, withdrew some Numidians from the centre of the
right wing, where the fighting was feebly kept up, and sent them m pursuit of
the fugitives, and at the same time sent the Spanish and Gaulish horse to the
aid of the Africans, who were by this time more wearied by slaughter than by
fighting.
22.49
Paulus
was on the other side of the field. In spite of his having been seriously
wounded at the commencement of the action by a bullet from a sling, he
frequently encountered Hannibal with a compact body of troops, and in
several places restored the battle. The Roman cavalry formed a bodyguard
round him, but at last, as he became too weak to manage his horse, they all
dismounted. It is stated that when some one reported to Hannibal that the
consul had ordered his men to fight on foot, he remarked, "I would rather he
handed them over to me bound hand and foot.'' Now that the victory of the
enemy was no longer doubtful this struggle of the dismounted cavalry was
such as might be expected when men preferred to die where they stood
rather than flee, and the victors, furious at them for delaying the victory,
butchered without mercy those whom they could not dislodge. They did,
however, repulse a few survivors exhausted with their exertions and their
wounds. All were at last scattered, and those who could regained their
horses for flight. Cn. Lentulus, a military tribune, saw, as he rode by, the
consul covered with blood sitting on a boulder. "Lucius Aemilius," he said,
"the one man whom the gods must hold guiltless of this day's disaster, take
this horse while you have still some strength left, and I can lift you into the
saddle and keep by your side to protect you. Do not make this day of battle
still more fatal by a consul's death, there are enough tears and mourning
without that." The consul replied: "Long may you live to do brave deeds,
Cornelius, but do not waste in useless pity the few moments left in which to
escape from the hands of the enemy. Go, announce publicly to the senate
that they must fortify Rome and make its defence strong before the
victorious enemy approaches, and tell Q. Fabius privately that I have ever
remembered his precepts in life and in death. Suffer me to breathe my last
among my slaughtered soldiers, let me not have to defend myself again when
I am no longer consul, or appear as the accuser of my colleague and protect
my own innocence by throwing the guilt on another." During this
conversation a crowd of fugitives came suddenly upon them, followed by the
enemy, who, not knowing who the consul was, overwhelmed him with a
shower of missiles. Lentulus escaped on horseback in the rush. Then there
was flight in all directions; 7000 men escaped to the smaller camp, 10,000 to
the larger, and about 2000 to the village of Cannae. These latter were at
once surrounded by Carthalo and his cavalry, as the village was quite
unfortified. The other consul, who either by accident or design had not
joined any of these bodies of fugitives, escaped with about fifty cavalry to
Venusia; 45,500 infantry, 2700 cavalry -almost an equal proportion of
Romans and allies -are said to have been killed. Amongst the number were
both the quaestors attached to the consuls, L. Atilius and L. Furius Bibulcus,
twenty-nine military tribunes, several ex-consuls, ex-praetors, and ex-aediles
(amongst them are included Cn. Servilius Geminus and M. Minucius, who
was Master of the Horse the previous year and, some years before that,
consul), and in addition to these, eighty men who had either been senators or
filled offices qualifying them for election to the senate and who had
volunteered for service with the legions. The prisoners taken in the battle are
stated to have amounted to 3000 infantry and 1500 cavalry.
22.50
Such
was the battle of Cannae, a battle as famous as the disastrous one at the
Allia; not so serious in its results, owing to the inaction of the enemy, but
more serious and more horrible in view of the slaughter of the army. For the
flight at the Allia saved the army though it lost the City, whereas at Cannae
hardly fifty men shared the consul's flight, nearly the whole army met their
death in company with the other consul. As those who had taken refuge in
the two camps were only a defenceless crowd without any leaders, the men
in the larger camp sent a message to the others asking them to cross over to
them at night when the enemy, tired after the battle and the feasting in
honour of their victory, would be buried in sleep. Then they would go in one
body to Canusium. Some rejected the proposal with scorn. "Why," they
asked, "cannot those who sent the message come themselves, since they are
quite as able to join us as we to join them? Because, of course, all the
country between us is scoured by the enemy and they prefer to expose other
people to that deadly peril rather than themselves." Others did not
disapprove of the proposal, but they lacked courage to carry it out. P.
Sempronius Tuditanus protested against this cowardice. "Would you," he
asked, "rather be taken prisoners by a most avaricious and ruthless foe and a
price put upon your heads and your value assessed after you have been
asked whether you are a Roman citizen or a Latin ally, in order that another
may win honour from your misery and disgrace? Certainly not, if you are
really the fellow-countrymen of L. Aemilius, who chose a noble death rather
than a life of degradation, and of all the brave men who are lying in heaps
around him. But, before daylight overtakes us and the enemy gathers in
larger force to bar our path, let us cut our way through the men who in
disorder and confusion are clamouring at our gates. Good swords and brave
hearts make a way through enemies, however densely they are massed. If
you march shoulder to shoulder you will scatter this loose and disorganised
force as easily as if nothing opposed you. Come then with me, all you who
want to preserve yourselves and the State." With these words he drew his
sword, and with his men in close formation marched through the very midst
of the enemy. When the Numidians hurled their javelins on the right, the
unprotected side, they transferred their shields to their right arms, and so got
clear away to the larger camp As many as 600 escaped on this occasion, and
after another large body had joined them they at once left the camp and came
through safely to Canusium. This action on the part of defeated men was due
to the impulse of natural courage or of accident rather than to any concerted
plan of their own or any one's generalship.
22.51
Hannibal's officers all surrounded him
and congratulated him on his victory, and urged that after such a magnificent
success he should allow himself and his exhausted men to rest for the
remainder of the day and the following night. Maharbal, however, the
commandant of the cavalry, thought that they ought not to lose a moment.
"That you may know," he said to Hannibal, "what has been gained by this
battle I prophesy that in five days you will be feasting as victor in the
Capitol. Follow me; I will go in advance with the cavalry; they will know
that you are come before they know that you are coming." To Hannibal the
victory seemed too great and too joyous for him to realise all at once. He
told Maharbal that he commended his zeal, but he needed time to think out
his plans. Maharbal replied: "The gods have not given all their gifts to one
man. You know how to win victory, Hannibal, you do not how to use it."
That day's delay is believed to have saved the City and the empire. The next
day, as soon as it grew light, they set about gathering the spoils on the field
and viewing the carnage, which was a ghastly sight even for an enemy. There
all those thousands of Romans were lying, infantry and cavalry
indiscriminately as chance had brought them together in the battle or the
flight. Some covered with blood raised themselves from amongst the dead
around them, tortured by their wounds which were nipped by the cold of the
morning, and were promptly put an end to by the enemy. Some they found
lying with their thighs and knees gashed but still alive; these bared their
throats and necks and bade them drain what blood they still had left. Some
were discovered with their heads buried in the earth, they had evidently
suffocated themselves by making holes in the ground and heaping the soil
over their faces. What attracted the attention of all was a Numidian who was
dragged alive from under a dead Roman lying across him; his ears and nose
were torn, for the Roman with hands too powerless to grasp his weapon
had, in his mad rage, torn his enemy with his teeth, and while doing so
expired.
22.52
After
most of the day had been spent in collecting the spoils, Hannibal led his men
to the attack on the smaller camp and commenced operations by throwing up
a breastwork to cut off their water supply from the river. As, however, all
the defenders were exhausted by toil and want of sleep, as well as by
wounds, the surrender was effected sooner than he had anticipated. They
agreed to give up their arms and horses, and to pay for each Roman three
hundred "chariot pieces," for each ally two hundred, and for each officer's
servant one hundred, on condition that after the money was paid they should
be allowed to depart with one garment apiece. Then they admitted the enemy
into the camp and were all placed under guard, the Romans and the allies
separately. Whilst time was being spent there, all those in the larger camp,
who had sufficient strength and courage, to the number of 4000 infantry and
200 cavalry, made their escape to Canusium, some in a body, others
straggling through the fields, which was quite as safe a thing to do. Those
who were wounded and those who had been afraid to venture surrendered
the camp on the same terms as had been agreed upon in the other camp. An
immense amount of booty was secured, and the whole of it was made over
to the troops with the exception of the horses and prisoners and whatever
silver there might be. Most of this was on the trappings of the horses, for
they used very little silver plate at table, at all events when on a campaign.
Hannibal then ordered the bodies of his own soldiers to be collected for
burial; it is said that there were as many as 8000 of his best troops. Some
authors state that he also had a search made for the body of the Roman
consul, which he buried. Those who had escaped to Canusium were simply
allowed shelter within its walls and houses, but a high-born and wealthy
Apulian lady, named Busa, assisted them with corn and clothes and even
provisions for their journey. For this munificence the senate, at the close of
the war, voted her public honours
22.53
Although there were four military
tribunes on the spot -Fabius Maximus of the first legion, whose father had
been lately Dictator, L. Publicius Bibulus and Publius Cornelius Scipio of the
second legion, and Appius Claudius Pulcher of the third legion, who had just
been aedile -the supreme command was by universal consent vested in P.
Scipio, who was quite a youth, and Appius Claudius. They were holding a
small council to discuss the state of affairs when P. Furius Philus, the son of
an ex-consul, informed them that it was useless for them to cherish ruined
hopes; the republic was despaired of and given over for lost; some young
nobles with L. Caecilius Metellus at their head were turning their eyes
seaward with the intention of abandoning Italy to its fate and transferring
their services to some king or other. This evil news, terrible as it was and
coming fresh on the top of all their other disasters, paralysed those who were
present with wonder and amazement. They thought that a council ought to
be summoned to deal with it, but young Scipio, the general destined to end
this war, said that it was no business for a council. In such an emergency as
that they must dare and act, not deliberate. "Let those," he cried, "who want
to save the republic take their arms at once and follow me. No camp is more
truly a hostile camp than one in which such treason is meditated." He started
off with a few followers to the house where Metellus was lodging, and
finding the young men about whom the report had been made gathered there
in council, he held his naked sword over the heads of the conspirators and
uttered these words: "I solemnly swear that I will not abandon the Republic
of Rome, nor will I suffer any other Roman citizen to do so; if I knowingly
break my oath, then do thou, O Jupiter Optimus Maximus, visit me, my
home, my family, and my estate with utter destruction. I require you, L.
Caecilius, and all who are here present, to take this oath. Whoever will not
swear let him know that this sword is drawn against him." They were in as
great a state of fear as though they saw the victorious Hannibal amongst
them, and all took the oath and surrendered themselves into Scipio's custody.
22.54
Whilst
these things were happening at Canusium, as many as 4500 infantry and
cavalry, who had been dispersed in flight over the country, succeeded in
reaching the consul at Venusia. The inhabitants received them with every
mark of kindness and distributed them all amongst their households to be
taken care of. They gave each of the troopers a toga and a tunic and
twenty-five "chariot pieces," and to each legionary ten pieces, and whatever
arms they required. All hospitality was shown them both by the government
and by private citizens, for the people of Venusia were determined not to be
outdone in kindness by a lady of Canusium. But the large number of men,
which now amounted to something like 10,000, made the burden imposed
upon Busa much heavier. For Appius and Scipio, on hearing that the consul
was safe, at once sent to him to inquire what amount of foot and horse he
had with him, and also whether he wanted the army to be taken to Venusia
or to remain at Canusium. Varro transferred his forces to Canusium, and
now there was something like a consular army; it seemed as though they
would defend themselves successfully behind their walls if not in the open
field. The reports which reached Rome left no room for hope that even these
remnants of citizens and allies were still surviving; it was asserted that the
army with its two consuls had been annihilated and the whole of the forces
wiped out. Never before, while the City itself was still safe, had there been
such excitement and panic within its walls. I shall not attempt to describe it,
nor will I weaken the reality by going into details. After the loss of the
consul and the army at Trasumennus the previous year, it was not wound
upon wound but multiplied disaster that was now announced. For according
to the reports two consular armies and two consuls were lost; there was no
longer any Roman camp, any general, any single soldier in existence; Apulia,
Samnium, almost the whole of Italy lay at Hannibal's feet. Certainly there is
no other nation that would not have succumbed beneath such a weight of
calamity. One might, of course, compare the naval defeat of the
Carthaginians at the Aegates, which broke their power to such an extent that
they gave up Sicily and Sardinia and submitted to the payment of tribute and
a war indemnity; or, again, the battle which they lost in Africa, in which
Hannibal himself was crushed. But there is no point of comparison between
these and Cannae, unless it be that they were borne with less fortitude.
22.55
P.
Furius Philus and M. Pomponius, the praetors, called a meeting of the senate
to take measures for the defence of the City, for no doubt was felt that after
wiping out the armies the enemy would set about his one remaining task and
advance to attack Rome. In the presence of evils the extent of which, great
as they were, was still unknown, they were unable even to form any definite
plans, and the cries of wailing women deafened their ears, for as the facts
were not yet ascertained the living and the dead were being indiscriminately
bewailed in almost every house. Under these circumstances Q. Fabius
Maximus gave it as his opinion that swift horsemen should be sent along the
Appian and Latin roads to make inquiries of those they met, for there would
be sure to be fugitives scattered about the country, and bring back tidings as
to what had befallen the consuls and the armies, and if the gods out of
compassion for the empire had left any remnant of the Roman nation, to find
out where those forces were. And also they might ascertain whither Hannibal
had repaired after the battle, what plans he was forming, what he was doing
or likely to do. They must get some young and active men to find out these
things, and as there were hardly any magistrates in the City, the senators
must themselves take steps to calm the agitation and alarm which prevailed.
They must keep the matrons out of the public streets and compel them to
remain indoors; they must suppress the loud laments for the dead and impose
silence on the City; they must see that all who brought tidings were taken to
the praetors, and that the citizens should, each in his own house, wait for any
news which affected them personally. Moreover, they must station guards at
the gates to prevent any one from leaving the City, and they must make it
clear to every man that the only safety he can hope for lies in the City and its
walls. When the tumult has once been hushed, then the senate must be again
convened and measures discussed for the defence of the City.
22.56
This
proposal was unanimously carried without any discussion. After the crowd
was cleared out of the Forum by the magistrates and the senators had gone
in various directions to allay the agitation, a despatch at last arrived from C.
Terentius Varro. He wrote that L. Aemilius was killed and his army cut to
pieces; he himself was at Canusium collecting the wreckage that remained
from this awful disaster; there were as many as 10,000 soldiers, irregular,
unorganised; the Carthaginian was still at Cannae, bargaining about the
prisoners' ransom and the rest of the plunder in a spirit very unlike that of a
great and victorious general. The next thing was the publication of the names
of those killed, and the City was thrown into such universal mourning that
the annual celebration of the festival of Ceres was suspended, because it is
forbidden to those in mourning to take part in it, and there was not a single
matron who was not a mourner during those days. In order that the same
cause might not prevent other sacred observances from being duly honoured,
the period of mourning was limited by a senatorial decree to thirty days.
When the agitation was quieted and the senate resumed its session, a fresh
despatch was received, this time from Sicily. T. Otacilius, the propraetor,
announced that Hiero's kingdom was being devastated by a Carthaginian
fleet, and when he was preparing to render him the assistance he asked for,
he received news that another fully equipped fleet was riding at anchor off
the Aegates, and when they heard that he was occupied with the defence of
the Syracusan shore they would at once attack Lilybaeum and the rest of the
Roman province. If, therefore, the senate wished to retain the king as their
ally and keep their hold on Sicily, they must fit out a fleet.
22.57
When
the despatches from the consul and the praetor had been read it was decided
that M. Claudius, who was commanding the fleet stationed at Ostia, should
be sent to the army at Canusium and instructions forwarded to the consul
requesting him to hand over his command to the praetor and come to Rome
as soon as he possibly could consistently with his duty to the republic. For,
over and above these serious disasters, considerable alarm was created by
portents which occurred. Two Vestal virgins, Opimia and Floronia, were
found guilty of unchastity. One was buried alive, as is the custom, at the
Colline Gate, the other committed suicide. L. Cantilius, one of the pontifical
secretaries, now called "minor pontiffs," who had been guilty with Floronia,
was scourged in the Comitium by the Pontifex Maximus so severely that he
died under it. This act of wickedness, coming as it did amongst so many
calamities, was, as often happens, regarded as a portent, and the decemvirs
were ordered to consult the Sacred Books. Q. Fabius Pictor was sent to
consult the oracle of Delphi as to what forms of prayer and supplication they
were to use to propitiate the gods, and what was to be the end of all these
terrible disasters. Meanwhile, in obedience to the Books of Destiny, some
strange and unusual sacrifices were made, human sacrifices amongst them. A
Gaulish man and a Gaulish woman and a Greek man and a Greek woman
were buried alive under the Forum Boarium. They were lowered into a stone
vault, which had on a previous occasion also been polluted by human
victims, a practice most repulsive to Roman feelings.
When the gods were believed to be duly propitiated, M. Claudius
Marcellus sent from Ostia 1500 men who had been enrolled for service with
the fleet to garrison Rome; the naval legion (the third) he sent on in advance
with the military tribunes to Teanum Sidicinum, and then, handing the fleet
over to his colleague, P. Furius Philus, hastened on by forced marches a few
days later to Canusium. On the authority of the senate M. Junius was
nominated Dictator and Ti. Sempronius Master of the Horse. A levy was
ordered, and all from seventeen years upwards were enrolled, some even
younger; out of these recruits four legions were formed and 1000 cavalry.
They also sent to the Latin confederacy and the other allied states to enlist
soldiers according to the terms of their treaties. Armour, weapons, and other
things of the kind were ordered to be in readiness, and the ancient spoils
gathered from the enemy were taken down from the temples and colonnades.
The dearth of freemen necessitated a new kind of enlistment; 8000 sturdy
youths from amongst the slaves were armed at the public cost, after they had
each been asked whether they were willing to serve or no. These soldiers
were preferred, as there would be an opportunity of ransoming them when
taken prisoners at a lower price.
22.58
After
his great success at Cannae, Hannibal made his arrangements more as though
his victory were a complete and decisive one than as if the war were still
going on. The prisoners were brought before him and separated into two
groups; the allies were treated as they had been at the Trebia and at
Trasumennus, after some kind words they were dismissed without ransom;
the Romans, too, were treated as they had never been before, for when they
appeared before him he addressed them in quite a friendly way. He had no
deadly feud, he told them, with Rome, all he was fighting for was his
country's honour as a sovereign power. His fathers had yielded to Roman
courage, his one object now was that the Romans should yield to his good
fortune and courage. He now gave the prisoners permission to ransom
themselves; each horseman at 500 "chariot pieces" and each foot-soldier at
300, and the slaves at 100 per head. This was somewhat more than the
cavalry had agreed to when they surrendered, but they were only too glad to
accept any terms. It was settled that they should elect ten of their number to
go to the senate at Rome, and the only guarantee required was that they
should take an oath to return. They were accompanied by Carthalo, a
Carthaginian noble, who was to sound the feelings of the senators, and if
they were inclined towards peace he was to propose terms. When the
delegates had left the camp, one of them, a man of an utterly un-Roman
temper, returned to the camp, as if he had forgotten something, and in this
way hoped to free himself from his oath. He rejoined his comrades before
nightfall. When it was announced that the party were on their way to Rome a
lictor was despatched to meet Carthalo and order him in the name of the
Dictator to quit the territory of Rome before night.
22.59
The
Dictator admitted the prisoners' delegates to an audience of the senate. Their
leader, M. Junius, spoke as follows: "Senators: we are every one of us aware
that no State has held its prisoners of war of less account than our own, but,
unless we think our case a better one than we have any right to do, we
would urge that none have ever fallen into the hands of the enemy who were
more deserving of consideration than we are. For we did not give up our
arms during the battle from sheer cowardice; standing on the heaps of the
slain we kept up the struggle till close on night, and only then did we retire
into camp; for the remainder of the day and all through the night we
defended our entrenchments; the following day we were surrounded by the
victorious army and cut off from the water, and there was no hope whatever
now of our forcing our way through the dense masses of the enemy. We did
not think it a crime for some of Rome's soldiers to survive the battle of
Cannae, seeing that 50,000 men had been butchered there, and therefore in
the very last resort we consented to have a price fixed for our ransom and
surrendered to the enemy those arms which were no longer of the slightest
use to us. Besides, we had heard that our ancestors had ransomed
themselves from the Gauls with gold, and that your fathers, sternly as they
set themselves against all conditions of peace, did nevertheless send
delegates to Tarentum to arrange the ransom of the prisoners. But neither
the battle at the Alia against the Gauls nor that at Heraclea against Pyrrhus
was disgraced by the actual losses sustained so much as by the panic and
flight which marked them. The plains of Cannae are covered by heaps of
Roman dead, and we should not be here now if the enemy had not lacked
arms and strength to slay us. There are some amongst us who were never in
the battle at all, but were left to guard the camp, and when it was
surrendered they fell into the hands of the enemy. I do not envy the fortune
or the circumstances of any man, whether he be a fellow-citizen or a
fellow-soldier, nor would I wish it to be said that I had glorified myself by
depreciating others, but this I will say, not even those who fled from the
battle, mostly without arms, and did not stay their flight till they had reached
Venusia or Canusium, can claim precedence over us or boast that they are
more of a defence to the State than we are. But you will find both in them
and in us good and gallant soldiers, only we shall be still more eager to serve
our country because it will be through your kindness that we shall have been
ransomed and restored to our fatherland. You have enlisted men of all ages
and of every condition; I hear that eight thousand slaves are armed. Our
number is no less, and it will not cost more to ransom us than it did to
purchase them, but if I were to compare ourselves as soldiers with them, I
should be offering an insult to the name of Roman. I should think, senators,
that in deciding upon a matter like this, you should also take into
consideration, if you are disposed to be too severe, to what sort of an enemy
you are going to abandon us. Is it to a Pyrrhus, who treated his prisoners as
though they were his guests? Is it not rather to a barbarian, and what is
worse, a Carthaginian, of whom it is difficult to judge whether he is more
rapacious or more cruel? Could you see the chains, the squalor, the
disgusting appearance of your fellow-citizens, the sight would, I am sure,
move you no less than if, on the other hand, you beheld your legions lying
scattered over the plains of Cannae. You can behold the anxiety and the
tears of our kinsmen as they stand in the vestibule of your House and await
your reply. If they are in such anxiety and suspense about us and about those
who are not here, what, think you, must be the feelings of the men
themselves whose life and liberty are at stake? Why, good heavens! even if
Hannibal, contrary to his nature, chose to be kind to us, we should still think
life not worth living after you had decided that we did not deserve to be
ransomed. Years ago the prisoners who were released by Pyrrhus without
ransom returned to Rome, but they returned in company with the foremost
men of the State who had been sent to effect their ransom. Am I to return to
my native country as a citizen not thought worth three hundred coins ? Each
of us has his own feelings, senators. I know that my life and person are at
stake, but I dread more the peril to my good name, in case we depart
condemned and repulsed by you; for men will never believe that you grudged
the cost."
22.60
No
sooner had he finished than a tearful cry arose from the crowd in the
comitium; they stretched their hands towards the Senate-house and implored
the senators to give them back their children, their brothers, and their
relations. Fear and affection had brought even women amongst the crowd of
men who thronged the Forum. After the strangers had withdrawn the debate
commenced in the senate. There was great difference of opinion; some said
that they ought to be ransomed at the expense of the State, others were of
opinion that no public expense ought to be incurred, but they ought not to be
prevented from defraying the cost from private sources, and in cases where
ready money was not available it should be advanced from the treasury on
personal security and mortgages. When it came to the turn of T. Manlius
Torquatus, a man of old-fashioned and, some thought, excessive strictness,
to give his opinion, he is said to have spoken in these terms: "If the delegates
had confined themselves to asking that those who are in the hands of the
enemy might be ransomed, I should have stated my opinion in few words
without casting reflections on any of them, for all that would have been
necessary would be to remind you that you should maintain the custom and
usage handed down from our forefathers by setting an example necessary for
military discipline. But as it is, since they have almost treated their surrender
to the enemy as a thing to be proud of, and think it right that they should
receive more consideration than the prisoners taken in the field or those who
reached Venusia and Canusium, or even the consul himself, I will not allow
you to remain in ignorance of what actually happened. I only wish that the
facts which I am about to allege could be brought before the army at
Canusium, which is best able to testify to each man's courage or cowardice,
or at least that we had before us P. Sempronius Tuditanus, for if these men
had followed him they would at this moment be in the Roman camp, not
prisoners in the hands of the foe.
"The enemy had nearly all returned to their camp, tired out with
fighting, to make merry over their victory, and these men had the night clear
for a sortie. Seven thousand men could easily have made a sortie, even
through dense masses of the enemy, but they did not make any attempt to do
so on their own initiative, nor would they follow any one else. Nearly the
whole night through P. Sempronius Tuditanus was continually warning them
and urging them to follow him, whilst only a few of the enemy were
watching their camp, whilst all was quiet and silent, whilst the night could
still conceal their movements; before it was light they could reach safety and
be protected by the cities of our allies. If he had spoken as that military
tribune P. Decius spoke in the days of our fathers, or as Calpurnius Flamma,
in the first Punic war, when we were young men, spoke to his three hundred
volunteers whom he was leading to the capture of a height situated in the
very centre of the enemy's position: 'Let us,' he exclaimed, 'die, my men, and
by our death rescue our blockaded legions from their peril' -if, I say, P.
Sempronius had spoken thus, I should not regard you as men, much less as
Romans, if none had come forward as the comrade of so brave a man. But
the way he pointed out to you led to safety quite as much as to glory, he
would have brought you back to your country, your parents, your wives, and
your children. You have not courage enough to save yourselves; what would
you do if you had to die for your country? All round you on that day were
lying fifty thousand dead, Romans and allies. If so many examples of courage
did not inspire you, nothing ever will. If such an awful disaster did not make
you hold your lives cheap, none will ever do so. It is whilst you are free men,
with all your rights as citizens, that you must show your love for your
country, or rather, while it is your country and you are its citizens. Now you
are showing that love too late, your rights forfeited, your citizenship
renounced, you have become the slaves of the Carthaginians. Is money going
to restore you to the position which you have lost through cowardice and
crime? You would not listen to your own countryman Sempronius when he
bade you seize your arms and follow him, you did listen shortly afterwards to
Hannibal when he bade you give up your arms and betray your camp. But
why do I only charge these men with cowardice when I can prove them
guilty of actual crime? For not only did they refuse to follow him when he
gave them good advice, but they tried to stop him and keep him back, until a
body of truly brave men drew their swords and drove back the cowards. P.
Sempronius had actually to force his way through his own countrymen
before he could do so through the enemy! Would our country care to have
such as these for her citizens when, had all those who fought at Cannae been
like them, she would not have had amongst them a single citizen worth the
name! Out of seven thousand men in arms there were six hundred who had
the courage to force their way, and returned to their country free men with
arms in their hands. The enemy did not stop these six hundred, how safe the
way would have been, do you not think? for a force of almost two legions.
You would have to-day, senators, at Canusium 20,000 brave loyal soldiers;
but as for these men, how can they possibly be good and loyal citizens? And
as to their being 'brave,' they do not even themselves assert that -unless,
indeed, some one chooses to imagine that whilst they were trying to stop the
others from making the sortie, they were really encouraging them, or that,
fully aware that their own timidity and cowardice was the cause of their
becoming slaves, they feel no grudge towards the others for having won
both safety and glory through their courage. Though they might have got
away in the dead of the night, they preferred to skulk in their tents and wait
for the daylight and with it the enemy. But you will say, if they lacked
courage to leave the camp they had courage enough to defend it bravely;
blockaded for several days and nights, they protected the rampart with their
arms, and themselves with the rampart; at last, after going to the utmost
lengths of endurance and daring, when every support of life failed, and they
were so weakened by starvation that they had not strength to bear the weight
of their arms, they were in the end conquered by the necessities of nature
more than by the force of arms. What are the facts? At daybreak the enemy
approached the rampart; within two hours, without trying their fortune in
any conflict, they gave up their arms and themselves. This, you see, was their
two days' soldiership. When duty called them to keep their line and fight they
fled to their camp, when they ought to have fought at the rampart they
surrendered their camp; they are useless alike in the field and in the camp.
Am I to ransom you? When you ought to have made your way out of the
camp you hesitated and remained there, when it was obligatory for you to
remain there and defend the camp with your arms you gave up camp, arms,
and yourselves to the enemy. No, senators, I do not think that those men
ought to be ransomed any more than I should think it right to surrender to
Hannibal the men who forced their way out of the camp through the midst of
the enemy and by that supreme act of courage restored themselves to their
fatherland."
22.61
Although most of the senators had
relations among the prisoners, there were two considerations which weighed
with them at the close of Manlius' speech. One was the practice of the State
which from early times had shown very little indulgence to prisoners of war.
The other was the amount of money that would be required, for they were
anxious that the treasury should not be exhausted, a large sum having been
already paid out in purchasing and arming the slaves, and they did not wish
to enrich Hannibal who, according to rumour, was in particular need of
money. When the melancholy reply was given that the prisoners were not
ransomed, the prevailing grief was intensified by the loss of so many citizens,
and the delegates were accompanied to the gates by a weeping and
protesting crowd. One of them went to his home because he considered
himself released from his vow by his pretended return to the camp. When
this became known it was reported to the senate, and they unanimously
decided that he should be arrested and conveyed to Hannibal under a guard
furnished by the State. There is another account extant as to the fate of the
prisoners. According to this tradition ten came at first, and there was a
debate in the senate as to whether they should be allowed within the City or
not; they were admitted on the understanding that the senate would not
grant them an audience. As they stayed longer than was generally expected,
three other delegates arrived -L. Scribonius, C. Calpurnius, and L. Manlius -and a relative of Scribonius who was a tribune of the plebs made a motion in
the senate to ransom the prisoners. The senate decided that they should not
be ransomed, and the three who came last returned to Hannibal, but the ten
remained in Rome. They alleged that they had absolved themselves from
their oath because after starting on their journey they had returned to
Hannibal under the pretext of reviewing the list of the prisoners' names. The
question of surrendering them was hotly debated in the senate, and those in
favour of this course were beaten by only a few votes. Under the next
censors, however, they were so crushed beneath every mark of disgrace and
infamy that some of them immediately committed suicide; the others not only
avoided the Forum for all their after life, but almost shunned the light of day
and the faces of men. It is easier to feel astonishment at such discrepancies
amongst our authorities than to determine what is the truth.
How far that disaster surpassed previous ones is shown by one
simple fact. Up to that day the loyalty of our allies had remained unshaken,
now it began to waver, for no other reason, we may be certain, than that
they despaired of the maintenance of our empire. The tribes who revolted to
the Carthaginians were the Atellani, the Calatini, the Hirpini, a section of the
Apulians, all the Samnite cantons with the exception of the Pentri, all the
Bruttii and the Lucanians. In addition to these, the Uzentini and almost the
whole of the coast of Magna Graecia, the people of Tarentum Crotona and
Locri, as well as all Cisalpine Gaul. Yet, in spite of all their disasters and the
revolt of their allies, no one anywhere in Rome mentioned the word "Peace,"
either before the consul's return or after his arrival when all the memories of
their losses were renewed. Such a lofty spirit did the citizens exhibit in those
days that though the consul was coming back from a terrible defeat for
which they knew he was mainly responsible, he was met by a vast concourse
drawn from every class of society, and thanks were formally voted to him
because he "had not despaired of the republic." Had he been
commander-in-chief of the Carthaginians there was no torture to which he
would not have been subjected.
End of Book 22