University of Virginia Library

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Since my acknowledgment of yours of Oct. 20 & 31, I
have received those of 2d, 15 & 23d November and 11th
December.

In mine of January 31 I informed you that Louisiana had
been transferred by the French Commissioner to our Commissioners
on the 20th of December—that nothing had officially
passed on the occasion concerning the boundaries of the ceded
territory[16] ; but that Mr. Laussat had confidentially signified

that it did not comprehend any part of West Florida; adding at
the same time that it extended westwardly to the Rio Bravo otherwise
called Rio del Norde. Orders were accordingly obtained
from the Spanish authorities for the delivery of all the posts
on the West side of the Mississippi as well as on the Island of
New Orleans. With respect to the posts in West Florida,
orders for the delivery were neither offered to, nor demanded
by our Commissioners. No instructions have in fact been
ever given them to make the demand. This silence on the
part of the Executive was deemed eligible first because it was
foreseen that the demand would not only be rejected by the Spanish
authority at New Orleans which had in an official publication
limited the Cession Westwardly by the Mississippi and the
Island of New Orleans, but was apprehended as has turned out,
that the French Commissioner might not be ready to support the
demand, and might even be disposed to second the Spanish
opposition to it; secondly because in the latter of these cases a seriious
check would be given to our title, and in either of them a
premature dilemma would result between an overt submission
to the refusal and a resort to force; thirdly because mere silence
would be no bar to a plea at any time that a delivery of a part,
particularly of the Seat of Government, was a virtual delivery
of the whole; whilst in the mean time, we could ascertain
the views and claim the interposition of the French Government,
and avail ourselves of that and any other favorable
circumstances for effecting an amicable adjustment of the
question with the Government of Spain. In this state of
things it was deemed proper by Congress in making the regulations
necessary for the collection of Revenue in the Ceded
territory and guarding against the new danger of smuggling
into the United States thro' the channels opened by it, to
include a provision for the case of West Florida by vesting
in the President a power which his discretion might accommodate
to events. This provision is contained in the IIth
taken in connection with the 4th Section of the Act herewith
inclosed. The Act had been many weeks depending in Congress
with these Sections word for word in it; the Bill had
been printed as soon as reported by the Committee for the
use of the members, and as two copies are by a usage of politeness
always allotted for each foreign Minister here it must
in all probability have been known to the Marquis D'Yrujo
in an early stage of its progress. If it was not, it marks much
less of that zealous vigilance over the concerns of his Sovereign
than he now makes the plea for his intemperate conduct. For
some days even after the Act was published in the Gazette of
this City, be was silent. At length however he called at the
Office of State, with the Gazette in his hand, and entered into a
very angry comment on the 11th Section, which was answered
by remarks (some of which it would seem from this written
allusion to them were not well understood) calculated to assuage
his dissatisfaction with the law, as far as was consistent
with a candid declaration to him that we considered all of
West Florida Westward of the Perdido as clearly ours by the
Treaty of April 30, 1803, and that of S'Ildefonso.[17] The conversation
ended as might be inferred from his letters which
followed it on the 7th and 17th inst., of which copies are
herewith enclosed, as are also copies of my answer of
and of his reply of. You will see by this correspondence,
the footing on which, a rudeness which no Government can tolerate
has placed him with this Government, and the view of it which
must be unavoidably conveyed to our Minister at Madrid. It
may be of some importance also that it be not misconceived
where you are. But the correspondence is chiefly of importance
as it suggests the earnestness with which Spain is likely to
contest our construction of the Treaties of Cession, and the
Spanish reasoning which will be employed against it; and consequently
as it urges the expediency of cultivating the disposition
of the French Government to take our side of the question. To
this she is bound no less by sound policy, than by a regard to
right.

She is bound by the former; because the interest she has

in our friendship interests her in the friendship between us and
Spain, which cannot be maintained with full effect, if at all,
without removing the sources of collision lurking under a
neighbourhood marked by such circumstances and which, considering
the relation between France and Spain cannot be
interrupted without endangering the friendly relations between
the United States and France. A transfer from Spain to the
United States of the territory claimed by the latter, or rather
of the whole of both the Floridas on reasonable conditions, is
in fact, nothing more than a sequel and completion of the
policy which led France into her own treaty of Cession;
and her discernment and her consistency are both pledges that
she will view the subject in this light. Another pledge lies in
the manifest interest which France has in the peaceable transfer
of these Spanish possessions to the United States as the only
effectual security against their falling into the hands of Great
Britain. Such an event would be certain in case of a rupture
between Great Britain and Spain, and would be particularly
disagreeable to France, whether Great Britain should retain
the acquibition for the sake of the important harbours and
other advantages belonging to it, or should make it the basis
of some transaction with the United States, which notwithstanding
the good faith and fairness towards France (which
would doubtless be observed on our part) might involve conditions
too desirable to her enemy, not to be disagreeable to
herself. It even deserves consideration that the use which
Great Britain could make of the Territory in question, and the
facility in seizing it, may become a casting motive with her
to force Spain into War, contrary to the wishes and the policy
of France.

The territory ceded to the United States is described in the
words following "the Colony or province of Louisiana with
the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, that it
had when France possessed it, and such as it ought to be according
to the Treaties subsequently passed between Spain
and other States."

In expounding this three-fold description, the different
forms used must be so understood as to give a meaning to each
description, and to make the meaning of each coincide with
that of the others.

The first form of description is a reference to the extent
which Louisiana now has in the hands of Spain. What is that
extent as determined by its Eastern limits? It is not denied
that the Perdido was once the Eastern limit of Louisiana. It
is not denied that the Territory nowpossessed by Spain extends
to the river Perdido. The river Perdido we say then is the
limits to the Eastern extent of the Louisiana ceded to the
United States.

This construction gives an obvious and pertinent meaning
to the term "now" and to the expression "in the hands of
Spain" which can be found in no other construction. For
a considerable time previous to the treaty of peace in 1783
between Great Britain and Spain, Louisiana as in the hands of
Spain was limited Eastwardly by the Mississippi, the Iberville
&c. The term "now" fixes its extent as enlarged by that
Treaty in contradistinction to the more limited extent in
which Spain held it prior to that Treaty. Again the expression
"in the hands or in the possession of Spain" fixes the same
extent, because the expression cannot relate to the extent
which Spain by her internal regulations may have given to a
particular district under the name of Louisiana, but evidently
to the extent in which it was known to other nations, particularly
to the nation in Treaty with her, and in which it was
relatively to other nations in her hands and not in the hands of
any other nation. It would be absurd to consider the expression
"in the hands of Spain" as relating not to others but to
herself and to her own regulations; for the territory of Louisiana
in her hands must be equally so and be the same, whether
formed into one or twenty districts or by whatever name or
names it may be called by herself.

What may now be the extent of a provincial district under
the name of Louisiana according to the municipal arrangements

of the Spanish Government is not perfectly known.
It is at least questionable whether even these arrangements
had not incorporated the portion of Louisiana acquired from
Great Britain with the Western portion before belonging to
Spain under the same Provincial Government. But whether
such be the fact or not, the construction of the Treaty will be
the same.

The next form of description refers to the extent which
Louisiana had when possessed by France. What is this extent?
It will be admitted that for the whole period prior to the
division of Louisiana between Spain and Great Britain in
1762–3 or at least from the adjustment of boundary between
France and Spain in 1719 to that event, Louisiana extended
in the possession of France to the river Perdido. Had the meaning
then of the first description been less determinate and had
France been in possession of Louisiana at any time with less extent
than to the Perdido, a reference to this primitive and long
continued extent would be more natural and probable than
to any other. But it happens that France never possessed
Louisiana with less extent than to the Perdido; because on the
same day that she ceded a part to Spain, the residue was ceded
to Great Britain, and consequently as long as she possessed
Louisiana at all, she possessed it entire that is in its extent
to the Perdido. It is true that after the cession of Western
Louisiana to Spain in the year 1762–3, the actual delivery
of the Territory by France was delayed for several years,
but it never can be supposed that a reference could be intended
to this short period of delay during which France held that
portion of Louisiana, without the Eastern portion, in the right
of Spain only, not in her own right, when in other words she
held it merely as the Trustee of Spain; and that a reference
to such a possession for such a period should be intended
rather than a reference to the long possession of the whole
territory in her own acknowledged right prior to that period.

In the order of the French King in 1764 to Monsieur D'Abbadie
for the delivery of Western Louisiana to Spain, it is

stated that the Cession by France was on the 3d of November
and the acceptance by Spain on the 13th of that month, leaving
an interval of ten days. An anxiety to find a period during
which Louisiana as limited by the Mississippi and the Iberville
was held by France in her own right may possibly lead the
Spanish Government to seize the pretext into which this
momentary interval may be converted. But it will be a mere
pretext. In the first place it is probable that the Treaty of
Cession to Spain which is dated on the same day with that
to Great Britain was like the latter a preliminary treaty,
consummated and confirmed by a definitive treaty bearing
the same date with the definitive treaty including the Cession
to Great Britain, in which case the time and effect of each
Cession would be the same whether recurrence be had to the
date of the preliminary or definitive treaty. In the next
place, the Cession by France to Spain was essentially made
on the 3d of November 1762 on which day the same with
that of the cession to Great Britain the right passed from
France. The acceptance by Spain ten days after, if necessary
at all to perfect the deed, had relation to the dates of the
Cession by France and must have the same effect and no other,
as if Spain had signed the deed on the same day with France.
This explanation which rests on the soundest principles
nullifies this interval of ten days so as to make the Cession to
Great Britain and Spain simultaneous on the supposition that
recurrence be had to the preliminary Treaty and not to the
definitive treaty; and consequently establishes the fact that
France at no time possessed Louisiana with less extent than
to the Perdido; the alienation and partition of the Territory
admitting no distinction of time. In the last place conceding
even that during an interval of ten days the right of Spain
was incompleat, and was in transitu only from France, or in
another form of expression that the right remained in France,
subject to the eventual acceptance of Spain, is it possible to
believe that a description which must be presumed to aim at
clearness and certainty, should refer for its purposes to so
fugitive and equivocal a state of things, in preference to a
state of things where the right and the possession of France
were of long continuance and susceptible of neither doubt nor
controversy. It is impossible. And consequently the only
possible construction which can be put on the second form of
description coincides with the only rational construction that
can be put on the first; making Louisiana of the same extent
that is to the River Perdido, both "as in the hands of Spain"
and "as France possessed it."

The third and last description of Louisiana is in these words
"such as it ought to be according to the Treaties subsequently
passed between Spain and other States."

This description may be considered as an auxiliary to the
two other and is conclusive as an argument for comprehending
within the cession of Spain territory Eastward of the Mississippi
and the Iberville, and for extending the cession to the
river Perdido.

The only treaties between Spain and other nations that
affect the extent of Louisiana as being subsequent to the possession
of it by France are first the Treaty in 1783 between Spain
and Great Britain and secondly the Treaty of 1795 between
Spain and the United States.

The last of these Treaties affects the extent of Louisiana
as in the hands of Spain, by defining the northern boundary
of that part of it which lies East of the Mississippi and the
Iberville. And the first affects the extent of Louisiana by including
in the Cession from Great Britain to Spain, the Territory
between that River and the Perdido; and by giving to
Louisiana in consequence of that reunion of the Eastern and
Western part, the same extent eastwardly in the hands of
Spain as it had when France possessed it. Louisiana then as it
ought to be according to treaties of Spain subsequent to the
possession by France is limited by the line of demarkation
settled with the United States and forming a Northern boundary;
and is extended to the River Perdido as its Eastern
boundary.

This is not only the plain and necessary construction of the
words; but is the only construction that can give a meaning
to them. For they are without meaning on the supposition
that Louisiana as in the hands of Spain is limited by the Mississippi
and the Iberville; since neither the one nor the other of
those treaties have any relation to Louisiana that can affect
its extent, but thro' their relation to the limits of that part
of it which lies Eastward of the Mississippi and the Iberville.
Including this part therefore, as we contend within the extent
of Louisiana and a meaning is given to both as pertinent as it is
important. Exclude this part, as Spain contends from Louisiana
and no treaties exist to which the reference is applicable.

This deduction cannot be evaded by pretending that the
reference to subsequent treaties of Spain was meant to save
the right of deposit and other rights stipulated to the commerce
of the United States by the Treaty of 1795; first because,
altho' that may be an incidental object of the reference to that
Treaty, as was signified by His Catholic Majesty to the Government
of the United States, yet the principal object of the reference
is evidently the territorial extent of Louisana: secondly,
because the reference is to more than one treaty, to the Treaty
of 1783 as well as to that of 1795, and the Treaty of 1783 can
have no modifying effect whatever rendering it applicable,
but on the supposition that Louisiana was considered as extending
Eastward of the Mississippi and the Iberville into the
Territory ceded by that Treaty to Spain.

In fine the construction which we maintain gives to every
part of the Description of the Territory ceded to the United
States, a meaning clear in itself and in harmony with every
other part, and is no less conformable to facts, than it is
founded in the ordinary use and analogy of the expressions.
The construction urged by Spain gives, on the contrary, a
meaning to the first description which is inconsistent with
the very terms of it; it prefers in the second a meaning that is
impossible or absurd; and it takes from the last all meaning
whatever.

In confirmation of the meaning which extends Louisiana
to the River Perdido, it may be regarded as most consistent
with the object of the First Consul in the Cession obtained
by him from Spain. Every appearance, every circumstance
pronounces this to have been, to give lustre to his administration
and to gratify natural pride in his nation, by reannexing
to its domain possessions which had without any sufficient
considerations, been severed from it; and which being in the
hands of Spain, it was in the power of Spain to restore.
Spain on the other side might be the less reluctant against
the Cession in this extent as she would be only replaced by it,
within the original limits of her possessions, the Territory
East of the Perdido having been regained by her from Great
Britain in the peace of 1783 and not included in the late
cession.

It only remains to take notice of the argument derived
from a criticism on the term "retrocede" by which the Cession
from Spain to France is expressed. The literal meaning
of this term is said to be that Spain gives back to France what
she received from France; and that as she received from
France no more than the territory West of the Mississippi
and the Iberville that no more could be given back by Spain.

Without denying that such a meaning, if uncontrouled by
other terms would have been properly expressed by the term
"retrocede" it is sufficient and more than sufficient to observe
1st that with respect to France the literal meaning is satisfied;
France receiving back what she had before alienated. Secondly
that with respect to Spain, not only the greater part of Louisiana
had been confessedly received by her from France, and
consequently was literally ceded back by Spain as well as
ceded back to France; but with respect to the part in question
Spain might not unfairly be considered as ceding back to
France what France had ceded to her; inasmuch as this Cession
of it to Great Britain was made for the benefit of Spain, to
whom on that account Cuba was restored. The effect was
precisely the same as if France had in form made the Cession

to Spain and Spain had assigned it over to Great Britain;
and the Cession may the more aptly be considered as passing
thro' Spain, as Spain herself was a party to the Treaty by
which it was conveyed to Great Britain. In this point of view,
not only France received back what she had ceded, but Spain
ceded back what she had received, and the etomology even of
the term "retrocede" is satisfied. This view of the case is
the more substantially just as the territory in question passed
from France to Great Britain for the account of Spain but
passed from Great Britain into the hands of Spain in 1783,
in consequence of a War to which Spain had contributed but
little compared with France, and in terminating which so
favorably in this article for Spain, France had doubtless a preponderating
influence. Thirdly, that if a course of proceeding
might have existed to which the term "retrocede" would be
more literally applicable, it may be equally said that there is no
particular term which would be more applicable to the whole
proceeding as it did exist. Fourthly, Lastly, that if this were
not the case, a new criticism on the etimology of a single term
can be allowed no weight against a conclusion drawn from
the clear meaning of every other term and from the whole
context.

In aid of these observation, I enclose herewith two papers
which have been drawn up with a view to trace and support
our title to Louisiana in its extent to the Perdido. You
will find in them also the grounds on which its Western extent
is maintainable against Spain, and its northern in relation to
Great Britain.

On the whole we reckon with much confidence on the obligations
& disposition of the French Government to favor
our object with Spain, and on your prudent exertions to
strengthen our hold on both, not only in relation to the true
construction of the Treaty, but to our acquisition of the
Spanish Territory Eastward of the Perdido on convenient and
equitable conditions.

You will find herewith inclosed, copies of another correspondence

sufficiently explaining itself, with the Marquis
D'Yrujo on the commerce from our ports to S' Domingo,
to which is added a letter on that subject from Mr. Pichon.
The ideas of the President, as well to the part which the true
interest of France recommends to her, as to the part prescribed
both to her and to the United States by the law of Nations
were communicated in my letter of the 31st of January last. It
is much to be desired that the French Government may enter
into proper views on this subject. With respect to the trade in
articles not for War there cannot be a doubt that the interest
of France concurs with that of the United States. With
respect to articles for War it is probably the interest of all
nations that they should be kept out of hands likely to make
so bad a use of them. It is clear at the same time that the
United States are bound by the law of Nations to nothing
further than to leave their offending citizens to the consequence
of an illicit trade; and it deserves serious consideration how far
their undertaking at the instance of one power to enforce
the law of nations by prohibitory regulations to which they
are not bound, may become an embarrassing precedent and
stimulate pretensions and complaints of other powers. The
French Government must be sensible also that prohibitions
by one nation would have little effect, if others including
Great Britain, should not follow the example. It may be
added that the most which the United States could do in the
case, short of prohibiting the export of contraband articles
altogether, a measure doubtless beyond the expectations of
France, would be to annex to the shipment of these articles
a condition that they should be delivered elsewhere than in
S' Domingo, and that a regulation of this kind would readily
be frustrated by a reshipment of the articles after delivery
elsewhere, in the same or other vessels in order to accomplish
the forbidden destination. If indeed the prohibitory regulation
on the part of the United States were the result of a stipulation
and recommended by an equivalent concession, the
objection to it as an inconvenient precedent would be avoided.
If, for example, France would agree to permit the trade with
S'. Domingo in all other articles, on condition that we would
agree to prohibit contraband articles, no objection of that sort
would lie against the arrangement; and the arrangement would
in itself be so reasonable on both sides and so favorable even to
the people of S' Domingo, that the President authorizes you
not only to make it, if you find it not improper, the subject
of a frank conference with the French Government, but to
put it into the form of a conventional regulation. Or, should
this be objectionable, the object may be attained perhaps
by a tacit understanding between the two Governments,
which may lead to the regulations on each side respectively
necessar. Altho' a legal regulation on our part cannot
be absolutely promised, otherwise than by a positive and
mutual stipulation, yet with a candid explanation of this constitutional
circumstance, there can be little risk in inspiring
the requisite confidence that the Legislative authority here
would interpose its sanction.

It is more important that something should be done in this,
and done soon, as the pretext founded upon the supposed
illegality of any trade whatever with the negroes in S' Domingo,
is multiplying depredations on our commerce not only with
that Island but with the West Indies generally, to a degree
highly irritating, and which is laying the foundation for extensive
claims and complaints on our part. You will not fail to
state this fact to the French Government in its just importance;
as an argument for some such arrangement as is above suggested,
or if that be disliked as requiring such other interposition
of that Government as will put an end to the evil.

It is represented that a part of the depredations are committed
by French armed vessels without Commissions, or with
Commissions from incompetent authorities. It appears also
that these lawless proceedings are much connected with Spanish
ports and subjects, probably Spanish Officers also, in the
West Indies, particularly in the Island of Cuba. So far as the
responsibility of Spain may be involved, we shall not lose sight

of it. An appeal at the same time to that of France is as
pressing as it is just, and you will please to make it in the
manner best calculated to make it effectual.

In one of your letters you apprehended that the interest
accruing from the delay of the Commissioners at Paris may be
disallowed by the French Government, and wish for instructions
on the subject. I am glad to find by late communications
from Mr. Skipwith that the apparent discontent at the
delay had subsided. But whatever solicitude that Government
might feel for dispatch in liquidating the claims, it would be a
palpable wrong to make a disappointment in that particular,
a pretext for refusing any stipulated part of the claims. In
a legal point of view, the Treaty could not be in force until
mutually ratified; and every preparatory step taken for carrying
it into effect however apposite or useful, must be connected
with legal questions arising under the Treaty.

In other parts of your correspondence you seem to have
inferred from some passage in mine that I thought the ten
millions of livres in cash over which a discretion was given,
ought to have been paid rather to France than to our creditor
citizens. If the inference be just, my expressions must have
been the more unfortunate as they so little accord with the
original plan communicated in the Instructions to yourself
and Mr. Monroe; the more unfortunate still as they not only
decide a question wrong, but a question which could never
occur. The cash fund of 10 millions was provided on the supposition
that in a critical moment and in a balance of considerations
the immediate payment of that sum as a part of the
bargain might either tempt the French Government to enter
into it or to reduce the terms of it. If wanted for either of
these purposes, it was to be paid to the French Government:
if not wanted for either it was made applicable to no other.
The provision contemplated for the creditors had no reference
to the fund of ten millions of livres; nor was it even
contemplated that any other cash fund would be made applicable
to their claims. It was supposed not unreasonable that

the ease of our Treasury and the chance and means of purchasing
the territory remaining to Spain Eastward of the
Mississippi, might be so far justly consulted, as to put the
indemnification of the claims against France on a like footing
with that on which the indemnification of like claims against
Great Britain had been put. And it was inferred that such a
modification of the payments would not only have fully satisfied
the expectations of the creditors; but would have encountered
no objections on the part of the French Government,
who had no interest in the question, and who were precluded
by all that happened from urging objections of any other sort.

Mr. Merry has formally complained of the expressions in
your printed memorial which were construed into ill will towards
Great Britain, and an undue partiality to the French
Government. He said that he was expressly instructed by his
Government to make this complaint; that the memorial was
viewed by it in a very serious light, and that it was expected
from the candor of the American Government and the relations
subsisting between the two nations, that the unfriendly sentiments
expressed in the memorial, if not authorized by instructions,
as was doubtless the case, would be disavowed. He
admitted that the memorial might not be an official paper,
or an authenticated publication, but dwelt on the notoriety
of its author, and on its tendency as an ostensible evidence of
the spirit and views of so important and maritime a power
as the United States, to excite animosity in other nations
against Great Britain, and to wound her essential interests.
He mentioned several circumstances known to himself whilst
at Paris, among others conversations with you on the subject
of the memorial which established the fact that it was written
by you. If I did not mistake him he said that the fact was
informally acknowledged to him by yourself, altho' you disowned
it in an official point of view.

In reply it was, on the day following, observed to him, by
the direction of the President, that the sentiments of the
United States and of their Government towards Great Britain

were sincerely friendly, according to the assurances which
had been given to him, and otherwise communicated, that we
wished to cultivate the friendship between the two countries,
as important to our as well as to his; that altho' we wished to
maintain friendship at the same time with France and with all
other Nations, we entertained no sentiments towards her or
any other Nation, that could lessen the confidence of Great
Britain in the equal sincerity of our friendship for her or in our
strict impartiality in discharging every duty which belonged
to us as a neutral nation; that no instruction could therefore
have been given to any functionary of the United States to say
or do anything unfriendly or disrespectful to Great Britain;
that the memorial in question if written by you was a private
and not official document, that the reasoning employed in it
could have been intended merely to reconcile the French Government
to the objects of the writer, not to injure or offend
Great Britain; that as far as the memorial could be supposed
to have a tendency to either, it resulted solely from its publication,
a circumstance which there was every reason to believe
had been without your sanction, and must have been followed
by your disapprobation and regret. Mr. Merry, after repeating
the sensibility of his Government to the incident of which
he complained, and the importance attached to it, expressed
much satisfaction at the explicit and friendly explanation he
had heard, and his confidence that the favorable report which
he should make of it, would be equally satisfactory to his
Government.

From this view of the matter you will be sensible of the
regret excited by your permission to the French Government
mentioned in your letter of Decr. 11 to publish the memorial
as attributed to you. A publication of it by the French Government
with a reference to you as the author, and without
any denial on your part will doubtless be represented by the
British Government as having all the authenticity and effect
of a direct publication by yourself, as well as the appearance
moreover of some sort of collusion with the French Government

against the British Government; and it may be fairly
suspected that one object at least of the former in endeavoring
to connect your name with the publication has been to engender
or foster in the latter a distrust and ill humour towards
the United States.

You will infer from these observations the wish of the
President, that if no irrevocable step should have been taken
in the case, the French Government may be induced, in the
manner you may find most delicate to withdraw its request,
and thereby relieve the Government of the United States
from the necessity of further explanations to the British
Government which will be more disagreeable as it may be the
more difficult to make them satisfactory.

Congress adjourned on tuesday the 27th of March to the
first monday in November next. Copies of their laws will
be forwarded to you as soon as they issue from the press.
For the present, I inclose herewith a list of all their acts, and
copies of a few of them; particularly of the acts providing for
the Government of Louisiana and for the war in the Mediterranean.
The former it is hoped will satisfy the French Government
of the prudent and faithful regard of the Government
of the United States to the interest and happiness of the people
transferred into the American family. The latter was thought
a proper antidote to the unfortunate accident to the ship and
men under Capt. Bainbridge before the harbour of Tripoli.
The addition which it will enable the President to make to
our force in the Mediterranean, will more than regain the
ground lost with that regency, at the same time that it will
impress on the others respect for our resources, and in a more
general view be advantageous at the present crisis. It is probable
that three or four frigates will soon proceed to join Commodore
Preble.