University of Virginia Library

TO JAMES MONROE.

The communication by Mr. Hughes including the Treaty
and Convention signed with the French Government, were
safely delivered on the 14 instant. Inclosed is a copy of a
letter written in consequence of them to Mr. Livingston and
yourself.

On the presumption, which accords with the information
given by Mr. Hughes, that you will have proceeded to Madrid
in pursuance of the instructions of the 17th February last, it
is thought proper to observe to you, that altho' Louisiana
may in some respects be more important than the Floridas,
and has more than exhausted the funds allotted for the purchase

of the latter, the acquisition of the Floridas is still to be
pursued, especially as the crisis must be favorable to it.

You will be at no loss for the arguments most likely to have
weight in prevailing on Spain to yield to our wishes. These
Colonies, separated from her other territory on this Continent,
by New Orleans, the Mississippi, and the whole of Western
Louisiana, are now of less value to her than ever, whilst to
the United States, they retain the peculiar importance derived
from their position, and their relations to us thro' the
navigable rivers running from the U States into the Gulph of
Mexico. In the hands of Spain they must ever be a dead expence
in time of war, and at all times a source of irritation and
ill blood with the United States. The Spanish Government
must understand in fact that the United States can never
consider the amicable relations between Spain and them as
definitively and permanently secured, without an arrangement
on this subject, which will substitute the manifest indications
of nature, for the artificial and inconvenient state of things
now existing.

The advantage to be derived to your negotiations from
the war which has just commenced, will certainly not escape
you. Powerful, and it might be presumed, effectual use may
be made of the fact, that Great Britain meant to seize New
Orleans with a view to the anxiety of the United States to
obtain it;—and of the inference from the fact, that the same
policy will be pursued with respect to the Floridas. Should
Spain be [engaged?] in the war it cannot be doubted that
they will be quickly occupied by a British force, and held out
on some condition or other, to the United States. Should
Spain be still at peace, and wish not to lose her neutrality,
she should reflect that the facility and policy of seizing the
Floridas, must strengthen the temptations of G. Britain to
force her into the war. In every view, it will be better for
Spain, that the Floridas should be in the hands of the United
States, than of Great Britain; and equally so, that they should
be ceded to us on beneficial terms by herself, than that they
should find their way to us thro' the hands of Great Britain.

The Spanish Government may be assured of the sincere
and continued desire of the United States to live in harmony
with Spain; that this motive enters deeply into the solicitude
of their Government for a removal of the danger to it,
which is inseparable from such a neighborhood as that of the
Floridas; and that having, by a late Convention with G.
Britain, adjusted every territorial question and interest with
that Nation, and the Treaty with France concerning Louisiana
having just done the same with her, it only remains that
the example be copied into an arrangement with Spain, who
is evidently not less interested in it than we are.

By the inclosed note of the Spanish Minister here, you will
see the refusal of Spain to listen to our past overtures, with
the reasons for the refusal. The answer to that communication
is also inclosed. The reply to such reasons will be very
easy. Neither the reputation nor the duty of his Catholic
Majesty can suffer from any measure founded in wisdom, and
the true interests of Spain. There is as little ground for supposing,
that the maritime powers of Europe will complain of,
or be dissatisfied with a Cession of the two Floridas to the
United States, more than with the late cession of Louisiana
by Spain to France, or more than with the former cessions
thro' which the Floridas have passed. What the Treaties are
subsequent to that of Utrecht, which are alleged to preclude
Spain from the proposed alienation, have not been examined.
Admitting them to exist in the sense put upon them, there is
probably no maritime power who would not readily acquiesce
in our acquisition of the Floridas, as more advantageous
to itself, than the retention of them by Spain, shut up against
all foreign commerce, and liable at every moment to be
thrown into the preponderant scale of G. Britain. Great
Britain herself would unquestionably have no objection to
their being transferred to us; unless it should be drawn from
her intention to conquer them for herself, or from the use she
might expect to make of them, in a negotiation with the
United States. And with respect to France, silence at least
is imposed on her by the Cession to the United States, of the

Province ceded to her by Spain; not to mention, that she
must wish to see the Floridas, like Louisiana kept out of the
hands of Great Britain, and has doubtless felt that motive in
promising her good offices with Spain for obtaining these
possessions for the United States. Of this promise you will
of course make the proper use in your negotiations.

For the price to be given for the Floridas, you are referred
generally to the original instructions on this point. Altho'
the change of circumstances lessens the anxiety for acquiring
immediately a territory which now more certainly than ever,
must drop into our hands, and notwithstanding the pressure
of the bargain with France on our Treasury; yet for the sake
of a peaceable and fair completion of a great object, you are
permitted by the President in case a less sum will not be accepted,
to give two Millions and a quarter of dollars, the sum
heretofore apportioned to this purchase. It will be expected
however, that the whole of it, if necessary be made applicable
to the discharge of debts and damages claimed from Spain,
as well those not yet admitted by the Spanish Government,
as those covered by the Convention signed with it by Mr.
Pinckney on the 11th day of Augt. 1802, and which was not
ratified by the Senate because it embraced no more of the just
responsibilities of Spain. On the subject of these claims, you
will hold a strong language. The Spanish Government may
be told plainly, that they will not be abandoned any farther
than an impartial Tribunal may make exceptions to them.
Energy in the appeal to its feelings, will not only tend to justice
for past wrongs, but to prevent a repetition of them in
case Spain should become a party to the present war.

In arranging the mode, the time, and the priority of paying
the assumed debts, the ease of the Treasury is to be consulted
as much as possible: less is not to be done with that view, than
was enjoined in the case of the French debts to our Citizens.
The stock to be engaged in the transaction is not to be made
irredeemable, without a necessity not likely to arise; and the
interest as well as the principal should be payable at the
Treasury of the United States. The only admissible limitation

on the redemption of the stock is, that the holder shall
not be paid off in less than about one fifth or one fourth of
the amount in one year.

Indemnifications for the violation of our deposit at New
Orleans have been constantly kept in view, in our remonstrances
and demands on that subject. It will be desirable
to comprehend them in the arrangement. A distinction
however is to be made between the positive and specific damages
sustained by individuals, and the general injuries accruing
from that breach of Treaty. The latter could be
provided for by a gross and vague estimate only, and need not
be pressed, as an indispensable condition. The claim however,
may be represented as strictly just, and a forbearance
to insist on it, as an item in the valuable considerations for
which the Cession is made. Greater stress may be laid on
the positive and specific damages capable of being formally
verified by individuals; but there is a point beyond which
it may be prudent not to insist even here; especially as the
incalculable advantage accruing from the acquisition of New
Orleans, will diffuse a joy throughout the Western Country
that will drown the sense of these little sacrifices. Should no
bargain be made on the subject of the Floridas, our claims of
every sort are to be kept in force. If it be impossible to bring
Spain to a Cession of the whole of the two Floridas, a trial is to
be made for obtaining either or any important part of either.
The part of West Florida adjoining the territories now ours,
and including the principal rivers falling into the Gulph, will
be particularly important and convenient.

It is not improbable that Spain, in Treating on a Cession of
the Floridas, may propose an exchange of them for Louisiana
beyond the Mississippi, or may make a serious point of some
particular boundary to that territory. Such an exchange is
inadmissible. In intrinsic value there is no equality; besides
the advantage, given us by the Western Bank, of the
entire jurisdiction of the river. We are the less disposed also
to make sacrifices to obtain the Floridas, because their position
and the manifest course of events guarantee an early and

reasonable acquisition of them. With respect to the adjustment
of a boundary between Louisiana and the Spanish territories,
there might be no objection to combining it with a
Cession of the Floridas, if our knowledge of the extent and
character of Louisiana were less imperfect. At present any
arrangement, would be a step too much in the dark to be hazarded,
and this will be a proper answer to the Spanish Government.
Perhaps the inter-communications with the Spanish
Government on this subject with other opportunities at Madrid,
may enable you to collect useful information, and proofs
of the fixt limits, or of the want of fixt limits to Western Louisiana.
Your enquiries may also be directed to the question
whether any and how much of what passes for West Florida,
be fairly included in the territory ceded to us by France. The
treaties and transactions between Spain and France will claim
particular attention in this enquiry.

Should no cession whatever be attainable, it will remain
only, for the present, to provide for the free use of the rivers
running from the United States into the Gulph. A convenient
deposit is to be pressed as equally reasonable there as on
the Mississippi; and the inconveniency experienced on the
latter from the want of a jurisdiction over the deposit, will be
an argument for such an improvement of the stipulation.
The free use of those rivers for our external commerce, is to be
insisted on as an important right, without which the United
States can never be satisfied, and without an admission of
which by Spain they can never confide either in her justice
or her disposition to cultivate harmony and good neighborhood
with them. It will not be advisable to commit the U
States into the alternative of War or a compliance on the
part of Spain; but no representation short of that, can be
stronger than the case merits.

The instruction to urge on Spain some provision for preventing,
or rectifying, by a delegated authority here, aggressions
and abuses committed, by her Colonial officers, is to be
regarded as of high importance. Nothing else may be able
to save the U States from the necessity of doing themselves

justice. It cannot be expected that they will long continue
to wait the delays and the difficulties of negotiating,
on every emergency, beyond the Atlantic. It is more easy
and more just, that Spain and other European nations, should
establish a remedy on this side of the Atlantic where the
source of the wrongs is established, than that the complaints
of the United States should be carried to the other side, and
perhaps wait till the Atlantic has moreover been twice
crossed, in procuring information for the other party without
which a decision may be refused.

The navigation of the Bay of St. Mary's is common to Spain
and the United States; but a light house and the customary
water marks can be established within the Spanish jurisdiction
only. Hitherto the Spanish Officers have refused every
proper accommodation on this subject. The case may be
stated to the Government of Spain, with our just expectation
that we may be permitted either to provide the requisite establishments
ourselves, or to make use of those provided by
Spain.

This letter will be addressed to Madrid; but as it is possible
that you may not have left Paris, or may have proceeded
to London, a copy will be forwarded to Paris, to be thence, if
necessary, sent on to London. In case it should find you
either at Paris or London, it must be left to your own decision
how far the call for you at either of those places, ought to
suspend these instructions. Should you decide to go to Madrid,
it may be proper first to present your credence to the French
or British Government, as the case may be; and to charge a
fit person with the public business during your absence.
Should you even be at Paris and your Commission filled up
for London, it may be best to proceed first to London, if the
call to Madrid be not very urgent.

I shall write to Mr. Pinckney and inform him that this letter
is intended for his use jointly with yours; tho' addressed
to you alone, because in part not applicable to him. Should
you suspend or have suspended your visit to Madrid, you will
please write to him also, giving him your ideas as to the expediency

of prosecuting the object of the joint instructions
or not, until you can be with him.