University of Virginia Library

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON AND JAMES MONROE.

Since my last which was of April 18th the tenor of our information
from France and Great Britain renders a war between
these powers in the highest degree probable. It may
be inferred at the same time from the information given by
Mr. Livingston and Mr. King, that the importance of the
United States is rising fast in the estimation both of the
French and the British Cabinets, and that Louisiana is as
much a subject of solicitude with the latter, as it has been
an object of acquisition with the former. The crises presented
by this jealous and hostile attitude of those rival

powers has doubtless been seen in its bearings on the arrangements
contemplated in your Commission and instructions;
is hoped, tho' we have not yet heard, that the arrival of Mr.
Monroe will have taken place in time, to give full advantage
to the means of turning the actual state of things to the just
benefit of the United States.

The solicitude of England with respect to Louisiana is sufficiently
evinced by her controuling the French expedition
from Holland to that Country, But her views have been
particularly unfolded to Mr. King by Mr. Addington, who
frankly told him that in case a war should happen, it would
perhaps be one of their first steps to occupy New Orleans,
adding that it would not be to keep it, for that England
would not accept the Country were all agreed to give it to
her, but to prevent another power from obtaining it, which
in his opinion would be best effected by its belonging to the
United States; and concluding with assurances that nothing
should be done injurious to their interests. If the Councils
of France should be guided by half the wisdom which is here
displayed on the part of her rival, your negotiations will be
made easy, and the result of them very satisfactory.

Altho' the immediate object of Great Britain in occupying
New Orleans may be that of excluding France, and altho' her
prudence may renounce the fallacious advantage of retaining
it for herself, it is not to be presumed that she will yield it to
the United States without endeavouring to make it the ground
of some arrangement that will directly or indirectly draw
them into her war, or of some important concessions in favour
of her commerce at the expence of our own. This consideration
necessarily connects itself with the explanation, and
friendly assurances of Mr. Addington, and so far leaves in
force the inducement to accomplish our object by an immediate
bargain with France.

In forming this bargain however, the prospect held out by
the British Minister, with the nature of the crisis itself, authorizes
us to expect better terms than your original instructions
allow.

The President thinks it will be ineligible under such circumstances
that any Convention whatever on the subject
should be entered into, that will not secure to the United
States the jurisdiction of a reasonable district on some convenient
part of the Bank of the Mississippi.

He is made the more anxious also by the manner in which
the British Government has opened itself to our Minister as
well as by other considerations, that as little concession as
possible should be made in the terms with France on points
disagreeable to Great Briatin, and particularly that the acknowledgment
of the right of France as holding one shore of
the Mississippi to shut it against British vessels, should be
avoided, if not essential to the attainment of the great objects
we have in view, on terms otherwise highly expedient. It is
desirable that such an acknowledgement should not even be
admitted into the discussion.

The guarantee of the Country beyond the Mississippi is
another condition, which it will be well to avoid if possible,
not only for the reasons you already possess, but because it
seems not improbable from the communications of Mr. King
that Great Britain is meditating plans for the emancipation
and independence of the whole of the American Continent,
South of the United States, and consequently that such guarantee
would not only be disagreeable to her, but embarrassing
to the United States. Should War indeed precede
your Conventional arrangements with France, the guarantee,
if admitted at all, must necessarily be suspended and limited
in such a manner as to be applicable only to the state of
things as it may be fixed by a peace.

The proposed occupancy of New Orleans by Great Britain,
suggests a further precaution. Should possession be taken
by her, and the preliminary sum of 2 Millions or any part of
it be paid to France, risks and disputes might ensue, which
make it advisable to postpone the payment till possession
shall be given to the United States, or if this cannot be done,
obtain possible security against eventual loss.

As the question may arise, how far in a state of War, one

of the parties can of right convey territory to a neutral power,
and thereby deprive its enemy of the chance of conquest incident
to war, especially when the conquest may have been
actually projected, it is thought proper to observe to you 1st
That in the present case the project of peaceable acquisition
by the United States originated prior to the War, and consequently
before a project of conquest could have existed.
2dly That the right of a neutral to procure for itself by a bona
fide, transaction property of any sort from a belligerent power
ought not to be frustrated by the chance that a rightful
conquest thereof might thereby be precluded. A contrary
doctrine would sacrifice the just interests of peace to the unreasonable
pretensions of war, and the positive rights of one
nation to the possible rights of another. A restraint on the
alienation of territory from a nation at War to a nation at
peace is imposed only in cases where the proceeding might
have a collusive reference to the existence of the War, and
might be calculated to save the property from danger, by
placing it in secret trust, to be reconveyed on the return of
peace. No objection of this sort can be made to the acquisitions
we have in view. The measures taken on this subject,
were taken before the existence or the appearance of war,
and they will be pursued as they were planned, with the bona
fide purpose of vesting the acquisition forever in the United
States.

With these observations, you will be left to do the best you
can, under all circumstances, for the interest of your Country;
keeping in mind that the rights we assert are clear, that the
objects we pursue are just, and that you will be warranted in
providing for both by taking every fair advantage of emergencies.

For the course of information relating to the deposit at New
Orleans, I refer you to my letter of the 25th inst; to Mr.
Livingston.