The writings of James Madison, comprising his public papers and his private correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed. |
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TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON AND JAMES MONROE. |
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 | The writings of James Madison, |  |
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON AND JAMES MONROE.
A month having elapsed since the departure of Mr. Monroe,
it may be presumed that by the time this reaches you, communications
will have passed with the French Government
sufficiently explaining its views towards the United States,
and preparing the way for the ulterior instructions which
the President thinks proper should now be given.
In case a conventional arrangement with France should
have resulted from the negotiations with which you are
charged; or in case such should not have been the result;
but no doubt should be left that the French Government
means to respect our rights and to cultivate sincerely peace
and friendship with the United States, it will be expedient
for you to make such communications to the British Government
as will assure it that nothing has been done inconsistent
with our good faith, and as will prevent a diminution of
the good understanding which subsists between the two
Countries.
If the French Government instead of friendly arrangements,
or views should be found to meditate hostilities or to have
formed projects which will constrain the United States to
resort to hostilities, such communications are then to be held
with the British Government as will sound its dispositions and
invite its concurrence in the War. Your own prudence will
suggest that the communications be so made as on one hand,
not to precipitate France into hostile operations, and on the
other not to lead Great Britain from the supposition that war
depends on the choice of the United States and that their
is to be the result, it is manifestly desirable that it be de-delayed,
until the certainty of this result can be known, and
the Legislative and other provisions can be made here; and
also of great importance that the certainty should not be
known to Great Britain who might take advantage of the
posture of things to press on the United States disagreeable
conditions of her entering into the war.
It will probably be most convenient in exchanging ideas
with the British Government, to make use of its public Minister
at Paris; as less likely to alarm and stimulate the French
Government, and to raise the pretensions of the British Government,
than the repairing of either of you to London, which
might be viewed by both as a signal of rupture. The latter
course however, may possibly be rendered most eligible by the
pressure of the crisis.
Notwithstanding the just repugnance of this Country to a
coalition of any sort with the belligerent policies of Europe,
the advantages to be derived from the co-operation of Great
Britain in a war of the United States, at this period, against
France and her allies, are too obvious and too important to be
renounced. And notwithstanding the apparent disinclination
of the British councils to a renewal of hostilities with
France, it will probably yield to the various motives which
will be felt to have the United States in the scale of Britain
against France, and particularly for the immediate purpose
of defeating a project of the latter which has evidently created
much solicitude in the British Government.
The price which she may attach to her co-operation cannot
be foreseen, and therefore cannot be the subject of full
and precise instructions. It may be expected that she will
insist at least on a stipulation, that neither of the parties
shall make peace or truce without the consent of the other,
and as such an article cannot be deemed unreasonable, and
will secure us against the possibility of her being detached in
the course of the war, by seducing overtures from France, it
will not be proper to raise difficulties on that account. It
as the case will admit, of the objects contemplated by her,
that whenever with ours they may be attainable by peace
she may be duly pressed to listen to it. Such an explanation
will be the more reasonable, as the objects of the United
States will be so fair and so well known.
It is equally probable that a stipulation of commercial advantages
in the Mississippi beyond those secured by existing
treaties, will be required. On this point it may be answered
at once that Great Britain shall enjoy a free trade with all of
the ports to be acquired by the United States, on the terms
allowed to the most favored nation in the ports generally of
the United States. If made an essential condition, you may
admit that in the ports to be acquired within the Mississippi,
the trade of her subjects shall be on the same footing for a
term of about ten years with that of our own citizens. But
the United States are not to be bound to the exclusion of the
trade of any particular nation or nations.
Should a mutual guarantee of the existing possessions, or
of the conquests to be made by the parties, be proposed, it
must be explicitly rejected as of no value to the United States,
and as entangling them in the frequent wars of that nation
with other powers, and very possibly in disputes with that
nation itself.
The anxiety which Great Britain has shown to extend her
domain to the Mississippi, the uncertain extent of her claims,
from North to South, beyond the Western limits of the United
States, and the attention she has paid to the North West
coast of America, make it probable that she will connect with
a war on this occasion, a pretension to the acquisition of the
Country on the West side of the Mississippi, understood to be
ceded by Spain to France, or at least of that portion of it lying
between that River and the Missoury. The evils involved in
such an extension of her possessions in our neighborhood, and
in such a hold on the Mississippi, are obvious. The acquisition
is the more objectionable as it would be extremely displeasing
to our western citizens; and as its evident bearing
of France and Spain, and to prolong the war on which
the event would depend. Should this pretension therefore
be pressed, it must be resisted, as altogether repugnant to the
sentiments, and the sound policy of the United States. But
it may be agreed, in alleviation of any disappointment of
Great Britain that France shall not be allowed to retain or
acquire any part of the territory, from which she herself would
be precluded.
The moment the prospect of war shall require the precaution
you will not omit to give confidential notice to our public
Ministers and Consuls, and to our naval commanders in the
Mediterranean, that our commerce and public ships may be
as little exposed to the dangers as possible. It may under
certain circumstances be proper to notify the danger immediately
to the Collectors in the principal ports of the U. States.
Herewith inclosed are two blank plenipotentiary Commissions
and letters of credence to the French and British Governments.
Those for the British Government are to be filled
with the name of Mr. Monroe, unless his Mission to France
should have an issue likely to be disagreeable to Great Britain;
in which case the President would wish Mr. Livingston
inserted if the translation be not disagreeable to him, and the
name of Mr. Monroe to be inserted in the Commission for the
French Republic. To provide for the event of Mr. Livingston's
translation, a letter of leave is inclosed.
A separate letter to you is also inclosed, authorizing you to
enter into such communications and conferences with British
Ministers as may possibly be required bv the conduct of
France. The letter is made a separate one that it may be used
with the effect, but without the formality of a commission. It
is hoped that sound calculations of interest as well as a sense
of right in the French Government, will prevent the necessity
of using the authority expressed in the letter. In a contrary
state of things the President relies on your own information,
to be gained on the spot, and on your best discretion to open
with advantage the communications with the British Government,
with it, to the indications of an approaching war with France.
Of these indications you will be best able to judge. It will
only be observed to you that if France should avow or evince
a determination to deny to the United States the free navigation
of the Mississippi, your consultations with Great Britain
may be held on the ground that war is inevitable. Should
the navigation not be disputed, and the deposit alone be
denied, it will be prudent to adapt your consultations to the
possibility that Congress may distinguish between the two
cases, and make a question how far the latter right may call
for an instant resort to arms, or how far a procrastination of
that remedy may be suggested and justified by the prospect
of a more favorable conjuncture.
These instructions have thus far supposed that Great Britain
and France are at peace, and that neither of them intend
at present to interrupt it. Should war have actually commenced,
or its approach be certain, France will no doubt be
the more apt to concur in friendly accommodations with us,
and Great Britain the more desirous to engaging us on her side.
You will, of course, avail yourselves of this posture of things,
for avoiding the necessity of recurring to Great Britain, or if
the necessity cannot be avoided, for fashioning her disposition
to arrangements which may be the least inconvenient to
the United States. Whatever connection indeed may be
eventually formed with Great Britain, in reference to war,
the policy of the United States requires that it be as little
entangling as the nature of the case will permit.
Our latest authentic information from New Orleans is of
the 25th of February. At that date the port had been opened
for provisions carried down the Mississippi, subject to a duty
of 6 p Cent, if consumed in the province, and an additional
duty if exported; with a restriction in the latter case to Spanish
bottoms, and to the external ports permitted by Spain to
her colonial trade. A second letter written by the Spanish
Minister here, had been received by the Intendant, but without
effect. On the 10th of March his interposition was
communication to the Department of State, in one of the
inclosed papers, was meant to be absolutely effectual. You
will find in the same paper the translation of a letter from the
French charge d'Affaires here, to the Governor of Louisiana,
written with a co-operating view. A provisional letter to
any French Agents, who might have arrived, had been previously
written by him, in consequence of a note from this
Department founded on a document published at New Orleans
shewing that orders had been given by the Spanish
Government for the surrender of the province to France; and
he has of late addressed a third letter on the subject to the
Prefect said to have arrived at New Orleans. It does not
appear however, from any accounts received, that Louisiana
has yet changed hands.
What the result of the several measures taken for restoring
the right of deposit will be, remains to be seen. A representation
on the subject was made by Mr. Graham, in the absence
of Mr. Pinckney, to the Spanish Government on the 3d
of February. No answer had been received on the 8th, but
Mr. Graham was led by circumstances to make no particular
inference from the delay. The silence of the French Government
to Mr. Livingston's representation as stated in his letter
of the day of is a very unfavorable indication.
It might have been expected from the assurances given of an
intention to observe the Treaty between Spain and the United
States, and to cultivate the friendship of the latter, that the
occasion would have been seized for evincing the sincerity of
the French Government: and it may still be expected that
no interposition that may be required by the actual state of
things will be witheld, if peace and friendship with the United
States be really the objects of that Government. Of this
the Mission of Mr. Monroe, and the steps taken by you
on his arrival, will doubtless have impressed the proper
convictions.
During this suspense of the rightful commerce of our Western
Citizens, their conduct has been and continues to be
the wrongs done them, they have united a patient confidence
in the measures and views of their Government. The justice
of this observation will be confirmed to you by manifestations
contained in the Western Newspapers herewith inclosed;
and if duly appreciated, will not lessen the force of prudential
as well as of other motives, for correcting past, and avoiding
future trespasses on American rights.
The letter from the Marquis D'Yrujo, of which you will find
a tranlsated copy in the inclosed newspaper of this date, was
yesterday received. The letters to which it refers, as containing
orders for the reestablishment of our deposit at New
Orleans were immediately forwarded. They will arrive in
time we hope, to mitigate considerably the losses from the
misconduct of the Spanish Intendant; and they are the more
acceptable as they are an evidence of the respect in the Government
of Spain for our rights and our friendship.
From the allusion in this communication from the Spanish
Minister to a future agreement between the two Governments
on the subject of an equivalent deposit, it would seem that
the Spanish Government regards the Cession to France as
either no longer in force, or not soon to be carried into execution.
However this may be, it will not be allowed, any more
than the result of our remonstrance to Spain on the violation
of our rights, to slacken the negotiations for the greater security
and the enlargement of these rights. Whether the French
or the Spaniards or both are to be our neighbours, the considerations
which led to the measures taken with respect to these
important objects, still require that they should be pursued
into all the success that may be attainable.
| The writings of James Madison, | |