Livy's History of Rome: Book 23
Hannibal at Capua
23.1
Immediately after the
battle of Cannae and the capture and plunder of the Roman camp, Hannibal
moved out of Apulia into Samnium, in consequence of an invitation he had
received from a man named Statius Trebius, who promised to hand over
Compsa to him if he would visit the territory of the Hirpini. Trebius was a
native of Compsa, a man of note amongst his people, but his influence was
less than that of the faction of the Mopsii, a family which owed its
predominance to the favour and support of Rome. After the report of the
battle of Cannae had reached the town, and Trebius was telling everybody
that Hannibal was coming, the Mopsian party left the city. It was then
peacefully handed over to the Carthaginian and a garrison placed in it. There
Hannibal left all his booty and his baggage, and then forming his army into
two divisions, gave Mago the command of one and retained the other
himself. He gave Mago instructions to receive the submission of the cities in
the district which were revolting from Rome and to compel those which
were hanging back to revolt, whilst he himself marched through the
Campanian district towards the Lower Sea with the view of attacking
Neapolis so that he might have a city accessible from the sea. When he
entered the confines of Neapolis he placed some of his Numidians wherever
he conveniently could in ambuscade, for the roads are mostly deep, with
many unseen windings. The others he ordered to ride up to the gates driving
ostentatiously before them the plunder they had collected from the fields. As
they appeared to be a small and disorganised force, a troop of cavalry came
out against them, they were drawn on by the retreating Numidians into the
ambuscade and surrounded. Not a man would have escaped had not the
proximity of the sea, and some ships, mostly fishing vessels, which they saw
not far from the shore, afforded a means of escape to those who were good
swimmers. Several young nobles, however, were either taken or killed in the
skirmish, amongst them Hegeas, the commandant of the cavalry, who fell
whilst following the retreating foe too incautiously. The aspect of the walls
deterred the Carthaginian from attacking the city; they by no means offered
facilities for an assault.
23.2
From
there he directed his march towards Capua. This city had become
demoralised by a long course of prosperity and the indulgence of Fortune,
but most of all by the universal corruption produced by the wild excesses of
a populace who exercised their liberty without any restraint. Pacuvius
Calavius had got the senate of Capua entirely in his own power and that of
the populace. He was a noble, and at the same time a favourite with the
people, but he had gained his influence and power by resorting to base
practices. He happened to be chief magistrate in the year in which the defeat
at Trasumennus occurred, and knowing the hatred which the populace had
long felt towards the senate, he thought it highly probable that they would
seize their opportunity, create a violent revolution, and, if Hannibal with his
victorious army should visit their neighbourhood, murder the senators and
hand over Capua to him. Bad as the man was, he was not utterly abandoned,
since he preferred to play the autocrat in a commonwealth which was
constitutionally sound rather than in one that was ruined, and he knew that
no political constitution could be sound where there was no council of state.
He embarked on a plan by which he could save the senate and at the same
time render it completely subservient to himself and to the populace. He
summoned a meeting of the senate and commenced his speech by saying that
any idea of a revolt from Rome would have been quite repugnant to him had
it not been a necessity, seeing that he had children by the daughter of Appius
Claudius and had given his own daughter in marriage to M. Livius in Rome.
"But," he went on, "there is a much more serious and formidable danger
impending, for the populace are not simply contemplating beginning their
revolt from Rome by banishing the senate from the city, they mean to murder
the senators and then hand over the city to Hannibal and the Carthaginians.
It is in my power to save you from this peril if you will put yourselves in my
hands, and, forgetting all our past quarrels, trust me." Overcome by their
fears they all placed themselves in his hands. "I will," he then said, "shut you
in your House, and whilst appearing myself to participate in their act by
approving of designs which I should in vain attempt to oppose, I will
discover a way of safety for you. Take any guarantee in this matter which
you please." When he had given the guarantee he went out and ordered the
doors to be fastened, and left a guard in the vestibule to prevent any one
from entering or leaving without his orders.
23.3
Next, he
called an assembly of the people and addressed them thus: "You have often
wished, citizens of Capua, that you had the power to execute summary
justice on the unscrupulous and infamous senate. You can do so now safely,
and none can call you to account. You need not risk your lives in desperate
attempts to force the houses of individual senators guarded as they are by
their clients and slaves; take them as they now are, locked up in the
Senate-house, all by themselves, unarmed. Do not be in a hurry, do nothing
rashly. I will put you in a position to pass sentence of life and death so that
each of them in turn may pay the penalty he deserves. But whatever you do
see that you do not go too far in satisfying your feelings of resentment, make
the security and welfare of the State your first consideration. For, as I
understand it, it is these particular senators that you hate, you do not want to
go without a senate altogether; for you must either have a king which is an
abomination, or a senate, which is the only consultative body that can exist
in a free commonwealth. So you have to do two things at once, remove the
old senate and choose a fresh one. I shall order the senators to be summoned
one by one and I shall take your opinion as to their fate, and whatever
decision you arrive at shall be carried out. But before punishment is inflicted
on any one found guilty you must choose a strong and energetic man to take
his place as senator." He then sat down, and after the names of the senators
had been cast into the urn he ordered the man whose name was drawn first
to be brought out of the Senate-house. As soon as they heard the name they
all shouted that he was a worthless scoundrel and richly deserved to be
punished. Then Pacuvius said: "I see clearly what you think of this man, in
place of a worthless scoundrel you must choose a worthy and honest man as
senator. For a few minutes there was silence as they were unable to suggest
a better man. Then one of them, laying aside his diffidence, ventured to
suggest a name, and a greater clamour than ever arose. Some said they had
never heard of him, others imputed to him shameful vices and humble birth,
sordid poverty, and a low class of occupation or trade. A still more violent
demonstration awaited the second and third senators who were summoned,
and it was obvious that while they intensely disliked the man, they had no
one to put in his place. It was no use mentioning the same names again and
again, for it only led to everything that was bad being said about them and
the succeeding names were those of people much more low born and
unknown than those which were first suggested. So the crowd dispersed
saying to one another that the evils they were best acquainted with were the
easiest to bear.
23.4
The
senate had to thank Pacuvius for its life, and it was much more under his
control than under that of the populace. By common consent he now
wielded supreme power and needed no armed support. Henceforth the
senators, forgetting their rank and independence, flattered the populace,
saluted them courteously, invited them as guests, received them at
sumptuous banquets, undertook their cases, always appeared on their side,
and when they were trying suits they always decided the actions in a way to
secure the favour of the mob. In fact, the proceedings in the senate were
exactly as though it had been a popular assembly. The city had always been
disposed to luxury and extravagance, not only through the weakness of the
character of its citizens, but also through the superabundance of the means
of enjoyment and the incitements to every kind of pleasure which land or sea
could furnish, and now, owing to the obsequiousness of the nobility and the
licence of the populace, it was becoming so demoralised that the sensuality
and extravagance which prevailed exceeded all bounds. They treated the
laws, the magistrates, the senate with equal contempt, and now after the
defeat of Cannae they began to feel contempt for the one thing which they
had hitherto held in some respect -the power of Rome. The only
circumstances which prevented them from immediately revolting were the
old established right of intermarriage which had led to many of their
illustrious and powerful families becoming connected with Rome and the fact
that several citizens were serving with the Romans. The strongest tie of this
nature was the presence of three hundred cavalry, from the noblest families
in Capua, in Sicily, whither they had been specially sent by the Roman
authorities to garrison the island. The parents and relatives of these troopers
succeeded after much difficulty in getting envoys sent to the Roman consul.
23.5
The
consul had not yet started for Canusium; they found him and his scanty,
insufficiently armed force still at Venusia, an object calculated to arouse the
deepest compassion in trusty allies, and nothing but contempt amongst
arrogant and treacherous ones like the Campanians. The consul made
matters worse and increased the contempt felt for himself and his fortunes by
revealing too plainly and openly the extent of the disaster. When the envoys
assured him that the senate and people of Capua were much grieved that any
mischance had happened to the Romans and expressed their readiness to
supply all that was needed for the war, he replied: "In bidding us requisition
from you what we need for the war you have preserved the tone in which we
speak to allies instead of suiting your language to the actual state of our
circumstances. For what was left us at Cannae that we should wish what is
lacking -as though we still possessed something -to be made up by our
allies? Are we to ask you to furnish infantry as though we still possessed any
cavalry? Are we to say that we want money, as though that were the only
thing we want? Fortune has not even left us anything which we can
supplement. Legions, cavalry, arms, standards, men and horses, money,
supplies -all have gone either on the battlefield or when the two camps were
lost the following day. So then, men of Capua, you have not to help us in the
war but almost to undertake the war for us. Call to mind how once when
your forefathers were driven in hurried flight within their walls in dread of
the Sidicine as well as the Samnite we took them under our protection at
Saticula, and how the war which then commenced with the Samnites on your
behalf was kept up by us with all its changeful fortunes for nearly a century.
Besides all this you must remember that after you had surrendered we gave
you a treaty on equal terms, we allowed you to retain your own laws, and -what was, before our defeat at Cannae at all events, the greatest privilege -we granted our citizenship to most of you and made you members of our
commonwealth. Under these circumstances, men of Capua, you ought to
realise that you have suffered this defeat as much as we have, and to feel that
we have a common country to defend. It is not with the Samnites or the
Etruscans that we have to do; if they deprived us of our power it would still
be Italians who would hold it. But the Carthaginian is dragging after him an
army that is not even made up of natives of Africa, he has collected a force
from the furthest corners of the earth, from the ocean straits, and the Pillars
of Hercules, men devoid of any sense of right, destitute of the condition, and
almost of the speech of men. Savage and barbarous by nature and habit, their
general has made them still more brutal by building up bridges and barriers
with human bodies and -I shudder to say it -teaching them to feed on
human flesh. What man, if he were merely a native of Italy, would not be
horrified at the thought of looking upon men who feast upon what it is
impious even to touch as his lords and masters, looking to Africa and above
all to Carthage for his laws, and having to submit to Italy becoming a
dependency of the Numidians and the Moors? It will be a splendid thing,
men of Capua, if the dominion of Rome, which has collapsed in defeat,
should be saved and restored by your loyalty, your strength. I think that in
Campania you can raise 30,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry; you have already
sufficient money and corn. If you show a loyalty corresponding to your
means Hannibal will not feel that he has conquered or that the Romans are
vanquished."
23.6
After this
speech of the consul's, the envoys were dismissed. As they were on their way
home, one of their number, Vibius Virrius, told them that the time had come
when the Campanians could not only recover the territory wrongfully taken
from them by the Romans, but even achieve the dominion over Italy. They
could make a treaty with Hannibal on any terms they chose, and there was
no disputing the fact that when the war was over and Hannibal after his
conquest returned with his army to Africa, the sovereignty over Italy would
fall to the Campanians. They all agreed with what Virrius said, and they gave
such an account of their interview with the consul as to make everybody
think that the very name of Rome was blotted out. The populace and a
majority of the senate began at once to prepare for a revolt; it was owing to
the exertions of the senior members that the crisis was staved off for a few
days. At last the majority carried their point, and the same envoys who had
been to the Roman consul were now sent to Hannibal. I find it stated in some
annalists that before they started or it was definitely decided to revolt,
envoys were sent from Capua to Rome to demand as the condition of their
rendering assistance that one consul should be a Campanian, and amidst the
indignation which this demand aroused the envoys were ordered to be
summarily ejected from the Senate-house, and a lictor told off to conduct
them out of the City with orders not to remain a single day on Roman
territory. As, however, this demand is too much like one made by the Latins
in earlier times, and Caelius amongst others would not have omitted to
mention it without good reason, I will not venture to vouch for the truth of
the statement.
23.7
The
envoys came to Hannibal and negotiated a peace with him on the following
terms: No Carthaginian commander or magistrate was to have any
jurisdiction over the citizens of Capua nor was any Campanian citizen to be
obliged to serve in any military or other capacity against his will; Capua was
to retain its own magistrates and its own laws; and the Carthaginian was to
allow them to choose three hundred Romans out of his prisoners of war
whom they were to exchange for the Campanian troopers who were serving
in Sicily. These were the terms agreed upon, but the Campanians went far
beyond the stipulations in their criminal excesses. The populace seized
officers in command of our allies and other Roman citizens, some whilst
occupied with their military duties, others whilst engaged in their private
business, and ordered them to be shut up in the baths on the presence of
keeping them in safe custody; unable to breathe owing to the heat and fumes
they died in great agony. Decius Magius was a man who, if his
fellow-citizens had been rational, would have gained very great authority
with them. He did his best to prevent these crimes and to stop the envoys
from going to Hannibal. When he heard that troops were being sent by
Hannibal to garrison the city, he protested most earnestly against their being
admitted and referred, as warning examples, to the tyranny of Pyrrhus and
the wretched servitude into which the Tarentines fell. After they were
admitted he urged that they should be expelled, or what was better, if the
Capuans wished to clear themselves by a deed which would be remembered
from their guilt in revolting from ancient allies and blood-relations, let them
put the Carthaginian garrison to death and be once more friends with Rome.
When this was reported to Hannibal -for there was no secrecy
about Magius' action -he sent to summon him to his camp. Magius sent a
spirited refusal; Hannibal, he said, had no legal authority over a citizen of
Capua. The Carthaginian, furious at the rebuff, ordered the man to be
thrown into chains and brought to him. Fearing, however, on second
thoughts, that the use of force might create a tumult and feelings once
aroused might lead to a sudden outbreak, he sent a message to Marius
Blossius, the chief magistrate of Capua, that he would be there on the
morrow, and started with a small escort for the city. Marius called the people
together and gave public notice that they should assemble in a body with
their wives and children and go to meet Hannibal. The whole population
turned out, not because they were ordered, but because the mob were
enthusiastic in favour of Hannibal, and were eager to see a commander
famous for so many victories. Decius Magius did not go to meet him, nor did
he shut himself up at home, as this might have implied a consciousness of
guilt; he strolled leisurely about the Forum with his son and a few of his
clients, whilst the whole city was in a state of wild excitement at seeing and
welcoming Hannibal. When he had entered the city Hannibal asked that the
senate should be convened at once. The leading Campanians, however,
implored him not to transact any serious business then, but to give himself up
to the joyous celebration of a day which had been made such a happy one by
his arrival. Though he was naturally impulsive in his anger, he would not
begin with a refusal, and spent most of the day in viewing the city.
23.8
He
stayed with two brothers, Sthenius and Pacuvius, men distinguished for their
high birth and wealth. Pacuvius Calavius, whom we have already mentioned,
the leader of the party which brought the city over to the Carthaginians,
brought his young son to the house. The youth was closely attached to
Decius Magius, and had stood up most resolutely with him for the alliance
with Rome and against any terms with the Carthaginians, and neither the
changing over of the city to the other side nor the authority of his father had
been able to shake his resolution. Pacuvius dragged him away from Magius'
side and now sought to obtain Hannibal's pardon for the youth by
intercessions rather than by any attempts at exculpation. He was overcome
by the father's prayers and tears and went so far as to order him to be invited
to a banquet to which none were to be admitted but his hosts and Vibellius
Taureas, a distinguished soldier. The banquet began early in the day, and was
not at all in accordance with Carthaginian customs or military discipline, but
as was natural in a city, still more in a house full of wealth and luxury, the
table was furnished with every kind of dainty and delicacy. Young Calavius
was the only one who could not be persuaded to drink, though his hosts and
occasionally Hannibal invited him; he excused himself on the ground of
health, and his father alleged as a further reason his not unnatural excitement
under the circumstances. It was nearly sunset when the guests rose. Young
Calavius accompanied his father out of the banquet chamber and when they
had come to a retired spot in the garden behind the house, he stopped and
said: "I have a plan to propose to you, father, by which we shall not only
obtain pardon for the Romans for our offence in revolting to Hannibal, but
also possess much more influence and prestige in Capua than we have ever
done before." When his father asked him in great surprise what his plan was,
he threw his toga back from his shoulder and showed him a sword belted on
to his side. "Now," he said, "this very moment will I ratify our treaty with
Rome in Hannibal's blood. I wanted you to know first, in case you would
rather be away when the deed is done."
23.9
The old
man, beside himself with terror at what he saw and heard, as though he were
actually witnessing the act his son had spoken of, exclaimed: "I pray and
beseech you, my son, by all the sacred bonds which unite parents and
children, not to insist upon doing and suffering everything that is horrible
before your father's eyes. It is only a few hours ago that we pledged our
faith, swearing by all the gods and joining hand to hand, and do you want us,
when we have just separated after friendly talk, to arm those hands,
consecrated by such a pledge, against him? Have you risen from the
hospitable board to which you were invited by Hannibal with only two others
out of all Capua that you may stain that board with your host's blood? I,
your father, was able to make Hannibal friendly towards my son, am I
powerless to make my son friendly towards Hannibal? But let nothing sacred
hold you back, neither the plighted word, nor religious obligation, nor filial
affection; dare infamous deeds, if they do not bring ruin as well as guilt upon
us. But what then? Are you going to attack Hannibal single-handed? What of
that throng of free men and slaves with all their eyes intent on him alone?
What of all those right hands? Will they hang down listlessly during that act
of madness? Armed hosts cannot bear even to gaze on the face of Hannibal,
the Roman people dread it, and will yon endure it? Though other help be
lacking, will you have the courage to strike me, me your father, when I
interpose myself to protect Hannibal? And yet it is through my breast that
you must pierce his. Suffer yourself to be deterred here rather than
vanquished there. Let my prayers prevail with you as they have already
to-day prevailed for you." By this time the youth was in tears, and seeing
this, the father flung his arms round him, clung to him with kisses, and
persisted in his entreaties until he made his son lay aside his sword and give
his word that he would do nothing of the kind. Then the son spoke: "I must
pay to my father the dutiful obedience which I owe to my country. I am
indeed grieved on your account for you have to bear the guilt of a threefold
betrayal of your country; first when you instigated the revolt from Rome,
secondly when you urged peace with Hannibal, and now once more when
you are the one let and hindrance in the way of restoring Capua to the
Romans. Do you, my country, receive this sword with which I armed myself
in your defence when I entered the stronghold of the enemy." With these
words he flung the sword over the garden wall into the public road, and to
allay all suspicions returned to the banqueting room.
23.10
The
following day there was a full meeting of the senate to hear Hannibal. At first
his tone was very gracious and winning; he thanked the Capuans for
preferring his friendship to alliance with Rome, and amongst other
magnificent promises he assured them that Capua would soon be the head of
all Italy and that Rome, in common with all the other nationalities, would
have to look to her for their laws. Then his tone changed. There was one
man, he thundered, who was outside the friendship of Carthage and the
treaty they had made with him, a man that was not, and ought not to be
called a Campanian -Decius Magius. He demanded his surrender and asked
that this matter should be discussed and a decision arrived at before he left
the House. They all voted for surrendering the man, though a great many
thought that he did not deserve such a cruel fate and felt that a long step had
been taken in the abridgment of their rights and liberties. On leaving the
Senate-house Hannibal took his seat on the magistrates' tribunal and ordered
Decius Magius to be arrested, brought before him, and put on his defence,
alone and unbefriended. The high spirit of the man was still unquelled, he
said that by the terms of the treaty this could not be insisted on, but he was
at once placed in irons and ordered to be conducted to the camp, followed
by a lictor. As long as his head was uncovered he was incessantly haranguing
and shouting to the crowds round him: "You have got the liberty, you
Campanians, that you asked for. In the middle of the Forum, in the broad
daylight, with you looking on, I a man second to none in Capua am being
hurried off in chains to death. Could any greater outrage have been
committed if the city had been taken? Go and meet Hannibal, decorate your
city, make the day of his arrival a public holiday that you may enjoy the
spectacle of this triumph over a fellow-citizen! As the mob appeared to be
moved by these outbursts, his head was muffled up and orders were given to
hurry him more quickly outside the city gate. In this way he was brought into
the camp and then at once put on board a ship and sent to Carthage.
Hannibal's fear was that if any disturbance broke out in Capua in
consequence of such scandalous treatment the senate might repent of having
surrendered their foremost citizen, and if they sent to ask for his restoration
he would either offend his new allies by refusing the first request they made,
or, if he granted it, would have in Capua a fomenter of disorder and sedition.
The vessel was driven by a storm to Cyrenae which was then under a
monarchy. Here Magius fled for sanctuary to the statue of King Ptolemy,
and his guards conveyed him to the King of Alexandria. After he had told
him how he had been thrown into chains by Hannibal in defiance of all treaty
rights, he was liberated from his fetters and permission accorded to him to
go to Rome or Capua, whichever he preferred. Magius said that he would
not be safe at Capua, and as there was at that time war between Rome and
Capua, he would be living in Rome more like a deserter than a guest. There
was no place where he would sooner live than under the rule of the man
whom he had known as the champion and asserter of his freedom.
23.11
During
these occurrences Q. Fabius Pictor returned home from his mission to
Delphi. He read the response of the oracle from a manuscript, in which were
contained the names of the gods and goddesses to whom supplications were
to be made, and the forms to be observed in making them. This was the
closing paragraph: "If ye act thus, Romans, your estate will be better and less
troubled, your republic will go forward as ye would have it, and the victory
in the war will belong to the people of Rome. When your commonwealth is
prosperous and safe send to Pythian Apollo a gift from the gains you have
earned and honour him with your substance out of the plunder, the booty,
and the spoils. Put away from you all wanton and godless living." He
translated this from the Greek as he read it, and when he had finished reading
he said that as soon as he left the oracle he offered sacrifice with wine and
incense to all the deities who were named, and further that he was instructed
by the priest to go on board wearing the same laurel garland in which he had
visited the oracle and not to lay it aside till he got to Rome. He stated that he
had carried out all his instructions most carefully and conscientiously, and
had laid the garland on the altar of Apollo. The senate passed a decree that
the sacrifices and intercessions which were enjoined should be carefully
performed at the earliest opportunity.
During these occurrences in Rome and Italy, Mago, Hamilcar's son,
had arrived at Carthage with the news of the victory of Cannae. He had not
been sent by his brother immediately after the battle, but had been detained
for some days in receiving into alliance Bruttian communities as they
successively revolted. When he appeared before the senate he unfolded the
story of his brother's successes in Italy, how he had fought pitched battles
with six commanders-in-chief, four of whom were consuls and two a
Dictator and his Master of Horse, and how he had killed about 200,000 of
the enemy and taken more than 50,000 prisoners. Out of four consuls two
had fallen, of the two survivors one was wounded and the other, after losing
the whole of his army, had escaped with fifty men. The Master of the Horse,
whose powers were those of a consul, had been routed and put to flight, and
the Dictator, because he had never fought an action, was looked upon as a
matchless general. The Bruttians and Apulians, with some of the Samnite
and Lucanian communities, had gone over to the Carthaginians. Capua,
which was not only the chief city of Campania, but now that the power of
Rome had been shattered at Cannae was the head of Italy, had surrendered
to Hannibal. For all these great victories he felt that they ought to be truly
grateful and public thanksgivings ought to be offered to the immortal gods.
23.12
As
evidence that the joyful tidings he brought were true, he ordered a quantity
of gold rings to be piled up in the vestibule of the Senate-house, and they
formed such a great heap that, according to some authorities, they measured
more than three modii; the more probable account, however, is that they did
not amount to more than one modius. He added by way of explanation, to
show how great the Roman losses had been, that none but knights, and
amongst them only the highest in rank, wore that ornament. The main
purport of his speech was that the nearer Hannibal's chances were of
bringing the war to a speedy close the more need there was to render him
every possible assistance; he was campaigning far from home, in the midst of
a hostile country; vast quantities of corn were being consumed and much
money expended, and all those battles, whilst they destroyed the armies of
the enemy, at the same time wasted very appreciably the forces of the victor.
Reinforcements, therefore, must be sent, money must be sent to pay the
troops, and supplies of corn to the soldiers who had done such splendid
service for Carthage. Amidst the general delight with which Mago's speech
was received, Himilco, a member of the Barcine party, thought it a
favourable moment for attacking Hanno. "Well, Hanno," he began, "do you
still disapprove of our commencing a war against Rome? Give orders for
Hannibal to be surrendered, put your veto upon all thanksgivings to the gods
after we have received such blessings, let us hear the voice of a Roman
senator in the Senate-house of Carthage?"
Then Hanno spoke to the following effect: "Senators, I would have
kept silence on the present occasion, for I did not wish on a day of universal
rejoicing to say anything which might damp your happiness. But as a senator
has asked me whether I still disapprove of the war we have commenced
against Rome, silence on my part would show either insolence or cowardice;
the one implies forgetfulness of the respect due to others, the other of one's
own self-respect. My reply to Himilco is this: I have never ceased to
disapprove of the war, nor shall I ever cease to censure your invincible
general until I see the war ended upon conditions that are tolerable. Nothing
will banish my regret for the old peace that we have broken except the
establishment of a new one. Those details which Mago has proudly
enumerated make Himilco and the rest of Hannibal's caucus very happy; they
might make me happy too, for a successful war, if we choose to make a wise
use of our good fortune, will bring us a more favourable peace. If we let this
opportunity slip, when we are in a position to offer rather than submit to
terms of peace, I fear that our rejoicing will become extravagant and finally
turn out to be groundless. But even now, what is it that you are rejoicing at?
'I have slain the armies of the enemy; send me troops.' What more could you
ask for, if you had been defeated? 'I have captured two of the enemy's
camps, filled, of course, with plunder and supplies; send me corn and
money.' What more could you want if you had been despoiled, stripped of
your own camp? And that I may not be the only one to be surprised at your
delight -for as I have answered Himilco, I have a perfect right to ask
questions in my turn -I should be glad if either Himilco or Mago would tell
me, since, you say, the battle of Cannae has all but destroyed the power of
Rome and the whole of Italy is admittedly in revolt, whether, in the first
place, any single community of the Latin nation has come over to us, and,
secondly, whether a single man out of the thirty-five Roman tribes has
deserted to Hannibal." Mago answered both questions in the negative. "Then
there are still," Hanno continued, "far too many of the enemy left. But I
should like to know how much courage and confidence that vast multitude
possess."
23.13
Mago
said he did not know. "Nothing," replied Hanno, "is easier to find out. Have
the Romans sent any envoys to Hannibal to sue for peace? Has any rumour
reached your ears of any one even mentioning the word 'peace' in Rome?"
Again Mago replied in the negative. "Well, then," said Hanno, "we have as
much work before us in this war as we had on the day when Hannibal first
set foot in Italy. Many of us are still alive who can remember with what
changeful fortunes the first Punic war was fought. Never did our cause
appear to be prospering more by sea and land than immediately before the
consulship of C. Lutatius and A. Postumius. But in their year of office we
were utterly defeated off the Aegates. But if (which heaven forfend!) fortune
should now turn to any extent, do you hope to obtain when you are defeated
a peace which no one offers to give you now that you are victorious? If any
one should ask my opinion about offering or accepting terms of peace I
would say what I thought. But if the question before us is simply whether
Mago's demands should be granted, I do not think that we are concerned
with sending supplies to a victorious army, much less do I consider that they
ought to be sent if we are being deluded with false and empty hopes." Very
few were influenced by Hanno's speech. His well-known dislike of the
Barcas deprived his words of weight and they were too much preoccupied
with the delightful news they had just heard to listen to anything which
would make them feel less cause for joy. They fancied that if they were
willing to make a slight effort the war would soon be over. A resolution was
accordingly passed with great enthusiasm to reinforce Hannibal with 4000
Numidians, 40 elephants, and 500 talents of silver. Bostar also was sent with
Mago into Spain to raise 20,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry to make good the
losses of the armies in Italy and Spain.
23.14
As
usual, however, in seasons of prosperity, these measures were executed with
great remissness and dilatoriness. The Romans, on the other hand, were kept
from being dilatory by their native energy and still more by the necessities of
their position. The consul did not fail in any single duty which he had to
perform, nor did the Dictator show less energy. The force now available
comprised the two legions which had been enrolled by the consuls at the
beginning of the year, a levy of slaves and the cohorts which had been raised
in the country of Picenum and Cisalpine Gaul. The Dictator decided to still
further increase his strength by adopting a measure to which only a country
in an almost hopeless state could stoop, when honour must yield to
necessity. After duly discharging his religious duties and obtaining the
necessary permission to mount his horse, he published an edict that all who
had been guilty of capital offences or who were in prison for debt and were
willing to serve under him would by his orders be released from punishment
and have their debts cancelled. 6000 men were raised in this way, and he
armed them with the spoils taken from the Gauls and which had been carried
in the triumphal procession of C. Flaminius. He then started from the City
with 25,000 men. After taking over Capua, and making another fruitless
appeal to the hopes and fears of Neapolis, Hannibal marched into the
territory of Nola. He did not at once treat it in a hostile manner as he was
not without hope that the citizens would make a voluntary surrender, but if
they delayed, he intended to leave nothing undone which could cause them
suffering or terror. The senate, especially its leading members, were faithful
supporters of the Roman alliance, the populace as usual were all in favour of
revolting to Hannibal; they conjured up the prospect of ravaged fields and a
siege with all its hardships and indignities; nor were there wanting men who
were actively instigating a revolt. The senate were afraid that if they openly
opposed the agitation they would not be able to withstand the popular
excitement, and they found a means of putting off the evil day by pretending
to go with the mob. They represented that they were in favour of revolting
to Hannibal, but nothing was settled as to the conditions on which they were
to enter into a new treaty and alliance. Having thus gained time, they sent
delegates in great haste to Marcellus Claudius the praetor, who was with his
army at Casilinum, to inform him of the critical position of Nola, how their
territory was in Hannibal's hand, and the city would be in the possession of
the Carthaginians unless it received succour. and how the senate, by telling
the populace that they might revolt when they pleased. had made them less
in a hurry to do so. Marcellus thanked the delegates and told them to adhere
to the same policy and postpone matters till he arrived. He then left
Casilinum for Caiatia and from there he marched across the Vulturnus,
through the districts of Saticula and Trebia, over the hills above Suessula,
and so arrived at Nola.
23.15
On the
approach of the Roman praetor the Carthaginian evacuated the territory of
Nola and marched down to the coast close to Neapolis, as he was anxious to
secure a seaport town to which there might be a safe passage for ships
coming from Africa. When, however, he learnt that Neapolis was held by a
Roman officer, M. Junius Silanus, who had been invited by the Neapolitans,
he left Naples, as he had left Nola, and went to Nuceria. He spent some time
in investing the place, often attacking it, and often making tempting
proposals to the chief men of the place and to the leaders of the populace,
but all to no purpose. At last famine did its work, and he received the
submission of the town, the inhabitants being allowed to depart without arms
and with one garment apiece. Then, to keep up his character of being
friendly to all the Italian nationalities except the Romans, he held out
honours and rewards to those who consented to remain in his service. Not a
single man was tempted by the prospect; they all dispersed, wherever they
had friends, or wherever each man's fancy led him, amongst the cities of
Campania, mainly Nola and Neapolis. About thirty of their senators, and, as
it happened, their principal ones, endeavoured to enter Capua, but were
refused admission because they had closed their gates against Hannibal. They
accordingly went on to Cumae. The plunder of Nuceria was given to the
soldiers, the city itself was burnt.
Marcellus retained his hold on Nola quite as much by the support of
its leading men as by the confidence he felt in his troops. Fears were
entertained as to the populace and especially L. Bantius. This enterprising
young man was at that time almost the most distinguished among the allied
cavalry, but the knowledge that he had attempted revolt and his fear of the
Roman praetor were driving him on to betray his country or, if he found no
means of doing that, to become a deserter. He had been discovered lying
half-dead on a heap of bodies on the field of Cannae, and after being taken
the utmost care of, Hannibal sent him home loaded with presents. His
feelings of gratitude for such kindness made him wish to place the
government of Nola in the hands of the Carthaginian, and his anxiety and
eagerness for a revolution attracted the observation of the praetor. As it was
necessary either to restrain the youth by punishment or to win him by
kindness, the praetor chose the latter course, preferring to secure such a
brave and enterprising youth as a friend rather than to lose him to the enemy.
He invited him to come and see him and spoke to him most kindly. "You can
easily understand," he told him, "that many of your countrymen are jealous
of you, from the fact that not a single citizen of Nola has pointed out to me
your many distinguished military services. But the bravery of a man who has
served in a Roman camp cannot be hidden. Many of your fellow-soldiers tell
me what a young hero you are, and how many perils and dangers you have
undergone in defence of the safety and honour of Rome. I am told that you
did not give up the struggle on the field of Cannae until you were buried
almost lifeless, beneath a falling mass of men and horses and arms. May you
long live to do still more gallant deeds! With me you will gain every honour
and reward, and you will find that the more you are in my company the more
will it lead to your profit and promotion." The young man was delighted
with these promises. The praetor made him a present of a splendid charger
and authorised the quaestor to pay him 500 silver coins; he also instructed
his lictors to allow him to pass whenever he wished to see him.
23.16
The
high-spirited youth was so completely captivated by the attention Marcellus
paid him that for the future none among the allies of Rome gave her more
efficient or more loyal help. Hannibal once more moved his camp from
Nuceria to Nola, and when he appeared before its gates the populace again
began to look forward to revolting. As the enemy approached Marcellus
retired within the walls, not because he feared for his camp, but because he
would not give any opportunity to the large number of citizens who were
bent on betraying their city. Both armies now began to prepare for battle; the
Romans before the walls of Nola and the Carthaginians in front of their
camp. Slight skirmishes took place between the city and the camp with
varying success, as the generals would not prohibit their men from going
forward in small parties to offer defiance to the enemy nor would they give
the signal for a general action. Day after day the two armies took up their
respective stations in this way, and during this time the leading citizens of
Nola informed Marcellus that nocturnal interviews were taking place
between the populace and the Carthaginians, and that it had been arranged
that when the Roman army had passed out of the gates they should plunder
their baggage and kits, then close the gates and man the walls so that having
become masters of their city and government they might forthwith admit the
Carthaginians instead of the Romans.
On receiving this information Marcellus warmly thanked the Nolan
senators and made up his mind to try the fortune of a battle before any
disturbances arose in the city. He formed his army into three divisions and
stationed them at the three gates which faced the enemy, he ordered the
baggage to follow close behind, and the camp-servants, sutlers, and disabled
soldiers were to carry stakes. At the centre gate he posted the strongest part
of the legions and the Roman cavalry, at the two on either side he stationed
the recruits, the light infantry, and the cavalry of the allies. The Nolans were
forbidden to approach the walls or gates and a special reserve was placed in
charge of the baggage to prevent any attack upon it whilst the legions were
engaged in the battle. In this formation they remained standing inside the
gates. Hannibal had his troops drawn up for battle, as he had had for several
days, and remained in this position till late in the day. At first it struck him
with surprise that the Roman army did not move outside the gates and that
not a single soldier appeared on the walls. Then, supposing that the secret
interviews had been betrayed and that his friends were afraid to move, he
sent back a portion of his troops to their camp with orders to bring all the
appliances for attacking the town as soon as possible to the front of the line.
He felt fairly confident that if he attacked them whilst thus hesitating the
populace would raise some disturbance in the town. Whilst his men were
hurrying up to the front ranks, each to his allotted task, and the whole line
was approaching the walls, Marcellus ordered the gates to be suddenly flung
open, the attack sounded, and the battle shout raised; the infantry, followed
by the cavalry, were to attack with all the fury possible. They had already
carried enough confusion and alarm into the enemies' centre when P.
Valerius Flaccus and C. Aurelius, divisional commanders, burst out from the
other two gates and charged. The sutlers and camp-servants and the rest of
the troops who were guarding the baggage joined in the shouting, and this
made the Carthaginians, who had been despising the fewness of their
numbers, think that it was a large army. I would hardly venture to assert, as
some authorities do, that 2800 of the enemy were killed, and that the
Romans did not lose more than 500. But whether the victory was as great as
that or not, I do not think that an action more important in its consequences
was fought during the whole war, for it was more difficult for those who
conquered to escape being defeated by Hannibal than it was afterwards to
conquer him.
23.17
As
there was no hope of his getting possession of Nola, Hannibal withdrew to
Acerrae. No sooner had he departed than Marcellus shut the gates and
posted guards to prevent any one from leaving the city. He then opened a
public inquiry in the forum into the conduct of those who had been holding
secret interviews with the enemy. Above seventy were found guilty of
treason and beheaded and their property confiscated. Then, after handing the
government over to the senate, he left with his entire force and took up a
position above Suessula, where he encamped. At first the Carthaginian tried
to persuade the men of Acerrae to make a voluntary surrender, but when he
found that their loyalty remained unshaken he made preparations for a siege
and an assault. The Acerrans possessed more courage than strength, and
when they saw that the blockade was being carried round their walls and that
it was hopeless to attempt any further defence, they decided to escape before
the enemies' line of circumvallation was closed, and stealing away in the dead
of night through any unguarded gaps in the earthworks they fled, regardless
of roads or paths, as chance or design led them. They escaped to those cities
of Campania which they had every reason to believe had not changed their
allegiance. After plundering and burning Acerrae Hannibal marched to
Casilinum in consequence of information he received of the Dictator's march
on Capua with his legions. He was apprehensive that the proximity of the
Roman army might create a counter-revolution in Capua. At that time
Casilinum was held by 500 Praenestines with a few Roman and Latin troops,
who had gone there when they heard of the disaster at Cannae. The levy at
Praeneste had not been completed by the appointed day, and these men
started from home too late to be of use at Cannae. They reached Casilinum
before news of the disaster arrived, and, joined by Romans and allies, they
advanced in great force. Whilst on the march they heard of the battle and its
result and returned to Casilinum. Here, suspected by the Campanians and
fearing for their own safety, they passed some days in forming and evading
plots. When they were satisfied that Capua was in revolt and that Hannibal
would be admitted, they massacred the townsmen of Casilinum at night and
took possession of the part of the city on this side of the Vulturnus -the
river divides the city in two -and held it as a Roman garrison. They were
joined also by a cohort of Perusians numbering 460 men who were driven to
Casilinum by the same intelligence that sent the Praenestines there a few
days previously. The force was quite adequate for the small circuit of walls,
protected, too, as they were on one side by the river, but the scarcity of corn
made even that number appear too large.
23.18
When
Hannibal was now not far from the place he sent on in advance a troop of
Gaetulians under an officer named Isalca, to try and get a parley with the
inhabitants and persuade them by fair words to open their gates and admit a
Carthaginian detachment to hold the town. If they refused, they were to use
force and make an attack, wherever it seemed feasible, on the place. When
they approached the walls the town was so silent that they thought it was
deserted, and taking it for granted that the inhabitants had fled through fear
they began to force the gates and break down the bars. Suddenly the gates
were thrown open and two cohorts which had been standing inside ready for
action dashed out and made a furious charge, utterly discomfiting the enemy.
Maharbal was sent with a stronger force to their assistance, but even he was
unable to withstand the impetuosity of the cohorts. At last Hannibal pitched
his camp before the walls, and made preparations for assaulting the little
town and its small garrison with the combined strength of his entire army.
After completing the circle of his investing lines he began to harass and
annoy the garrison, and in this way lost some of his most daring soldiers who
were hit with missiles from the wall and turrets. On one occasion when the
defenders were taking the aggressive in a sortie he nearly cut them off with
his elephants and drove them in hasty flight into the city; the loss,
considering their numbers, was quite severe enough, and more would have
fallen had not night intervened. The next day there was a general desire to
begin the assault. The enthusiasm of the men had been kindled by the offer of
a "mural crown" of gold and also by the way in which the general himself
remonstrated with the men who had taken Saguntum for their slackness in
attacking a little fortress situated in open country, and also reminded them
one and all of Cannae, Trasumennus, and the Trebia. The vineae were
brought up and mines commenced, but the various attempts of the enemy
were opposed with equal strength and skill by the defenders, the allies of
Rome; they created defences against the vineae, intercepted their mines with
counter-mines, and met all their attacks above ground or below with steady
resistance until at last Hannibal for very shame gave up his project. He
contented himself with fortifying his camp and leaving a small force to
defend it, so that it might not be supposed that the siege was entirely
abandoned; after which he settled in Capua as his winter quarters.
There he kept his army under shelter for the greater part of the
winter. A long and varied experience had inured that army to every form of
human suffering, but it had not been habituated to or had any experience of
ease and comfort. So it came about that the men whom no pressure of
calamity had been able to subdue fell victims to a prosperity too great and
pleasures too attractive for them to withstand, and fell all the more utterly
the more greedily they plunged into new and untried delights. Sloth, wine,
feasting, women, baths, and idle lounging, which became every day more
seductive as they became more habituated to them, so enervated their minds
and bodies that they were saved more by the memory of past victories than
by any fighting strength they possessed now. Authorities in military matters
have regarded the wintering at Capua as a greater mistake on the part of
Hannibal than his not marching straight to Rome after his victory at Cannae.
For his delay at that time might be looked upon as only postponing his final
victory but this may be considered as having deprived him of the strength to
win victory. And it certainly did look as if he left Capua with another army
altogether; it did not retain a shred of its former discipline. A large number
who had become entangled with women went back there, and as soon as
they took to tents again and the fatigue of marching and other military toils
had to be endured their strength and spirits alike gave way just as though
they were raw recruits. From that time all through the summer campaign a
large number left the standards without leave, and Capua was the only place
where the deserters sought to hide themselves.
23.19
However, when the mild weather came,
Hannibal led his army out of their winter quarters and marched back to
Casilinum. Although the assault had been suspended, the uninterrupted
investment had reduced the townsfolk and the garrison to the extremity of
want. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus was in command of the Roman camp,
as the Dictator had to leave for Rome to take the auspices afresh. Marcellus
was equally anxious to assist the besieged garrison, but he was detained by
the Vulturnus being in flood, and also by the entreaties of the people of Nola
and Acerrae who feared the Campanians in case the Romans withdrew their
protection. Gracchus simply watched Casilinum, for the Dictator had given
strict orders that no active operations should be undertaken in his absence.
He therefore kept quiet, though the reports from Casilinum might easily have
been too much for any man's patience. It was stated as a fact that some,
unable to endure starvation any longer, had flung themselves from the walls,
others had stood there unarmed and exposed their defenceless bodies to the
missiles of the enemy. These tidings sorely tried his patience, for he durst not
fight against the Dictator's orders, and he saw that he would have to fight if
he were seen getting corn into the place, and there was no chance of getting
it in without being seen. He gathered in a supply of corn from all the fields
round and filled a number of casks with it, and then sent a messenger to the
chief magistrate at Casilinum asking him to pick up the casks which the river
carried down. The next night, while all were intently watching the river, after
their hopes had been raised by the Roman messenger, the casks floated down
in the middle of the stream; and the corn was divided in equal shares
amongst them all. The same thing happened on the two following days; they
were sent off by night and reached their destination; so far they had escaped
the notice of the enemy. Then, owing to the perpetual rain, the river became
more rapid than usual and the cross currents carried the casks to the bank
which the enemy were guarding. They caught sight of them as they stuck
amongst the osier beds which grew on the bank and a report was made to
Hannibal in consequence of which greater caution was observed and a closer
watch was kept, so that nothing could be sent by the Vulturnus to the city
without being detected. Nuts, however, were scattered on the river from the
Roman camp; these floated down the mid-stream and were caught in
baskets. At last things came to such a pitch that the inhabitants tried to chew
the leather straps and hides which they tore from their shields, after softening
them in boiling water, nor did they refuse mice and other animals; they even
dug up from the bottom of their walls grass and roots of all sorts. When the
enemy had ploughed up all the grass outside the walls they sowed it with
rape, which made Hannibal exclaim: "Am I to sit here before Casilinum until
these seeds have grown?" and whereas he had never allowed any terms of
surrender to be mentioned in his hearing, he now consented to proposals for
the ransom of all the freeborn citizens. The price agreed upon was seven
ounces of gold for each person. When their liberty was guaranteed they
surrendered, but were kept in custody till all the gold was paid, then in strict
observance of the terms they were released. This is much more likely to be
true than that after they had left cavalry were sent after them and put them
all to death. The great majority were Praenestines. Out of the 570 who
formed the garrison not less than half had perished by sword and famine, the
rest returned in safety to Praeneste with their commanding officer, M.
Anicius, who had formerly been a notary. To commemorate the event his
statue was set up in the forum of Praeneste, wearing a coat of mail with a
toga over it and having the head veiled. A bronze plate was affixed with this
inscription: "Marcus Anicius has discharged the vow he made for the safety
of the garrison of Casilinum." The same inscription was affixed to the three
images standing in the temple of Fortune.
23.20
The
town of Casilinum was given back to the Campanians, and a garrison of 700
men from Hannibal's army was placed in it in case the Romans should attack
it after Hannibal's departure. The senate decreed that double pay and an
exemption for five years from further service should be granted to the
Praenestine troops. They were also offered the full Roman citizenship, but
they preferred not to change their status as citizens of Praeneste. There is
more obscurity as to what happened to the Perusians, as there is no light
thrown upon it by any monument of their own or any decree of the senate.
The people of Petelia, who alone of all the Bruttii had remained friendly to
Rome, were now attacked not only by the Carthaginians, who were
overrunning that district, but also by the rest of the Bruttii who had adopted
the opposite policy. Finding themselves helpless in the presence of all these
dangers, they sent envoys to Rome to ask for support. The senate told them
that they must look after themselves, and on hearing this they broke into
tears and entreaties and flung themselves on the floor of the vestibule. Their
distress excited the deep sympathy of both senate and people, and the
praetor, M. Aemilius asked the senators to reconsider their decision. After
making a careful survey of the resources of the empire, they were compelled
to admit that they were powerless to protect their distant allies. They advised
the envoys to return home and now that they had proved their loyalty to the
utmost they must adopt such measures as their present circumstances
demanded. When the result of their mission was reported to the Petelians,
their senate was so overcome by grief and fear that some were in favour of
deserting the city and seeking refuge wherever they could, others thought
that as they had been abandoned by their old allies they had better join the
rest of the Bruttii and surrender to Hannibal. The majority, however, decided
that no rash action should be taken, and that the question should be further
debated. When the matter came up the next day a calmer tone prevailed and
their leading statesmen persuaded them to collect all their produce and
possessions from the fields and put the city and the walls into a state of
defence.
23.21
About
this time despatches arrived from Sicily and Sardinia. The one sent from T.
Otacilius, the propraetor commanding in Sicily, was read in the senate. It
stated in effect that P. Furius had reached Lilybaeum with his fleet; that he
himself was seriously wounded and his life in great danger; that the soldiers
and sailors had no pay or corn given them from day to day, nor was there
any means of procuring any, and he strongly urged that both should be sent
as soon as possible, and that, if the senate agreed, one of the new praetors
should be sent to succeed him. The despatch from A. Cornelius Mammula
dealt with the same difficulty as to pay and corn. The same reply was sent to
both; there was no possibility of sending either, and they were instructed to
make the best arrangements they could for their fleets and armies. T.
Otacilius sent envoys to Hiero, the one man whom Rome could fall back
upon, and received in reply as much money as he needed and a six months'
supply of corn. In Sicily the allied cities sent generous contributions. Even in
Rome, too, the scarcity of money was felt and a measure was carried by M.
Minucius, one of the tribunes of the plebs, for the appointment of three
finance commissioners. The men appointed were: L. Aemilius Papus, who
had been consul and censor; M. Atilius Regulus, who had been twice consul,
and L. Scribonius Libo, one of the tribunes of the plebs. Marcus and Caius
Atilius, two brothers, were appointed to dedicate the temple of Concord
which L. Manlius had vowed during his praetorship. Three new pontiffs
were also chosen -Q. Caecilius Metellus, Q. Fabius Maximus, and Q.
Fulvius Flaccus -in the place of P. Scantinius who had died, and of L.
Aemilius Paulus, the consul, and Q. Aelius Paetus, both of whom fell at
Cannae.
23.22
When
the senate had done their best -so far as human wisdom could do so -to
make good the losses which Fortune had inflicted in such an uninterrupted
series of disasters, they at last turned their attention to the emptiness of the
Senate-house and the small number of those who attended the national
council. There had been no revision of the roll of the senate since L.
Aemilius and C. Flaminius were censors, though there had been such heavy
losses amongst the senators during the last five years on the field of battle, as
well as from the fatalities and accidents to which all are liable. In compliance
with the unanimous wish, the subject was brought forward by the praetor,
M. Aemilius, in the absence of the Dictator, who after the loss of Casilinum
had rejoined the army. Sp. Carvilius spoke at considerable length about the
dearth of senators, and also the very small number of citizens from whom
senators could be chosen. He went on to say that for the purpose of filling
up the vacancies, and also of strengthening the union between the Latins and
Rome, he should strongly urge that the full citizenship be granted to two
senators out of each Latin city, to be approved by the senate, and that these
men should be chosen into the senate in the place of those who had died.
The senate listened to these proposals with quite as much impatience as they
had previously felt at the demand of the Latins. A murmur of indignation
went through the House. T. Manlius in particular was heard asserting that
there was even still one man of the stock to which that consul belonged who
once in the Capitol threatened that he would kill with his own hand any Latin
whom he saw sitting in the senate. Q. Fabius Maximus declared that no
proposal had ever been mooted in the senate at a more inopportune time
than this; it had been thrown out at a moment when the sympathies of their
allies were wavering and their loyalty doubtful, and it would make them
more restless than ever; those rash inconsiderate words uttered by one man
ought to be stifled by the silence of all men. Whatever secret or sacred
matter had at any time imposed silence on that House, this most of all must
be concealed, buried, forgotten, considered as never having been uttered. All
further allusion to the subject was accordingly suppressed. It was ultimately
decided to nominate as Dictator a man who had been censor before, and was
the oldest man living who had held that office, in order that the roll of
senators might be revised. C. Terentius was recalled to nominate the
Dictator. Leaving a garrison in Apulia he returned to Rome by forced
marches, and the night after his arrival nominated, in accordance with
ancient custom M. Fabius Buteo to act as Dictator for six months without
any Master of the Horse.
23.23
Accompanied by his lictors, Fabius
mounted the rostra and made the following speech: "I do not approve of
there being two Dictators at the same time, a thing wholly unprecedented,
nor of there being a Dictator without a Master of the Horse, nor of the
censorial powers being entrusted to one individual and that for the second
time, nor of the supreme authority being placed in the hands of a Dictator for
six months unless he has been created to wield executive powers. These
irregularities may perhaps be necessary at this juncture, but I shall fix a limit
to them. I shall not remove from the roll any of those whom C. Flaminius
and L. Aemilius, the last censors, placed on it, I shall simply order their
names to be transcribed and read out, as I do not choose to allow the power
of judging and deciding upon the reputation or character of a senator to rest
with any single individual. I shall fill up the places of those who are dead in
such a way as to make it clear that preference is given to rank and not to
persons." After the names of the old senate had been read out, Fabius began
his selection. The first chosen were men who, subsequent to the censorship
of L. Aemilius and C. Flaminius, had filled a curule office, but were not yet
in the senate, and they were taken according to the order of their previous
appointments. They were followed by those who had been aediles, tribunes
of the plebs, or quaestors. Last of all came those who had not held office,
but had the spoils of an enemy set up in their houses or had received a "civic
crown." In this way names were added to the senatorial roll, amidst general
approbation. Having completed his task he at once laid down his
Dictatorship and descended from the rostra as a private citizen. He ordered
the lictors to cease their attendance and mingled with the throng of citizens
who were transacting their private business, deliberately idling his time away
in order that he might not take the people out of the Forum to escort him
home. The public interest in him, however, did not slacken through their
having to wait, and a large crowd escorted him to his house. The following
night the consul made his way back to the army, without letting the senate
know, as he did not want to be detained in the City for the elections.
23.24
The
next day the senate, on being consulted by M. Pomponius, the praetor,
passed a decree to write to the Dictator, asking him, if the interests of the
State permitted, to come to Rome to conduct the election of fresh consuls.
He was to bring with him his Master of the Horse and M. Marcellus, the
praetor, so that the senate might learn from them on the spot in what
condition the affairs of the Republic were, and form their plans accordingly.
On receiving the summons they all came, after leaving officers in command
of the legions. The Dictator spoke briefly and modestly about himself; he
gave most of the credit to Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, his Master of the
Horse, and then gave notice of the elections. The consuls elected were L.
Postumius for the third time -he was elected in his absence, as he was then
administering the province of Gaul -and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, Master
of the Horse, and at that time curule aedile also. Then the praetors were
elected. They were M. Valerius Laevinus, for the second time, Appius
Claudius Pulcher, Q. Fulvius Flaccus, and Q. Mucius Scaevola. After the
various magistrates had been elected the Dictator returned to his army in
winter quarters at Teanum. The Master of the Horse was left in Rome; as he
would be entering upon office in a few days, it was desirable for him to
consult the senate about the enrolment and equipment of the armies for the
year.
While these matters were engrossing attention a fresh disaster was
announced, for Fortune was heaping one disaster upon another this year. It
was reported that L. Postumius, the consul elect, and his army had been
annihilated in Gaul. There was a wild forest called by the Gauls Litana, and
through this the consul was to conduct his army. The Gauls cut through the
trees on both sides of the road in such a way that they remained standing as
long as they were undisturbed, but a slight pressure would make them fall.
Postumius had two Roman legions, and he had also levied a force from the
country bordering on the Upper Sea, sufficiently large to bring the force with
which he entered the hostile territory up to 2s,000 men. The Gauls had
posted themselves round the outskirts of the forest, and as soon as the
Roman army entered they pushed the sawn trees on the outside, these fell
upon those next to them, which were tottering and hardly able to stand
upright, until the whole mass fell in on both sides and buried in one common
ruin arms and men and horses. Hardly ten men escaped, for when most of
them hail been crushed to death by the trunks or broken branches of the
trees, the remainder, panic-struck at the unexpected disaster, were killed by
the Gauls who surrounded the forest. Out of the whole number only very
few were made prisoners, and these, whilst trying to reach a bridge over the
river, were intercepted by the Gauls who had already seized it. It was there
that Postumius fell whilst fighting most desperately to avoid capture. The
Boii stripped the body of its spoils and cut off the head, and bore them in
triumph to the most sacred of their temples. According to their custom they
cleaned out the skull and covered the scalp with beaten gold; it was then
used as a vessel for libations and also as a drinking cup for the priest and
ministers of the temple. The plunder, too, which the Gauls secured was as
great as their victory, for although most of the animals had been buried
beneath the fallen trees, the rest of the booty, not having been scattered in
flight, was found strewn along the whole line where the army lay.
23.25
When
the news of this disaster arrived the whole community was in such a state of
alarm that the shops were shut up and a solitude like that of night pervaded
the City. Under these circumstances the senate instructed the aediles to make
a round of the City and order the citizens to re-open their shops and lay
aside the aspect of public mourning. Ti. Sempronius then convened the
senate, and addressed them in a consolatory and encouraging tone. "We," he
said, "who were not crushed by the overthrow at Cannae must not lose heart
at smaller calamities. If we are successful, as I trust we shall be, in our
operations against Hannibal and the Carthaginians, we can safely leave the
war with the Gauls out of account for the present; the gods and the Roman
people will have it in their power to avenge that act of treachery. It is with
regard to the Carthaginians and the armies with which the war is to be
carried on that we have now to deliberate and decide." He first gave details
as to the strength of infantry and cavalry, and the proportion in each of
Roman and allied troops, which made up the Dictator's army; Marcellus
followed with similar details as to his own force. Then inquiry was made of
those who were acquainted with the facts as to the strength of the force with
C. Terentius Varro in Apulia. No practical method suggested itself for
bringing up the two consular armies to sufficient strength for such an
important war. So in spite of the justifiable resentment which was generally
felt they decided to discontinue the campaign in Gaul for that year. The
Dictator's army was assigned to the consul. It was decided that those of
Marcellus' troops who were involved in the flight from Cannae should be
transported to Sicily to serve there as long as the war continued in Italy. All
the least efficient in the Dictator's army were also to be removed there, no
period of service being fixed in their case, except that they must each serve
out their time. The two legions raised in the City were allocated to the other
consul who should succeed L. Postumius; and it was arranged that he should
be elected as soon as favourable auspices could be obtained. The two legions
in Sicily were to be recalled at the earliest possible moment, and the consul
to whom the legions from the City had been assigned was to take out of
those what men he required. C. Terentius had his command extended for
another year, and no reduction was to be made in the army with which he
was protecting Apulia.
23.26
Whilst
these preparations were going on in Italy, the war in Spain was being carried
on with as much energy as ever and, so far, in favour of the Romans. The
two Scipios, Publius and Cnaeus, had divided their forces between them,
Cnaeus was to operate on land and Publius by sea. Hasdrubal, the
Carthaginian commander, did not feel himself strong enough in either arm,
and kept himself safe by taking up strong positions at a distance from the
enemy; until, in response to his many earnest appeals for reinforcements,
4000 infantry and 1000 cavalry were sent to him from Africa. Then,
recovering his confidence, he moved nearer the enemy, and gave orders for
the fleet to be put into readiness to protect the islands and the coast. In the
very middle of his preparations for a fresh campaign he was dismayed by
news of the desertion of the naval captains. After they had been heavily
censured for their cowardice in abandoning the fleet at the Ebro they had
never been very loyal either to their general or to the cause of Carthage.
These deserters had started an agitation amongst the tribe of the Tartesii and
had induced several cities to revolt, and one they had actually taken by
storm. The war was now diverted from the Romans to this tribe, and
Hasdrubal entered their territories with an invading army. Chalbus, a
distinguished general amongst them, was encamped with a strong force
before the walls of a city which he had captured a few days before, and
Hasdrubal determined to attack him. He sent forward skirmishers to draw
the enemy into an engagement and told off a part of his cavalry to lay waste
the surrounding country and pick up stragglers. There was confusion in the
camp and panic and bloodshed in the fields, but when they had regained the
camp from all directions their fears so suddenly left them that they became
emboldened, not only to defend their camp, but even to take the aggressive
against the enemy. They burst in a body out of their camp, executing war
dances after their manner, and this unexpected daring on their part carried
terror into the hearts of the enemy, who had shortly before been challenging
them. Hasdrubal thereupon withdrew his force to a fairly lofty hill, which
was also protected by a river which served as a barrier. He retired his
skirmishers and his scattered cavalry also to this same position. Not,
however, feeling sufficiently protected by either hill or river he strongly
entrenched himself. Several skirmishes took place between the two sides
who were alternately frightening and fearing each other, and the Numidian
trooper proved to be no match for the Spaniard, nor were the darts of the
Moor very effective against the ox-hide shields of the natives, who were
quite as rapid in their movements and possessed more strength and courage.
23.27
When
they found that though they rode up to the Carthaginian lines they could not
entice the enemy into action, whilst an attack upon the camp was a far from
easy matter, they successfully assaulted the town of Ascua, where Hasdrubal
had stored his corn and other supplies on entering their territories, and
became masters of all the country round. Now there was no longer any
discipline amongst them, whether on the march or in camp. Hasdrubal soon
became aware of this, and seeing that success had made them careless, he
urged his men to attack them whilst they were scattered away from their
standards; he himself meanwhile descended from the hill and marched with
his men in attack formation straight to their camp. News of his approach was
brought by men rushing in from the look-out stations and outposts and there
was a general call to arms. As each man seized his weapons he hurried with
the others into battle, without order or formation, or word of command or
standards. The foremost of them were already engaged, whilst others were
still running up in small groups and some had not yet left the camp. Their
reckless daring, however, at first checked the enemy, but soon, finding that
whilst loose and scattered themselves, they were charging an enemy in close
formation, and that their scanty numbers imperilled their safety, they looked
round at one another, and as they were being repulsed in every direction they
formed a square. Standing close together with their shields touching they
were gradually driven into such a close mass that they had hardly room to
use their weapons, and for a great part of the day were simply cut down by
the enemy who completely surrounded them. A very few cut their way out
and made for the woods and hills. The camp was abandoned in the same
panic and the whole tribe made their surrender the following day. But they
did not remain quiet long, for just after this battle an order was received
from Carthage for Hasdrubal to lead his army as soon as he could into Italy.
This became generally known throughout Spain and the result was that there
was a universal feeling in favour of Rome. Hasdrubal at once sent a despatch
to Carthage pointing out what mischief the mere rumour of his departure had
caused, and also that if he did really leave Spain it would pass into the hands
of the Romans before he crossed the Ebro. He went on to say that not only
had he neither a force nor a general to leave in his place, but the Roman
generals were men whom he found it difficult to oppose even when his
strength was equal to theirs. If, therefore, they were at all anxious to retain
Spain they should send a man with a powerful army to succeed him, and
even though all went well with his successor he would not find it an easy
province to govern.
23.28
Although this despatch made a great
impression on the senate, they decided that as Italy demanded their first and
closest attention, the arrangements about Hannibal and his forces must not
be altered. Himilco was sent with a large and well-appointed army and an
augmented fleet to hold and defend Spain by sea and land. As soon as he had
brought his military and naval forces across he formed an entrenched camp,
hauled his ships up on the beach and surrounded them with a rampart. After
providing for the safety of his force he started with a picked body of cavalry,
and marching as rapidly as possible, and being equally on the alert whether
passing through doubtful or through hostile tribes, succeeded in reaching
Hasdrubal. After laying before him the resolutions and instructions of the
senate and being in his turn shown in what way the war was to be managed
in Spain, he returned to his camp. He owed his safety most of all to the
speed at which he travelled, for he had got clear of each tribe before they
had time for any united action. Before Hasdrubal commenced his march, he
levied contributions on all the tribes under his rule, for he was quite aware
that Hannibal had secured a passage through some tribes by paying for it,
and had obtained his Gaulish auxiliaries simply by hiring them. To commence
such a march without money would hardly bring him to the Alps. The
contributions were therefore hurriedly called in and after receiving them he
marched down to the Ebro. When the resolutions of the Carthaginians and
Hasdrubal's march were reported to the Roman generals, the two Scipios at
once put aside all other matters and made preparations to meet him at the
outset with their joint forces and stop his further progress. They believed
that if Hannibal, who single-handed was almost too much for Italy, were
joined by such a general as Hasdrubal and his Spanish army it would mean
the end of the Roman empire. With so much to make them anxious they
concentrated their forces at the Ebro and crossed the river. They deliberated
for some considerable time as to whether they should meet him, army against
army, or whether it would be enough for them to hinder his proposed march
by attacking the tribes in alliance with the Carthaginians. The latter plan
seemed the best, and they made preparations for attacking a city which from
its proximity to the river was called Hibera, the wealthiest city in that
country. As soon as Hasdrubal became aware of this, instead of going to the
assistance of his allies he proceeded to attack a city which had recently put
itself under the protection of Rome. On this the Romans abandoned the siege
which they had begun and turned their arms against Hasdrubal himself.
23.29
For
some days they remained encamped at a distance of about five miles from
each other, and though frequent skirmishes took place there was no general
action. At last on the same day, as though by previous agreement, the signal
was given on both sides and they descended with their entire forces on to the
plain. The Roman line was in three divisions. Some of the light infantry were
posted between the leading ranks of the legions, the rest amongst those
behind; the cavalry closed the wings. Hasdrubal strengthened his centre with
his Spaniards, on the right wing he posted the Carthaginians, on the left the
Africans and the mercenaries, the Numidian horse he stationed in front of the
Carthaginian infantry, and the rest of the cavalry in front of the Africans. Not
all the Numidian horse, however, were on the right wing, but only those who
were trained to manage two horses at the same time like circus-riders and,
when the battle was at the hottest, were in the habit of jumping off the
wearied horse on to the fresh one, such were the agility of the riders and the
docility of the horses.
These were the dispositions on each side, and whilst the two armies
were standing ready to engage, their commanders felt almost equally
confident of victory, for neither side was much superior to the other either in
the numbers or the quality of the troops. With the men themselves it was far
otherwise. Though the Romans were fighting far away from their homes
their generals had no difficulty in making them realise that they were fighting
for Italy and for Rome. They knew that it hung upon the issue of that fight
whether they were to see their homes again or not, and they resolutely
determined either to conquer or to die. The other army possessed nothing
like the same determination, for they were most of them natives of Spain and
would rather be defeated in Spain than win the victory and be dragged to
Italy. At the first onset, almost before they had hurled their javelins, the
centre gave ground, and when the Romans came on in a tremendous charge
they turned and fled. The brunt of the fighting now fell upon the wings; the
Carthaginians pressed forward on the right, the Africans on the left, and
slowly wheeling round attacked the advancing Roman infantry on both
flanks. But the whole force had now concentrated on the centre, and forming
front in both directions beat back the attack on their flanks. So two separate
actions were going on. The Romans, having already repulsed Hasdrubal's
centre, and having the advantage as regarded both the numbers and the
strength of their men, proved themselves undoubtedly superior on both
fronts. A very large number of the enemy fell in these two attacks, and had
not their centre taken to hasty flight almost before the battle began, very few
would have survived out of their whole army. The cavalry took no part
whatever in the fighting, for no sooner did the Moors and Numidians see the
centre of the line giving way than they fled precipitately, leaving the wings
exposed, and even driving the elephants before them. Hasdrubal waited to
see the final issue of the battle and then escaped out of the slaughter with a
few followers. The camp was seized and plundered by the Romans. This
battle secured for Rome all the tribes who were wavering and deprived
Hasdrubal of all hopes of taking his army to Italy or even of remaining with
anything like safety in Spain. When the contents of the despatch from the
Scipios was made known in Rome, the gratification felt was not so much on
account of the victory as that Hasdrubal's march into Italy was at an end.
23.30
During
these incidents in Spain, Petelia in Bruttium was taken by Himilco, one of
Hannibal's lieutenants, after a siege which lasted several months. That
victory cost the Carthaginians heavy losses in both killed and wounded, for
the defenders only yielded after they had been starved out. They had
consumed all their corn and eaten every kind of animal whether ordinarily
used as food or not, and at last kept themselves alive by eating leather and
grass and roots and the soft bark of trees and leaves picked from shrubs. It
was not until they had no longer strength to stand on the walls or to bear the
weight of their armour that they were subdued. After the capture of Petelia
the Carthaginian marched his army to Consentia. The defence here was less
obstinate and the place surrendered in a few days. About the same time an
army of Bruttians invested the Greek city of Croton. At one time this city
had been a military power, but it had been overtaken by so many and such
serious reverses that its whole population was now reduced to less than
2000 souls. The enemy found no difficulty in gaining possession of a city so
denuded of defenders; the citadel alone was held, after some had sought
refuge there from the massacre and confusion which followed the capture of
the city. Locri also went over to the Bruttians and Carthaginians after the
aristocracy of the city had betrayed the populace. The people of Rhegium
alone in all that country remained loyal to the Romans and kept their
independence to the end.
The same change of feeling extended to Sicily and even the house
of Hiero did not altogether shrink from deserting Rome. Gelo, the eldest son
of the family, treating with equal contempt his aged father and the alliance
with Rome, after the defeat of Cannae, went over to the Carthaginians. He
was arming the natives and making friendly overtures to the cities in alliance
with Rome and would have brought about a revolution in Sicily had he not
been removed by the hand of death, a death so opportune that it cast
suspicion even on his father. Such were the serious occurrences in Italy,
Africa, Sicily, and Spain during the year (216 B.C.). Towards the close of
the year Q. Fabius Maximus asked the senate to allow him to dedicate the
temple of Venus Erycina which he had vowed when Dictator. The senate
passed a decree that Tiberius Sempronius the consul-elect should
immediately upon his entering office propose a resolution to the people that
Q. Fabius be one of the two commissioners appointed to dedicate the
temple. After the death of M. Aemilius Lepidus, who had been augur and
twice consul, his three sons, Lucius, Marcus, and Quintus, celebrated funeral
games in his honour for three days and exhibited twenty-two pairs of
gladiators in the Forum. The curule aediles, C. Laetorius and Ti. Sempronius
Gracchus, consul elect, who during his aedileship had been Master of the
Horse, celebrated the Roman Games; the celebration lasted three days. The
Plebeian Games given by the aediles Marcus Aurelius Cotta and Marcus
Claudius Marcellus were solemnised three times. The third year of the Punic
war had run its course when Ti. Sempronius entered on his consulship on
March 15. The praetors were Q. Fulvius Flaccus, who had been previously
censor and twice consul, and M. Valerius Laevinus; the former exercised
jurisdiction over citizens, the latter over foreigners. App. Claudius Pulcher
had the province of Sicily allotted to him, Q. Mucius Scaevola that of
Sardinia. The people made an order investing M. Marcellus with the powers
of a proconsul, because he was the only one out of the Roman commanders
who had gained any successes in Italy since the disaster at Cannae.
23.31
The
first day the senate met for business at the Capitol they passed a decree that
the war-tax for that year should be doubled, and that half the whole amount
should be collected at once to furnish pay for all the soldiers, except those
who had been present at Cannae. As regarded the armies they decreed that
Ti. Sempronius should fix a day on which the two City legions were to
muster at Cales, and that they should march from there to Claudius' camp
above Suessula. The legions there, mostly made up from the army which
fought at Cannae, were to be transferred by App. Claudius Pulcher to Sicily
and the legions in Sicily were to be brought to Rome. M. Claudius Marcellus
was sent to take command of the army which had been ordered to assemble
at Cales and he received orders to conduct it to Claudius' camp. Ti.
Maecilius Croto was sent by App. Claudius to take over the old army and
conduct it to Sicily. At first people waited in silent expectation for the consul
to hold an Assembly for the election of a colleague, but when they saw that
M. Marcellus, whom they particularly wished to have as consul this year
after his brilliant success as praetor, was kept out of the way, murmurs
began to be heard in the Senate-house. When the consul became aware of
this he said, "It is to the interest of the State, senators, that M. Claudius has
gone into Campania to effect the exchange of armies, and it is equally to the
interest of the State that notice of election should not be given until he has
discharged the commission entrusted to him and returned home, so that you
may have for your consul the man whom the circumstances of the republic
call for and whom you most of all wish for." After this nothing more was
said about the election till Marcellus returned.
Meanwhile the two commissioners were appointed for the
dedication of temples: T. Otacilius Crassus dedicated the temple to Mens, Q.
Fabius Maximus the one to Venus Erycina. Both are on the Capitol,
separated only by a water channel. In the case of the three hundred
Campanian knights, who after loyally serving their time in Sicily had now
come to Rome, a proposal was made to the people that they should receive
the full rights of Roman citizenship and should be entered on the roll of the
burghers of Cumae, reckoning from the day previous to the revolt of the
Campanians from Rome. The main reason for this proposal was their
declaration that they did not know to what people they belonged, as they had
abandoned their old country and had not yet been admitted as citizens into
that to which they had returned. On Marcellus' return from the army notice
was given of the election of a consul in the place of L. Postumius. Marcellus
was elected by a quite unanimous vote in order that he might take up his
magistracy at once. Whilst he was assuming the duties of the consulship
thunder was heard; the augurs were summoned and gave it as their opinion
that there was some informality in his election. The patricians spread a report
that as that was the first time that two plebeian consuls were elected
together, the gods were showing their displeasure. Marcellus resigned his
office and Q. Fabius Maximus was appointed in his place; this was his third
consulship. This year the sea appeared to be on fire; at Sinuessa a cow
brought forth a colt; the statues in the temple of Juno Sospita at Lanuvium
sweated blood and a shower of stones fell round the temple. For this portent
there were the usual nine days' religious observances; the other portents
were duly expiated.
23.32
The
consuls divided the armies between them; the army at Teanum which M.
Junius the Dictator had been commanding passed to Fabius, Sempronius
took command of the volunteer slaves there and 25,000 troops furnished by
the allies; the legions which had returned from Sicily were assigned to M.
Valerius the praetor; M. Claudius was sent to the army which was in camp
above Suessa to protect Nola; the praetors went to their respective
provinces in Sicily and Sardinia. The consuls issued a notice that whenever
the senate was summoned the senators and all who had the right of speaking
in the senate should meet at the Capena gate. The praetors whose duty it
was to hear cases set up their tribunals near the public bathing place and
ordered all litigants to answer to their recognisances at that place, and there
they administered justice during the year. In the meanwhile the news was
brought to Carthage that things had gone badly in Spain and that almost all
the communities in that country had gone over to Rome. Mago, Hannibal's
brother, was preparing to transport to Italy a force of 12,000 infantry, 1500
cavalry, and 20 elephants, escorted by a fleet of 60 warships. On the receipt
of this news, however, some were in favour of Mago, with such a fleet and
army as he had, going to Spain instead of Italy, but whilst they were
deliberating there was a sudden gleam of hope that Sardinia might be
recovered. They were told that "there was only a small Roman army there,
the old praetor, A. Cornelius, who knew the province well, was leaving and
a fresh one was expected; the Sardinians, too, were tired of their long
subjection, and during the last twelve months the government had been harsh
and rapacious and had crushed them with a heavy tax and an unfair exaction
of corn. Nothing was wanting but a leader to head their revolt. "This report
was brought by some secret agents from their leaders, the prime mover in
the matter being Hampsicora, the most influential and wealthy man amongst
them at that time. Perturbed by the news from Spain, and at the same time
elated by the Sardinian report, they sent Mago with his fleet and army to
Spain and selected Hasdrubal to conduct the operations in Sardinia,
assigning to him a force about as large as the one they had furnished to
Mago.
After they had transacted all the necessary business in Rome the
consuls began to prepare for war. Ti. Sempronius gave his soldiers notice of
the date when they were to assemble at Sinuessa, and Q. Fabius, after
previously consulting the senate, issued a proclamation warning every one to
convey the corn from their fields into the fortified cities by the first day of
the following June, all those who failed to do so would have their land laid
waste, their farms burnt, and they themselves would be sold into slavery.
Even the praetors who had been appointed to administer the law were not
exempted from military duties. It was decided that Valerius should be sent to
Apulia to take over the army from Terentius: when the legions came from
Sicily he was to employ them mainly for the defence of that district and send
the army of Terentius under one of his lieutenants to Tarentum. A fleet of
twenty-five vessels was also supplied him for the protection of the coast
between Brundisium and Tarentum. A fleet of equal strength was assigned to
Q. Fulvius, the praetor in charge of the City, for the defence of the coast
near Rome. C. Terentius, as proconsul, was commissioned to raise a force in
the territory of Picenum to defend that part of the country. Lastly, T.
Otacilius Crassus was despatched to Sicily, after he had dedicated the temple
of Mens, with full powers as propraetor to take command of the fleet.
23.33
This
struggle between the most powerful nations in the world was attracting the
attention of all men, kings and peoples alike, and especially of Philip, the
King of Macedon, as he was comparatively near to Italy, separated from it
only by the Ionian Sea. When he first heard the rumour of Hannibal's passage
of the Alps, delighted as he was at the outbreak of war between Rome and
Carthage, he was still undecided, till their relative strength had been tested,
which of the two he would prefer to have the victory. But after the third
battle had been fought and the victory rested with the Carthaginians for the
third time, he inclined to the side which Fortune favoured and sent
ambassadors to Hannibal. Avoiding the ports of Brundisium and Tarentum
which were guarded by Roman ships, they landed near the temple of Juno
Lacinia. Whilst traversing Apulia on their way to Capua they fell into the
midst of the Roman troops who were defending the district, and were
conducted to Valerius Laevinus, the praetor, who was encamped near
Luceria. Xenophanes, the head of the legation, explained, without the
slightest fear or hesitation, that he had been sent by the king to form a league
of friendship with Rome, and that he was conveying his instructions to the
consuls and senate and people. Amidst the defection of so many old allies,
the praetor was delighted beyond measure at the prospect of a new alliance
with so illustrious a monarch, and gave his enemies a most hospitable
reception. He assigned them an escort, and pointed out carefully what route
they should take, what places and passes were held by the Romans and what
by the enemy. Xenophanes passed through the Roman troops into Campania
and thence by the nearest route reached Hannibal's camp. He made a treaty
of friendship with him on these terms: King Philip was to sail to Italy with as
large a fleet as possible -he was, it appears, intending to fit out two hundred
ships -and ravage the coast, and carry on war by land and sea to the utmost
of his power; when the war was over the whole of Italy, including Rome
itself, was to be the possession of the Carthaginians and Hannibal, and all the
plunder was to go to Hannibal; when the Carthaginians had thoroughly
subdued Italy they were to sail to Greece and make war upon such nations as
the king wished; the cities on the mainland and the islands lying off
Macedonia were to form part of Philip's kingdom.
23.34
These
were, in effect, the terms on which the treaty was concluded between the
Carthaginian general and the King of Macedon. On their return the envoys
were accompanied by commissioners sent by Hannibal to obtain the king's
ratification of the treaty: they were Gisgo, Bostar, and Mago. They reached
the spot near the temple of Juno Lacinia, where they had left their ship
moored in a hidden creek, and set sail for Greece. When they were out to sea
they were descried by the Roman fleet which was guarding the Calabrian
coast. Valerius Flaccus sent some light boats to chase and bring back the
strange vessel. At first the king's men attempted flight, but finding that they
were being overhauled they surrendered to the Romans. When they were
brought before the admiral of the fleet he questioned them as to who they
were, where they had come from, and whither they were sailing.
Xenophanes, who had so far been very lucky, began to make up a tale; he
said that he had been sent by Philip to Rome and had succeeded in reaching
M. Valerius, as he was the only person he could get to safely; he had not
been able to go through Campania as it was beset by the enemy's troops.
Then the Carthaginian dress and manner of Hannibal's agents aroused
suspicion, and on being questioned their speech betrayed them. Their
comrades were at once taken aside and terrified by threats, a letter from
Hannibal to Philip was discovered, and also the articles of agreement
between the King of Macedon and the Carthaginian general. When the
investigation was completed, it seemed best to carry the prisoners and their
companions as soon as possible to the senate at Rome or to the consuls,
wherever they were. Five of the swiftest ships were selected for the purpose
and L. Valerius Antias was placed in charge of the expedition with
instructions to distribute the envoys amongst the ships under guard and to be
careful that no conversation was allowed amongst them or any
communication of plans.
During this time A. Cornelius Mammula on leaving his province
made a report on the condition of Sardinia. All, he said, were contemplating
war and revolt; Q. Mucius, who had succeeded him, had been affected by the
unhealthy climate and impure water and had fallen into an illness which was
tedious rather than dangerous, and would make him for some considerable
time unfit to bear the responsibilities of war. The army, too, which was
quartered there, though strong enough for the occupation of a peaceable
province, was quite inadequate for the war which seemed likely to break out.
The senate made a decree that Q. Fulvius Flaccus should raise a force of
5000 infantry and 400 cavalry and arrange for its immediate transport to
Sardinia, and further that he should send whom he considered the most
suitable man, invested with full powers, to conduct operations until Mucius
recovered his health. He selected T. Manlius Torquatus, who had been twice
consul as well as censor, and during his consulship had subdued the
Sardinians. About the same time a Carthaginian fleet which had been
despatched to Sardinia under the command of Hasdrubul, surnamed "the
Bald," was caught in a storm and driven on the Balearic Isles. So much
damage was caused, not only to the rigging but also to the hulls, that the
vessels were hauled ashore and a considerable time was spent in repairing
them.
23.35
In
Italy the war had been less vigorously conducted since the battle of Cannae;
for the strength of the one side was broken and the temper of the other
enervated. Under these circumstances the Campanians made an attempt by
themselves to become masters of Cumae. They first tried persuasion, but as
they could not succeed in inducing them to revolt from Rome, they decided
to employ stratagem. All the Campanians held a sacrificial service at stated
intervals at Hamae. They informed the Cumans that the Campanian senate
was going there, and they asked the Cuman senate also to be present in
order to come to a common understanding, so that both peoples might have
the same allies and the same enemies. They also promised that they would
have an armed force there, to guard against any danger from either Romans
or Carthaginians. Although the Cumans suspected a plot, they made no
difficulty about going, for they thought that by thus consenting they would
be able to conceal a maneuver of their own. The consul Tiberius Sempronius
had in the meanwhile purified his army at Sinuessa, the appointed
rendezvous, and after crossing the Vulturnus pitched his camp near
Liternum. As there was nothing for them to do in camp, he put his men
through frequent war maneuvers to accustom the recruits, most of whom
were volunteer slaves, to follow the standards and know their places in the
ranks when in action. In carrying out these exercises, the general's main
object -and he had given similar instructions to the officers -was that there
should be no class-feeling in the ranks, through the slaves being twitted with
their former condition; the old soldiers were to regard themselves as on a
perfect equality with the recruits, the free men with the slaves; all to whom
Rome had entrusted her standards and her arms were to be regarded as
equally honourable, equally well-born; Fortune had compelled them to adopt
this state of things, and now that it was adopted she compelled them to
acquiesce to it. The soldiers were quite as anxious to obey these instructions
as the officers were to enforce them, and in a short time the men had become
so fused together that it was almost forgotten what condition of life each
man had been in before he became a soldier.
While Gracchus was thus occupied messengers from Cumae
informed him of the proposals made by the Campanians a few days
previously and of their reply, and that the festival was to be held in three
days' time, when not only the whole senate would be there but also the
Campanian army in camp. Gracchus gave the Cumans orders to remove
everything from their fields into the city and to remain within their walls,
whilst he himself moved his camp to Cumae the day before the Campanians
were to perform their sacrifice. Hamae was about three miles distant. The
Campanians had already, as arranged, assembled there in large numbers and
not far away Marius Alfius, the "Medixtuticus" (the chief magistrate of the
Campanians), was secretly encamped with 14,000 troops, but he was more
intent on making preparations for the sacrifice and the stratagem he was to
execute during its performance than on fortifying his camp or any other
military duty. The ceremonial took place at night and was over by midnight.
Gracchus thought this the best time for his purpose, and after stationing
guards at the camp gate to prevent any one from conveying information of
his design, he ordered his men to refresh themselves and get what sleep they
could at four o'clock in the afternoon so that they might be ready to
assemble round the standards as soon as it was dark. About the first watch
he ordered the advance to be made and the army marched in silence to
Hamae, which they reached at midnight. The Campanian camp, as might be
expected during a nocturnal festival, was negligently guarded, and he made a
simultaneous attack on all sides of it. Some were slain whilst stretched in
slumber, others whilst returning unarmed after the ceremony. In the
confusion and terror of the night more than 2000 men were killed, including
their general, Marius Alfius, and 34 standards seized.
23.36
After
getting possession of the enemies' camp with a loss of less than 100 men,
Gracchus speedily retired, fearing an attack from Hannibal, who had his
camp at Tifata, overlooking Capua. Nor were his anticipations groundless.
No sooner had the news of the disaster reached Capua than Hannibal,
expecting to find at Hamae an army, composed mostly of raw recruits and
slaves, wildly delighted at their victory, despoiling their vanquished foes and
carrying off the plunder, hurried on with all speed past Capua, and ordered
all the Campanian fugitives he met to be escorted to Capua and the wounded
to be carried there in wagons. But when he got to Hamae he found the camp
abandoned, nothing was to be seen but the traces of the recent slaughter and
the bodies of his allies lying about everywhere. Some advised him to march
straight to Cumae and attack the place. Nothing would have suited his
wishes better for, after his failure to secure Neapolis, he was very anxious to
get possession of Cumae that he might have one maritime city at all events.
As, however, his soldiers in their hurried march had brought nothing with
them beyond their arms he returned to his camp on Tifata. The next day,
yielding to the importunities of the Campanians, he marched back to Cumae
with all the necessary appliances for attacking the city, and after effectually
devastating the neighbourhood, fixed his camp at the distance of one mile
from the place. Gracchus still remained in occupation of Cumae, more
because he was ashamed to desert the allies who were imploring his
protection and that of the Roman people than because he felt sufficiently
assured as to his army. The other consul, Fabius, who was encamped at
Cales, did not venture to cross the Vulturnus; his attention was occupied
first with taking fresh auspices and then with the portents which were being
announced one after another, and which the soothsayers assured him would
be very difficult to avert.
23.37
Whilst
these causes kept Fabius from moving, Sempronius was invested, and the
siege works were now actually in operation. A huge wooden tower on
wheels had been brought up against the walls and the Roman consul
constructed another still higher upon the wall itself, which was fairly high
and which served as a platform, after he had placed stout beams across. The
besieged garrison protected the walls of the city by hurling stones and
sharpened stakes and other missiles from their tower; at last when they saw
the other tower brought up to the walls they flung blazing brands over it and
caused a large fire. Terrified by the conflagration the crowd of soldiers in it
flung themselves down and at the same moment a sortie was made from two
of the gates, the outposts of the enemy were overpowered and driven in
flight to their camp, so that for that day the Carthaginians were more like a
besieged than a besieging force. As many as 1300 Carthaginians were killed
and 59 taken prisoners who had been surprised while standing careless and
unconcerned round the walls or at the outposts, and least of all fearing a
sortie. Before the enemy had time to recover from their panic Gracchus gave
the signal to retire and withdrew with his men inside the walls. The following
day, Hannibal, expecting that the consul, elated with his success, would be
prepared to fight a regular battle, formed his line on the ground between his
camp and the city; when, however, he saw that not a single man moved from
his usual post of defence and that no risks were being taken through rash
confidence, he returned to Tifata without accomplishing anything. Just at the
time when the siege of Cumae was raised Ti. Sempronius, surnamed
"Longus," fought a successful action with the Carthaginian Hanno at
Grumentum in Lucania. Over 2000 were killed, 280 men and 41 military
standards were captured. Driven out of Lucania, Hanno retreated to
Bruttium. Amongst the Hirpini, also, three towns which had revolted from
Rome, Vercellium, Vescellium, and Sicilinum, were retaken by the praetor
M. Valerius, and the authors of the revolt beheaded. Over 5000 prisoners
were sold, the rest of the booty was presented to the soldiers, and the army
marched back to Luceria.
23.38
During
these incidents amongst the Lucanians and Hirpini, the five ships which were
carrying the Macedonian and Carthaginian agents to Rome, after sailing
almost round the whole of Italy in their passage from the upper to the lower
sea were off Cumae, when Gracchus, uncertain whether they belonged to
friends or foes, sent vessels from his own fleet to intercept them. After
mutual questionings those on board learnt that the consul was at Cumae. The
vessels accordingly were brought into the harbour and the prisoners were
brought before the consul and the letters placed in his hands. He read the
letters of Philip and Hannibal through and sent everything under seal by land
to the senate, the agents he ordered to be taken by sea. The letters and the
agents both reached Rome the same day, and when it was ascertained that
what the agents said in their examination agreed with the letters, the senate
were filled with very gloomy apprehensions. They recognised what a heavy
burden a war with Macedon would impose upon them at a time when it was
all they could do to bear the weight of the Punic war. They did not,
however, so far give way to despondency as not to enter at once upon a
discussion as to how they could divert the enemy from Italy by themselves
commencing hostilities against him. Orders were given for the agents to be
kept in chains and their companions to be sold as slaves; they also decided to
equip twenty vessels in addition to the twenty-five which P. Valerius Flaccus
already had under his command. After these had been fitted out and
launched, the five ships which had carried the agents were added and thirty
vessels left Ostia for Tarentum. Publius Valerius was instructed to place on
board the soldiers which had belonged to Varro's army and which were now
at Tarentum under the command of L. Apustius, and with his combined fleet
of fifty-five vessels he was not only to protect the coast of Italy but try to
obtain information about the hostile attitude of Macedon. If Philip's designs
should prove to correspond to the captured despatches and the statements of
the agents, he was to write to Marcus Valerius, the praetor, to that effect
and then, after placing his army under the command of L. Apustius, go to the
fleet at Tarentum and sail across to Macedonia at the first opportunity and
do his utmost to confine Philip within his own dominions. A decree was
made that the money which had been sent to Appius Claudius in Sicily to be
returned to King Hiero should now be devoted to the maintenance of the
fleet and the expenses of the Macedonian war, and it was conveyed to
Tarentum through L. Antistius. Two hundred thousand modii of wheat and
barley were sent at the same time by King Hiero.
23.39
While
these various steps were being taken, one of the captured ships which were
on their way to Rome escaped during the voyage to Philip, and he then
learnt that his agents had been captured together with his despatches. As he
did not know what understanding they had come to with Hannibal, or what
proposals Hannibal's agents were bringing to him, he despatched a second
embassy with the same instructions. Their names were Heraclitus, surnamed
Scotinus, Crito of Boeotia, and Sositheus the Magnesian. They
accomplished their mission successfully, but the summer passed away before
the king could attempt any active measures. So important was the seizure of
that one ship with the king's agents on board in delaying the outbreak of the
war which now threatened Rome! Fabius at last succeeded in expiating the
portents and crossed the Vulturnus; both consuls now resumed the campaign
round Capua. Combulteria, Trebula, and Austicula, all of which had revolted
to Hannibal, were successfully attacked by Fabius, and the garrisons which
Hannibal had placed in them as well as a large number of Campanians were
made prisoners. At Nola, the senate were on the side of the Romans, as they
had been the year before, and the populace, who were on the side of
Hannibal, were hatching secret plots for the murder of the aristocrats and the
betrayal of the city. To prevent them from carrying out their intentions
Fabius marched between Capua and Hannibal's camp on Tifata and
established himself in Claudius' camp overlooking Suessula. From there he
sent M. Marcellus, who was propraetor, with the force under his command
to occupy Nola.
23.40
The
active operations in Sardinia which had been dropped owing to the serious
illness of Q. Mucius were resumed under the direction of T. Manlius. He
hauled ashore his war-ships and furnished the seamen and rowers with arms,
so that they might be available for service on land; with these and the army
he had taken over from the praetor he made up a force of 22,000 infantry
and 1200 cavalry. With this combined force he invaded the hostile territory
and fixed his camp at no great distance from Hampsicora's lines. Hampsicora
himself happened to be absent; he had paid a visit to the Pelliti-Sardinians in
order to arm the younger men amongst them so as to increase his own
strength. His son Hostus was in command and in the impetuosity of youth he
rashly offered battle, with the result that he was defeated and put to flight.
3000 Sardinians were killed in that battle and 800 taken alive; the rest of the
army after wandering in their flight through fields and woods heard that their
general had fled to a place called Cornus, the chief town of the district, and
thither they directed their flight. That battle would have finished the war had
not the Carthaginian fleet under Hasdrubal, which had been driven by a
storm down to the Balearic Isles, arrived in time to revive their hopes of
renewing the war. When Manlius heard of its arrival he retired upon Carales,
and this gave Hampsicora an opportunity of forming a junction with the
Carthaginian. Hasdrubal disembarked his force and sent the ships back to
Carthage, and then, under Hampsicora's guidance, proceeded to harry and
waste the land belonging to the allies of Rome. He would have gone as far as
Carales if Manlius had not met him with his army and checked his
widespread ravages. At first the two camps faced each other, with only a
small space between; then small sorties and skirmishes took place with
varying results; at last it came to a battle, a regular action, which lasted for
four hours. For a long time the Carthaginians made the issue doubtful, the
Sardinians, who were accustomed to defeat, being easily beaten, but at last
when they saw the whole field covered with dead and flying Sardinians they
too gave way, but when they turned to flee the Roman wing which had
routed the Sardinians wheeled round and hemmed them in. Then it was more
of a massacre than a battle. 12,000 of the enemy, Sardinians and
Carthaginians, were slain, about 3700 were made prisoners, and 27 military
standards were captured.
23.41
What
more than anything else made the battle glorious and memorable was the
capture of the commander-in-chief, Hasdrubal, and also of Hanno and Mago,
two Carthaginian nobles. Mago was a member of the house of Barca, a near
relative of Hannibal; Hanno had taken the lead in the Sardinian revolt and
was unquestionably the chief instigator of the war. The battle was no less
famous for the fate which overtook the Sardinian generals; Hampsicora's
son, Hostus, fell on the field, and when Hampsicora, who was fleeing from
the carnage with a few horsemen, heard of his son's death, he was so crushed
by the tidings, coming as it did on the top of all the other disasters, that in
the dead of night, when none could hinder his purpose, he slew himself with
his own hand. The rest of the fugitives found shelter as they had done before
in Cornus, but Manlius leading his victorious troops against it effected its
capture in a few days. On this the other cities which had espoused the cause
of Hampsicora and the Carthaginians gave hostages and surrendered to him.
He imposed upon each of them a tribute of money and corn; the amount was
proportioned to their resources and also to the share they had taken in the
revolt. After this he returned to Carales. There the ships which had been
hauled ashore were launched, the troops he had brought with him were
re-embarked, and he sailed for Rome. On his arrival he reported to the
senate the complete subjugation of Sardinia, and made over the money to the
quaestors, the corn to the aediles, and the prisoners to Q. Fulvius, the
praetor.
During this time T. Otacilius had crossed with his fleet from
Lilybaeum to the coast of Africa and was ravaging the territory of Carthage,
when rumours came to him that Hasdrubal had recently sailed from the
Balearic Isles to Sardinia. He set sail for that island and fell in with the
Carthaginian fleet returning to Africa. A brief action followed on the high
seas in which Otacilius took seven ships with their crews. The rest dispersed
in a panic far and wide, as though they had been scattered by a storm. It so
happened at this time that Bomilcar arrived at Locri with reinforcements of
men and elephants and also with supplies. Appius Claudius intended to
surprise him, and with this view he led his army hurriedly to Messana as
though he were going to make a circuit of the province, and finding the wind
and tide favourable, crossed over to Locri. Bomilcar had already left to join
Hanno in Bruttium and the Locrians shut their gates against the Romans;
Appius after all his efforts achieved no results and returned to Messana. This
same summer Marcellus made frequent excursions from Nola, which he was
holding with a garrison, into the territory of the Hirpini and in the
neighbourhood of Samnite Caudium. Such utter devastation did he spread
everywhere with fire and sword that he revived throughout Samnium the
memory of her ancient disasters.
23.42
Both
nations sent envoys simultaneously to Hannibal, who addressed him thus:
"We have been the enemies of Rome, Hannibal, from very early times. At
first we fought her in our own might as long as our arms, our strength,
sufficed to protect us. When we could trust them no more we took our place
by the side of King Pyrrhus; when we were abandoned by him we were
compelled to accept terms of peace and by those terms we stood for almost
fifty years, down to the time of your arrival in Italy. It was your conspicuous
courtesy and kindness towards our fellow-countrymen who were your
prisoners and whom you sent back to us, quite as much as your courage and
success, which have so won our hearts that as long as you, our friend, are
safe and prosperous we should not fear -I do not say the Romans, but -even
the wrath of heaven, if I may say so without irreverence. But, good heavens!
while you are not only safe and victorious but actually here amongst us,
when you could almost hear the shrieks of our wives and children and see
our blazing houses, we have suffered such repeated devastations this summer
that it would seem as if M. Marcellus and not Hannibal had been the victor
at Cannae, and as if the Romans had good cause to boast that you have only
strength enough for one blow, and that like a bee that has left its sting you
are now inert and powerless. For a hundred years we have been at war with
Rome and no general, no army from without, has come to our aid save for
the two years when Pyrrhus used our soldiers to increase his strength rather
than use his strength to defend us. I will not boast of our successes -the two
consuls with their armies whom we sent under the yoke, and all the other
fortunate or glorious events which we can recall. The trials and sufferings we
then went through can be recounted with less bitter feelings than those which
are happening today. Then great Dictators with their Masters of the Horse
would invade our borders, two consuls and two consular armies found it
necessary to act together against us, and they took every precaution, careful
scouting, reserves duly posted, their army in order of battle, when they
ravaged our country; now we are the prey of a solitary propraetor and a
small garrison at Nola! They do not even march in military detachments, but
they scour the whole of our country like brigands and more carelessly than if
they were roaming about on Roman ground. The reason is simply this: you
do not defend us, and our soldiery who could protect us if they were at
home are all serving under your standards. I should be utterly ignorant of
you and your army if I did not think it an easy task for the man, by whom to
my knowledge so many Roman armies have been routed and laid low, to
crush these plunderers of our country while they are roving about in disorder
and wandering wherever any one is led by hopes of plunder, however futile
such hopes may be. They will be the prey of a few Numidians, and you will
relieve both us and Nola of its garrison if only you count the men whom you
thought worthy of your alliance still worthy of your protection."
23.43
To all
this Hannibal replied: "You Samnites and Hirpini are doing everything at
once; you point out your sufferings and ask for protection and complain of
being unprotected and neglected. But you ought to have first made your
representations, then asked for protection, and if you did not obtain it then
only should you have complained that you had sought help in vain. I shall
not lead my army into the country of the Hirpini and Samnites because I do
not want to be a burden to you, but I shall march into those districts
belonging to the allies of Rome which are nearest to me. By plundering these
I shall satisfy and enrich my soldiers and shall frighten the enemy sufficiently
to make him leave you alone. As to the war with Rome, if Trasumennus was
a more famous battle than the Trebia, if Cannae was more famous than
Trasumennus, I shall make even the memory of Cannae fade in the light of a
greater and more brilliant victory." With this reply and with munificent
presents he dismissed the envoys, and then leaving a somewhat small
detachment on Tifata marched with the rest of his army to Nola, whither
Hanno also came with the reinforcements he had brought from Carthage and
the elephants. Encamping at no great distance, he found out, on inquiry, that
everything was very different from the impression he had received from the
envoys. No one who watched Marcellus' proceedings could ever say that he
trusted to Fortune or gave the enemy a chance through his rashness.
Hitherto his plundering expeditions had been made after careful
reconnoitring, with strong supports for the marauding parties and a secure
retreat. Now when he became aware of the enemy's approach, he kept his
force within the fortifications and ordered the senators of Nola to patrol the
ramparts and keep a sharp lookout all round and find out what the enemy
were doing.
Hanno had come close up to the walls, and, seeing amongst the
senators Herennius Bassus and Herius Pettius, asked for an interview with
them. Having obtained permission from Marcellus they went out to him. He
addressed them through an interpreter. After magnifying the merits and good
fortune of Hannibal and dwelling upon the decaying strength and greatness
of Rome, he went on to urge that even if Rome were what she once had
been, still men who knew by experience how burdensome the Roman
government was to their allies and with what indulgence Hannibal had
treated all those of his prisoners who belonged to any Italian nation must
surely prefer the alliance and friendship of Carthage to those of Rome. If
both the consuls and their two armies had been at Nola, they would still be
no more a match for Hannibal than they were at Cannae, how then could one
praetor with a few raw soldiers defend the place? It was of more importance
to them whether the town were taken or surrendered than it was to
Hannibal; he would get possession of it in any case as he had got possession
of Capua and Nuceria. But what a difference there was between the fate of
Capua and that of Nola, they knew best, situated as they were midway
between the two places. He did not want to prophesy what would happen to
the city if it were captured; he preferred to pledge his word that if they
would give up Marcellus and his garrison and the city of Nola no one but
themselves should dictate the terms on which they would become allies and
friends of Hannibal.
23.44
Herennius Bassus briefly replied that the
friendship between Rome and Nola had now lasted many years, and up to
that day neither party had had any reason to regret it. If they had wished to
change their allegiance when the change came in their fortunes, it was too
late to do so now. If they had thought of surrendering to Hannibal would
they have asked for a Roman garrison? They were in perfect accord with
those who had come to protect them, and they would continue to be so to
the last. This interview destroyed any expectations Hannibal might have
formed of securing Nola by treachery. He therefore drew his lines completely
round the town so that a simultaneous attack might be made on all sides.
When Marcellus saw that he was close up to the ramparts, he drew up his
men inside one of the gates and then burst out in a fierce tumultuous charge.
A few were overthrown and killed in the first shock, but as men ran up into
the fighting line and the two sides became more equalised, the contest was
beginning to be a severe one, and few battles would have been more
memorable had not a very heavy storm of rain and wind separated the
combatants. They retired for that day after only a brief encounter but in a
state of great exasperation, the Romans to the city, the Carthaginians to their
camp. Of the latter not more than thirty fell in the first attack; the Romans
lost fifty. The rain fell without any intermission all through the night and
continued till the third hour of the following day, so, though both sides were
eager for battle, they remained that day within their lines. The following day
Hannibal sent part of his force on a plundering expedition in the Nolan
territory. No sooner was Marcellus aware of it than he formed his line of
battle, nor did Hannibal decline the challenge. There was about a mile
between his camp and the city, and within that space -it is all level ground
round Nola -the armies met. The battle shout raised on both sides brought
back the nearest amongst the cohorts who had been sent off to plunder; the
Nolans, too, on the other side, took their place in the Roman line. Marcellus
addressed a few words of encouragement and thanks to them, and told them
to take their station amongst the reserve and help to carry the wounded from
the field, they were to keep out of the fighting unless they received the signal
from him.
23.45
The
battle was obstinately contested; the generals encouraged the men, and the
men fought to the utmost of their strength. Marcellus urged his men to press
vigorously on those whom they had vanquished only three days ago, who
had been driven in flight from Cumae, and whom he had himself, with
another army, defeated the year before. "All his forces," he said, "are not in
the field, some are roving through the land bent on plunder, whilst those who
are fighting are enervated by the luxury of Capua and have worn themselves
out through a whole winter's indulgence in wine and women and every kind
of debauchery. They have lost their force and vigour, they have dissipated
that strength of mind and body in which they surmounted the Alpine peaks.
The men who did that are mere wrecks now; they can hardly bear the weight
of their armour on their limbs while they fight. Capua has proved to be
Hannibal's Cannae. All soldierly courage; all military discipline, all glory won
in the past, all hopes for the future have been extinguished there." By
showing his contempt for the enemy, Marcellus raised the spirits of his men.
Hannibal, on the other hand, reproached his own men in much more severe
terms. "I recognise," he said, "the same arms and standards here which I saw
and used at the Trebia, at Trasumennus, and finally at Cannae, but not the
same soldiers. It is quite certain that I led one army into winter quarters at
Capua and marched out with quite a different one. Are you, whom two
consular armies never withstood, hardly able now to hold your own against a
subordinate officer, with his one legion and its contingent of allies? Is
Marcellus to challenge us with impunity a second time with his raw recruits
and Nolan supports? Where is that soldier of mine who dragged the consul,
C. Flaminius, from his horse and struck off his head? Where is the one who
slew L. Paulus at Cannae? Has the sword lost its edge; have your right hands
lost their power? Or has any other miracle happened? Though but few
yourselves, you have been wont to vanquish an enemy that far outnumbered
you; now you can hardly stand up against a force far smaller than your own.
You used to boast, tongue-valiant as you are, that you would take Rome by
storm if any one would lead you. Well, I want you to try your courage and
your strength in a smaller task. Carry Nola; it is a city in a plain, with no
protection from river or from sea. When ye have loaded yourselves with the
plunder of such a wealthy city as this, I will lead you or follow you wherever
you wish."
23.46
Neither his censures nor his promises had
any effect in strengthening the morale of his men. When they began to fall
back in all directions the spirits of the Romans rose, not only because of their
general's cheering words, but also because the Nolans raised encouraging
shouts and fired them with the glow of battle, until the Carthaginians fairly
turned to flee and were driven to their camp. The Romans were anxious to
storm the camp, but Marcellus marched them back to Nola amid the joyous
congratulations even of the populace who had before been more inclined to
the Carthaginians. More than 5000 of the enemy were killed that day and
600 made prisoners, 18 military standards were taken and two elephants;
four had been killed in the battle. The Romans had less than a thousand
killed. The next day was spent by both sides in burying those killed in battle,
under an informal truce. Marcellus burnt the spoils taken from the enemy in
fulfilment of a vow to Vulcan. Three days later, owing, I fancy, to some
disagreement or in hope of more liberal pay, 272 troopers, Numidians and
Spaniards, deserted to Marcellus. The Romans often availed themselves of
their brave and loyal help in the war. At its close a gift of land was made in
Spain to the Spaniards and in Africa to the Numidians as a reward for their
valour.
Hanno was sent back into Bruttium with the force he had brought,
and Hannibal went into winter quarters in Apulia and encamped in the
neighbourhood of Arpi. As soon as Q. Fabius heard that Hannibal had left
for Apulia, he had a quantity of corn from Nola and Neapolis conveyed into
the camp above Suessula, and after strengthening its defences and leaving a
force sufficient to hold the position through the winter months, he moved his
own camp nearer to Capua and laid waste its territory with fire and sword.
The Campanians had no confidence whatever in their strength, but they were
at last compelled to come out of their gates into the open and form an
entrenched camp in front of the city. They had 6000 men under arms, the
infantry were absolutely useless, but the mounted men were more efficient,
so they kept harassing the enemy by cavalry skirmishes. There were several
Campanian nobles serving as troopers, amongst them Cerrinus Vibellius,
surnamed Taurea. He was a citizen of Capua and by far the finest soldier in
the Campanian horse, so much so indeed that when he was serving with the
Romans there was only one Roman horseman that enjoyed an equal
reputation, and that was Claudius Asellus. Taurea had for a long time been
riding up to the enemy's squadrons to see if he could find this man, and at
last when there was a moment's silence he asked where Claudius Asellus
was. "He has often," he said, "argued with me about our respective merits,
let him settle the matter with the sword, and if he is vanquished yield me the
spolia opima, or if he is the victor take them from me."
23.47
When
this was reported to Asellus in the camp, he only waited till he could ask the
consul whether he would be allowed, against the regulations, to fight his
challenger. Permission being granted he at once armed himself and, riding in
front of the outposts, called Taurea by name and told him to meet him
wherever he pleased. The Romans had already gone out in crowds to watch
the duel, and the Campanians had not only lined the rampart of their camp,
but had gathered in large numbers on the fortifications of the city. After a
great flourish of words and expressions of mutual defiance they levelled their
spears and spurred their horses. As there was plenty of space they kept
evading each other's thrusts and the fight went on without either being
wounded. Then the Campanian said to the Roman: "This will be a trial of
skill between the horses and not their riders unless we leave the open and go
down into this hollow lane. There will be no room for swerving aside there,
we shall fight at close quarters." Almost before the words were out of his
mouth, Claudius leaped his horse into the lane, and Taurea, bolder in words
than deeds, shouted, "Never be an ass in a ditch," and this expression
became a rustic proverb. After riding some distance along the lane and
finding no opponent, Claudius got into the open and returned to camp,
saying strong things about the cowardice of his adversary. He was welcomed
as victor with cheers and congratulations by his comrades. In the accounts of
this duel on horseback some annalists record an additional circumstance -how far there is any truth in it each must judge for himself, but it is at least
remarkable. They say that Claudius went in pursuit of Taurea who fled to the
city, and galloped in through one open gate and out through another unhurt,
the enemy standing dumbfounded at the extraordinary sight.
23.48
After
this incident the Roman camp was undisturbed; the consul even shifted his
camp further away that the Campanians might complete their sowing, and he
did not inflict any injury on their land until the corn was high enough in the
blade to yield fodder. Then he carried it off to Claudius' camp above
Suessula and built huts for his men to winter in there. M. Claudius, the
proconsul, received orders to keep a force at Nola sufficient to protect the
place and send the rest of his troops to Rome to prevent their being a burden
to the allies and an expense to the republic. And Ti. Gracchus, having
marched his legions from Cumae to Luceria in Apulia, sent the praetor, M.
Valerius, to Brundisium with the army he had had at Luceria, and gave him
orders to protect the coast of the Sallentine territory and to make such
provision as might be necessary with regard to Philip and the Macedonian
war. Towards the end of the summer in which the events we have been
describing occurred, despatches from P. and Cn. Scipio arrived, giving an
account of the great successes they had achieved, but also stating that money
to pay the troops was needed, as also clothing and corn for the army, whilst
the seamen were destitute of everything. As regarded the pay, if the treasury
were low they (the Scipios) would devise some means by which they could
obtain it from the Spaniards, but all the other things must in any case be sent
from Rome, otherwise they could neither keep their army nor the province.
When the despatches had been read there was no one present who did not
admit that the statements were true and the demands fair and just. But other
considerations were present to their minds -the enormous land and sea
forces they had to keep up; the large fleet that would have to be fitted out if
the war with Macedon went forward; the condition of Sicily and Sardinia,
which before the war had helped to fill the treasury and were now hardly
able to support the armies which were protecting those islands; and, above
all, the shrinkage in the revenue. For the war-tax from which the national
expenditure was met had diminished with the number of those who paid it
after the destruction of the armies at Trasumennus and at Cannae, and if the
few survivors had to pay at a very much higher rate, they too, would perish,
though not in battle. If, therefore, the State could not be upheld by credit it
could not stand by its own resources. After thus reviewing the position of
affairs the senate decided that Fulvius, one of the praetors, should appear
before the Assembly and point out to the people the pressing needs of the
State and ask those who had augmented their patrimonies by making
contracts with the government to extend the date of payment for the State,
out of which they had made their money, and contract to supply what was
needed for the army in Spain on condition that as soon as there was money
in the treasury they should be the first to be paid. After making this proposal,
the praetor fixed a date for making the contracts for the supply of clothing
and corn to the army in Spain, and for furnishing all that was required for the
seamen.
23.49
On the
appointed day three syndicates appeared, consisting each of nineteen
members, prepared to tender for the contracts. They insisted on two
conditions -one was that they should be exempt from military service whilst
they were employed on this public business, and the other that the cargoes
they shipped should be insured by the government against storm or capture.
Both demands were conceded, and the administration of the State was
carried on with private money. Such were the moral tone and lofty
patriotism which pervaded all ranks of society! As the contracts had been
entered into from a generous and noble spirit, so they were executed with
the utmost conscientiousness; the soldiers received as ample supplies as
though they had been furnished, as they once were, from a rich treasury.
When these supplies reached Spain, the town of Iliturgi, which had gone
over to the Romans, was being attacked by three Carthaginian armies under
Hasdrubal, Mago, and Hannibal, the son of Bomilcar. Between these three
camps the Scipios forced their way into the town after hard fighting and
heavy losses. They brought with them a quantity of corn, of which there was
a great scarcity, and encouraged the townsfolk to defend their walls with the
same courage that they saw the Roman army display when fighting on their
behalf. Then they advanced to attack the largest of the three camps, of which
Hasdrubal was in command. The other two commanders and their armies
saw that the decisive struggle would be fought there and they hastened to its
support. As soon as they had emerged from their camps the fighting began.
There were 60,000 of the enemy engaged that day and about 16,000
Romans. And yet the victory was such a crushing one that the Romans slew
more than their own number of the enemy, made prisoners of more than
3000, captured somewhat less than 1000 horses, 59 military standards, 7
elephants, 5 having been killed in the battle, and got possession of the three
camps -all in that one day. After the siege of Iliturgi was thus raised, the
Carthaginian armies marched to attack Intibili. They had repaired their losses
out of that province which, above all others, was eager for fighting, if only
plunder and money were to be got out of it, and which, too, abounded in
young men. A pitched battle was again fought with the same result for both
sides. Over 13,000 of the enemy were killed, more than 2000 made
prisoners, 42 standards and 9 elephants were also taken. And now nearly all
the tribes of Spain went over to Rome, and the successes gained in Spain
that summer were far greater than those in Italy.
End of Book 23