University of Virginia Library

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON AND JAMES MONROE.

You will herewith receive a Commission and letters of credence,
one of you as Minister Plenipotentiary, the other as
Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, to treat with
the Government of the French Republic, on the subject of
the Mississippi and the Territory eastward thereof, and without
the limits of the United States. The object in view is to
procure by just and satisfactory arrangements a cession to
the United States of New Orleans, and of West and East Florida,
or as much thereof as the actual proprietor can be prevailed
on to part with.

The French Republic is understood to have become the

proprietor by a cession from Spain in the year of New
Orleans, as part of Louisiana, if not of the Floridas also. If
the Floridas should not have been then included in the Cession,
it is not improbable that they will have been since
added to it.

It is foreseen that you may have considerable difficulty in
overcoming the repugnance and the prejudices of the French
Government against a transfer to the United States of so important
a part of the acquisition. The apparent solicitude
and exertions amidst many embarrassing circumstances, to
carry into effect the cession made to the French Republic,
the reserve so long used on this subject by the French Government
in its communications with the Minister of the United
States at Paris, and the declaration finally made by the
French Minister of Foreign relations, that it was meant to
take possession before any overtures from the United States
would be discussed, shew the importance which is attached to
the territories in question. On the other hand as the United
States have the strongest motives of interest and of a pacific
policy to seek by just means the establishment of the Mississippi,
down to its mouth as their boundary, so these are considerations
which urge on France a concurrence in so natural
and so convenient an arrangement.

Notwithstanding the circumstances which have been
thought to indicate in the French Government designs of unjust
encroachment, and even direct hostility on the United
States, it is scarcely possible, to reconcile a policy of that sort,
with any motives which can be presumed to sway either the
Government or the Nation. To say nothing of the assurances
given both by the French Minister at Paris, and by the
Spanish Minister at Madrid, that the cession by Spain to
France was understood to carry with it all the conditions
stipulated by the former to the United States, the manifest
tendency of hostile measures against the United States, to
connect their Councils, and their Colosal growth with the
great and formidable rival of France, can never escape her
discernment, nor be disregarded by her prudence, and might

alone be expected to produce very different views in her
Government.

On the supposition that the French Government does not
mean to force, or Court war with the United States; but on
the contrary that it sees the interest which France has in cultivating
their neutrality and amity, the dangers to so desirable
a relation between the two countries which lurk under a
neighbourhood modified as is that of Spain at present, must
have great weight in recommending the change which you
will have to propose. These dangers have been always sufficiently
evident; and have moreover been repeatedly
suggested by collisions between the stipulated rights or reasonable
expectations of the United States, and the Spanish jurisdiction
at New Orleans. But they have been brought more
strikingly into view by the late proceeding of the Intendant
at that place. The sensibility and unanimity in our nation
which have appeared on this occasion, must convince France
that friendship and peace with us must be precarious until
the Mississippi shall be made the boundary between the
United States and Louisiana; and consequently render the
present moment favorable to the object with which you [are]
charged.

The time chosen for the experiment is pointed out also by
other important considerations. The instability of the peace of
Europe, the attitude taken by Great Britain, the languishing
state of the French finances, and the absolute necessity of
either abandoning the West India Islands or of sending
thither large armaments at great expence, all contribute at
the present crisis to prepare in the French Government a disposition
to listen to an arrangement which will at once dry up
one source of foreign controversy, and furnish some aid in
struggling with internal embarrassments. It is to be added,
that the overtures committed to you coincide in great measure
with the ideas of the person thro' whom the letter of the
President of April 30-1802 was conveyed to Mr. Livingston,
and who is presumed to have gained some insight into the
present sentiments of the French Cabinet.

Among the considerations which have led the French Government
into the project of regaining from Spain the province
of Louisiana, and which you may find it necessary to meet in
your discussions, the following suggest themselves as highly
probable.

1st A jealousy of the Minister as leaning to a coalition
with Great Britain and consistent with neutrality and amity
towards France; and a belief that by holding the key to the
commerce of the Mississippi, she will be able to command
the interests and attachments of the Western portion of the
United States; and thereby either controul the Atlantic porttion
also, or if that cannot be done, to seduce the former with
a separate Government, and a close alliance with herself.

In each of these particulars the calculation is founded in
error.

It is not true that the Atlantic states lean towards any connection
with Great Britain inconsistent with their amicable
relations to France. Their dispositions and their interests
equally prescribe to them amity and impartiality to both
of those nations. If a departure from this simple and salutary
line of policy should take place, the causes of it will be
found in the unjust or unfriendly conduct experienced from
one or other of them. In general it may be remarked, that
there are as many points on which the interests and views of
the United States and of Great Britain may not be thought
to coincide as can be discovered in relation to France. If less
harmony and confidence should therefore prevail between
France and the United States than may be maintained between
Great Britain and the United States, the difference
will be not in the want of motives drawn from the mutual
advantage of the two nations; but in the want of favorable
dispositions in the Governments of one or the other of them.
That the blame in this respect will not justly fall on the Government
of the United States, is sufficiently demonstrated by
the Mission and the objects with which you are now charged.

The French Government is not less mistaken if it supposes
that the Western part of the United States can be withdrawn

from their present Union with the Atlantic part, into a separate
Government closely allied with France.

Our Western fellow citizens are bound to the Union not
only by the ties of kindred and affection which for a long time
will derive strength from the stream of emigration peopling
that region, but by two considerations which flow from clear
and essential interests.

One of these considerations is the passage thro' the Atlantic
ports of the foreign merchandize consumed by the Western
inhabitants, and the payments thence made to a Treasury in
which they would lose their participation by erecting a separate
Government. The bulky productions of the Western
Country may continue to pass down the Mississippi; but the
difficulties of the ascending navigation of that river, however
free it may be made, will cause the imports for consumption
to pass thro' the Atlantic States. This is the course thro'
which they are now received, nor will the impost to which
they will be subject change the course even if the passage up
the Mississippi should be duty free. It will not equal the
difference in the freight thro' the latter channel. It is true
that mechanical and other improvements in the navigation
of the Mississippi may lessen the labour and expence of ascending
the stream, but it is not the least probable, that savings
of this sort will keep pace with the improvements in
canals and roads, by which the present course of imports will
be favored. Let it be added that the loss of the contributions
thus made to a foreign Treasury would be accompanied with
the necessity of providing by less convenient revenues for the
expence of a separate Government, and of the defensive
precautions required by the change of situation.

The other of these considerations results from the insecurity
to which the trade from the Mississippi would be exposed,
by such a revolution in the Western part of the United
States. A connection of the Western people as a separate
state with France, implies a connection between the Atlantic
States and Great Britain. It is found from long experience
that France and Great Britain are nearly half their time at

War. The case would be the same with their allies. During
nearly one half the time therefore, the trade of the Western
Country from the Mississippi, would have no protection but
that of France, and would suffer all the interruptions which
nations having the command of the sea could inflict on it.

It will be the more impossible for France to draw the Western
Country under her influence, by conciliatory regulations
of the trade thro' the Mississippi, because regulations which
would be regarded by her as liberal and claiming returns of
gratitude, would be viewed on the other side as falling short
of justice. If this should not be at first the case, it soon
would be so. The Western people believe, as do their Atlantic
brethren, that they have a natural and indefeasible right to
trade freely thro' the Mississippi. They are conscious of their
power to enforce their right against any nation whatever.
With these ideas in their minds, it is evident that France will
not be able to excite either a sense of favor, or of fear, that
would establish an ascendency over them. On the contrary,
it is more than probable, that the different views of their respective
rights, would quickly lead to disappointments and
disgusts on both sides, and thence to collisions and controversies
fatal to the harmony of the two nations. To guard
against these consequences, is a primary motive with the
United States, in wishing the arrangement proposed. As
France has equal reasons to guard against them, she ought to
feel an equal motive to concur in the arrangement.

2d. The advancement of the commerce of France by an establishment
on the Mississippi, has doubtless great weight
with the Government in espousing this project.

The commerce thro' the Mississippi will consist 1st of that
of the United States, 2d of that of the adjacent territories to
be acquired by France.

The 1st is now and must for ages continue the principal
commerce. As far as the faculties of France will enable her to
share in it, the article to be proposed to her on the part of the
United States on that subject promises every advantage she
can desire. It is a fair calculation, that under the proposed

arrangement, her commercial opportunities would be extended
rather than diminished; inasmuch as our present
right of deposit gives her the same competitors as she would
then have, and the effect of the more rapid settlement of the
Western Country consequent on that arrangement would
proportionally augment the mass of commerce to be shared
by her.

The other portion of commerce, with the exception of the
Island of New Orleans and the contiguous ports of West Florida,
depends on the Territory Westward of the Mississippi.
With respect to this portion, it will be little affected by the
Cession desired by the United States. The footing proposed
for her commerce on the shore to be ceded, gives it every advantage
she could reasonably wish, during a period within
which she will be able to provide every requisite establishment
on the right shore; which according to the best information,
possesses the same facilities for such establishments as
are found on the Island of New Orleans itself. These circumstances
essentially distinguish the situation of the French
commerce in the Mississippi after a Cession of New Orleans to
the United States, from the situation of the commerce of the
United States, without such a Cession; their right of deposit
being so much more circumscribed and their territory on the
Mississippi not reaching low enough for a commercial establishment
on the shore, within their present limits.

There remains to be considered the commerce of the Ports
in the Floridas. With respect to this branch, the advantages
which will be secured to France by the proposed arrangement
ought to be satisfactory. She will here also derive a
greater share from the increase, which will be given by a
more rapid settlement of a fertile territory, to the exports
and imports thro' those ports, than she would obtain from
any restrictive use she could make of those ports as her own
property. But this is not all. The United States have a
just claim to the use of the rivers which pass from their territories
thro' the Floridas. They found their claim on like
principles with those which supported their claim to the use

of the Mississippi. If the length of these rivers be not in the
same proportion with that of the Mississippi, the difference
is balanced by the circumstance that both Banks in the
former case belong to the United States.

With a view to perfect harmony between the two nations a
cession of the Floridas is particularly to be desired, as obviating
serious controversies that might otherwise grow even out
of the regulations however liberal in the opinion of France,
which she may establish at the Mouth of those rivers. One
of the rivers, the Mobile, is said to be at present navigable for
400 miles above the 31° of latitude, and the navigation may
no doubt be opened still further. On all of them, the Country
within the Boundary of the United States, tho' otherwise
between that and the sea, is fertile. Settlements on it are
beginning; and the people have already called on the Government
to procure the proper outlets to foreign Markets.
The President accordingly, gave some time ago, the proper
instructions to the Minister of the United States at Madrid.
In fact, our free communication with the sea thro' these channels
is so natural, so reasonable, and so essential that eventually
it must take place, and in prudence therefore ought to
be amicably and effectually adjusted without delay.

A further object with France may be, to form a Colonial
establishment having a convenient relation to her West India
Islands, and forming an independent source of supplies for
them.

This object ought to weigh but little against the Cession we
wish to obtain for two reasons, 1st. Because the Country
which the Cession will leave in her hands on the right side of
the Mississippi is capable of employing more than all the faculties
she can spare for such an object and of yielding all the
supplies which she could expect, or wish from such an establishment:
2d Because in times of general peace, she will be
sure of receiving whatever supplies her Islands may want
from the United States, and even thro' the Mississippi if more
convenient to her; because in time of peace with the United
States, tho' of War with Great Britain, the same sources will

be open to her, whilst her own would be interrupted; and because
in case of war with the United States, which is not
likely to happen without a concurrent war with Great Britain
(the only case in which she could need a distinct fund of supplies)
the entire command of the sea, and of the trade thro'
the Mississippi, would be against her, and would cut off the
source in question. She would consequently never need the
aid of her new Colony, but when she could make little or no
use of it.

There may be other objects with France in the projected
acquisition; but they are probably such as would be either
satisfied by a reservation to herself of the Country on the
right side of the Mississippi, or are of too subordinate a character
to prevail against the plan of adjustment we have in
view; in case other difficulties in the way of it can be overcome.
The principles and outlines of this plan are as follows
viz.

Ist

France cedes to the United States forever, the Territory
East of the River Mississippi, comprehending the two Floridas,
the Island of New Orleans and the Island lying to the
North and East of that channel of the said River, which is
commonly called the Mississippi, together with all such other
Islands as appertain to either West or East Florida; France
reserving to herself all her territory on the West side of the
Mississippi.

II.

The boundary between the Territories ceded and reserved
by France shall be a continuation of that already defined
above the 31st degree of North Latitude viz, the middle of the
channel or bed of the river, thro' the said South pass to the
sea. The navigation of the river Mississippi in its whole
breadth from its source to the ocean, and in all its passages to
and from the same shall be equally free and common to citizens
of the United States and of the French Republic.

III

The vessels and citizens of the French Republic may exercise
commerce to and at such places on their respective shores
below the said thirty first degree of North Latitude as may
be allowed for that use by the parties to their respective citizens
and vessels. And it is agreed that no other Nation shall
be allowed to exercise commerce to or at the same or any other
place on either shore, below the said thirty first degree of Latitude.
For the term of ten years to be computed from the
exchange of the ratifications hereof, the citizens, vessels and
merchandizes of the United States and of France shall be subject
to no other duties on their respective shores below the
said thirty first degree of latitude than are imposed on their
own citizens, vessels and merchandizes. No duty whatever
shall, after the expiration of ten years be laid on Articles the
growth or manufacture of the United States or of the ceded
Territory exported thro' the Mississippi in French vessels, so
long as such articles so exported in vessels of the United
States shall be exempt from duty: nor shall French vessels
exporting such articles, ever afterwards be subject to pay a
higher duty than vessels of the United States.

IV.

The citizens of France may, for the term of ten years, deposit
their effects at New Orleans and at such other places on
the ceded shore of the Mississippi, as are allowed for the commerce
of the United States, without paying any other duty
than a fair price for the hire of stores.

V.

In the ports and commerce of West and East Florida,
France shall never be on a worse footing than the most favored
nations; and for the term of ten years her vessels and
merchandize shall be subject therein to no higher duties than
are paid by those of the United States and of the ceded Territory,

exported in French vessels from any port in West or
East Florida, [and] shall be exempt from duty as long as
vessels of the United States shall enjoy this exemption.

VI.

The United States, in consideration of the Cession of Territory
made by this Treaty shall pay to France———
millions of livres Tournois, in the manner following, viz,
They shall pay———millions of livres tournois immediately
on the exchange of the ratifications hereof: they
shall assume in such order of priority as the Government of
the United States may approve, the payment of claims, which
have been or may be acknowledged by the French Republic
to be due to American citizens, or so much thereof as with
the payment to be made on the exchange of ratifications
will not exceed the sum of——and in case a balance
should remain due after such payment and assumption, the
same shall be paid at the end of one year from the final liquidation
of the claims hereby assumed, which shall be payable
in three equal annual payments, the first of which is to take
place one year after the exchange of ratifications or they shall
bear interest at the rate of six p Cent p annum from the date
of such intended payments; until they shall be discharged.
All the above mentioned payments shall be made at the
Treasury of the United States and at the rate of one dollar
and ten cents for every six livres tournois.

VII.

To incorporate the inhabitants of the hereby ceded territory
with the citizens of the United States on an equal footing,
being a provision, which cannot now be made, it is to be
expected, from the character and policy of the United States,
that such incorporation will take place without unnecessary
delay. In the meantime they shall be secure in their persons
and property, and in the free enjoyment of their religion.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE PLAN.

1st

• As the Cession to be made by France in this case must
  rest on the Cession made to her by Spain, it might be proper
  that Spain should be a party to the transaction. The objections
  however to delay require that nothing more be asked on
  our part, than either an exhibition and recital of the Treaty
  between France and Spain; or an engagement on the part of
  France, that the accession of Spain will be given. Nor
  will it be advisable to insist even on this much, if attended
  with difficulty or delay, unless there be ground
  to suppose that Spain will contest the validity of the transaction.

2d

• The plan takes for granted also that the Treaty of 1795
  between the United States and Spain is to lose none of its
  force in behalf of the former by any transactions whatever
  between the latter and France. No change it is evident will
  be, or can be admitted to be produced in that Treaty or in the
  arrangements carried into effect under it, further than it may
  be superseded by stipulations between the United States and
  France, who will stand in the place of Spain. It will not be
  amiss to insist on an express recognition of this by France as
  an effectual bar against pretexts of any sort not compatible
  with the stipulations of Spain.

3d

• The first of the articles proposed, in defining the Cession
  refers to the South pass of the Mississippi, and to the
  Islands North and East of that channel. As this is the most
  navigable of the several channels, as well as the most direct
  course to the sea, it is expected that it will not be objected to.
  It is of the greater importance to make it the boundary, because
  several Islands will be thereby acquired, one of which is
  said to command this channel, and to be already fortified.
  The article expressly included also the Islands appertaining
  to the Floridas. To this there can be no objection. The
  Islands within six leagues of the shore are the subject of a
  British proclamation in the year 1763 subsequent to the Cession
  of the Floridas to Great Britain by France, which is
  

  ---

  21

  
  
  
  not known to have been ever called in question by either
  France or Spain.

The 2d Article requires no particular observations.

Article 3d is one whose import may be expected to undergo
the severest scrutiny. The modification to be desired is that,
which, whilst it provides for the interest of the United States
will be acceptable to France, and will give no just ground of
complaint, and the least of discontent to Great Britain.

The present form of the article ought and probably will be
satisfactory to France; first because it secures to her all the
commercial advantages on the river which she can well desire;
secondly because it leaves her free to contest the mere navigation
of the River by Great Britain, without the consent of
France.

The article also, in its present form violates no right of
Great Britain, nor can she reasonably expect of the United
States that they will contend beyond their obligations for her
interest at the expense of their own. As far as Great Britain
can claim the use of the river under her Treaties with us, or
by virtue of, contiguous territory, the silence of the Article
on that subject, leaves the claim unaffected. As far again as
she is entitled under the Treaty of 1794 to the use of our Bank
of the Mississippi above the 31st degree of N. Latitude, her
title will be equally entire. The article stipulates against her
only in its exclusion of her commerce from the bank to be
ceded below our present limits. To this she cannot, of right
object, 1st because the Territory not belonging to the United
States at the date of our Treaty with her is not included in its
stipulations, 2dly because the privileges to be enjoyed by
France are for a consideration which Great Britain has not
Given and cannot give 3dly because the conclusion in this case,
being a condition on which the Territory will be ceded and
accepted, the right to communicate the privilege to Great
Britain will never have been vested in the United States.

But altho' these reasons fully justify the article in its relation
to Great Britain, it will be advisable before it be proposed,
to feel the Pulse of the French Government with

respect to a stipulation that each, of the parties may without
the consent of the other admit whomsoever it pleases to navigate
the river and trade with their respective shores, on the
same terms, as in other parts of France and the United States;
and as far as the disposition of that Government will concur, to
vary the proposition accordingly. It is not probable that this
concurrence will be given; but the trial to obtain it will not
only manifest a friendly regard to the wishes of Great Britain,
and if successful, furnish a future price for privileges within
her grant; but is a just attention to the interests of our Western
fellow citizens, whose commerce will not otherwise be on
an equal footing with that of the Atlantic States.

Should France not only refuse any such change in the Article;
but insist on a recognition of her right to exclude all
nations, other than the United States, from navigating the
Mississippi, it may be observed to her, that a positive stipulation
to that effect might subject us to the charge of intermeddling
with and prejudging questions existing merely between
her and Great Britain; that the silence of the article is sufficient;
that as Great Britain never asserted a claim on this
subject against Spain, it is not to be presumed that she will
assert it against France on her taking the place of Spain;
that if the claim should be asserted the Treaties between
the United States and Great Britain will have no connection
with it, the United States having in those treaties given
their separate consent only to the use of the river by Great
Britain, leaving her to seek whatever other consent may be
necessary.

If, notwithstanding such expostulations as these, France
shall inflexibly insist on an express recognition to the above
effect it will be better to acquiesce in it, than to lose the opportunity
of fixing an arrangement, in other respects satisfactory;
taking care to put the recognition into a form not
inconsistent with our treaties with Great Britain, or with an
explanatory article that may not improbably be desired by her.

In truth it must be admitted, that France as holding one
bank, may exclude from the use of the river any Nation

not more connected with it by Territory than Great Britain
is understood to be. As a river where both its banks are
owned by one Nation, belongs exclusively to that Nation; it
is clear that when the Territory on one side is owned by one
Nation and on the other side by another nation, the river belongs
equally to both, in exclusion of all others. There are
two modes by which an equal right may be exercised; the
one by a negative in each on the use of the river by any other
nation except the joint proprietor, the other by allowing each
to grant the use of the river to other nations, without the consent
of the joint proprietor. The latter mode would be preferable
to the United States. But if it be found absolutely
inadmissible to France, the former must in point of expediency,
since it may in point of right be admitted by the
United States. Great Britain will have the less reason to be
dissatisfied on this account as she has never asserted against
Spain, a right of entering and navigating the Mississippi, nor
has she or the United States ever founded on the Treaties
between them, a claim to the interposition of the other party
in any respect; altho' the river has been constantly shut
against Great Britain from the year 1783 to the present moment,
and was not opened to the United States until 1795,
the year of their Treaty with Spain.

It is possible also that France may refuse to the United
States, the same commercial use of her shores, as she will
require for herself on those ceded to the United States. In
this case it will be better to relinquish a reciprocity, than to
frustrate the negotiation. If the United States held in their
own right, the shore to be ceded to them, the commercial use
of it allowed to France, would render a reciprocal use of her
shore by the United States, an indispensable condition.
But as France may, if she chuses, reserve to herself the commercial
use of the ceded shore as a condition of the cession,
the claim of the United States to the like use of her shore
would not be supported by the principle of reciprocity, and
may therefore without violating that principle, be waved
in the transaction.

The article limits to ten years the equality of French citizens,
vessels and merchandizes, with those of the United
States. Should a longer period be insisted on it may be
yielded. The limitation may even be struck out, if made
essential by France; but a limitation in this case is so desirable
that it is to be particularly pressed, and the shorter the
period the better.

Art IV The right of deposit provided for in this article,
will accommodate the commerce of France, to and from her
own side of the river, until an emporium shall be established
on that side, which it is well known will admit of a convenient
one. The right is limited to ten years, because such
an establishment may within that period be formed by her.
Should a longer period be required, it may be allowed, especially
as the use of such a deposit would probably fall
within the general regulations of our commerce there. At
the same time, as it will be better that it should rest on our
own regulations, than on a stipulation, it will be proper
to insert a limitation of time, if France can be induced to
acquiesce in it.

Art. V. This article makes a reasonable provision for the
commerce of France in the ports of West and East Florida.
If the limitation to ten years of its being on the same footing
with that of the United States, should form an insuperable
objection, the term may be enlarged; but it is much to
be wished that the privilege may not in this case, be made
perpetual.

Art VI—The pecuniary consideration, to be offered for
the territories in question, is stated in Art. VI. You will of
course favor the United States as much as possible both in
the amount and the modifications of the payments. There
is some reason to believe that the gross sum expressed in the
Article, has occurred to the French Government, and is as
much as will be finally insisted on. It is possible that less
may be accepted, and the negotiation ought to be adapted
to that supposition. Should a greater sum be made an ultimatum
on the part of France, the President has made up

his mind to go as far as fifty——million of livres tournois,
rather than lose the main object. Every struggle however
is to be made against such an augmentation of the price, that
will consist with an ultimate acquiescence in it.

The payment to be made immediately on the exchange of
ratifications is left blank; because it cannot be foreseen either
what the gross sum or the assumed debts will be; or how far
a reduction of the gross sum may be influenced by the anticipated
payments provided for by the act of Congress herewith
communicated and by the authorization of the President and
Secretary of the Treasury endorsed thereon. This provision
has been made with a view to enable you to take advantage
of the urgency of the French Government for money, which
may be such as to overcome their repugnance to part with
what we want, and to induce them to part with it on lower
terms, in case a payment can be made before the exchange of
ratifications. The letter from the Secretary of the Treasury
to the Secretary of State, of which a copy is herewith
inclosed, will explain the manner in which this advance of the
ten Millions of livres, or so much thereof as may be necessary,
will be raised most conveniently for the United States. It
only remains here to point out the condition or event on
which the advance may be made. It will be essential that
the Convention be ratified by the French Government before
any such advance be made; and it may be further required,
in addition to the stipulation to transfer possession of the
ceded territory as soon as possible, that the orders for the
purpose, from the competent source, be actually and immediately
put into your hands. It will be proper also to provide
for the payment of the advance, in the event of a refusal of
the United States to ratify the Convention.

It is apprehended that the French Government will feel no
repugnance to our designating the classes of claims and debts,
which, embracing more equitable considerations than the
rest, we may believe entitled to a priority of payment. It is
probable therefore that the clause of the VI article referring
it to our discretion may be safely insisted upon. We think

the following classification such as ought to be adopted by
ourselves.

1st. Claims under the fourth Article of the Convention of
Sept. 1800.

2ndly Forced contracts or sales imposed upon our citizens
by French authorities; and

3rdly Voluntary contracts, which have been suffered to
remain unfulfilled by them.

Where our citizens have become creditors of the French
Government in consequence of Agencies or Appointments
derived from it, the United States are under no particular
obligation to patronize their claims, and therefore no sacrifice
of any sort, in their behalf ought to be made in the arrangement.
As far as this class of claimants can be embraced,
with [out] embarrassing the negotiation, or influencing in
any respect the demands or expectations of the French Government,
it will not be improper to admit them into the provision.
It is not probable however, that such a deduction
from the sum ultimately to be received by the French Government
will be permitted, without some equivalent accommodation
to its interests, at the expence of the United States.

The claims of Mr. Beaumarchais and several other French
individuals on our government, founded upon antiquated or
irrelevant grounds, altho' they may be attempted to be included
in this negotiation have no connection with it. The
American Government is distinguished for its just regard to
the rights of foreigners and does not require those of individuals
to become subjects of Treaty in order to be admitted.
Besides, their discussion involves a variety of minute topics,
with which you may fairly declare yourselves to be unacquainted.
Should it appear however, in the course of the
negotiation, that so much stress is laid on this point, that
without some accommodation, your success will be endangered,
it will be allowable to bind the United States for the
payment of one Million of livres tournois to the representatives
of Beaumarchais, heretofore deducted from his account
against them; the French Government declaring the same

never to have been advanced to him on account of the United
States.

Art. VII is suggested by the respect due to the rights of
the people inhabiting the ceded territory and by the delay
which may be found in constituting them a regular and integral
portion of the Union. A full respect for their rights
might require their consent to the Act of Cession; and if the
French Government should be disposed to concur in any
proper mode of obtaining it, the provision would be honorable
to both nations. There is no doubt that the inhabitants
would readily agree to the proposed transfer of their
allegiance.

It is hoped that the idea of a guarantee of the Country
reserved to France may not be brought into the negotiation.
Should France propose such a stipulation it will be expedient
to evade it if possible, as more likely to be a source of disagreeable
questions, between the parties concerning the actual
casus federis than of real advantage to France. It is not in
the least probable that Louisiana in the hands of that Nation
will be attacked by any other whilst it is in the relations to
the United States on which the guarantee would be founded;
whereas nothing is more probable than some difference of
opinion as to the circumstances and the degree of danger
necessary to put the stipulations in force. There will be less
reason in the demand of such an Article as the United States
would [put] little value on a guarantee of any part of their
territory and consequently there would be no great reciprocity
in it. Should France notwithstanding these considerations
make a guarantee an essential point, it will be better to accede
to it than to abandon the object of the negotiation, mitigating
the evil as much as possible by requiring for the casus federis
a great and manifest danger threatened to the Territory
guaranteed, and by substituting for an indefinite succour, or
even a definite succour in Military force, a fixed sum of money
payable at the Treasury of the United States. It is difficult
to name the proper sum which is in no posture of the business
to be exceeded, but it can scarcely be presumed that more

than about——dollars, to be paid annually during the
existence of the danger, will be insisted on. Should it be
unavoidable to stipulate troops in place of money, it will
be prudent to settle the details with as much precision as
possible, that there may be no room for controversy either
with France or with her money, on the fulfillment of the
stipulation.

The instructions thus far given suppose that France may
be willing to cede to the United States the whole of the Island
of New Orleans, and both the Floridas. As she may be inclined
to dispose of a part or parts, and of such only, it is
proper for you to know that the Floridas together are estimated
at 1/4 the value of the whole Island of New Orleans,
and East Florida at ½ that of West Florida. In case of a partial
Cession, it is expected, that the regulations of every other
kind so far as they are onerous to the United States, will be
more favorably modified.

Should France refuse to cede the whole of the Island, as
large a portion as she can be prevailed on to part with, may be
accepted; should no considerable portion of it be attainable,
it will still be of vast importance to get a jurisdiction
over space enough for a large commercial town and its appurtenances,
on the Bank of the river, and as little remote from
the mouth of the river as may be. A right to chuse the place,
would be better than a designation of it in the Treaty. Should
it be impossible to procure a complete jurisdiction over any
convenient spot whatever, it will only remain to explain and
improve the present right of deposit, by adding thereto the
express privilege of holding real estate for commercial purposes,
of providing hospitals, of having Consuls residing there,
and other Agents who may be authorized to authenticate and
deliver all documents requisite for vessels belonging to and
engaged in the trade of the United States to and from the
place of deposit. The United States cannot remain satisfied,
nor the Western people be kept patient under the restrictions
which the existing Treaty with Spain authorizes.

Should a Cession of the Floridas not be attainable your

attention will also be due to the establishment of suitable
deposits at the mouths of the rivers passing from the United
States thro' the Floridas, as well as of the Free navigation of
the rivers by Citizens of the United States. What has been
above suggested in relation to the Mississippi and the deposit
on its Banks is applicable to the other rivers; and additional
hints relative to them all may be derived from the letter of
which a copy is inclosed from the Consul at New Orleans.

It has been long manifest, that whilst the injuries to the
United States so frequently occurring from the Colonial offices
scattered over our hemisphere and in our neighbourhood
can only be repaired by a resort to their respective Governments
in Europe, that it will be impossible to guard against
the most serious inconveniences. The late events at New
Orleans strongly manifest the necessity of placing a power
somewhere nearer to us, capable of correcting and controuling
the mischievous proceedings of such officers toward our
citizens, without which a few individuals not always among
the wisest and best of men, may at any time threaten the good
understanding of the two Nations. The distance between the
United States and the old continent, and the mortifying delays
of explanations and negotiations across the Atlantic on
emergencies in our neighborhood, render such a provision
indispensable, and it cannot be long before all the Governments
of Europe having American Colonies must see the
necessity of making it. This object therefore will likewise
claim your special attention.

It only remains to suggest that considering the possibility
of some intermediate violence between citizens of the United
States and the French or Spaniards in consequence of the
interruption of our right of deposit, and the probability that
considerable damages will have been occasioned by that
measure to citizens of the United States, it will be proper
that indemnification in the latter case be provided for, and
that in the former, it shall not be taken on either side as a
ground or pretext for hostilities.

These instructions, tho' as full as they could be conveniently

made, will necessarily leave much to your discretion.
For the proper exercise of it, the President relies on your
information, your judgment, and your fidelity to the interests
of your Country.