University of Virginia Library

4. CHAP. IV. Of disposition.

Disposition is the orderly placing of those things which are Invented. It is two fold.

First, Natural, in which tings are discoursed in that order in which they were done, or in which according to nature, they should be done: as if you were to commend a person, you should first begin with his childhood, next his youth, and so to the other degrees of his age.

The second way is Artificial, which doth either for delight, or profit diversly mingle and confound the matter, putting that in the end which should be in the beginning, and the beginning in the end, that so he may both delight the Auditours and hold them in suspence; which in an unexpected event doth not a little please and delight the hearers. Thus doth Virgil do in his Æneades, in which he speaketh of Æneas his voyage into Italy, but not in the same order in which he began: thus doth Barclay

in his Argenes, and thus do all that write either Comedies or Tragedies.

The Orator then having resolved of his proposition, must first consider of what Nature is, whether single or consisting of several parts, and which of the parts should be first handled, which next.

Secondly, He must choose some few of the best arguments he hath invented, and place some solid argument in the beginning, those that are less forcible in the midst, reserving still the best and most convincing argument for the conclusion; because the Auditor at the first being greedy of knowing must be prepossessed and convinced, but in the end he must be strongly confirmed and forced.

And the most perswasive arguments are those, which proceed from the Definition, Distribution, Genus, Causes, and Effects of the thing discoursed of, for these explain the nature thereof: The less forcible arguments are such as are collected from some trivial adjuncts and conjectures.

Thirdly, He must Logically dispose of these reasons and arguments, first into Syllogisms, and then consider how to enlarge them in an Oratorical manner.

Fourthly, He must consider into what parts his Oration should be divided. Concerning the two last, I will a little enlarge my self: And

First, of the Logical Disposition of those reasons and arguments which are invented, by way of Syllogisms, and the enlarging of those Syllogisms in an Oratorical manner.

A logical argumentation is the disposition or explication of the argument, which when it is perfect doth consist of three parts, of which that which is put in the first place, Logicians call the Major, Rhetoricians the Proposition: That which is put in the second place, philosophers call the Minor, Orators the Assumption: That which is put in the third place is by Logicians called the conclusion, by Rhetoricians the complexion or inference. And these three propositions, when they are regularly placed, are called a Syllogism, which must be framed from that proposition, and cause or reason, which was before invented.

For example, the proposition was, That Clodius is justly put to death: the Argument or reason given for it is, because he was a treacherous person. Now then form your Syllogism thus: Take this cause and joyn it with the predicate of your proposition, saying,

Every treacherous person doth deserve to be put to death: and this is your Major. Then take the subject of your proposition, and joyn that with the given cause and say, Clodius was a treacherous person ; and that is your Minor: then bring in the proposition it self, saying, therefore Clodius serveth death, which is the conclusion, and maketh up the whole Syllogism. The like may be done in any other; but alwayes, consider, with what reasons, examples, sentences or similitudes your Major or Minor may be again confirmed, especially if they be in themselves weak & but probably true; for if they be certain, they are not then to be proved, but handsomely expressed. This done, consider how these Syllogisms may be handled Oratorically; the which besides many others may be effected nine several wayes.

The first and most usual is so to place the parts of the Syllogism, as Logicians do, that is the Major first, and the arguments by which it may be proved. The Minor next with the arguments for that ; And lastly the Conclusion.

Example.

Imagine that some King through ambition

of raigning had killed his brother Prince; And so make this proposition, The King ought to be deposed ; The Reason, because he is wicked : place this Logically thus : We ought not to endure a wicked man in the Kingdom ; The King is a wicked man; Therefore he is not to ne endured in the Kingdome. The Reason of the Major is ; because otherwise we shall blemish our reputation among forreigners , by whom we have been always esteemed honourable, and promoters of vertue, but shall now be called patrons and servants of wickedness. The Reason of the Minor is, that he through ambition having deceitfully killed his brother, hath been injurious to nature and to us : This proposition, may Rhetorically be thus handled.

The Major.

Have we the Citizens of N. now at length made such progress in the love of wickedness, as that we are not ashamed to see the power of our lives and liberties put into the hands of a desperately wicked person? Shall we now any longer honour the Prince in wickedness, or wickedness in the Prince ? till we our selves are reckoned among the wicked.

The Reason of the Major. Ah woe is me! O Citizens of N. Ah the glory of our name, bought with the blood our Ancestors, which we have so rashly prostituted, through our own inadvertcy ! That we who were formerly reputed the patrons of vertue, should now be reckoned the servants of wickedness. What will be said by the bordering, what by the more remote nations ? Behold ( shall they say ) the men for whose vertuous acts the world it self was too narrow ; who could imbrace nothing, nor do any thing, but what was contained within, or did not exceed the bounds of vertue : behold them now so far fallen into naughtiness, that laying aside all modesty, they are not ashamed to adore wickedness in the Throne. And what is the guise of the rest of the Citizens ? What is the reputation of the nobles ? if by their approbation baseness doth thus triumph in the highest place of dignity. Certainly they cannot but love wickedness, who do not only permit it, but also honour it.

The Minor.

Had our King gloried in a wicked act committed upon one of the meanest of his subjects ; he might perhaps have had some small pretence for his cruelty, though it had been accomplished with bloody hands.

The Reason of the Minor.

But to be so inhumanely enraged against the Prince his brother, who was setled in the Kindome by our free and generall consent, what is it but to proclaime a Warre against us and nature it self, and by this one impietie, to offend the tribunals of all Nations.

Approbation

Truly, if we do well, in judging of the day by the morning, we may be no false Prophets, in foreseeing, what kind of Nero he will prove to us, who begins to feed his cruelty with the blood of his own relations, and hath there made an entrance to his cruelty, where others have ended theirs.

therefore O ye generous progeny of all vertue, and if you have any respect to your abased name, or the glory of your Nation, depose that wicked person from the Throne; let it be heard in the world, let it be known to all posterity, that wickedness might be in the Kingdom , but could not goe unpunished, no not in the Prince.

2. The second way of Rhetoricall arguing is to put the Minor with the Reasons thereof in the first place, the Major next and the Reasons thereof , and lastly the Conclusion.

Example.

Let the proposition be the contrary to the former, Namely, That the King ought not to be deposed, or put to death, for any hainous offence committed by him. The Reason is, because in so doing, we shall blemish our own reputation. Place it Logically thus. We who are Citizens ought not to blemish our own reputation ; but if we depose the King or put him to death, we shall blemish our owne reputation; Therefore we ought neither to depose the King , nor put him to death. The Reason of the Major is, Because Reputation is the publick treasure, and

noble patrimony of a Common wealth, which we all ought highly to regard. The Reafon of the Minor is, Because that hitherto we have been famous, for that we never did depose our Prince or put him to death, and this honour we shall now lose, if we do either.

The Approbation, Because our Ancestors have also had wicked Princes; and yet they did let them alone. And this proposition may be Rhetorically handled in this manner.

The Minor.

I wish O Citizens of N. that they who through accursed and disloyal boldnesse, have by their cruel suffrages decreed to rob the Prince not only of his Throne, but also of his life, would but consider the consequence of it in after ages : I would have them consider that our same shall be more stained by their rashness, than it could have been by a patient submission to his cruelty.

The Reason of the Minor.

For hitherto it hath been our peculiar honour that our natural Princes, have been

ours , not more by their birth-right than by our affection; neither hath the world ever heard, that our hands have been stained with the blood of any of our Princes : which as it is our peculiar honour above other Nations ; so it ought to be our great studie to continue it. But now if we should lay wicked hands on our Prince, shall we not fall headlong from the glory of our reputation ? And be with the rest deservedly hissed at for paracides for ever?

The Approbation.

Or, look back upon your Ancestours, and let it be your care to tread in their footsteps: Whose Kings although they were Heroes, yet they were also men, and that they were all of them free from vice, or that none of them did burthen the Throne with wickedness, doth seem to me unlikely ; yet they rather endured the wickedness of their Prince, than to make themselves wicked by deposing them; and were willing to exceed in submission, rather than in fury.

The Major with the Reason.

Why then shall we degenerate foules banish our fame? Why shall we cruel wretches suffer men to hatch cruelty againft the common-wealth? We who in honour are compelled to have a principall regard unto our glory , as being our publick treasure, and the most noble patrimony of our Kingdome, and ought, one with his armes, and another with his good works, another with Justice, another with Clemency ever maintaine it, is the great Magazin of our honour.

Conclusion.

The King hath acted wickedly against his brother, let not us act wickedly against the King, neither let posterity deride us, for committing one wickedness, to be revenged of another ; let us have regard to that proverbial speech of wise men, If a King be good, obey him, if evill, endure his wickedness with patience.

The Third way of arguing Rhetorically is to put the Conclusion in the first place with the Major or Minor added thereunto, by the particles, for, therefore, for this

cause, &c. And if any argument follow sometimes we find the conclusion repeat and sometimes not: but if the Oration be short, as most of our common orations are, the Conclusion is repeated at last, in other words.

Example.

In a Gratulatory speech, for some kindness received : of which the proposition is I owe you many thankes: The Reason, Because you have given me a preferment, and have passed by others who were my competitors. Place it Logically thus: He who hath gotten a preferment from one who hath passed by others his competitors , he oweth the Don many thanks ; But I have gotten such a preferment. Therefore, &c. Rhetorically thus:

Beginning with the Conclusion.

Most gracious Soveraign, The thanks which I owe unto your Majesty, for the preferment, which you have bestowed upon me are such as cannot be expressed by words; much less can they ever be requited by me; and I am necessarily enforced to take up the words before your most gracious Majesty,

which Socrates once used to Plato ; who when he had nothing to give him which was answerable to his kindness cried out, O Plato accept of Socrates. And seeing your kindnesses to me have far transcended them of Plato to Socrates, and also that I my self cannot be a recompence sufficient for the kindness of a King, I do here devote my self and all that I have to your Majesty in token of gratitude.

The Major.

Ought not he to account himself highly engaged to obedience, on whom the King of his own mere inclination, hath conferred that honour, which many near him have in vain expected, and for which many have in vain petitioned ?

The Reafon of the Major.

Certainly his favour is heightened by the expectations and petitions of others, and one bounty becometh two when he that hath it, is adorned with a much desired honour, and in being thus adorned is preferred before all his Competitors. It is not unknown to any, what men, how much deserving of

your Majesty, and of their countrey, have made great suite for this dignity both by themselves & others; with whom, if I should come in competition, I could be hardly any way compared: but your most gracious Majesty, most bountifully supplying the imperfections of my actions with your own benigne charity, hath alwaies looked upon me, as one that hath devoted himself to you, and the Common-wealth.

The Conclusion repeated.

What shall I now promise, but earnestly to endeavour that you may never have occasion to think, that you have placed your kindness on an ungratefull soul ? I do therefore most humbly lay down my self and my endeavours, all that I have, and all their endeavours, at your Majesties feet, to be ordered according to your will and pleasure: be pleased to command us, and you shall find our lives to be of less value to us than your injunctions.

The Fourth way of Arguing Rhetorically, is to put the Major with the Reason, thereof in the first place ; Secondly the Conclusion, and Thirdly the Minor: Fourthly, if

it seem necessary, the Conclusion may be repeated in other words.

Example.

If you would congratulate the arrival of some Kings Ambassador, or any great Person: you may make this proposition :We ought to rejoyce in your coming to us: The Reason; Because you are a great person. Place it Logically thus: We ought to rejoyce, at the coming of a great Person. But you are a great person. Therefore, &c. Rhetorically: thus, beginning with the Major.

The stars cannot appear without rejoycing the inanimate world ; nor great persons without affecting the souls of men, N. N. Nature hath given them this, that they can not be,but they must be profitable.

The Reason of the Major.

Vertue hath imposed this most beautiful necessitie, That great men can be no where, but where they may shew favour and clemency to those that are under them.

The Conclusion.

Would to God you might this day see thorowly into all our souls, yea even of Momus, you might there behold Love and Fear, Joy and Sorrow, desire and eloquence, wrestling together in our hearts, with no ordinary conflict: for when we salute you as our great Guest we cannot well tell, whether our fear should love, or our love fear your Excellencie ; whether our joy should sorrow its straitness, or our sorrow joy your appearance; whether our desires should speak, or our Eloquence wish: Oh that we were wholly joy, wholly love, wholly desire, wholly Eloquence , that we might here in your presence , expresse our affections towards you as we ought.

The Minor with the Approbation thereof.

The truth is, that not only the Nobleness of your birth, singular wisdome, sweet cariage, and behaviour , and your other inestimable vertues, do make you great in our eyes : but we also reverence your greatnesse, because you are so in the judgment of

the whole Kingdome ; which having those beames of honour on your person, hath published to the world, that you are her Starr. Our King hath greatly esteemed you in making you not only of his privy Councell, but Arbitrator of it, when he hath again and again declared you worthy to accompany him, not only in Germany and Britain, but even in all the parts of his own Kingdome, that you might here and every where, be esteemed great. And all our borders will for ever owne your greatnesse, because you have condescended to shew your illustrious presence and noble soul in our mean confines: all of us being sensible, that great men do augment their greatness by their condescentions.

The Fift way of arguing Rhetorically.

Sometimes the Major is omitted, and the Reason of the Major with its Approbation is put in its place ; Then the Conclusion, afterward the Minor with the proof thereof, and lastly the conclusion is repeated.

Example.

Let the proportion be: You ought not

greatly to lament the death of your friends. The Reason is : because death is a common evill: place it Logically thus: We ought not greatly to lament a common evill; but the Death of our freinds is a common evill ; Therefore &c. The Reafon of the Major is , because a common evill cannot be eschewed; you may handle it Rhetorically thus.

Wise men do agree that what cannot be avoided, ought patiently to be endured.

The Approbation : That so in not feeling it, it may appear to us, as if it did not particularly concern us.

The Conclusion : We then do certainly ill, to give our selves over to grief , for the departure of our friends, and in some sort to bury our joy, in the same grave with them.

The Minor.

For this evil doth not concern, assalt, or befall one onely person; but it conerns all alike, it overfloweth all.

The Reason of the Minor.

For all things on which we live, whose life we enjoy, in the use of which we are delighted, are bound to the same Condition, are all subject unto death.

Confirmation. Morover our soul doth inhabit but an infirm and weak cottage, which doth in it self consist of adverse and contrary elements, and from without it self, is assalted with many and great dangers. To which purpose Seneca saith well, that we are deceived, when we look on our death, as if it were to come; a great part thereof is past, and this very time which we live is death.

The Conclusion repeated :

Divide then that grief among all men, which you have engrossed to your self from the common bitterness of fortune; we all run the same fate, and must all endure it; think not then that you do well, in giving your self up to too much to grief.

The Sixt way.

Oftimes the Major is omitted, and the Minor onely with the Approbation thereof; and the Conclufion, are mentioned. This argumentation is called an Enthymem, of which the firt part is called the Antecedent, the other the consequent. And you may place them as you please, the Antecedent first and then the Consequent, or on the contrary.

Example.

Let the proposition be: Youths are not to be bridled with rigid discipline. The Reason : Because they are not the better for rigour, but the worse. Omitting the Major, place it Logically thus : Youths are the worse for the rigour of discipline, therefore they ought not to be kept under a rigid Discipline. Oratorically thus.

You erre greatly if you think that youth may be improved by severity and fear of discipline; for though they may by an austere carriage seem to be reclaimed, yet really and indeed, they become thereby the more dissolute : Go to experiences and you shall find them, to be commonly the worst of all others, who have passed their youth under the most severe discipline. As a torrent may for a while be stopped by an overthwart bank, but while it stops, it is but gathering its more strong floud, by which when the bank is broken; it doth redeem the length of its cessation, with its more raging flux: so youth being bridled under cruel pressures, after it is once freed from those lawes by wich it was restrained, it doth become the more violently insolent and drowneth the Soul

in the pursuite of those Syren snares from which it was before debarred : for we alwaies desire forbidden fruit, and to enjoy what we cannot obtain. This disease of the soul is best cured by indulgence: for as Ovid excellently describes such tempers.

The Seventh way.

Cicero directeth Herenaius, first to place the exposition or the thing to be proved, Secondly the Reason or Reasons, Thirdly the Approbation: Fourthly the exornation or illustration, from the contrary, or from Example, Similitude, Testimony or Sentences &c. Fiftly the Complexion in which all is summed up; this is the most easie way, and most fit for extemporary speeches.

Example.

Let the proposition be : A little knavery and wantoness doth not hurt a youth. The Reasons. Because they cannot presently be thereupon accounted bad. For a man can not be alwayes good; And the clearest day hath some clouds: The Approbation. And those who are now old men, were wanton when they were young. The Exornation from Testimony : A certain Poet said, He depriveth the year of the Spring, who would not permit a youth to be wanton. From Sentences; And every age ought to have that behaviour, which is most agreeable thereunto. From the Contrary. It is unseemly for an old man to behave himself like a youth : Therefore it it also, unseemly for a youth to behave himself like an old man. From Similitude ; For if Ale be not mad when it is new, it is never good when it is stale. This you may handle Rhetorically thus.

Exposition. What great matter is it if a youth be somewhat waggish, for a little while? The Reasons : Do the Spaniards therefore drink water, because they temper their Wine? or doth one fair day make a Summer?

And what man is wise at all times? The clearest day hath ever had some clouds. Why do we then so scrutinously reprehend the very least fault in a youth, and (if I may speek freely) all that leudness in them, which in our selves we called but waggery. What if they Crown the streets with their friendly concourse, or pull one another by the hair in jest; or weary their armes with a kind Wrestling and are not alwayes among the prophets, not alwayes toiling at their bookes, but sometimes give themselves to dancing, laughing, and jesting; what other things, I say, are these but the sports of youth; and keeping themselves in action, till age and experience, lead them to more noble imployments. Unless then they disguise their faces like melancholy persons, unless their eyes be for ever condemned to the earth that they may there tell all the stones and atoms of dust, unless they hang their heads upon their shoulders, and become devotionary ghosts; they must be thought worthy of banishment to Gyarus and Thale.

The Comprobation.

Oh rigid Catos, fit to be Judges of Manlius's laws, either you have forgotten your own youth, or you might from the

former indulgencies of your own folly, learn to connive for a while at ours; neither durst you by violating the priviledges of our youth accuse nature when (as the Poet saith well) to deprive youth of their waggery, is to deprive the year of its spring.

From Testimonies:

Every age hath its proper limits; and it is as necessary that the behaviour of persons should be suiteable to their years, as for garments to be fitted for the body.

From the Contrary.

And if we may deride a youthfull old man, why may we not by the same rule detest the behaviour of the aged in those that are young? And what cruelty is it in the morning of age to exact the noondaies gravity, and when the twilight of wisedome doth scarcely appeare, you require the sageness of the perfect day. You give your Horses, and Bullocks liberty; to exercise their irregular caperings ; and are you so blind, that what you see to be naturall in other creatures, you cannot see to be so in your owne children. And (that I may speak with all mildness) be pleased at least to take a sober draught of this truth,

even out a Barrel of Ale; unless the Ale when it is new do fill the Aire; the Cellar, the barrell, with a malepert hurly burly; it will when it is old be neither healthful for the bodie, nor pleasing to the Palate. And hence an exhortation might be made, to take well and beare with the wantonness of youth.

The Eighth way of arguing Rhetorically.

The Eighth way is by Induction; now Induction is a speech, which from undoubted premises, doth inferr some one conclusion.

In this we must observe two things.

First, That the things premised be certain.

Secondly, That what is inferred have some resemblance to the things premised. This way of arguing is most familiar unto an Oratour, and doth most excellently set forth a matter. Causinus saith, it sweetly instills matter, and is in proving delightfull: and if the things inferred be many, it affords a large field for discourse.

Example.

Let the propofition be this. A man should be commended from what he is, and not

from what he hath. The Reason: because a Ship, and a Sword, and a square are commended from what they are and not from the ornaments that they have. Seneca doth thus handle it Rhetorically.

We call not that a good Ship which is painted with curious colours or which hath a gilded head, or a stern overlaid with Ivory, or which is loaded with the riches or revenues of Kings; but that which is stable, strong and sound, to bear through the raging Billowes of the Sea, which is easily governed by the Helm, is able to beare a gale of wind, and is withall a nimble sayler. We call not that a good sword which hath an embroidered belt or a scabbard set with Jewells, but which hath a sharp edge and point, to hew in peices all that standeth in its way. The goodness of a thing is not in its beauty, but in its fitness for that use for which it properly is. Therefore in a man also we are not to regard how much he ploweth, how much he lets out on usury, by how many he is courted, in how magnificent a bed he lieth, in how rich a Cup he drinketh, but how good he is in himself &c.

To this way doth that also of the Scythian Ambassadours in Quintus Curtius appertain,

proving to Alexander, that he ought not too much to trust to his greatness and fortitude, by an Induction thus: What, say they, know you not that great trees grow along time, and in an hour are cut down: he is a fool that covets the fruite and considereth not the height of the tree, on which it growes: the Lyon hath sometime been the food of small birds; and ruft doth consume the strongest steel: there is nothing secure from being destroyed, even by the most contemptible instrument.

The Ninth way of arguing Rhetorically, is to argue from Example.

Now an Example is an imperfect Induction, or arguing from one Similitude to another. And is done two waies especially.

First, Explaining a thing by a Protasis and an Apodasis; so this proposition, A Generall should be a lover of learning, as Julius Cæsar was, is thus handled. The more famous that Julius Cæsar was in his victories, the more did he exercise his learning; and with the same hands he scattered those Palmes in his Books, with which he won them from his enemies. Who then

then can deny, but learning is well becoming the most warlike Prince or Emperour ? Nay if he despise not the best counsell that can be given him, if he mean to arrive to the perfect perfection of a good Prince, he will labour for learning with all his might, &c.

Secondly, We argue from Example, when after the relation we presently add some reasons, either by way of approbation or disallowance, as we are wont to do in other parts of the oration; but after the reasons given we apply the thing to the matter in hand, shewing in what it doth or doth not agree. This daily practice is very antient; but observe that the use of Examples is very graceful (and the same may be said of Sentences, Apothegmes, Hieroglypicks, &c.) when by that either in the beginning or in other parts of the Oration we express the same thing, which we should otherwise have done in our words.

For Example, I would say: O ye Judges ye ought to take heed, that ye ascend not the Tribunal for hope of reward: I would do this by Example; Agathocles, when he went to give Judgment, was wont to say, Let us go to a Golden harvest.

Then I would add the reason which I should have added to my proposition, namely it is a wicked thing to endeavour to grow rich by other mens wickedness.

Afterwards I would more fully prove and enlarg it. Or instead of this example, I might have used this sentence: They that are intrusted with the government of the common wealth, should not go to the administration of Justice, as those that go into a Faire or market. And to this sentence, may be added some reasons and arguments to prove the reasonableness of that assertion. But you must be alwaies carefull, that the example or sentence may beare the same sence with the thing, that is in that place to be explained.