University of Virginia Library

2. CHAP. II
Of Invention.

The Rules of this Art or Faculty of Rhetoricall and delightfull speaking are commonly reduced unto five heads, Invention, Disposition, Elocution, Memory and Pronunciation.

The first of these is Invention, in which we must consider three things; First, what we are to invent, Secondly by what Arguments we may confirm the matter invented: Thirdly, from what Topickes or generall heads, those Arguments may be raised.

And First, we are to consider what it is that we are to invent; and the thing or matter which we are to invent or find out, is the scope and purpose, of the intended Oration; that is, we must propound some certain proposition, to which we mean to direct our speech; and of those several propositions which may be raised from the Subject propounded, we should still make choice of that, which is most agreeable to the sentence given, most suteable to the present occasion, most profitable, and that which the Auditors may probably best apprehend. But now a dayes our Oratours do much labour to find out some acute proposition, and that proposition is so stilled, which under some Allegory doth express a simple and a received truth: as in this expression; I would advise you to set the Campe in order: the meaning is, I would advise you to prepare for War: such propositions are not to be found fault with; but yet we must take heed of affectation, yea and of lightness too, because gravity doth become an Oratour; though young students may do well to pitch upon the most plain and obvious propositions; and such easie arguments

as are most pertinient to the matter in hand; and after they can do this tollerably well, they may by degrees aspire higher.

Secondly, When you have resolved upon your proposition, then you are to bethink your self of some Arguments by which that proposition may be confirmed: for an argument is a probable reason brought, to perswade the Auditours of the truth of the Proposition.

I call it a probable reason, because arguments are of two sorts; some are certain, evident and necessary, and these are convincing: as, that Peter is not a beast, because he is indued with reason; others are probable carrying with them some shew of truth; that is, they seem to be true either from the general received opinion, or for the similitude that they have with the truth, or from the event; and these are the Arguments, which an Oratour should chiefly enquire after; not but that he may also use such are demonstrable and undeniably true: but because he many times hath to doe with such propositions as cannot be demonstrated, or if they can, yet he useth probable arguments for the most part, because he is to

speake to such, as will be more easily perswaded by such arguments, as come within their own sphere, which they can easily fathom, than by such as are Demonstrative and beyond their apprehension.

Thirdly, in Invention, we are to conside the several Topicks or common places, from whence these probable Arguments may be invented or raised; and these are of two sorts; Intrinsecal, and Extrinsecal: those are called Intrinsecal, which are comprised in the matter which is propounded of what kind soever it be; and all matter is comprised in one of these three kinds of Cases or Causes, Demonstrative, Deliberative, and Judicial.

The Demonstrative Case is so called, because it doth Demonstrate the Nature of the Subject propounded. And is used either in the Commendation, or Condemnation of persons, actions, or things. When it is used by way of commendation, it is called an Encomium or a Penegyrick: and when it is used by way of condemnation, it is called an Invective, if against some eminent Person, it is called Philippick.

The deliberative Case is so called, from the deliberation or consideration that

should be taken before advice be given.

The subject matter in this case, is every contingent thing; every thing which is in our own power.

More particularly, if it be a publick case there are five things in which according to Aristotle, deliberation is required.

1. In publick taxations. 2. In making of War and Peace. 3. In the guarding of countries. 4. In importation and exportation of goods. 5. In the dispensing or not dispensing with Laws.

But in private cases the particular matters in which we should deliberate, cannot be assigned, beacuse of the great variety; there being nothing concering our selves or families, in which deliberation is not convenient, if not necessary.

The Judicial case may be so called, from the delivering of our Judgment or opinion of the matter propounded, whether for or against, whether by way of Accusation, or by way of Defence. And the heads from whence Arguments may be raised in these severall kinds of cases are either such as are common to them all; or such as are peculiar to each kind: I will here speak of such

general wayes of inventing Arguments from the very matter propounded, as are common to all these cases or causes; and they being well understood, the Ingenious and Judicious Oratour will need no direction for each severall kind of causes in particular.

The Topicks or Heads for invention in the General are these following.

1. Definition. 2. Division. 3. Notation. 4. Conjugation. 5. Genus. 6. Species. 7. Similitude. 8. Dissimilitude. 9. Contraries. 10. Opposites. 11. Comparison. 12. Causes. 13. Effects. 14. Adjuncts. 15. Antecedents. 16. Consequents. All other Topicks from whence Intrinsical or Artificial arguments may be raised, are contained in these or may be derived from them.

The first of these Topicks I call Definition. And, Definition is a Speech explaining or declaring what a thing is. The parts of a Definition according to the Logicians are these two 1. The Genus or general name; that is, a name that doth agree with the thing defined, and also with several other things besides. 2. The Difference or particular name, that is, a name which doth only agree with that which

is defined; for example, Man is a living creature endued with Reason. But such Definitions are seldome used by Orators, because they afford but little matter for an Oration; but other wayes of Defining things, which may be called Descriptions rather, and such are these that follow.

One way of Defining things, much used by Oratours, is, to describe it by the parts thereof, which may be sometimes large and yet elegant: of this way we have an axample in Causinus, who doth describe a Butterflie in this manner. "A Butterflie," saith he, "is a small Animal, seldome seen in Cities but very frequently in the fields; it is of a full, tender, soft, and flexible body, growing smaller and smaller to a little length, on which a dispersed gentle down doth neatly shine; there stand out as it were extended Horns, small as thrids, between which a pleasant light of his shining eyes doth sparkle; but a special wonder is in his Wings, far beyond the bulk of his little body, they are bedecked with flowers, adorned with Purple, shine like Gold, and glitter with stars; being poysed with these, he flies as it were with Oares into the air, disporting

himself, and cleaving almost to every stalke: sometimes he sucks the juice of leaves with his most delicate trunk, sometimes he sweetly reposeth amongst delightfull odors, other while with a renewed flight he soars aloft and escapes the hands of insulting boyes, drawing in the air six hundred Meanders.

A Second way by which Oratours do define or rather describe things, is by such effects, as do proceed from the four causes, and this way doth as it were open a gate to a large field; only you must take heed, that you reckon not every minute or small matter for an effect; according to this way Saint Ambrose doth describe drunkenness to be an incentive of madness, the fomenter of lust, and the poyson to wisdome.

A Third way is by similitude; but not according to the usual way of expressing them, by the particle, As: but by bare affirmation omitting the usual way of comparison: for example: What is our life? It is a market in which we buy and sell; in which one deceiveth another, and in which every one doth mind his own business; and hath a care of his own wealth: it is a Comedie, in which every one doth act his own part, this man the part of a King, and that of a peasant.

A Fourth way is by Synonomie, as thus: What else is a Lilly, but an ornament to the Earth, the glory of Plants, the very eye of Flowers, the Jewel of the meadowes and Star of the Fields, adorning the Earth, as the Stars do Heaven; giving as great a luster to other flowers, as the Jasper stone doth to Gold, and as much delighting the eye as the Sun the world.

A Fifth way is by those causes by which effects are produced; as the Material, formal, efficient and finall causes. For example, the Edifice which Dædalus hath raised with his own hand, of strong and hewed stone, in a round form, is not only fortified against the injury of weather; but hath also so much gracefullness in it, that it easeth the mind of all care, yea and filleth it with delight; it is so neatly built, that you would think it Heaven upon Earth.

A Sixth way is by negation; when we first shew what a thing is not, and then what it is: Thus Babusius Lib.3.Epigr. doth describe a Friend.

A Friend is not a bare voice, or empty nutshel, but a Friend is known by his affection and behaviour, by his words and actions.

A Seventh way is by adjuncts and proprieties; Thus our blessed Saviour is called, The Assertor of humane liberty, the master of Sanctitie, and absolute perfection, the everlasting fountain of all vertues. Thus Solomon is described: Solomon that great miracle and Oracle of humane Wisdome, the Master or Tutor of the World.

An Eighth way, is first to describe the thing Ironically according to the opinion of some, and then to explain the same, as in truth it is, or at least according to your own thoughts and apprehensions of it.

The Second Topick for Invention is Division, or Distribution of the matter propounded into its parts; thus the life of Man may be divided, into Infancy, Childhood, Youth, middle age, old-age.

Arguments may be raised from the parts unto the whole, three wayes. 1. By affirming that of the whole, which may be affirmed of all the parts; as if you would prove the whole Fabrick of a Huse to be defective; you may divide the house, into the walls, the roofe, and floores; and shew the defects in each of these.

2. By denying that of the whole, what may be denied of all the parts; as if you

were to shew the inconvenience of sending Children to travell: you may enumerate the several places adjoyning, and shew the inconveniences that may be in sending them to any of those places; as suppose to France, Spain, or Italy, and by consequence any whither else.

3. By making an affirmation of one particular part, omitting or rejecting the rest; as thus, either he loves me or hates me, for there is no third or mean; but he doth not love me, therefore he hates me.

This Topick may be elegantly used by way of Interrogation, Repetition, Subjection, Preterition, and Apostrophe. And example whereof, may be this excellent description of a garden, as it is set forth by Drexelius in his Nicetas. "There was," saith he, "a most pleasant garden as it were a Paradise, the smiling Trees stood with their leaves budded, which with a delightfull odour made the shadows gracefull, the gentle motion of whose boughs made a sweet whistling noyse, amongst these a murmuring Rivulet, clearer than any Chrystal, with running streams which did smoothly glide, disturbing the pible stones with its singing waters: so that the motion thereof was almost a Musicall harmony.

On either side were flowers, with Zephyrus's copious family; on the one hand the silver Lillies from the green bank did smile (upon you) on the other the purple Roses did glitter, from an other part the Daffidillies white as Snow or Ivory, were set off with the Hyacinths red as blood, yellow as gold; most pleasant gales of wind breathing from every part."

The Third Topick is Notation, or Etymologie, which is the interpretation of the word, shewing as well the original thereof, as the signification: as a Senate is so called because of convention of the Seniors, that is of old men. Etymology is more frequent amongst Grammarians, than Orators, yet sometimes there may be an occasion for it amongst them, even for ornament and sweetness sake.

The Fourth Topick is Conjugation: and Conjugation is either when one word hath various endings, as Knife, knives; or when several words do come from, or are derived from one primitive; thus beautifull and beautifullness are both derived from beauty. From this Topick we argue thus, If piety be a commendable quality, then he that is pious is worthy of commendation.

Conjugation and Notation differ in this; Notation explains the word; Conjugation shewes its derivation and various termination.

The Fifth and Sixth Topicks are Genus and Species: now that is called Genus, which doth comprehend several things under it which are really different from one another. And that is called Form or Species, which may with other things be referred to one common Genus: And thus this word (Art) is a Genus in respect of the seven liberal sciences, as Grammar, Rhetorick, &c. And these sciences Grammar, Rhetorick, &c. are the forms and Species which are contained under this Genus or general term (Art.)

The first of these Topicks namely that which is called Genus, doth many times afford the Oratour plenty of matter; for by this meanes a finite proposition, that is a propoisiton that is confined to the circumstances of time, place and such like, is reduced to an infinite, and hath all those restrictions taken from it. From these Topicks we may argue two ways.

1. That which is spoken of the Genus may sometimes be also spoken of the Form or Species; as thus, if vertue be to be imbraced,

then Temperance ought to be imbraced also.

2. That which is denied of the Genus, may be also denied of the Species; as thus, if no liberal Art be necessary for a Souldier; then Rhetorick is not necessary for him.

The seventh Topick is Similitude; and similitude is the comparing of two or more things together, which are in themselves diverse, but do agree in some particular. For Example, a shadow and Glory are in themselves very different things: but yet they agree in this, tha the shadow doth accompany the body, and glory vertue. And hence Tully saith, that Glory is the shadow of vertue. Similitude may be collected, either from words, actions or fables; nay there is scarce any thing which may not in some particular be compared with another, sometimes it is used for to prove, but most commonly for illustration.

The eighth Topick is Dissimilitude; and Dissimilitude is the disagreeing of two or more things in some particular; from this Topick we argue thus: that which agreeth with one thing that is unlike, doth not necessarily agree with another; & that which doth not agree with some one thing, may yet agree

with some other particular: For example, Idle citizens care not what mischief doth befall the Commonwealth; therefore the more generous and publick spirited men, must endeavour to keep the Republick from danger.

The ninth Topick is from Contraries; and those things are said to be contraries, which cannot both at the same time agree with one and the same thing: thus no man can be said to be wise in that thing, in which he is a fool.

Contraries are distinguished into four ranks or kinds: Adverse, Privitive, Relative and Contradictory; in these severall kinds of contraries we are wont to argue either by way of affirmation or by way of negation.

In those Contraries which we call adverse, we argue rightly, if we deny that of one thing or person, which we affirm of another, as thus; there is no safety in Warre, all men doe therefore desire peace.

In those Contraries, which are Privative, we argue rightly, when one privative is denied of that person, of which another is affirmed, as thus: you wish me poverty, because you envy my prosperous and wealthy condition.

In Relative contraries, we argue rightly, when one is inferred from the relation which it hath unto the other for example, if you be a Schollar, pray tell me who is your Master.

In Contradictory contraries, we argue rightly, when one being denied, the other is affirmed, or the contrary; as thus, He is just, he is not just.

The tenth Topick is from such things as are opposite to one another: And they are said to be opposites to one another, which can never agree together: as wrath and friendship; from which sort of Topicks, the way of arguing is, to deny that of one opposite which is affirmed of the other as thus, If Peter have a mind to kill Paul, surely he can have no love for him.

In the use of these Topicks we must consider how things that are contraries, unlike or oppoiste, do differ from one another. Those things are said to be contrary, which cannot agree with one another; things that are unlike doe not disagree, but are diverse; but in things that are opposite, when one of the contraries is expressed, we are to answer it by the effect of the other; as thus, to love and to hurt; for to hurt doth proceed from hatred, and hatred is contrary unto love.

The eleventh Topick is Comparison, and Comparison is the comparing of one thing with another. This is either equall or unequall.

Equal comparison is, when two equall things ar compared together. As thus; he hath deceived thee, therefore he will deceive me also.

Unequall comparison is two waies, first when we argue from the greater to the less: As, God spared not the Angels that sinned, how then shall he spare man?

Secondly, when we argue from the less to the greater: As, he will not let one sin go unpunished: much more will he therefore punish a multitude of sins.

Comparison doth differ from Similitude; in that two things are compared together in respect of some third; but in Similitude there is no respect unto a third, but to one another only: as thus, It is lawfull for M. Antony to defend Clodius; why may not Tully then defend Milo? Here the comparison is between Tully and Anthony, but it is in respect of a third, that is, in respect of Defence. But in this, As they that are sick, thinke all things loathsome, though never so sweet; so they that are wicked cannot relish the best Societies: Here the sick in body are compared to the sick in mind, that is to the wicked, but not in respect of a

third, but in respect of their own corrupted tastes.

The twelvth Topick is from the causes of things: And that is said to be a cause, from whence a thing may in any sort be said to be produced.

We commonly reckon four sorts of causes, Efficient, Material, Formal and Finall.

The efficient cause is that which maketh a thing: Thus the Sun causeth or maketh the Day; to this may instruments and all other things be referred, which do only assist in the making as well as those which make the thing: as a Pen is an assistant in writing. From this cause we argue thus: If the cause be granted, we grant the effect also: if it be praised or dispraised, we praise or dispraise the effect also.

The Material cause is that of which a thing is made, or is imployed in; as money of Gold, and an Oratour about every matter or thing. From this cause we argue thus; If matter be afforded, there may be such an effect, and the goodness or the badness of the effect depends upon the goodness or the badness of the matter.

The formal cause is that by which the thing is what it is, or that by which it is distinguished from other things. Thus a Ship and a Timber house do differ by the diverse disposing of the parts. In this cause we argue from the excellence or the meaness of the form; the more excellent the form is, the better is the thing, and any deficiency in the form doth make it the worse: and every thing should be proportionable to his form: and hence a man should aim at immortal things, because his soul (which is his form) is made immortal.

The final cause is that for which a thing is made: and the end for which we do anything, is generally one of these three, because it is either honest, profitable or delightfull. From this cause we argue according to these Axiomes. Such as the end is, such are the things that are done to that end. If the end be good or bad, the things referred to that end are good or bad also.

The thirteenth Topick is from the Effects, and those are said to be Effects which are produced by their causes. From these we argue either by inferring the cause, the effect being granted, or by denying the cause, the effect being granted, or by denying the cause, the effect being denied; or by commending

the cause, if the effects be good, or by condemning it, if the effects be bad: and these heads drawn from the causes and effects, do afford great plenty of matter for discourse.

The fourteenth Topick is from the Adjuncts, and those are said to be adjuncts, which are joyned with the thing, but not of necessity; to wit, such as are joyned to persons or things. Tully reckons up twelve of the first sort, viz. Of the Person, as the Name, the Nature, Quality &c, the Habit, the Fortune, the Life, the Affection, the Studies, Councells, Actions, Chances, and Speeches. The Adjuncts of a thing are commonly six. Place, Time Occasion, Manner, Faculty, and Instrument; but some there are which do reduce them to these seven.

Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando.
In English thus,
First ask, Who, What, and Where, and then,
What Aide, with Why, and How, and When.

Quis, who, doth signifie the quality of the Person, in which there must be considered

his nature, sex, age, nation, kindred and estate, in respect of his body, mind and fortune.

Quid, what, importeth an enquiry after the nature of the thing, as whether it be of importance or not; whether great or small; noble or ignoble.

Ubi, where, denotes the place.

Quibus auxiliis, with what aide, notes an enquiry concerning the person, that joyned with him in the action, or other instruments by which it was effected.

Cur, why, denotes the finall cause, with what intent or to what end it was done.

Quomodo, how, shewes the manner of doing it, as namely with what ease, or how hardly.

Quando, when, notes the time in which it was done, and this head doth many times afford great plenty of matter.

The fifteenth and the sixteenth Topicks are the Antecedents and the Consequents. Those are called Antecedents, which go before the thing; as, you made him tremble, therefore he is sensible.

They are called consequents, which do necessarily follow the thing; as, he that is thrust

through the heart must needs dye. From the Antecedents we argue thus. The Antecedent being granted, the consequent must needs follow; as, he is wounded in the heart, therefore he will dye. But from the Consequents we argue thus: If the consequent be affirmed, the antecedent is affirmed; as, It is a great gash, therefore it was a great blow that made it; if the Consequent be denied, the antecedent is denied also; as, he is not dead, therefore he is not wounded in the heart. And these are the Intrinsecal or Artificial Topicks from whence arguments may be raised on any Theam or matter propounded. For illustration sake, I will shew you, how, from these Topicks, a matter for an Oration may be raised from this Theam or proposition, Clodius laid snares for Milo.

The Praxis.

Every Theam or proposition doth consist of three parts, a Subject, a Predicate, and a Copula. That is called the Subject, of which we speak; The Predicate, that which is spoken of the Subject; and the Copula is some Verbe which joynes the subject with the predicate. In this proposition Clodius is the Subject, because it is of him that we are to

speak, to lay snares is the predicate, because that is the thing which is said of Clodius.

Now therefore if you would find out arguments on this Subject, consider well, which is the Subject, and which is the Predicate in your proposiiton: Then take the Subject and go through every Topick: first go to Definition, and ask what it is, what is the nature of it, and how it is distinguished from other things. Then go to Division, and see into how many parts the Subject may be divided; and so forward from Topick to Topick. And still observe to your self every argument, which doth by this means arise from the Subject, and applie it to the Predicate, so shall you easily see, whether it doth fully confirme your proposition; and when you have done with the Subject, take the Predicate, and run through the several Topicks, with that also; but if the matter require it, and that you judge it more convenient to take the whole proposition, than Subject and predicate apart by themselves, you may in that manner run through all the heads of Invention, but stay not too long upon any one, for if matter offer not it self in one head go to another, for every head perhaps may not afford matter,

at least not such as is apt and fit. But if you would know whether your argument or matter be drawn from the Subject or the predicate, put it into the form of Syllogism, and if the Major be most certain, you may couclude, that the argument is drawn from the Predicate, but if the minor be most certaine, it is then drawn from the Subject. When you have found your arguments which prove the proposition, you must reduce them also into the form of Syllogism, consisting of three propositions; The Major, Minor, and Conclusion; and then in the same manner as hath been shewed, you must seek out arguments to confirm every proposition, if need be: to which purpose, Similies, Examples, Apothegmes, sentences and such like are very serviceable and ought to be had in readiness. But for the more easie finding out of convenient matter you must consult such bookes which are written upon the subject in hand, among the rest Polyanthea, Theatrum vitæ humanæ, Feltham's Resolves, and such like.