University of Virginia Library

3. CHAP. III
Of the Sharpness and ingenuity becoming an Oration.

Such is the Curiosity of this age in which we live, as that it is grown weary of these plain and ordinary waies, an requireth or expecteth in the very style something more than ordinary; insomuch that now a daies he is not worthy the name of an Orator, that knowes not how to brandish an Oration, by some sharp and witty flourishes. And therefore, that we may comply with the present times, we will also speak something of that sharpness or ingenuity, with which an oration should be adorned.

And first I will shew you what is meant by sharpness or ingenuity: as Material sharpness then, is the meeting of two lines or sides in one point: so Metaphorical sharpness is an agreeing discord, or a disagreeing concord, that is, we are then

said to speake smartly or wittily, when the predicate and subject of an oration, do agree with one another in one part, and disagree in another.

This sharpness or acuteness is threefold, unnatural, præternatural, or natural.

Unnatural sharpness is, when two things agree that are in themselves unlike, opposite and contrary, or any way differing; or when there is a different application of the subject and predicate; as thus:

It is against nature that cold should proceed from fire. Yet seeing that many by that meanes have defended their chastitie, and restrained the heat of lust, it is fitly said, that cold proceeds from fire.

Præternatural sharpness is that, which is not indeed against nature, but yet is very unusual: as, Martial:

Deliciæ populi que fuerunt Domini.

Natural sharpness is that which doth agree

with the nature of the thing; as Martial:

Impensis vitam Principis annumeres.

It is the Kings grace that you are alive. As if he had said thus, You are beholding to the King for your life; whereas naturally, it becomes a King to preserve the lives of his subjects.

The best of these three is that which is called unnatural, because it begetteth great admiration.

The wayes by which this disagreeing concord between the subject and the predicate may be made, are chiefly four:

1. By annexing to the subject a disagreeing Epithite; as, an innocent ruin: a confused order.

2. By annexing to the subject another disagreeing substantive. As, The Sun is a fountain of light.

3. By a Catacresis either in the Adjective, in the Sustantive, or in the Verb. First in the Adjective; as, a brazen forehead, meaning shameless.

In the Sustantive, as if you call Almes, an holy rain, or a golden shower of piety.

In the Verb, as thus; the waters made

the Souldiers valiant and compelled them to fight: that is they were the more couragious, because being near the Sea it was impossible to fly.

4. When the predicate is both affirmed and denied of the subject in a different sence; as the Poet speaking of a Virgin that lost her beauty to preserve her chastity said: And then she thought her self most beautifull, when she had lost her beauty.

Matter in which to exemplifie these severall wayes of making an agreeing discord between the subject and the predicate in a proposition may be had first from the Logicall Topicks of Definition, Division, &c. for there is none of them so barren from whence with a little consideration you may not collect something that is smart and ingenious. Biderm.

Where he sheweth that tears are the waters

proper for or becoming funerals. To run through all the Topicks would be tedious, only observe, that the chiefe for this matter, are these, Final causes, effects, adjuncts, contraries and opposites: for hence it will be easie to find something consentaneous and dissentaneous to the subject.

Secondly, Matter may be had from some Paradox, or some unusual speech.

And unto this head may those be reduced, which are drawn from pleasant jests: as,

First from Metaphors; as if one seeing a horse with an ill favoured mouth should say, the Horse laughs.

2. From a Paronomasia: as, Eminent men of great note, are now a daies most subject to imminent dangers.

3. From the Etymologie of the name:

4. From some rare and pleasant story.

Thirdly, From some lesson of Morality.

Fourthly, From some Ambiguous word.

Fifthly, From some Trope and Figure in Rhetorick, especially from some Metaphor, Allegory, Catachresis, Metonymie, Prosopopœa, &c.

And now though these directions, for the finding out of something in a proposition

that is smart and ingenious are in themselves good, yet methinks they are not clear and perspicuous enough; here therefore I will set down what Horatius P. Matthias Sarbievius hath more plainly exprest by way of Praxis, though much to the same purpose.

The first Praxis is, when some magnitude, bulk, majesty, authority, largness, or destruction is fitly applied to any thing, in a doubtful sence; and is indifferent whether it be taken really or Morally. Thus Seneca, Epist. 66. saith, that Scævola being lame and unarmed, made war, and with that lame hand he overcame two Kings.

The second Praxis is the contrary unto this, when a thing is diminished either in quantity, or estimation, and in a doubtfull sence.

The third Praxis is when this Sharpness doth actually contain the cause, or doubtfully insinuate some truth of a contrary effect.

The fourth Praxis is from the ambiguity of some word or sentence, as when it doth in truth signifie one thing, but is in tended to signifie another. Thus when Julius Montanus was repeating his verses,

and having described the rising of the Sun, and began to describe the manner of his setting, one of the company would have gone his way; and being asked the reason, said, Could I heare him any longer than from Sunrise, to Sunset?

The fifth Praxis is, when that is applied to an inanimate thing, which is proper to a thing that hath life, yet so, as that the sence and meaning is understood, by some action of the thing of which we speak, being applied to something of a contrary nature. Thus Pliny speaking to one, that went to plough, after he had gotten the victory in battaile, saith: The earth rejoyceth to shew it self to one that is victorious, and being tilled by a conquerour, she waxeth proud with her early fullness of princely fruites. And thus Saint Augustin upon these words of Christ, I am the true light, saith, Rise then thou sluggard, the way it self doth come unto thee, and rouzeth thee from sleep, rise and walk.

He also speaketh acutely, who applieth naturall things to things artificial.

Thus the Poet, of one that had a long nose, saith,

The Sixt Praxis is, when that which doth agree with real persons, is applied to those that are not real. So he in Plautus, Our hands have eyes, and think they see. But this way is most pleasing, when in one and the same thing, the application is both true and false: such is that of Augustus Cæsar, when he said, that he had two nice daughters, which he was compelled to beare with; the one was his daughter Julia; and the other the common wealth.

There is yet another way of Inventing that which is sharp and witty; that is by comparing the matter with the Oratorical heads and Topicks: this may be done three wayes.

First, by comparing the matter in hand with every topick severally; by considering what the thing is which we are to speak, what the Parts, the Genus, Species, adjuncts

and the rest. Thus doth that Prince of Roman Eloquence, deride the consulship of Vatinius, by reckoning up the parts of the year in which he was not Consul : There happened,saith he, a wonderfull thing in the year of Vatinius, for while he was Consul, there was neither Spring, nor Autumn, neither Summer nor Winter.

Secondly, by comparing one head of the matter in hand, with another different head of the same thing: as the definition of the thing with its adjuncts, or of the effects with the Causes. Thus Valerius Maximus by comparing the body with the soul, finds out this smart commendation of Lucretia: Lucretia, saith he, that mirrour of Roman chastitie, whose manlike courage was by an evil mistake of fortune, confined to a female body.

Thirdly, by comparing the Topicks of one order, with other Topicks of the same order, as definition with definition, cause with cause, &c. as for example, the King whom Mutius Scævola could not conquer by his armed band, he made to fly, by setting his hand on fire. Here the acuteness lies, in comparing of one cause with another, that is his armed hand, with his hand in the flames. And thus much concerning Invention.