§. 164. But since a rational creature cannot be supposed, when free, to put
himself into subjection to another for his own harm (though where he finds a
good and a wise ruler he may not, perhaps, think it either necessary or useful
to set precise bounds to his power in all things), prerogative can be nothing
but the people's permitting their rulers to do several things of their own free
choice where the law was silent, and sometimes too against the direct letter of
the law, for the public good and their acquiescing in it when so done. For as a
good prince, who is mindful of the trust put into his hands and careful of the
good of his people, cannot have too much prerogative — that is, power to
do good, so a weak and ill prince, who would claim that power his predecessors
exercised, without the direction of the law, as a prerogative belonging to him
by right of his office, which he may exercise at his pleasure to make or
promote an interest distinct from that of the public, gives the people an
occasion to claim their right and limit that power, which, whilst it was
exercised for their good, they were content should be tacitly allowed.
