Chapter 6
Of Paternal Power
§. 52. IT may perhaps be censured an impertinent criticism in a discourse of
this nature to find fault with words and names that have obtained in the world.
And yet possibly it may not be amiss to offer new ones when the old are apt to
lead men into mistakes, as this of paternal power probably has done, which
seems so to place the power of parents over their children wholly in the
father, as if the mother had no share in it; whereas if we consult reason or
revelation, we shall find she has an equal title, which may give one reason to
ask whether this might not be more properly called parental power? For whatever
obligation Nature and the right of generation lays on children, it must
certainly bind them equal to both the concurrent causes of it. And accordingly
we see the positive law of God everywhere joins them together without
distinction, when it commands the obedience of children: "Honour thy
father and thy mother" (Exod. 20. 12); "Whosoever curseth his father
or his mother" (Lev. 20. 9); "Ye shall fear every man his mother and
his father" (Lev. 19. 3); "Children, obey your parents" (Eph. 6.
1), etc., is the style of the Old and New Testament.
§. 53. Had but this one thing been well considered without looking any deeper
into the matter, it might perhaps have kept men from running into those gross
mistakes they have made about this power of parents, which however it might
without any great harshness bear the name of absolute dominion and regal
authority, when under the title of "paternal" power, it seemed
appropriated to the father; would yet have sounded but oddly, and in the very
name shown the absurdity, if this supposed absolute power over children had
been called parental, and thereby discovered that it belonged to the mother
too. For it will but very ill serve the turn of those men who contend so much
for the absolute power and authority of the fatherhood, as they call it, that
the mother should have any share in it. And it would have but ill supported the
monarchy they contend for, when by the very name it appeared that that
fundamental authority from whence they would derive their government of a
single person only was not placed in one, but two persons jointly. But to let
this of names pass.
§. 54. Though I have said above (2) "That all men by nature are
equal," I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of
"equality." Age or virtue may give men a just precedency. Excellency
of parts and merit may place others above the common level. Birth may subject
some, and alliance or benefits others, to pay an observance to those to whom
Nature, gratitude, or other respects, may have made it due; and yet all this
consists with the equality which all men are in respect of jurisdiction or
dominion one over another, which was the equality I there spoke of as proper to
the business in hand, being that equal right that every man hath to his natural
freedom, without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man.
§. 55. Children, I confess, are not born in this full state of equality,
though they are born to it. Their parents have a sort of rule and jurisdiction
over them when they come into the world, and for some time after, but it is but
a temporary one. The bonds of this subjection are like the swaddling clothes
they are wrapt up in and supported by in the weakness of their infancy. Age and
reason as they grow up loosen them, till at length they drop quite off, and
leave a man at his own free disposal.
§. 56. Adam was created a perfect man, his body and mind in full possession of
their strength and reason, and so was capable from the first instance of his
being to provide for his own support and preservation, and govern his actions
according to the dictates of the law of reason God had implanted in him. From
him the world is peopled with his descendants, who are all born infants, weak
and helpless, without knowledge or understanding. But to supply the defects of
this imperfect state till the improvement of growth and age had removed them,
Adam and Eve, and after them all parents were, by the law of Nature, under an
obligation to preserve, nourish and educate the children they had begotten, not
as their own workmanship, but the workmanship of their own Maker, the Almighty,
to whom they were to be accountable for them.
§. 57. The law that was to govern Adam was the same that was to govern all his
posterity, the law of reason. But his offspring having another way of entrance
into the world, different from him, by a natural birth, that produced them
ignorant, and without the use of reason, they were not presently under that
law. For nobody can be under a law that is not promulgated to him; and this law
being promulgated or made known by reason only, he that is not come to the use
of his reason cannot be said to be under this law; and Adam's children being
not presently as soon as born under this law of reason, were not presently
free. For law, in its true notion, is not so much the limitation as the
direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest, and
prescribes no farther than is for the general good of those under that law.
Could they be happier without it, the law, as a useless thing, would of itself
vanish; and that ill deserves the name of confinement which hedges us in only
from bogs and precipices. So that however it may be mistaken, the end of law is
not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom. For in all the
states of created beings, capable of laws, where there is no law there is no
freedom. For liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others,
which cannot be where there is no law; and is not, as we are told, "a
liberty for every man to do what he lists." For who could be free, when
every other man's humour might domineer over him? But a liberty to dispose and
order freely as he lists his person, actions, possessions, and his whole
property within the allowance of those laws under which he is, and therein not
to be subject to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.
§. 58. The power, then, that parents have over their children arises from that
duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of their offspring during the
imperfect state of childhood. To inform the mind, and govern the actions of
their yet ignorant nonage, till reason shall take its place and ease them of
that trouble, is what the children want, and the parents are bound to. For God
having given man an understanding to direct his actions, has allowed him a
freedom of will and liberty of acting, as properly belonging thereunto within
the bounds of that law he is under. But whilst he is in an estate wherein he
has no understanding of his own to direct his will, he is not to have any will
of his own to follow. He that understands for him must will for him too; he
must prescribe to his will, and regulate his actions, but when he comes to the
estate that made his father a free man, the son is a free man too.
§. 59. This holds in all the laws a man is under, whether natural or civil. Is
a man under the law of Nature? What made him free of that law? what gave him a
free disposing of his property, according to his own will, within the compass
of that law? I answer, an estate wherein he might be supposed capable to know
that law, that so he might keep his actions within the bounds of it. When he
has acquired that state, he is presumed to know how far that law is to be his
guide, and how far he may make use of his freedom, and so comes to have it;
till then, somebody else must guide him, who is presumed to know how far the
law allows a liberty. If such a state of reason, such an age of discretion made
him free, the same shall make his son free too. Is a man under the law of
England? what made him free of that law — that is, to have the liberty to
dispose of his actions and possessions, according to his own will, within the
permission of that law? a capacity of knowing that law. Which is supposed, by
that law, at the age of twenty-one, and in some cases sooner. If this made the
father free, it shall make the son free too. Till then, we see the law allows
the son to have no will, but he is to be guided by the will of his father or
guardian, who is to understand for him. And if the father die and fail to
substitute a deputy in this trust, if he hath not provided a tutor to govern
his son during his minority, during his want of understanding, the law takes
care to do it: some other must govern him and be a will to him till he hath
attained to a state of freedom, and his understanding be fit to take the
government of his will. But after that the father and son are equally free, as
much as tutor and pupil, after nonage, equally subjects of the same law
together, without any dominion left in the father over the life, liberty, or
estate of his son, whether they be only in the state and under the law of
Nature, or under the positive laws of an established government.
§. 60. But if through defects that may happen out of the ordinary course of
Nature, any one comes not to such a degree of reason wherein he might be
supposed capable of knowing the law, and so living within the rules of it, he
is never capable of being a free man, he is never let loose to the disposure of
his own will; because he knows no bounds to it, has not understanding, its
proper guide, but is continued under the tuition and government of others all
the time his own understanding is incapable of that charge. And so lunatics and
idiots are never set free from the government of their parents:
"Children
who are not as yet come unto those years whereat they may have, and innocents,
which are excluded by a natural defect from ever having." Thirdly:
"Madmen, which, for the present, cannot possibly have the use of right
reason to guide themselves, have, for their guide, the reason that guideth
other men which are tutors over them, to seek and procure their good for
them,"
says Hooker (Eccl. Pol., lib. i., s. 7). All which seems no more
than that duty which God and Nature has laid on man, as well as other
creatures, to preserve their offspring till they can be able to shift for
themselves, and will scarce amount to an instance or proof of parents' regal
authority.
§. 61. Thus we are born free as we are born rational; not that we have
actually the exercise of either: age that brings one, brings with it the other
too. And thus we see how natural freedom and subjection to parents may consist
together, and are both founded on the same principle. A child is free by his
father's title, by his father's understanding, which is to govern him till he
hath it of his own. The freedom of a man at years of discretion, and the
subjection of a child to his parents, whilst yet short of it, are so consistent
and so distinguishable that the most blinded contenders for monarchy, "by
right of fatherhood," cannot miss of it; the most obstinate cannot but
allow of it. For were their doctrine all true, were the right heir of Adam now
known, and, by that title, settled a monarch in his throne, invested with all
the absolute unlimited power Sir Robert Filmer talks of, if he should die as
soon as his heir were born, must not the child, notwithstanding he were never
so free, never so much sovereign, be in subjection to his mother and nurse, to
tutors and governors, till age and education brought him reason and ability to
govern himself and others? The necessities of his life, the health of his body,
and the information of his mind would require him to be directed by the will of
others and not his own; and yet will any one think that this restraint and
subjection were inconsistent with, or spoiled him of, that liberty or
sovereignty he had a right to, or gave away his empire to those who had the
government of his nonage? This government over him only prepared him the better
and sooner for it. If anybody should ask me when my son is of age to be free, I
shall answer, just when his monarch is of age to govern.
"But at what
time," says the judicious Hooker (Eccl. Pol., lib. i., s. 6), "a man
may be said to have attained so far forth the use of reason as sufficeth to
make him capable of those laws whereby he is then bound to guide his actions;
this is a great deal more easy for sense to discern than for any one, by skill
and learning, to determine."
§. 62. Commonwealths themselves take notice of, and allow that there is a time
when men are to begin to act like free men, and therefore, till that time,
require not oaths of fealty or allegiance, or other public owning of, or
submission to, the government of their countries.
§. 63. The freedom then of man, and liberty of acting according to his own
will, is grounded on his having reason, which is able to instruct him in that
law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far he is left to the
freedom of his own will. To turn him loose to an unrestrained liberty, before
he has reason to guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege of his nature
to be free, but to thrust him out amongst brutes, and abandon him to a state as
wretched and as much beneath that of a man as theirs. This is that which puts
the authority into the parents' hands to govern the minority of their children.
God hath made it their business to employ this care on their offspring, and
hath placed in them suitable inclinations of tenderness and concern to temper
this power, to apply it as His wisdom designed it, to the children's good as
long as they should need to be under it.
§. 64. But what reason can hence advance this care of the parents due to their
offspring into an absolute, arbitrary dominion of the father, whose power
reaches no farther than by such a discipline as he finds most effectual to give
such strength and health to their bodies, such vigour and rectitude to their
minds, as may best fit his children to be most useful to themselves and others,
and, if it be necessary to his condition, to make them work when they are able
for their own subsistence; but in this power the mother, too, has her share
with the father.
§. 65. Nay, this power so little belongs to the father by any peculiar right
of Nature, but only as he is guardian of his children, that when he quits his
care of them he loses his power over them, which goes along with their
nourishment and education, to which it is inseparably annexed, and belongs as
much to the foster-father of an exposed child as to the natural father of
another. So little power does the bare act of begetting give a man over his
issue, if all his care ends there, and this be all the title he hath to the
name and authority of a father. And what will become of this paternal power in
that part of the world where one woman hath more than one husband at a time? or
in those parts of America where, when the husband and wife part, which happens
frequently, the children are all left to the mother, follow her, and are wholly
under her care and provision? And if the father die whilst the children are
young, do they not naturally everywhere owe the same obedience to their mother,
during their minority, as to their father, were he alive? And will any one say
that the mother hath a legislative power over her children that she can make
standing rules which shall be of perpetual obligation, by which they ought to
regulate all the concerns of their property, and bound their liberty all the
course of their lives, and enforce the observation of them with capital
punishments? For this is the proper power of the magistrate, of which the
father hath not so much as the shadow. His command over his children is but
temporary, and reaches not their life or property. It is but a help to the
weakness and imperfection of their nonage, a discipline necessary to their
education. And though a father may dispose of his own possessions as he pleases
when his children are out of danger of perishing for want, yet his power
extends not to the lives or goods which either their own industry, or another's
bounty, has made theirs, nor to their liberty neither when they are once
arrived to the enfranchisement of the years of discretion. The father's empire
then ceases, and he can from thenceforward no more dispose of the liberty of
his son than that of any other man. And it must be far from an absolute or
perpetual jurisdiction from which a man may withdraw himself, having licence
from Divine authority to "leave father and mother and cleave to his
wife."
§. 66. But though there be a time when a child comes to be as free from
subjection to the will and command of his father as he himself is free from
subjection to the will of anybody else, and they are both under no other
restraint but that which is common to them both, whether it be the law of
Nature or municipal law of their country, yet this freedom exempts not a son
from that honour which he ought, by the law of God and Nature, to pay his
parents, God having made the parents instruments in His great design of
continuing the race of mankind and the occasions of life to their children. As
He hath laid on them an obligation to nourish, preserve, and bring up their
offspring, so He has laid on the children a perpetual obligation of honouring
their parents, which, containing in it an inward esteem and reverence to be
shown by all outward expressions, ties up the child from anything that may ever
injure or affront, disturb or endanger the happiness or life of those from whom
he received his, and engages him in all actions of defence, relief, assistance,
and comfort of those by whose means he entered into being and has been made
capable of any enjoyments of life. From this obligation no state, no freedom,
can absolve children. But this is very far from giving parents a power of
command over their children, or an authority to make laws and dispose as they
please of their lives or liberties. It is one thing to owe honour, respect,
gratitude, and assistance; another to require an absolute obedience and
submission. The honour due to parents a monarch on his throne owes his mother,
and yet this lessens not his authority nor subjects him to her government.
§. 67. The subjection of a minor places in the father a temporary government
which terminates with the minority of the child; and the honour due from a
child places in the parents a perpetual right to respect, reverence, support,
and compliance, to more or less, as the father's care, cost, and kindness in
his education has been more or less, and this ends not with minority, but holds
in all parts and conditions of a man's life. The want of distinguishing these
two powers which the father hath, in the right of tuition, during minority, and
the right of honour all his life, may perhaps have caused a great part of the
mistakes about this matter. For, to speak properly of them, the first of these
is rather the privilege of children and duty of parents than any prerogative of
paternal power. The nourishment and education of their children is a charge so
incumbent on parents for their children's good, that nothing can absolve them
from taking care of it. And though the power of commanding and chastising them
go along with it, yet God hath woven into the principles of human nature such a
tenderness for their offspring, that there is little fear that parents should
use their power with too much rigour; the excess is seldom on the severe side,
the strong bias of nature drawing the other way. And therefore God Almighty,
when He would express His gentle dealing with the Israelites, He tells them
that though He chastened them, "He chastened them as a man chastens his
son" (Deut. 8. 5) — i.e., with tenderness and affection, and kept
them under no severer discipline than what was absolutely best for them, and
had been less kindness, to have slackened. This is that power to which children
are commanded obedience, that the pains and care of their parents may not be
increased or ill-rewarded.
§. 68. On the other side, honour and support all that which gratitude requires
to return; for the benefits received by and from them is the indispensable duty
of the child and the proper privilege of the parents. This is intended for the
parents' advantage, as the other is for the child's; though education, the
parents' duty, seems to have most power, because the ignorance and infirmities
of childhood stand in need of restraint and correction, which is a visible
exercise of rule and a kind of dominion. And that duty which is comprehended in
the word "honour" requires less obedience, though the obligation be
stronger on grown than younger children. For who can think the command,
"Children, obey your parents," requires in a man that has children of
his own the same submission to his father as it does in his yet young children
to him, and that by this precept he were bound to obey all his father's
commands, if, out of a conceit of authority, he should have the indiscretion to
treat him still as a boy?
§. 69. The first part, then, of paternal power, or rather duty, which is
education, belongs so to the father that it terminates at a certain season.
When the business of education is over it ceases of itself, and is also
alienable before. For a man may put the tuition of his son in other hands; and
he that has made his son an apprentice to another has discharged him, during
that time, of a great part of his obedience, both to himself and to his mother.
But all the duty of honour, the other part, remains nevertheless entire to
them; nothing can cancel that. It is so inseparable from them both, that the
father's authority cannot dispossess the mother of this right, nor can any man
discharge his son from honouring her that bore him. But both these are very far
from a power to make laws, and enforcing them with penalties that may reach
estate, liberty, limbs, and life. The power of commanding ends with nonage, and
though after that honour and respect, support and defence, and whatsoever
gratitude can oblige a man to, for the highest benefits he is naturally capable
of be always due from a son to his parents, yet all this puts no sceptre into
the father's hand, no sovereign power of commanding. He has no dominion over
his son's property or actions, nor any right that his will should prescribe to
his son's in all things; however, it may become his son in many things, not
very inconvenient to him and his family, to pay a deference to it.
§. 70. A man may owe honour and respect to an ancient or wise man, defence to
his child or friend, relief and support to the distressed, and gratitude to a
benefactor, to such a degree that all he has, all he can do, cannot
sufficiently pay it. But all these give no authority, no right of making laws
to any one over him from whom they are owing. And it is plain all this is due,
not to the bare title of father, not only because as has been said, it is owing
to the mother too, but because these obligations to parents, and the degrees of
what is required of children, may be varied by the different care and kindness
trouble and expense, is often employed upon one child more than another.
§. 71. This shows the reason how it comes to pass that parents in societies,
where they themselves are subjects, retain a power over their children and have
as much right to their subjection as those who are in the state of Nature,
which could not possibly be if all political power were only paternal, and
that, in truth, they were one and the same thing; for then, all paternal power
being in the prince, the subject could naturally have none of it. But these two
powers, political and paternal, are so perfectly distinct and separate, and
built upon so different foundations, and given to so different ends, that every
subject that is a father has as much a paternal power over his children as the
prince has over his. And every prince that has parents owes them as much filial
duty and obedience as the meanest of his subjects do to theirs, and can
therefore contain not any part or degree of that kind of dominion which a
prince or magistrate has over his subject.
§. 72. Though the obligation on the parents to bring up their children, and
the obligation on children to honour their parents, contain all the power, on
the one hand, and submission on the other, which are proper to this relation,
yet there is another power ordinarily in the father, whereby he has a tie on
the obedience of his children, which, though it be common to him with other
men, yet the occasions of showing it, almost constantly happening to fathers in
their private families and in instances of it elsewhere being rare, and less
taken notice of, it passes in the world for a part of "paternal
jurisdiction." And this is the power men generally have to bestow their
estates on those who please them best. The possession of the father being the
expectation and inheritance of the children ordinarily, in certain proportions,
according to the law and custom of each country, yet it is commonly in the
father's power to bestow it with a more sparing or liberal hand, according as
the behaviour of this or that child hath comported with his will and humour.
§. 73. This is no small tie to the obedience of children; and there being
always annexed to the enjoyment of land a submission to the government of the
country of which that land is a part, it has been commonly supposed that a
father could oblige his posterity to that government of which he himself was a
subject, that his compact held them; whereas, it being only a necessary
condition annexed to the land which is under that government, reaches only
those who will take it on that condition, and so is no natural tie or
engagement, but a voluntary submission; for every man's children being, by
Nature, as free as himself or any of his ancestors ever were, may, whilst they
are in that freedom, choose what society they will join themselves to, what
commonwealth they will put themselves under. But if they will enjoy the
inheritance of their ancestors, they must take it on the same terms their
ancestors had it, and submit to all the conditions annexed to such a
possession. By this power, indeed, fathers oblige their children to obedience
to themselves even when they are past minority, and most commonly, too, subject
them to this or that political power. But neither of these by any peculiar
right of fatherhood, but by the reward they have in their hands to enforce and
recompense such a compliance, and is no more power than what a Frenchman has
over an Englishman, who, by the hopes of an estate he will leave him, will
certainly have a strong tie on his obedience; and if when it is left him, he
will enjoy it, he must certainly take it upon the conditions annexed to the
possession of land in that country where it lies, whether it be France or
England.
§. 74. To conclude, then, though the father's power of commanding extends no
farther than the minority of his children, and to a degree only fit for the
discipline and government of that age; and though that honour and respect, and
all that which the Latins called piety, which they indispensably owe to their
parents all their lifetime, and in all estates, with all that support and
defence, is due to them, gives the father no power of governing — i.e.,
making laws and exacting penalties on his children; though by this he has no
dominion over the property or actions of his son, yet it is obvious to conceive
how easy it was, in the first ages of the world, and in places still where the
thinness of people gives families leave to separate into unpossessed quarters,
and they have room to remove and plant themselves in yet vacant habitations,
for the father of the family to become the prince of it;[1]
he had been a ruler from the beginning of the infancy of his children; and when
they were grown up, since without some government it would be hard for them to
live together, it was likeliest it should, by the express or tacit consent of
the children, be in the father, where it seemed, without any change, barely to
continue. And when, indeed, nothing more was required to it than the permitting
the father to exercise alone in his family that executive power of the law of
Nature which every free man naturally hath, and by that permission resigning up
to him a monarchical power whilst they remained in it. But that this was not by
any paternal right, but only by the consent of his children, is evident from hence,
that nobody doubts but if a stranger, whom chance or business had brought to his
family, had there killed any of his children, or committed any other act, he might
condemn and put him to death, or otherwise have punished him as well as any of
his children. which was impossible he should do by virtue of any paternal
authority over one who was not his child, but by virtue of that executive power
of the law of Nature which, as a man, he had a right to; and he alone could
punish him in his family where the respect of his children had laid by the
exercise of such a power, to give way to the dignity and authority they were
willing should remain in him above the rest of his family.
§. 75. Thus it was easy and almost natural for children, by a tacit and almost
natural consent, to make way for the father's authority and government. They
had been accustomed in their childhood to follow his direction, and to refer
their little differences to him; and when they were men, who was fitter to rule
them? Their little properties and less covetousness seldom afforded greater
controversies; and when any should arise, where could they have a fitter umpire
than he, by whose care they had every one been sustained and brought up. and
who had a tenderness for them all? It is no wonder that they made no
distinction betwixt minority and full age, nor looked after one-and-twenty, or
any other age, that might make them the free disposers of themselves and
fortunes, when they could have no desire to be out of their pupilage. The
government they had been under during it continued still to be more their
protection than restraint; and they could nowhere find a greater security to
their peace, liberties, and fortunes than in the rule of a father.
§. 76. Thus the natural fathers of families, by an insensible change, became
the politic monarchs of them too; and as they chanced to live long, and leave
able and worthy heirs for several successions or otherwise, so they laid the
foundations of hereditary or elective kingdoms under several constitutions and
manors, according as chance, contrivance, or occasions happened to mould them.
But if princes have their titles in the father's right, and it be a sufficient
proof of the natural right of fathers to political authority, because they
commonly were those in whose hands we find, de facto, the exercise of
government, I say, if this argument be good, it will as strongly prove that all
princes, nay, princes only, ought to be priests, since it is as certain that in
the beginning "the father of the family was priest, as that he was ruler
in his own household."
Footnotes
[1]
. "It is no improbable opinion, therefore, which the
arch-philosopher was of, That the chief person in every household was always,
as it were, a king; so when numbers of households joined themselves in civil
societies together, kings were the first kind of governors among them, which is
also, as it seemeth, the reason why the name of fathers continued still in
them, who of fathers were made rulers; as also the ancient custom of governors
to do as Melchizedec; and being kings, to exercise the office of priests, which
fathers did, at the first, grew, perhaps, by the same occasion. Howbeit, this
is not the only kind of regimen that has been received in the world. The
inconveniencies of one kind have caused sundry others to be devised, so that,
in a word, all public regimen, of what kind soever, seemeth evidently to have
risen from the deliberate advice, consultation and composition between men,
judging it convenient and behoveful, there being no impossibility in Nature,
considered by itself, but that man might have lived without any public
regimen." Hooker, Eccl. Pol., i. 10.