Chapter 8
Of the Beginning of Political Societies
§. 95. MEN being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and
independent, no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the
political power of another without his own consent, which is done by agreeing
with other men, to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe,
and peaceable living, one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their
properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it. This any
number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are
left, as they were, in the liberty of the state of Nature. When any number of
men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby
presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a
right to act and conclude the rest.
§. 96. For, when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual,
made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power
to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the
majority. For that which acts any community, being only the consent of the
individuals of it, and it being one body, must move one way, it is necessary
the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is
the consent of the majority, or else it is impossible it should act or continue
one body, one community, which the consent of every individual that united into
it agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be
concluded by the majority. And therefore we see that in assemblies empowered to
act by positive laws where no number is set by that positive law which empowers
them, the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course
determines as having, by the law of Nature and reason, the power of the whole.
§. 97. And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic
under one government, puts himself under an obligation to every one of that
society to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by
it; or else this original compact, whereby he with others incorporates into one
society, would signify nothing, and be no compact if he be left free and under
no other ties than he was in before in the state of Nature. For what appearance
would there be of any compact? What new engagement if he were no farther tied
by any decrees of the society than he himself thought fit and did actually
consent to? This would be still as great a liberty as he himself had before his
compact, or any one else in the state of Nature, who may submit himself and
consent to any acts of it if he thinks fit.
§. 98. For if the consent of the majority shall not in reason be received as
the act of the whole, and conclude every individual, nothing but the consent of
every individual can make anything to be the act of the whole, which,
considering the infirmities of health and avocations of business, which in a
number though much less than that of a commonwealth, will necessarily keep many
away from the public assembly; and the variety of opinions and contrariety of
interests which unavoidably happen in all collections of men, it is next
impossible ever to be had. And, therefore, if coming into society be upon such
terms, it will be only like Cato's coming into the theatre, tantum ut exiret.
Such a constitution as this would make the mighty leviathan of a shorter
duration than the feeblest creatures, and not let it outlast the day it was
born in, which cannot be supposed till we can think that rational creatures
should desire and constitute societies only to be dissolved. For where the
majority cannot conclude the rest, there they cannot act as one body, and
consequently will be immediately dissolved again.
§. 99. Whosoever, therefore, out of a state of Nature unite into a community,
must be understood to give up all the power necessary to the ends for which
they unite into society to the majority of the community, unless they expressly
agreed in any number greater than the majority. And this is done by barely
agreeing to unite into one political society, which is all the compact that is,
or needs be, between the individuals that enter into or make up a commonwealth.
And thus, that which begins and actually constitutes any political society is
nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of majority, to unite
and incorporate into such a society. And this is that, and that only, which did
or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world.
§. 100. To this I find two objections made: 1. That there are no instances to
be found in story of a company of men, independent and equal one amongst
another, that met together, and in this way began and set up a government. 2.
It is impossible of right that men should do so, because all men, being born
under government, they are to submit to that, and are not at liberty to begin a
new one.
§. 101. To the first there is this to answer: That it is not at all to be
wondered that history gives us but a very little account of men that lived
together in the state of Nature. The inconveniencies of that condition, and the
love and want of society, no sooner brought any number of them together, but
they presently united and in corporated if they designed to continue together.
And if we may not suppose men ever to have been in the state of Nature, because
we hear not much of them in such a state, we may as well suppose the armies of
Salmanasser or Xerxes were never children, because we hear little of them till
they were men and embodied in armies. Government is everywhere antecedent to
records, and letters seldom come in amongst a people till a long continuation
of civil society has, by other more necessary arts, provided for their safety,
ease, and plenty. And then they begin to look after the history of their
founders, and search into their original when they have outlived the memory of
it. For it is with commonwealths as with particular persons, they are commonly
ignorant of their own births and infancies; and if they know anything of it,
they are beholding for it to the accidental records that others have kept of
it. And those that we have of the beginning of any polities in the world,
excepting that of the Jews, where God Himself immediately interposed, and which
favours not at all paternal dominion, are all either plain instances of such a
beginning as I have mentioned, or at least have manifest footsteps of it.
§. 102. He must show a strange inclination to deny evident matter of fact,
when it agrees not with his hypothesis, who will not allow that the beginning
of Rome and Venice were by the uniting together of several men, free and
independent one of another, amongst whom there was no natural superiority or
subjection. And if Josephus Acosta's word may be taken, he tells us that in
many parts of America there was no government at all. "There are great and
apparent conjectures," says he, "that these men [speaking of those of
Peru] for a long time had neither kings nor commonwealths, but lived in troops,
as they do this day in Florida — the Cheriquanas, those of Brazil, and
many other nations, which have no certain kings, but, as occasion is offered in
peace or war, they choose their captains as they please" (lib. i. cap.
25). If it be said, that every man there was born subject to his father, or the
head of his family. that the subjection due from a child to a father took away
not his freedom of uniting into what political society he thought fit, has been
already proved; but be that as it will, these men, it is evident, were actually
free; and whatever superiority some politicians now would place in any of them,
they themselves claimed it not; but, by consent, were all equal, till, by the
same consent, they set rulers over themselves. So that their politic societies
all began from a voluntary union, and the mutual agreement of men freely acting
in the choice of their governors and forms of government.
§. 103. And I hope those who went away from Sparta, with Palantus, mentioned
by Justin, will be allowed to have been freemen independent one of another, and
to have set up a government over themselves by their own consent. Thus I have
given several examples out of history of people, free and in the state of
Nature, that, being met together, incorporated and began a commonwealth. And if
the want of such instances be an argument to prove that government were not nor
could not be so begun, I suppose the contenders for paternal empire were better
let it alone than urge it against natural liberty; for if they can give so many
instances out of history of governments begun upon paternal right, I think
(though at least an argument from what has been to what should of right be of
no great force) one might, without any great danger, yield them the cause. But
if I might advise them in the case, they would do well not to search too much
into the original of governments as they have begun de facto, lest they should
find at the foundation of most of them something very little favourable to the
design they promote, and such a power as they contend for.
§. 104. But, to conclude: reason being plain on our side that men are
naturally free; and the examples of history showing that the governments of the
world, that were begun in peace, had their beginning laid on that foundation,
and were made by the consent of the people; there can be little room for doubt,
either where the right is, or what has been the opinion or practice of mankind
about the first erecting of governments.
§. 105. I will not deny that if we look back, as far as history will direct
us, towards the original of commonwealths, we shall generally find them under
the government and administration of one man. And I am also apt to believe that
where a family was numerous enough to subsist by itself, and continued entire
together, without mixing with others, as it often happens, where there is much
land and few people, the government commonly began in the father. For the
father having, by the law of Nature, the same power, with every man else, to
punish, as he thought fit, any offences against that law, might thereby punish
his transgressing children, even when they were men, and out of their pupilage;
and they were very likely to submit to his punishment, and all join with him
against the offender in their turns, giving him thereby power to execute his
sentence against any transgression, and so, in effect, make him the law-maker
and governor over all that remained in conjunction with his family. He was
fittest to be trusted; paternal affection secured their property and interest
under his care, and the custom of obeying him in their childhood made it easier
to submit to him rather than any other. If, therefore, they must have one to
rule them, as government is hardly to be avoided amongst men that live
together, who so likely to be the man as he that was their common father,
unless negligence, cruelty, or any other defect of mind or body, made him unfit
for it? But when either the father died. and left his next heir — for want
of age, wisdom, courage, or any other qualities — less fit for rule, or
where several families met and consented to continue together, there, it is not
to be doubted, but they used their natural freedom to set up him whom they
judged the ablest and most likely to rule well over them. Conformable hereunto
we find the people of America, who — living out of the reach of the
conquering swords and spreading domination of the two great empires of Peru and
Mexico — enjoyed their own natural freedom, though, caeteris paribus, they
commonly prefer the heir of their deceased king; yet, if they find him any way
weak or incapable, they pass him by, and set up the stoutest and bravest man
for their ruler.
§. 106. Thus, though looking back as far as records give us any account of
peopling the world, and the history of nations, we commonly find the government
to be in one hand, yet it destroys not that which I affirm — viz., that
the beginning of politic society depends upon the consent of the individuals to
join into and make one society, who, when they are thus incorporated, might set
up what form of government they thought fit. But this having given occasion to
men to mistake and think that, by Nature, government was monarchical, and
belonged to the father, it may not be amiss here to consider why people, in the
beginning, generally pitched upon this form, which, though perhaps the father's
pre-eminency might, in the first institution of some commonwealths, give a rise
to and place in the beginning the power in one hand, yet it is plain that the
reason that continued the form of government in a single person was not any
regard or respect to paternal authority, since all petty monarchies — that
is, almost all monarchies, near their original, have been commonly, at least
upon occasion, elective.
§. 107. First, then, in the beginning of things, the father's government of
the childhood of those sprung from him having accustomed them to the rule of
one man, and taught them that where it was exercised with care and skill, with
affection and love to those under it, it was sufficient to procure and preserve
men (all the political happiness they sought for in society), it was no wonder
that they should pitch upon and naturally run into that form of government
which, from their infancy, they had been all accustomed to, and which, by
experience, they had found both easy and safe. To which if we add, that
monarchy being simple and most obvious to men, whom neither experience had
instructed in forms of government, nor the ambition or insolence of empire had
taught to beware of the encroachments of prerogative or the inconveniencies of
absolute power, which monarchy, in succession, was apt to lay claim to and
bring upon them; it was not at all strange that they should not much trouble
themselves to think of methods of restraining any exorbitances of those to whom
they had given the authority over them, and of balancing the power of
government by placing several parts of it in different hands. They had neither
felt the oppression of tyrannical dominion, nor did the fashion of the age, nor
their possessions or way of living, which afforded little matter for
covetousness or ambition, give them any reason to apprehend or provide against
it; and, therefore, it is no wonder they put themselves into such a frame of
government as was not only, as I said, most obvious and simple, but also best
suited to their present state and condition, which stood more in need of
defence against foreign invasions and injuries than of multiplicity of laws
where there was but very little property, and wanted not variety of rulers and
abundance of officers to direct and look after their execution where there were
but few trespassers and few offenders. Since, then, those who liked one another
so well as to join into society cannot but be supposed to have some
acquaintance and friendship together, and some trust one in another, they could
not but have greater apprehensions of others than of one another; and,
therefore, their first care and thought cannot but be supposed to be, how to
secure themselves against foreign force. It was natural for them to put
themselves under a frame of government which might best serve to that end, and
choose the wisest and bravest man to conduct them in their wars and lead them
out against their enemies, and in this chiefly be their ruler.
§. 108. Thus we see that the kings of the Indians, in America, which is still
a pattern of the first ages in Asia and Europe, whilst the inhabitants were too
few for the country, and want of people and money gave men no temptation to
enlarge their possessions of land or contest for wider extent of ground, are
little more than generals of their armies; and though they command absolutely
in war, yet at home, and in time of peace, they exercise very little dominion,
and have but a very moderate sovereignty, the resolutions of peace and war
being ordinarily either in the people or in a council, though the war itself,
which admits not of pluralities of governors, naturally evolves the command
into the king's sole authority.
§. 109. And thus, in Israel itself, the chief business of their judges and
first kings seems to have been to be captains in war and leaders of their
armies, which (besides what is signified by "going out and in before the
people," which was, to march forth to war and home again at the heads of
their forces) appears plainly in the story of Jephtha. The Ammonites making war
upon Israel, the Gileadites, in fear, send to Jephtha, a bastard of their
family, whom they had cast off, and article with him, if he will assist them
against the Ammonites, to make him their ruler, which they do in these words:
"And the people made him head and captain over them" (Judges 11. 11),
which was, as it seems, all one as to be judge. "And he judged
Israel" (Judges 12. 7) — that is, was their captain-general —
"six years." So when Jotham upbraids the Shechemites with the
obligation they had to Gideon, who had been their judge and ruler, he tells
them: "He fought for you, and adventured his life for, and delivered you
out of the hands of Midian" (Judges 9. 17). Nothing mentioned of him but
what he did as a general, and, indeed, that is all is found in his history, or
in any of the rest of the judges. And Abimelech particularly is called king,
though at most he was but their general. And when, being weary of the
ill-conduct of Samuel's sons, the children of Israel desired a king, "like
all the nations, to judge them, and to go out before them, and to fight their
battles" (1 Sam. 8. 20), God, granting their desire, says to Samuel,
"I will send thee a man, and thou shalt anoint him to be captain over my
people Israel, that he may save my people out of the hands of the
Philistines" (ch. 9. 16). As if the only business of a king had been to
lead out their armies and fight in their defence; and, accordingly, at his
inauguration, pouring a vial of oil upon him, declares to Saul that "the
Lord had anointed him to be captain over his inheritance" (ch. 10. 1). And
therefore those who, after Saul being solemnly chosen and saluted king by the
tribes at Mispah, were unwilling to have him their king, make no other
objection but this, "How shall this man save us?" (ch. 10. 27), as if
they should have said: "This man is unfit to be our king, not having skill
and conduct enough in war to be able to defend us." And when God resolved
to transfer the government to David, it is in these words: "But now thy
kingdom shall not continue: the Lord hath sought Him a man after His own heart,
and the Lord hath commanded him to be captain over His people" (ch. 13.
14.). As if the whole kingly authority were nothing else but to be their
general; and therefore the tribes who had stuck to Saul's family, and opposed
David's reign, when they came to Hebron with terms of submission to him, they
tell him, amongst other arguments, they had to submit to him as to their king,
that he was, in effect, their king in Saul's time, and therefore they had no
reason but to receive him as their king now. "Also," say they,
"in time past, when Saul was king over us, thou wast he that leddest out
and broughtest in Israel, and the Lord said unto thee, Thou shalt feed my
people Israel, and thou shalt be a captain over Israel."
§. 110. Thus, whether a family, by degrees, grew up into a commonwealth, and
the fatherly authority being continued on to the elder son, every one in his
turn growing up under it tacitly submitted to it, and the easiness and equality
of it not offending any one, every one acquiesced till time seemed to have
confirmed it and settled a right of succession by prescription; or whether
several families, or the descendants of several families, whom chance,
neighbourhood, or business brought together, united into society; the need of a
general whose conduct might defend them against their enemies in war, and the
great confidence the innocence and sincerity of that poor but virtuous age,
such as are almost all those which begin governments that ever come to last in
the world, gave men one of another, made the first beginners of commonwealths
generally put the rule into one man's hand, without any other express
limitation or restraint but what the nature of the thing and the end of
government required. It was given them for the public good and safety, and to
those ends, in the infancies of commonwealths, they commonly used it; and
unless they had done so, young societies could not have subsisted. Without such
nursing fathers, without this care of the governors, all governments would have
sunk under the weakness and infirmities of their infancy, the prince and the
people had soon perished together.
§. 111. But the golden age (though before vain ambition, and amor sceleratus
habendi, evil concupiscence had corrupted men's minds into a mistake of true
power and honour) had more virtue, and consequently better governors, as well
as less vicious subjects; and there was then no stretching prerogative on the
one side to oppress the people, nor, consequently, on the other, any dispute
about privilege, to lessen or restrain the power of the magistrate; and so no
contest betwixt rulers and people about governors or government.[1]
Yet, when ambition and luxury, in future ages, would retain and increase the
power, without doing the business for which it was given, and aided by
flattery, taught princes to have distinct and separate interests from their
people, men found it necessary to examine more carefully the original and
rights of government, and to find out ways to restrain the exorbitances and
prevent the abuses of that power, which they having entrusted in another's
hands, only for their own good, they found was made use of to hurt them.
§. 112. Thus we may see how probable it is that people that were naturally
free, and, by their own consent, either submitted to the government of their
father, or united together, out of different families, to make a government,
should generally put the rule into one man's hands, and choose to be under the
conduct of a single person, without so much, as by express conditions, limiting
or regulating his power, which they thought safe enough in his honesty and
prudence; though they never dreamed of monarchy being jure Divino, which we
never heard of among mankind till it was revealed to us by the divinity of this
last age, nor ever allowed paternal power to have a right to dominion or to be
the foundation of all government. And thus much may suffice to show that, as
far as we have any light from history, we have reason to conclude that all
peaceful beginnings of government have been laid in the consent of the people.
I say "peaceful," because I shall have occasion, in another place, to
speak of conquest, which some esteem a way of beginning of governments.
The other objection, I find, urged against the beginning of polities, in
the way I have mentioned, is this, viz.:
§. 113. "That all men being born under government, some or other, it is
impossible any of them should ever be free and at liberty to unite together and
begin a new one, or ever be able to erect a lawful government." If this
argument be good, I ask, How came so many lawful monarchies into the world? For
if anybody, upon this supposition, can show me any one man, in any age of the
world, free to begin a lawful monarchy, I will be bound to show him ten other
free men at liberty, at the same time, to unite and begin a new government
under a regal or any other form. It being demonstration that if any one born
under the dominion of another may be so free as to have a right to command
others in a new and distinct empire, every one that is born under the dominion
of another may be so free too, and may become a ruler or subject of a distinct
separate government. And so, by this their own principle, either all men,
however born, are free, or else there is but one lawful prince, one lawful
government in the world; and then they have nothing to do but barely to show us
which that is, which, when they have done, I doubt not but all mankind will
easily agree to pay obedience to him.
§. 114. Though it be a sufficient answer to their objection to show that it
involves them in the same difficulties that it doth those they use it against,
yet I shall endeavour to discover the weakness of this argument a little
farther.
"All men," say they, "are born under government, and
therefore they cannot be at liberty to begin a new one. Every one is born a
subject to his father or his prince, and is therefore under the perpetual tie
of subjection and allegiance." It is plain mankind never owned nor
considered any such natural subjection that they were born in, to one or to the
other, that tied them, without their own consents, to a subjection to them and
their heirs.
§. 115. For there are no examples so frequent in history, both sacred and
profane, as those of men withdrawing themselves and their obedience from the
jurisdiction they were born under, and the family or community they were bred
up in, and setting up new governments in other places, from whence sprang all
that number of petty commonwealths in the beginning of ages, and which always
multiplied as long as there was room enough, till the stronger or more
fortunate swallowed the weaker; and those great ones, again breaking to pieces,
dissolved into lesser dominions; all which are so many testimonies against
paternal sovereignty, and plainly prove that it was not the natural right of
the father descending to his heirs that made governments in the beginning;
since it was impossible, upon that ground, there should have been so many
little kingdoms but only one universal monarchy if men had not been at liberty
to separate themselves from their families and their government, be it what it
will that was set up in it, and go and make distinct commonwealths and other
governments as they thought fit.
§. 116. This has been the practice of the world from its first beginning to
this day; nor is it now any more hindrance to the freedom of mankind, that they
are born under constituted and ancient polities that have established laws and
set forms of government, than if they were born in the woods amongst the
unconfined inhabitants that run loose in them. For those who would persuade us
that by being born under any government we are naturally subjects to it, and
have no more any title or pretence to the freedom of the state of Nature, have
no other reason (bating that of paternal power, which we have already answered)
to produce for it, but only because our fathers or progenitors passed away
their natural liberty, and thereby bound up themselves and their posterity to a
perpetual subjection to the government which they themselves submitted to. It
is true that whatever engagements or promises any one made for himself, he is
under the obligation of them, but cannot by any compact whatsoever bind his
children or posterity. For his son, when a man, being altogether as free as the
father, any act of the father can no more give away the liberty of the son than
it can of anybody else. He may, indeed, annex such conditions to the land he
enjoyed, as a subject of any commonwealth, as may oblige his son to be of that
community, if he will enjoy those possessions which were his father's, because
that estate being his father's property, he may dispose or settle it as he
pleases.
§. 117. And this has generally given the occasion to the mistake in this
matter; because commonwealths not permitting any part of their dominions to be
dismembered, nor to be enjoyed by any but those of their community, the son
cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions of his father but under the same terms
his father did, by becoming a member of the society, whereby he puts himself
presently under the government he finds there established, as much as any other
subject of that commonweal. And thus the consent of free men, born under
government, which only makes them members of it, being given separately in
their turns, as each comes to be of age, and not in a multitude together,
people take no notice of it, and thinking it not done at all, or not necessary,
conclude they are naturally subjects as they are men.
§. 118. But it is plain governments themselves understand it otherwise; they
claim no power over the son because of that they had over the father; nor look
on children as being their subjects, by their fathers being so. If a subject of
England have a child by an Englishwoman in France, whose subject is he? Not the
King of England's; for he must have leave to be admitted to the privileges of
it. Nor the King of France's, for how then has his father a liberty to bring
him away, and breed him as he pleases; and whoever was judged as a traitor or
deserter, if he left, or warred against a country, for being barely born in it
of parents that were aliens there? It is plain, then, by the practice of
governments themselves, as well as by the law of right reason, that a child is
born a subject of no country nor government. He is under his father's tuition
and authority till he come to age of discretion, and then he is a free man, at
liberty what government he will put himself under, what body politic he will
unite himself to. For if an Englishman's son born in France be at liberty, and
may do so, it is evident there is no tie upon him by his father being a subject
of that kingdom, nor is he bound up by any compact of his ancestors; and why
then hath not his son, by the same reason, the same liberty, though he be born
anywhere else? Since the power that a father hath naturally over his children
is the same wherever they be born, and the ties of natural obligations are not
bounded by the positive limits of kingdoms and commonwealths.
§. 119. Every man being, as has been showed, naturally free, and nothing being
able to put him into subjection to any earthly power, but only his own consent,
it is to be considered what shall be understood to be a sufficient declaration
of a man's consent to make him subject to the laws of any government. There is
a common distinction of an express and a tacit consent, which will concern our
present case. Nobody doubts but an express consent of any man, entering into
any society, makes him a perfect member of that society, a subject of that
government. The difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent,
and how far it binds — i.e., how far any one shall be looked on to have
consented, and thereby submitted to any government, where he has made no
expressions of it at all. And to this I say, that every man that hath any
possession or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any government doth
hereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the
laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it, whether
this his possession be of land to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only
for a week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway; and, in
effect, it reaches as far as the very being of any one within the territories
of that government.
§. 120. To understand this the better, it is fit to consider that every man
when he at first incorporates himself into any commonwealth, he, by his uniting
himself thereunto, annexes also, and submits to the community those possessions
which he has, or shall acquire, that do not already belong to any other
government. For it would be a direct contradiction for any one to enter into
society with others for the securing and regulating of property, and yet to
suppose his land, whose property is to be regulated by the laws of the society,
should be exempt from the jurisdiction of that government to which he himself,
and the property of the land, is a subject. By the same act, therefore, whereby
any one unites his person, which was before free, to any commonwealth, by the
same he unites his possessions, which were before free, to it also; and they
become, both of them, person and possession, subject to the government and
dominion of that commonwealth as long as it hath a being. Whoever therefore,
from thenceforth, by inheritance, purchases permission, or otherwise enjoys any
part of the land so annexed to, and under the government of that commonweal,
must take it with the condition it is under — that is, of submitting to
the government of the commonwealth, under whose jurisdiction it is, as far
forth as any subject of it.
§. 121. But since the government has a direct jurisdiction only over the land
and reaches the possessor of it (before he has actually incorporated himself in
the society) only as he dwells upon and enjoys that, the obligation any one is
under by virtue of such enjoyment to submit to the government begins and ends
with the enjoyment; so that whenever the owner, who has given nothing but such
a tacit consent to the government will, by donation, sale or otherwise, quit
the said possession, he is at liberty to go and incorporate himself into any
other commonwealth, or agree with others to begin a new one in vacuis locis, in
any part of the world they can find free and unpossessed; whereas he that has
once, by actual agreement and any express declaration, given his consent to be
of any commonweal, is perpetually and indispensably obliged to be, and remain
unalterably a subject to it, and can never be again in the liberty of the state
of Nature, unless by any calamity the government he was under comes to be
dissolved.
§. 122. But submitting to the laws of any country, living quietly and enjoying
privileges and protection under them, makes not a man a member of that society;
it is only a local protection and homage due to and from all those who, not
being in a state of war, come within the territories belonging to any
government, to all parts whereof the force of its law extends. But this no more
makes a man a member of that society, a perpetual subject of that commonwealth,
than it would make a man a subject to another in whose family he found it
convenient to abide for some time, though, whilst he continued in it, he were
obliged to comply with the laws and submit to the government he found there.
And thus we see that foreigners, by living all their lives under another
government, and enjoying the privileges and protection of it, though they are
bound, even in conscience, to submit to its administration as far forth as any
denizen, yet do not thereby come to be subjects or members of that
commonwealth. Nothing can make any man so but his actually entering into it by
positive engagement and express promise and compact. This is that which, I
think, concerning the beginning of political societies, and that consent which
makes any one a member of any commonwealth.
Footnotes
[1]
. "At the first, when some certain kind of regimen
was once approved, it may be that nothing was then further thought upon for the
manner of governing, but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion, which
were to rule till, by experience, they found this for all parts very
inconvenient, so as the thing which they had devised for a remedy did indeed
but increase the sore which it should have cured. They saw that to live by one
man's will became the cause of all men's misery. This constrained them to come
unto laws wherein all men might see their duty beforehand, and know the
penalties of transgressing them." Hooker, Eccl. Pol. 1. 10.