§. 218. Why, in such a constitution as this, the dissolution of the government
in these cases is to be imputed to the prince is evident, because he, having
the force, treasure, and offices of the State to employ, and often persuading
himself or being flattered by others, that, as supreme magistrate, he is
incapable of control; he alone is in a condition to make great advances towards
such changes under pretence of lawful authority, and has it in his hands to
terrify or suppress opposers as factious, seditious, and enemies to the
government; whereas no other part of the legislative, or people, is capable by
themselves to attempt any alteration of the legislative without open and
visible rebellion, apt enough to be taken notice of, which, when it prevails,
produces effects very little different from foreign conquest. Besides, the
prince, in such a form of government, having the power of dissolving the other
parts of the legislative, and thereby rendering them private persons, they can
never, in opposition to him, or without his concurrence, alter the legislative
by a law, his consent being necessary to give any of their decrees that
sanction. But yet so far as the other parts of the legislative any way
contribute to any attempt upon the government, and do either promote, or not,
what lies in them, hinder such designs, they are guilty, and partake in this,
which is certainly the greatest crime men can be guilty of one towards another.
