§. 153. It is not necessary — no, nor so much as convenient — that
the legislative should be always in being; but absolutely necessary that the
executive power should, because there is not always need of new laws to be
made, but always need of execution of the laws that are made. When the
legislative hath put the execution of the laws they make into other hands, they
have a power still to resume it out of those hands when they find cause, and to
punish for any mal-administration against the laws. The same holds also in
regard of the federative power, that and the executive being both ministerial
and subordinate to the legislative, which, as has been shown, in a constituted
commonwealth is the supreme, the legislative also in this case being supposed
to consist of several persons; for if it be a single person it cannot but be
always in being, and so will, as supreme, naturally have the supreme executive
power, together with the legislative, may assemble and exercise their
legislative at the times that either their original constitution or their own
adjournment appoints, or when they please, if neither of these hath appointed
any time, or there be no other way prescribed to convoke them. For the supreme
power being placed in them by the people, it is always in them, and they may
exercise it when they please, unless by their original constitution they are
limited to certain seasons, or by an act of their supreme power they have
adjourned to a certain time, and when that time comes they have a right to
assemble and act again.
