Chapter 9
Of the Ends of Political Society and Government
§. 123. IF man in the state of Nature be so free as has been said, if he be
absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest and
subject to nobody, why will he part with his freedom, this empire, and subject
himself to the dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious
to answer, that though in the state of Nature he hath such a right, yet the
enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of
others; for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater
part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property
he has in this state is very unsafe, very insecure. This makes him willing to
quit this condition which, however free, is full of fears and continual
dangers; and it is not without reason that he seeks out and is willing to join
in society with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite for the
mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the
general name — property.
§. 124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths,
and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property;
to which in the state of Nature there are many things wanting.
Firstly, there wants an established, settled, known law, received and
allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common
measure to decide all controversies between them. For though the law of Nature
be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures, yet men, being biased by
their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to
allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their
particular cases.
§. 125. Secondly, in the state of Nature there wants a known and indifferent
judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established
law. For every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of
Nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to
carry them too far, and with too much heat in their own cases, as well as
negligence and unconcernedness, make them too remiss in other men's.
§. 126. Thirdly, in the state of Nature there often wants power to back and
support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any
injustice offended will seldom fail where they are able by force to make good
their injustice. Such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and
frequently destructive to those who attempt it.
§. 127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of
Nature, being but in an ill condition while they remain in it are quickly
driven into society. Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number of
men live any time together in this state. The inconveniencies that they are
therein exposed to by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every
man has of punishing the transgressions of others, make them take sanctuary
under the established laws of government, and therein seek the preservation of
their property. It is this that makes them so willingly give up every one his
single power of punishing to be exercised by such alone as shall be appointed
to it amongst them, and by such rules as the community, or those authorised by
them to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we have the original right
and rise of both the legislative and executive power as well as of the
governments and societies themselves.
§. 128. For in the state of Nature to omit the liberty he has of innocent
delights, a man has two powers. The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for
the preservation of himself and others within the permission of the law of
Nature; by which law, common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind are
one community, make up one society distinct from all other creatures, and were
it not for the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men, there would be no
need of any other, no necessity that men should separate from this great and
natural community, and associate into lesser combinations. The other power a
man has in the state of Nature is the power to punish the crimes committed
against that law. Both these he gives up when he joins in a private, if I may
so call it, or particular political society, and incorporates into any
commonwealth separate from the rest of mankind.
§. 129. The first power — viz., of doing whatsoever he thought fit for
the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be
regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of
himself and the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society
in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of Nature.
§. 130. Secondly, the power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his
natural force, which he might before employ in the execution of the law of
Nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit, to assist the executive
power of the society as the law thereof shall require. For being now in a new
state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies from the labour, assistance,
and society of others in the same community, as well as protection from its
whole strength, he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in
providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shall
require, which is not only necessary but just, since the other members of the
society do the like.
§. 131. But though men when they enter into society give up the equality,
liberty, and executive power they had in the state of Nature into the hands of
the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative as the good of the
society shall require, yet it being only with an intention in every one the
better to preserve himself, his liberty and property (for no rational creature
can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse), the
power of the society or legislative constituted by them can never be supposed
to extend farther than the common good, but is obliged to secure every one's
property by providing against those three defects above mentioned that made the
state of Nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so, whoever has the legislative or
supreme power of any commonwealth, is bound to govern by established standing
laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees, by
indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws;
and to employ the force of the community at home only in the execution of such
laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries and secure the community
from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end but the
peace, safety, and public good of the people.