Chapter 2
Of the State of Nature
§. 4. To understand political power aright, and derive it from its original,
we must consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of
perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and
persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of Nature, without
asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is
reciprocal, no one having more than another, there being nothing more evident
than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the
same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be
equal one amongst another, without subordination or subjection, unless the lord
and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one
above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an
undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.
§. 5. This equality of men by Nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as so
evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation of
that obligation to mutual love amongst men on which he builds the duties they
owe one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of justice and
charity. His words are:
"The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no
less their duty to love others than themselves, for seeing those things which
are equal, must needs all have one measure; if I cannot but wish to receive
good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul,
how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself
be careful to satisfy the like desire, which is undoubtedly in other men weak,
being of one and the same nature: to have anything offered them repugnant to
this desire must needs, in all respects, grieve them as much as me; so that if
I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that others should show
greater measure of love to me than they have by me showed unto them; my desire,
therefore, to be loved of my equals in Nature, as much as possible may be,
imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to themward fully the like
affection. From which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are
as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for
direction of life no man is ignorant." (Eccl. Pol. i.)
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§. 6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence;
though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his
person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as
any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare
preservation calls for it. The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern
it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind
who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to
harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions; for men being all the
workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of
one sovereign Master, sent into the world by His order and about His business;
they are His property, whose workmanship they are made to last during His, not
one another's pleasure. And, being furnished with like faculties, sharing all
in one community of Nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination
among us that may authorise us to destroy one another, as if we were made for
one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours. Every one
as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by
the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he
as much as he can to preserve the rest of mankind, and not unless it be to do
justice on an offender, take away or impair the life, or what tends to the
preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.
§. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others' rights, and
from doing hurt to one another, and the law of Nature be observed, which
willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of
Nature is in that state put into every man's hands, whereby every one has a
right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder
its violation. For the law of Nature would, as all other laws that concern men
in this world, be in vain if there were nobody that in the state of Nature had
a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain
offenders; and if any one in the state of Nature may punish another for any
evil he has done, every one may do so. For in that state of perfect equality,
where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another,
what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right
to do.
§. 8. And thus, in the state of Nature, one man comes by a power over another,
but yet no absolute or arbitrary power to use a criminal, when he has got him
in his hands, according to the passionate heats or boundless extravagancy of
his own will, but only to retribute to him so far as calm reason and conscience
dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may
serve for reparation and restraint. For these two are the only reasons why one
man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In
transgressing the law of Nature, the offender declares himself to live by
another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God
has set to the actions of men for their mutual security, and so he becomes
dangerous to mankind; the tie which is to secure them from injury and violence
being slighted and broken by him, which being a trespass against the whole
species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of Nature,
every man upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general,
may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so
may bring such evil on any one who hath transgressed that law, as may make him
repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and, by his example, others from
doing the like mischief. And in this case, and upon this ground, every man hath
a right to punish the offender, and be executioner of the law of Nature.
§. 9. I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men; but
before they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me by what right any prince or
state can put to death or punish an alien for any crime he commits in their
country? It is certain their laws, by virtue of any sanction they receive from
the promulgated will of the legislature, reach not a stranger. They speak not
to him, nor, if they did, is he bound to hearken to them. The legislative
authority by which they are in force over the subjects of that commonwealth
hath no power over him. Those who have the supreme power of making laws in
England, France, or Holland are, to an Indian, but like the rest of the world
— men without authority. And therefore, if by the law of Nature every man
hath not a power to punish offences against it, as he soberly judges the case
to require, I see not how the magistrates of any community can punish an alien
of another country, since, in reference to him, they can have no more power
than what every man naturally may have over another.
§. 10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the laws, and varying
from the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes degenerate, and
declares himself to quit the principles of human nature and to be a noxious
creature, there is commonly injury done, and some person or other, some other
man, receives damage by his transgression; in which case, he who hath received
any damage has (besides the right of punishment common to him, with other men)
a particular right to seek reparation from him that hath done it. And any other
person who finds it just may also join with him that is injured, and assist him
in recovering from the offender so much as may make satisfaction for the harm
he hath suffered.
§. 11. From these two distinct rights (the one of punishing the crime, for
restraint and preventing the like offence, which right of punishing is in
everybody, the other of taking reparation, which belongs only to the injured
party) comes it to pass that the magistrate, who by being magistrate hath the
common right of punishing put into his hands, can often, where the public good
demands not the execution of the law, remit the punishment of criminal offences
by his own authority, but yet cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private
man for the damage he has received. That he who hath suffered the damage has a
right to demand in his own name, and he alone can remit. The damnified person
has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender
by right of self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish the crime to
prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of preserving all
mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end. And thus
it is that every man in the state of Nature has a power to kill a murderer,
both to deter others from doing the like injury (which no reparation can
compensate) by the example of the punishment that attends it from everybody,
and also to secure men from the attempts of a criminal who, having renounced
reason, the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the
unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against
all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tiger, one of those
wild savage beasts with whom men can have no society nor security. And upon
this is grounded that great law of nature, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by
man shall his blood be shed." And Cain was so fully convinced that every
one had a right to destroy such a criminal, that, after the murder of his
brother, he cries out, "Every one that findeth me shall slay me," so
plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind.
§. 12. By the same reason may a man in the state of Nature punish the lesser
breaches of that law, it will, perhaps, be demanded, with death? I answer: Each
transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so much severity, as
will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to
repent, and terrify others from doing the like. Every offence that can be
committed in the state of Nature may, in the state of Nature, be also punished
equally, and as far forth, as it may, in a commonwealth. For though it would be
beside my present purpose to enter here into the particulars of the law of
Nature, or its measures of punishment, yet it is certain there is such a law,
and that too as intelligible and plain to a rational creature and a studier of
that law as the positive laws of commonwealths, nay, possibly plainer; as much
as reason is easier to be understood than the fancies and intricate
contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden interests put into words;
for truly so are a great part of the municipal laws of countries, which are
only so far right as they are founded on the law of Nature, by which they are
to be regulated and interpreted.
§. 13. To this strange doctrine — viz., That in the state of Nature every
one has the executive power of the law of Nature — I doubt not but it will
be objected that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases,
that self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends; and, on
the other side, ill-nature, passion, and revenge will carry them too far in
punishing others, and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, and
that therefore God hath certainly appointed government to restrain the
partiality and violence of men. I easily grant that civil government is the
proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of Nature, which must
certainly be great where men may be judges in their own case, since it is easy
to be imagined that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury will
scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it. But I shall desire those who
make this objection to remember that absolute monarchs are but men; and if
government is to be the remedy of those evils which necessarily follow from men
being judges in their own cases, and the state of Nature is therefore not to be
endured, I desire to know what kind of government that is, and how much better
it is than the state of Nature, where one man commanding a multitude has the
liberty to be judge in his own case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he
pleases without the least question or control of those who execute his
pleasure? and in whatsoever he doth, whether led by reason, mistake, or
passion, must be submitted to? which men in the state of Nature are not bound
to do one to another. And if he that judges, judges amiss in his own or any
other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind.
§. 14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever were, there
any men in such a state of Nature? To which it may suffice as an answer at
present, that since all princes and rulers of "independent"
governments all through the world are in a state of Nature, it is plain the
world never was, nor never will be, without numbers of men in that state. I
have named all governors of "independent" communities, whether they
are, or are not, in league with others; for it is not every compact that puts
an end to the state of Nature between men, but only this one of agreeing
together mutually to enter into one community, and make one body politic; other
promises and compacts men may make one with another, and yet still be in the
state of Nature. The promises and bargains for truck, etc., between the two men
in Soldania, in or between a Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of America, are
binding to them, though they are perfectly in a state of Nature in reference to
one another for truth, and keeping of faith belongs to men as men, and not as
members of society.
§. 15. To those that say there were never any men in the state of Nature, I
will not oppose the authority of the judicious Hooker (Eccl. Pol. i. 10), where
he says,
"the laws which have been hitherto mentioned" — i.e.,
the laws of Nature — "do bind men absolutely, even as they are men,
although they have never any settled fellowship, never any solemn agreement
amongst themselves what to do or not to do; but for as much as we are not by
ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent store of things
needful for such a life as our Nature doth desire, a life fit for the dignity
of man, therefore to supply those defects and imperfections which are in us, as
living single and solely by ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek
communion and fellowship with others; this was the cause of men uniting
themselves as first in politic societies."
But I, moreover, affirm that
all men are naturally in that state, and remain so till, by their own consents,
they make themselves members of some politic society, and I doubt not, in the
sequel of this discourse, to make it very clear.
Footnotes