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All scholarly editors must decide to what extent the texts they present in their editions can be permitted to depart from the documentary texts that have come down to them; no more basic theme runs through the history of scholarly editing than the perennial debates over the role of editorial judgment (necessarily subjective, to a greater or lesser degree) in the production of responsible texts. Even those who acknowledge the value, under certain circumstances, of critical texts (that is, texts incorporating the results of critical judgments as to whether alterations are required) sometimes wish to restrict as much as possible the operation of individual judgment. They may say, for instance, that emendations should be limited to the correction of what are thought to be printers' errors in a given text and should not be drawn from the variant readings of other texts, which represent different stages in the history of the work. Critical editing by definition moves one away from documentary texts, because it admits the possibility of emending those texts. This process need not be unhistorical, for the scholarly goal of emendation is to recreate texts that once existed, even if in some details they existed only in their authors' minds. But the fact remains that critical texts (if emendations have actually been made in them) do depart from the particular texts that have survived from the past; and any recreation of something that does not exist is conjectural and inevitably reflects, to some degree, later attitudes. These issues—which, taken together, might be called the question of historicism—have been discussed at length by generations of editors, and they will always be discussed. It comes as no surprise, therefore, to recognize that they have been prominent in editorial debate in the early 1980s; but they have, I think, been approached in these years from some neglected directions, offering new twists to old dilemmas.

This trend in editorial theorizing is not unrelated to what has been happening in scholarly literary criticism. Although recognition of the interdependence of textual scholarship and literary criticism has not advanced as far as one could wish, there is no doubt that recent writers


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have increasingly explored the connection. Editors have always known implicitly that any actions they took as editors reflected particular assumptions about the nature of literature and of verbal communication; but over the years they have not been inclined to confront this fact very explicitly. An age of criticism that has emphasized theory, however, has naturally provided a setting in which editorial discussion becomes more self-conscious regarding the theory of literature underlying it. That editors must be critics and that critics must understand textual history are truisms just beginning to be understood beyond a small circle of scholar-critics. The elements of a new historicism emerging in literary study have recently been usefully surveyed by Herbert Lindenberger,[1] who contrasts the "suspiciousness and self-conscious playfulness" of the new history with the "detachment and self-effacement" of the old, pre-New Criticism, variety. One of the reasons for this shift of tone, he suggests, is directly connected with textual scholarship: the theoretical questioning of the organic unity of individual works has been supported by some of the evidence produced by editors, evidence showing (as he says the Cornell edition of The Prelude of 1798-99 shows) that a literary work "consists essentially of layers of text—often, in fact, unfinished layers—none of which necessarily commands more authority than the others." This line of thinking leads to suspicion of "authorial authority" (p. 17)[2] and in turn to rejection of "objectivity" and "permanence" as attributes of historical scholarship (p. 22). Another link between critical and textual work is the recent critical interest in reading (that is, in readers' "responses"), which encourages a concern with the texts available to readers in the past and the reception accorded them (p. 20). Although Lindenberger's account does not emphasize textual matters, it does illustrate some of the ways in which developments in critical and in editorial theory and practice have begun to feed each other.

The new historicism in textual matters that I wish to examine has a somewhat different emphasis, however. After all, the "new history" Lindenberger describes is new in part because it recognizes the importance of historical context in literary analysis and comes after a period in which historical considerations were slighted. But textual study has always been, and is in conception, historical. The recent concern with


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historicism among editorial theorists does not result from a rediscovery of the value of historical research (which was never lost) but from new approaches to the nature of literature that dictate new limitations on an editor's freedom to be eclectic. In the pages that follow, I propose to examine the literature of editorial theory of the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s from this point of view. This report is conceived as a continuation of my previous surveys of recent editorial discussion.[3] That its focus is on historicism reflects the way the field has developed, for the most significant discussions of the last five or six years can profitably be examined in terms of their stance on this issue. I begin with some discussions (largely by historians) that cannot be considered to have advanced editorial thinking but that are representative of an unsophisticated attitude toward historicism still often encountered. I shall then turn to the two extreme positions that define the recent debates: the view that literature is social and collaborative in nature and therefore that the historical forms in which a work was presented to the public are of primary significance; and, at the other end of the spectrum, the view that literary works are the products of discrete private acts of creation and therefore that their essential forms do not include alterations by

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others nor even later revisions by the authors themselves. Finally I shall look at some efforts to assert the validity of multiple texts, recognizing that different historical interests may require different approaches to editing.